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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the mode of trial concerns in the U.S.A., New York State,
California, England and Wales and Canada --specifically the ability of the jury to
comprehend complex cases and the perception/reality that bench trials may not be as fair
as jury trials. Defining complex cases as those involving serious fraud indictments,
capital murder trials, and lawsuits or indictments against corporations and their managers,
the thesis examines problems associated with jury trials in such cases. It evaluates the
comparative law and customs and practices regarding the use of juries, emphasizing
problems with jury selection, deficits in jury deliberation and post trial problems
associated with jury verdicts. The thesis also evaluates the judge only trial, attempting to
determine whether a state imposed non jury trial in a criminal case as is presently
proposed in the England and Wales Parliament creates an unfairness to the defendant
because bench trials significantly differ from jury trials in the application of the rules of
evidence and in the role of the judge.
The thesis reports on the results of a survey of New York State trial judges, a like survey
of New York State lawyers, and the opinions of nine England and Wales judges
authorized to try serious fraud cases who were interviewed regarding these issues. The
surveys and interviews finds that there is a high degree of support for jury verdicts
expressed by the judges, examines evidentiary and pretrial practices in both modes of
trial and attempts to evaluate whether claims of procedural flaws and prejudice in bench
trials by respected academics are accurate.
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The thesis concludes by affirming the competence of juries to try complex cases,
proposing modifications to post jury verdict procedures to evaluate jury misconduct and
advocating that the bench trial evidentiary rules and conduct rules become comparable to
the jury trial. The thesis recommends that mode of trial choices be given to the
defendant, advocates that when a bench trial is selected that peremptory challenges of the
trial judge be permitted and postulates that these reforms will make the bench trial a more
attractive alternative to the jury trial in complex cases.
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"The first objective of any tyrant in Whitehall would be to
make Parliament utterly subservient to his will; and then
the next to overthrow or diminish trial by jury, for no tyrant
could afford to leave a subject's freedom in the hands of his
countrymen." Lord Devlin, Trial By Jury (1966)
I. Overview
The right to a jury trial is the major distinguishing factor between civil law jurisdictions
and common law jurisdictions. America's veneration of the right to a trial by jury is
historic and reflected in the 6th and 7th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution as well as
virtually every State Constitution. Canada provides constitutional protections of trial by
jury in criminal cases, but not in civil. England and Wales accords those charged with
serious crimes a trial by jury, but it is not a constitutional right. England and Wales does
not ensure or provide such a right in most civil lawsuits. Many influential voices within
these jurisdictions (the comparator jurisdictions) doubt juries, particularly in complex
cases, preferring trial by judge. The difference in opinion regarding the soundness of jury
verdicts as well as a difference in philosophy has fueled virtually continuous debates in
the U.S.A. and England and Wales about the strengths and weakness of each mode of
trial. In England and Wales a majority of the House of Commons holds the position that
serious frauds cases are appropriate for a judge imposed bench trial. In the U.S.A. not
only is jury capacity to decide capital punishment cases in serious question, it is argued
by jury detractors that some cases are too complex to receive a constitutional trial in
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commercial and corporate civil and criminal cases. Canada offers far less controversy
but is a helpful comparator in key parts of this work because it is a hybrid of the England
and Wales and U.S.A. justice systems.
As a preliminary matter, any examination of complex trials must begin with a definition
of complexity, recognizing that complexity is notoriously difficult to define and thus, the
definition set forth herein is the outgrowth of the research conducted in this thesis. The
definition is not easily obtained with uniformity in the comparator jurisdictions, but
recurrent factors that constitute complexity are readily discernible.
They are:
a) the fact pattern is complicated.
b) the indictment involves a number of discrete acts or facts;
c) the law to be applied by the trier of fact is complicated or difficult to
understand;
d) there are conflicting expert theories in the area of science, finance, accounting
or forensics;
e) there are a number of fact witnesses, documents and other evidence that will
extend the trial for many days.
f) the case is wrought with emotion or with political implications.
g) capital punishment cases.
h) serious fraud cases.
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For example, Hans, Kaye, et al examine juror comprehension using mock juror
responses to presentations regarding contrasting DNA evidence, testing how jurors
understand and apply scientific evidence.'
Vidmar used American civil medical malpractice cases as a complex subject matter to
measure jury function.'
In England and Wales, it is the view of the present government that "juries do not make
good fact finders in cases involving complex financial dealings";'
Laurie Berberich notes that jury instructions in capital sentencing cases require the jury to
consider many factors in arriving at a death sentence verdict, a variation of complexity by
virtue of both the subject matter and the detail of the jury instruction."
Mark Findlay aptly observed that:
"Due to the unique dimensions of each case and each trial
process, it is illusory and not a little distracting to search for
universal and constant indicators when trying to determine
the meaning of complexity."
1 Valerie P. Hans, David H. Kaye, Judge B. Michael Dann, Erin J. Farley, and Stephanie
Albertson, Science in the Jury Box: Jurors' Views and Understanding of Mitochondrial DNA
Evidence, p. 34, Cornell Law School Research Paper No. 07-021.
http://ssrn.comlabstract=l 025582.
2 Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Emperical Perspective, 40
Arizona L. Rev., 849.
3 Mike Redmayne, Theorizing Jury Reform; in Antony Duff, et ai, The Trial on Trial, Vol2 (Hart,
2006).
4 Laurie B. Berberich, Jury Instructions Regarding Deadlock in Capital Sentencing, 29 Hoftra L.
Rev. 1301 (2001).
5 Mark Findlay, Juror Comprehension and Complexity Strategies to Enhance Understanding, 41
Brit. J. Criminal (2001) 56, 58.
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Findlay's view is shared by Heuer and Penrod who note that trial complexity is not a
unitary construct and that complicated facts and legal issues and large quantities of
information create complexity."
The definition of complex as set forth above therefore is based on examples such as
above, the treatment by courts in the U.S.A. of fraud cases such as the trials of Kenneth
Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, Lord Conrad Black, and former Louisiana Governor Edwin O.
Edwards, and information obtained from interviews conducted with judges of the
England and Wales Crown Courts in Chapter 9 and a survey of American judges and
lawyers in Chapter 8.
There are probably other situations or circumstances which could be defined as a
complex trial, for the purposes of this work the foregoing definition is sufficiently
inclusive.
The debate in England and Wales and the U.S.A. offers a timely opportunity to examine
the modes of trial as presently practiced and to evaluate the changes proposed by the
critics and reformers. The methods used by the U.S.A., Canada, England and Wales to
provide trial by jury in complex criminal cases are scrutinized as are civil cases in the
U.S.A., to the extent their jurisprudence and management converges with criminal cases.
6 Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity A Field Investigation of Its Meaniing and Its
Effects, 18 Law & Hum. Behavior 29 (1994) 48.
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The comparison of the bench trial as an alternative to the jury trial, particularly in serious
fraud cases, includes a study of outcomes in both modes of trial.
However, this study finds that both modes of trial have unique features that may impact
both mode of trial choices and trial outcomes. Choice of mode of trial can, because of
the nature of the case and the rules of evidence, impact the outcome. Mode of trial
differences are examined to determine what impact those differences have on outcome
depending on the subject matter of the trial.
A number of factors are potentially significant to the outcome of jury trials, i.e.: external
and internal influences on jurors, the composition of the jury; rights juries may have to
privacy and free speech; what effect post-trial speech exercised by jurors has on the
deliberative process; notions of jury coercion both inside the jury by jury charge and
other means; and the effectiveness of the longstanding Lord Mansfield's Rule in each
comparator jurisdiction.
In America and England and Wales the complexity of jury trials may drive an increase in
plea bargaining or settlement rather than trial. Inevitably the issue of jury competence to
hear such complex cases is raised, coupled with management difficulties associated with
a formal jury trial in a complex case, ranging from elaborate evidentiary organization
with hundreds to thousands of exhibits, to the heavy reliance on forensic experts with the
nuanced rules of evidence and likely a cacophony of objections which will make the
complex jury trial a slow process. The actual subject matter of these cases is so highly
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sophisticated and complex that concern about jury capacity to understand DNA,
handwriting, accounting, pathology, voice pattern analysis, and actuaries is well
documented.
This study will also evaluate the contention that England and Wales has moved slowly
toward elements of a civil code jurisdiction by virtue of legislation and practice, elevating
the judge only trial to a new level of significance. Examples of the trend are the
abandonment of the jury in civil cases, the elimination of hearsay as a testimonial bar in
civil cases and as a weighing factor in criminal cases, Diplock non-jury trials in Northern
Ireland and the recent attempt to impose non-jury trial are all trends suggestive of greater
reliance on the judge only concept. In Canada, there is a longstanding history of bench
trials in civil and non-serious criminal cases. In America the role of the judge only trial
has not been elevated in the same manner, particularly in a jurisdiction like New York
State where the criminal defendant has control over the mode of trial.
Whether it is England and Wales with the emergent bench trial or the U.S.A. where the
bench trial may be under utilized, the distinctions of that mode of trial from the jury trial
impacts upon mode of trial decisions and evaluations of fairness and soundness. The
bench trial is a mode of trial in which the trier of fact is one person randomly selected in
all jurisdictions. There is a wide variance in judicial behaviour during the bench trial and
the rules of evidence are frequently all but ignored. Some of the rules ignored include the
practice that judges do not rule on objections in real time, there is no real limitation on
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the standard and scope of judicial questioning, and appellate review is highly deferential
to the trial judge when a bench verdict is reviewed.
This paper will look at the complex trial without a jury and consider whether such a mode
of trial offers benefits that outweigh the obvious detriment - there is one trier of fact
rather than twelve. Itwill examine the jury trial, exploring situations, circumstances and
behaviours which some assert reflect flaws injury capacity to understand complex cases.
What emerges are the conclusions that there is a failure on the part of the common law
system to offer the bench trial as a viable alternative to the jury trial, that juries are sound
triers of fact, and that both modes of trial, with proper calibration can offer defendants a
fair adjudicatory framework.
There are two inevitable overriding concerns which must plague all fair policy makers.
The two main concerns are: presently are the modes of trial comparable in each
jurisdiction -- that is will the parties to the trial receive treatment in terms of the evidence
and procedures which makes the modes of trial interchangeable options, and does having
different processes to determine the same set of facts in a criminal case sound or fair
especially when the defendant is not accorded the choice of mode of trial?
These concerns are evaluated in depth and the aforementioned conclusions are reached
through the following process.
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II. Research Questions
The question of mode of trial reliability exists in two parts: 1) is the jury trial a
responsible and fair mechanism for deciding complex criminal and civil disputes and 2)
is the bench trial a reliable or superior alternative. These are the overarching interrelated
questions weighed in this study.
Closely related is the problem of mode of trial choices, that is who is to choose between
the alternative modes of trial. A corollary question is what are the implications which are
created for verdict integrity when the choice of the mode of trial is entirely made by a
judge and not by the defendant.
The examination of these issues must commence with an analysis of the status quo in an
attempt to determine the present state of the jury and bench trial in the comparator
jurisdictions to evaluate if they are comparable processes and if there is confidence
within the system about verdicts in both modes of trial.
One hypothesis is that comparing mode of trial conviction and acquittal rates in the U.S.
Federal District Courts, California and New York helps to evaluate grossly the questions
raised, as does examining other factors such as: the recent fate of corporations charged
with crimes in New York State, jury as compared to bench trial selection in New York
and California; patterns in New York State and California (factoring their similarities and
differences) regarding both the choice of mode of trial; and selection of the trial judge. A
survey of judges and New York State lawyers was conducted as an attempt to learn more
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about the factors that go into mode of trial decision making, how the modes of trial
compare in terms of evidence and procedure, and the analysis of those surveyed of
verdict reliability. Interviews with nine English judges helped to evaluate the same
processes as they are followed in England and Wales.
As noted above, the operating hypothesis which permeates this thesis commences with
the belief that both modes of trial, if they are properly presided over with appropriate
rules, achieve acceptable results. Further it is hypothesized that the market place should
control which mode of trial is utilized rather than a unilateral process or a state imposed
decision about the mode of trial. A further operating hypothesis is that the rules and
procedures governing both modes of trial should be clearly identified and if each mode of
trial does not parallel the other, the differences between the modes of trial should be
readily apparent to the litigants so that informed choices can be made.
Thus, in an effort to determine if these theories are plausible, a survey was administered
to New York State Trial judges and members of the American College of Trial Lawyers
who practice in New York State which inquires about the factors considered in selecting
a bench trial and how bench and jury trials are conducted in the opinion of the sample. It
attempts to specifically determine:
a) How judges behave at bench trials.
b) What behaviours the lawyers believe are appropriate.
c) What is the application of the rules of evidence at bench trials presently?
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d) What application of the rules of evidence would be favoured by lawyers?
e) Inquires about the present and preferred application of hearsay rule, the
impact, if any, of the jurors with expertise, and attempts to measure
judge/attorney agreement with jury verdicts and attorney agreement with bench
verdicts.
At the same time, nine England and Wales judges were interviewed in an attempt to test
the same hypothetical questions as asked of the judges and lawyers in New York.
III. Research Methodology and Outline of Chapters
The research questions posed above are in part addressed by a qualitative evaluation of
judge as compared to jury trials and a quantitative survey and statistical comparisons of
mode of trial choices in the New York State court system.
Much of the research for this paper has been the hard/soft law as set forth in cases,
official government reports, newspaper accounts of trials, law journal and studies with
the application of socio legal studies in an attempt to understand both judge and jury
behaviour."
There is no readily available compendium of complex trial outcomes, so there is reliance
upon anecdotal reports of trial outcomes in complex cases in the U.S.A., England and
Wales and Canada. They are not scientifically selected, rather they are considered
7 D. Nelken (1981) The Gap Problem in The Sociology of Law: A Theoretical Review, 1 Windsor
Yearbook of Access to Justice, 35-61.
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because their notoriety or prominence unlike the survey of New York judges and
lawyers.
Chapter 2 evaluates the jury trial in terms of external factors that might influence juries
utilizing case law, law journal articles, and news reports. In Chapter 3, case law and law
journal articles offer an analysis of jury coercion by judicial charge, as well as the effects
of race and public opinion, with a primary emphasis on the U.S.A. but also evaluating
England and Wales and Canada. In Chapter 3 the six interviews that were conducted
with jurors in death penalty cases are reported on the narrow issue of confirming the
juror's understanding of a judge's final charge in a capital case, and attempting to
ascertain that jurors did not infer that there would some day be parole for the convicted
defendant if they sentence the defendant to life without parole. The author was present
for the interviews. Some interviews were primarily conducted by his students, others by
the author.
Chapter 4 explores the American notion of unconstitutional complexity and outlines the
debate about jury competence in complex cases in England and Wales and the U.S.A.
Chapter 5 reports the present law in the comparator jurisdictions regarding choice of
mode of trial, evaluates proposals to modify mode of trial choices and reviews the
present law regarding judicial disqualification, recusal and preemptive challenge.
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In Chapter 6, a quantitative approach is used to compare a number of bench and jury
trials in California and New York, a well as the rate of conviction and acquittal. Also a
rudimentary comparison is used to examine mode of trial choices and outcomes regarding
the trial of corporations as criminal defendants in New York State. This approach is
utilized to evaluate the present use of mode of trial choices in those jurisdictions, to
evaluate outcomes and to provide a statistical foundation to help identify more clearly
what possible implications might be associated with the England and Wales
government's proposed changes in serious fraud cases.
In Chapter 7. key evidentiary rules and how they are applied in jury and bench trials are
detailed in the comparator jurisdictions based on statute and case law.
Chapter 8 reports a survey of New York State trial judges and lawyers on the main issues
examined in this thesis including: what motivates mode of trial choices in a jurisdiction
where the defendant is empowered to select the mode of trial; what factors impact on the
mode of trial choice; what is the fairness of both modes of trial; what are the judicial
behaviours in both modes of trial including pretrial; are there substantial differences in
actual practice between judge only trials and jury trials; what is the judicial and attorney
view of the reliability of verdicts in the jury trial; what is the attorney view of the
reliability of bench verdicts; how are new factors such as jurors with expertise impacting
outcomes? In Chapter 8 a quantitative analysis which includes a statistical comparison
of survey results from New York State judges and selected New York State trial lawyers
is presented. The survey inquires regarding the research questions attempting to ascertain
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the level of confidence that exists in juries among the surveyed groups. It is important to
emphasize that each survey was written by the author but edited/redrafted by Elissa
Kraus and other staff of the New York State Office of Court Administration, which then
provided a web link for the survey and statistically analyzed the data. The data
calculations and analysis have been utilized by the author as a collaborative work product
with full recognition and attribution being given to the Office of Court Administration,
without whom the survey could not have been administered and who invaluably provided
assistance and analysis of the outcome.
Likewise in Chapter 9, a qualitative study was used to interview nine English judges
qualified to try serious fraud cases. The sample was selected both from an undisclosed
year of the Serious Fraud Office Reports of trial and from names suggested by the
judicial administration of England and Wales. The interviews were designed to gauge
judicial opinions about jury reliability in complex cases, the comparative advantages and
disadvantages presented by both modes of trial, the effectiveness of various managerial
policies on the administration of complex cases, and the effect of changes in rules of
evidence and jury selection.
The study again tests the research questions articulated above utilizing an interview
process mandated as a condition for the interviews.
Chapter 10 will offer the author's conclusions and proposals for reform.
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IV. Importance of the Study
The lack of academic attention to judicial opinions and conduct regarding mode of trial
choice, the reasons therefore, pretrial and intra conduct, and the success/failure of
managerial approach in England and Wales is striking. The study herein is of value in
that it gives a small sample of serious fraud credentialed judges an opportunity to
comment on proposals to diminish trial by jury and to evaluate changes such as
managerial policies and evidentiary procedures.
While in the U.S.A there has been a broad based examination of judge/jury agreement,
this study looks specifically at complex cases, not only in the terms of judge/jury
agreement, but actual outcomes and practices in complex trials.
The thrust of this study is to compare and contrast jury trials as compared to bench trials
with the conclusion that the right to a jury trial will be strengthened by improving bench
trial practices, offering the defendant mode of trial choices, and permitting peremptory
challenges of judges in bench trials.
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Chapter 2
JURY RIGHTS, THE INTRADELIBERATIVE PRIVILEGE, AND A FAIR
TRIAL - CAN THEY CO-EXIST?
1. Introduction
There is a world of difference between the simple rendering of a trial verdict by a jury
and a sound jury verdict that resonates fairness and justice. Criminal jury trials have
become major news events, consequently they are the common subject of analysis at all
phases of the trial by experts and the press. A United States Supreme Court Justice has
acknowledged that the modern trial is not just conducted in the courtroom, but also in the
"court of public opinion"." Even "routine" murders, rapes and burglary trials in America,
England and Wales and Canada receive substantial local publicity in community and
regional newspapers and on the local television and radio news. At the center of this
spectacle is the jury - citizens summoned by force of law, ordered to interrupt their lives
to become as a group the triers of fact, the legally empowered mechanism of the law
which decides guilt or innocence. The stakes are frequently high for both the government
and the defendant. The subject matter often involves base and demoralizing facts.
Summoned into this high stakes battle between the government and the defendant,
individual jurors traditionally are poked and prodded but not protected by the system they
serve. It is only in the latter part of the twentieth century that the concept of a jurors'
right to privacy has been introduced as a serious proposition -- primarily in America. A
8 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) per Justice Kennedy.
28
juror's right to privacy includes protection from public intervention into their private
lives as a result of jury service and accords jurors enhanced protection from harm as a
result of their public service," The emergence of the notion of juror rights has set up a
clash of conflicting interests between the jury, the parties, the media, and even the
lawyers.
Who the jurors are, what they believe, and how they will respond to the evidence,
composes much of the great unknown in any trial, whether in America, England, Wales
or Canada. In recognition that the jury is a major unknown quantity in a trial, far more
uncertain than the application of the rules of evidence, the quirks of the trial judge, or the
skills of the lawyers, it is the American conventional legal wisdom that there is a tactical
advantage associated with detailed knowledge of the composition of the venire
summoned for jury selection. That tactical advantage accentuates a great divide between
the American jury trial and jury trials in Canada and England and Wales. That perceived
tactical advantage in America has fueled the emergence of jury research experts who are
retained to reduce the uncertainty and unpredictability attendant with jury selection. Jury
research fuels an even more intimate American approach to jurors' private lives,
prompting invasive questioning of jurors in American courtrooms, personalizing each
and every juror's voir dire to the maximum. Jury research customarily is performed by
consultants, retained by trial lawyers, with a self proclaimed expertise in jury analysis.
The jury consultants may be psychologists, or other behavioural science experts. It has
9 David Weinstein, Protecting a Jurors Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and Policy
Options, 70 Temple L. Rev. 1 (1997). Weinstein argues that jurors privacy rights emanate from
a "second strain of privacy rights: the individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters" citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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become an established American litigation tool, utilized pretrial to study potential jurors
by the creation of profiles of the ideal juror likely to vote for one side or the other. Jury
research also commonly evaluates jurors during jury selection providing
recommendations about which jurors should be selected or rejected. During the trial
shadow juries are empanelled to mirror the background of the actual jury. The shadow
jury unobtrusively sits through the entire trial in the spectator area providing ongoing
feedback at the end of the day or during trial recesses to the clientitriallawyer regarding
their reaction (and thus, presumably the reaction of the actual jury) to events in the
courtroom. The objective is to orchestrate behaviour and proof in the courtroom in a way
that will be favorably perceived by the actual jury.
The American remedy to increased invasiveness is to permit anonymous juries in limited
situations where there is a perceived potential risk to jurors or the integrity of the trial
process. Post trial interviews are a final component of jury research for several reasons,
primarily to evaluate trial technique and to assist the losing side in an effort to undo the
unfavorable verdict." Jury research of this type is not allowed in England and Wales or
Canada.
Both England and Wales and Canada have a far more controlled and arguably respectful
approach to jurors. There is virtually no voir dire in England and Wales and the
prevailing notion is that a proper jury is truly random, defined as the first twelve called.
Absolute random jury selection, in a time in which the composition of jury pool is
changing, poses new potential risks to sound verdicts. As England becomes more
10 Paul M. Lisnek, The Hidden Jury (2003) at 23-26.
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racially and ethnically diverse, there is an increasing risk that jurors with prejudice will
pollute the jury's deliberations without any meaningful mechanism for culling them out. I I
The Canadian criminal justice system does permit voir dire in a limited and controlled
setting. Canadian jurisprudence has evolved to the recognition of race as a relevant
factor that should be explored to rule out prejudice. Canadian courts have become more
permissive in allowing voir dire about racial prejudice, while still significantly limiting
personal questions to prospective jurors.
America, England, Wales and Canada hold, with varying applications, that once a jury
verdict is rendered, a high legal standard should prevent the trial judge or the Appellate
Courts from looking behind the verdict and second guessing the jury.12 The nations
differ post-verdict on whether or not the juror's deliberative process and discussions can
be disclosed publicly. England and Wales by statute made it illegal for jurors to be
questioned about their deliberations and in Canada a juror can be charged with a criminal
offense for disclosing intra-deliberative conduct.l ' In America by contrast jurors post-
trial have inside the courthouse interviews, provide detailed accounts of their
deliberations and even dream of book deals and other ways to financially exploit their
IIGillian Daly and Rosemary Pattenden, Racial Bias and the English Criminal Trial Jury, 64
Cambridge Law Journal 678 (2005): a call for the taping of jury deliberations as a check on juror
racial bias causing a miscarriage of justice.
12 Allan Manson, Freedom of Press and Juries: The Law the Courts and the Charter, Chap. 11
(Philip Anisman and Allen M. Linden, Eds. 1986).
13 Manson, Id.
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jury service.l" As will be seen below, however, lawyers and parties are sometimes limited
in the contact they can have with jurors post trial.
How is a fair trial affected by American factors like state-of-the-art jury research, the
advent of jury rights, and the recent phenomena of post-trial jury celebrity which has
increased juror propensity to discuss the intra-deliberative jury room process? As we
assess the jury's function does the emphasis on protecting the jury's verdict with nearly
impermeable rules deprive the justice system of an important evaluative tool that would
assist the ongoing judicial effort to obtain verdicts that are safe, reliable, and are worthy
of public confidence? Does the ascendance of twenty-four hour television news and
hyper aggressive journalism give the modem jury and the rules that encase it sufficient
space and latitude to preserve the integrity of the jury system? Does the rule protecting
intrinsic intra-deliberative discussions provide the necessary confidentiality for open and
honest deliberations debate? Without that confidentiality is the integrity of a trial by jury
placed in serious jeopardy?
Does the England and Wales principle of randomness create a definitional unfairness to
minorities? Is the English jury so sequestered post verdict that injustice in a jury decision
cannot be rooted out? Is the Canadian approach the right blend or would its
restrictiveness create injustice and chaos in culturally diverse America and unwelcome
dissent in the ostensibly well ordered English and Wales system?
14On the Rita Cosby program, MSNBC (an investigative television news show), two jurors in
the California State Court sexual abuse trial of Michael Jackson announced post trial that they
were writing a book about the trial as they impeached their own verdict.
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Finally do the new rules of jury composition adopted in much of America and now in
England and Wales which eliminate automatic excusal from jury duty people with
expertise (doctors, lawyers, judges, law professors, police officers) create an
unacceptable risk that the jury will be offered expert opinions during deliberations by
uniquely qualified fellow jurors who are not subject to the rigors of cross-examination or
the rules of evidence?
This chapter will explore these questions, recognizing that there are no absolute answers,
looking at the law of England and Wales, Canada, the American Federal law, as well as,
the law of New York State and California. Rather like most of what occurs in
courtrooms, there are situations which reoccur that require analysis and rules, which if
fairly applied, would promote the likelihood of sound jury verdicts.
II. A Brief Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Rights, Jury Selection Rules,
The Existence of Unanimous or Majority Verdicts, Remedies to Intra-Trial Juror
Misconduct and the Judicial Powers to Set Aside Verdicts
America, England and Wales and Canada all strive to afford their citizens accused of a
crime a fair adjudication of those charges. Comparing and contrasting laws, customs, and
practices are helpful to determine whether the jury remains a sound device to decide
factual disputes.
The relevant similarities and distinctions between the U.S.A., England and Canada
regarding the right to trial by jury, the nature of jury selection, vote requirements for a
guilty verdict, post-conviction verdict review by the trial judge, dismissal of jurors during
the trial, and post-verdict proceedings offer a context regarding the jury's legal and
cultural status in each jurisdiction
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A. Constitutional Rights
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom (Charter) 1982 recognized the right to jury
trial:
Any person charged with an offense has the right ...
except in the case of an offense under military law tried
before a military tribunal, to the benefit of a trial by jury
where the maximum penalty for the offense is
imprisonment for five years or a more severe punishment.P
According to leading legal authorities, there is no constitutional right to trial by jury in
England and Wales.16 However, there is the public perception that such a right is
preserved by the constitution or the ECHR.17 Indictable offenses are triable only by jury.
Intermediate offenses may be triable by jury or magistrate at the option of the Defendant.
Lesser offenses are tried generally by lay magistrates in groups of three, although
sometimes magistrates may be trained lawyers.l'' Recent statutory developments would
IS Can. Const. (Constitutional Act, 1982) (Pt. I, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms),
§11(f) [hereinafter Charter].
16 Lord Justice Robin Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts in England and Wales, www.criminal-
courts-review.org.uk. (Auld Report) (2001) ~8 of Chapter 5; The European Convention on
Human Rights (Article 6) does not specifically reserve the right to trial by jury; Alec Samuels,
Trials on Indictment Without a Jury, 68 Journal of Criminal Law 125 (2004), and applies in many
jurisdictions without juries.
17 Lord Taylor, Criminal Justice After the Royal Commission: The Times, 28 July, 1993,
commenting that there is "the perception of many that trial by jury is a fundamental right".
18 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (Third Edition, Oxford Press,
2005) 1,2-8,297-310. England and Wales divide offenses into three categories. Those triable on
indictment only are the most serious. They are tried by jury in Crown Court. The defendant
cannot opt to try by judge. Either way offenses may be tried in Crown court or Magistrates
Court. The Defendant retains the absolute right to choose the mode of trial in either Crown Court
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allow the prosecution to apply for a judicial order permitting a criminal indictment to be
tried without a jury in a complicated fraud case if brought into force. Under the proposal,
such an order may be granted on the condition that the length of time to complete the trial
is likely to make the jury service burdensome to the jury, on the condition that the waiver
of the jury trial is also approved by the Lord Chief Justice or his Judicial designee.!" An
order can only be granted after a preparatory hearing'" in which the Court is satisfied that
the issues can be simplified in a way that will not disadvantage the prosecution." Finally
the Court may under the proposal order a non-jury trial following the above format where
there is the potential for jury tampering.r' All of the foregoing will be examined in
greater detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 9, including present pending legislation to enact a
modified version of this statutory scheme.
The U.S.A. specifically preserves in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution the right to
a jury trial for any crime.23 That requirement is made applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."
or Magistrates Court. Magistrates are trained lay people who sit in a bench of more than one,
advised by a clerk (lawyer). They hear the lower level crimes and offenses. Sometimes they are
trained attorneys who are entitled stipendiary magistrates.
19 Criminal Justice Act 2003, Part 7, 43 (4) (5).
20 Id. Part 7, 45(6).
21 Id. Part 7. 43 (6)(7).
22 Id, Part 7, 46(3)(4)(5) once again a preparatory inquiry is required to determine if jury
tampering has taken place and if to continue the trial without a "jury would be fair to the
Defendant" and if the trial might be terminated in the interests of justice. If so a new trial without
a jury may be ordered.
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B. Jury Composition/Selection
The American Federal District Courts and State Courts accord the prosecution and the
defendant peremptory challenges as well as the right to challenge for cause, which are
challenges decided by a judge.2s In New York State death penalty cases special voir dire
is permitted of each juror one at a time regarding qualifications and racial bias.26 Juries
are summoned in many states and by the Federal Courts from voter rolls. New York
State, California and several other states use drivers' licenses, social services lists, and
other like sources to supplement the voter rolls. There are few exceptions from jury duty
under the Federal system and in New York and Califomiajurors are commonly voting
age and above.27
23 U.S. Const. Amend XI., The Sixth Amendment states" In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed ... "
24 U.S. Const. XIV Section 1: The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Section 1
provides in pertinent part, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and amenities of citizens of the U.S., or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law ... "
25 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Juror Statistics, State Court Organization, 1998, 273-276. In
the U.S. District Court the preemptory challenges are twenty each for both sides in a capital case,
six for state and ten for reference in a felony case. In New York State Court the prosecutor has
twenty/fifteen/ten preemptory challenges depending on the seriousness of the felony, the
Defendant has twenty/fifteen/ten preemptory challenges. In California State Court the prosecutor
has twenty/ten preemptory challenges, the Defendant has twenty/ten preemptory challenges. U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Juror Statistics, State Court Organization, 1998,273-276.
26 New York Criminal Procedure Law §i70.16. (McKinney 2005).
27 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court Organization 1998, 263-272.
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In England and Wales, there are no peremptory challenges" and the exercise of
challenges for cause is so limited that an experienced trial judge is quoted as stating that
he has never seen a challenge for cause in all of his years on the bench/" The
prosecution retains the right to stand aside jurors.i'' English juries are ages 18 to 70 with
names obtained from the election rolls." Previously there were a number of exceptions
from English jury duty including hardship and specific occupations including barristers,
solicitors, legal executives, police, prison and probation officers, clergymen, the mentally
ill,32 those with a criminal record who have received a specific type of sentence.P and
those on bail." The Criminal Justice Act of2003 removed many of those exemptions
from jury duty.35 Jury selection in England and Wales is based on the notion of random
selection: Juries are chosen at random so as to give a broad cross-section of society the
opportunity to serve, but are not intended to be average or representative."
28 Criminal Justice Act, 1988,Ch. 33, §118(l); Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases: A
Comparison of Regulation in the United States, England, and Canada, 16LOY. L.A. Int'I &
Comp L. J. 201 1993-1994 at 217.
29 James Morton, [1987] Jury Selection, 137New Law Joumal561 citing a letter by Judge Alan
King Hamilton to the Times.
30 Sally Lloyd Bostock and Cheryl Thomas, Dec/ine of the Little Parliament, Juries and Jury
Reform in England and Wales, 62 Law & Contemp Probs. 7 (1999).
31 Juries Act 1974.
32 Id. Sch.I, Pt I.
33 Id. Sch.l, Pt. II.
34 Criminal Justice & Public Order Act, 1994, §40.
35 Criminal Justice Act (2003) Section 321, Schedule 33, Jury Service §3. This Act repeals the
prior Section 9(12) of the Juries Act 1974 (c. 23) which repealed most occupational excuses from
jury service. The occupations no longer exempt include solicitors, barristers, police officers, and
physicians. The mentally ill, those on bail and sentence remain excluded.
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In Canada peremptory challenges are equally provided to both sides - twenty where the
charge is high treason or first degree murder, twelve where the charge is any other
offense which carries a term of more than five years, and four where the defendant is
charged with any other offense.37
While the selection of jurors in Canada falls within the jurisdiction of both the State and
Federal governments" the Constitution Act, 1867 (The British North America Act of
the Westminster Parliament) gave [the Ottawa] Parliament jurisdiction over jury selection
within the courtroom and the provincial legislatures over the circumstances and
conditions of jury panels." Most provincial jury acts make all citizens eligible for jury
duty with exemptions for public officials, lawyers, teachers, clergy, police officers,
physicians, nurses, and pharrnacists.i"
The jury is assembled in the sole discretion of the Sheriffs in some provinces, in other
provinces they are assembled by a judge who likewise has sole discretion. In yet other
provinces jurors are drawn from specified lists."
36 Peter Ferguson, Whistleblowing Jurors [2004], 154 New Law Joumal370; R. v. Smith (2003) 1
W.L.R. 2229.
37 Criminal Code (Jury), 40-41 Eliz II, Ch. 41 §§634, 641.
38 R. v. Sherratt [1991] 1. S.C.R. 509 at 519-20 and R. v. Burro [1987] 2 S.C.R. 694 at 712-13.
39 Section 91(27) and Section 92( 14).
40 David M. Tanovich, David M. Paciocco & Steven Skurka, [1997] Jury Selection in Criminal
Trials: Skills, Science, and the Law (1997) pg. 273.
41 Id., 56.
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In Canada there are two challenges; the challenge for cause which can result in a mini
trial, and a challenge to the panel (to the array) based on three grounds -- partiality, fraud,
or wilfull misconduct on the part of the summoning party.42
To further explain the challenge to the panel, under the common law before 1993, the
judge could excuse or stand-by jurors only with the consent of lawyers for the
prosecution and the defendant. In 1993, the Code was amended to allow the trial judge to
excuse jurors at any time before the trial for the following reasons:
1) Personal interest in the matter to be tried;
2) A relationship personal in nature with the judge, attorneys, accused or a likely
witness;
3) Personal hardship.
The judge did have the authority to require jurors called by the clerk to stand aside,
however this power was declared unconstitutional."
The framework for a challenge for cause is established by statute, the grounds being:
a. The name of the juror does not appear on the panel."
b. A juror is not indifferent between the Queen and the accused.
42 Crim. Code 629(1); R. v. Hayes (No.2) (1903) 9 C.C.C. 101 (B.C. S.C.) Re Thomas and The
Queen (1973) 12 C.C.C. (2d) 78, 23 CRNS41 (ONT. H.C.J.); R. v. Brass [1981] 4 W.W.R. 657
(B.C.S.C.)
43 Crim. Code 633; R. v. Williams (1998) 1 S.C.R. 1128, 124 C.C.C.3d 48l.
44 This is the sole challenge for cause issue decided by the Judge. Crim. Code 640(1); Tanovich
et aI, supra, 89.
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c. A prior conviction carrying a sentence of death or incarceration greater than
twelve months.
d. The juror is an alien.
e. The juror is physically unable to perform.
f. Language problems.Y
A challenge for cause to an individual juror based on the issue of indifference which is
found by the judge to have an air of reality results in a process that can take the form of a
brief trial on the validity of the challenge - to be decided by triers - two jurors sworn to
determine if the ground of the challenge for cause is true." The trial judge prior to the
commencement of the selection process may determine who is not indifferent to the
parties because of obvious partiality, notwithstanding that the code is silent on the
matter."
A lawyer asserts the challenge for cause in writing (unless the challenge will not
embarrass the juror) and is made just prior to the juror taking the oath outside of the
presence of the rest of the panel." The challenge must have at minimum an air of reality,
the standard defined as there is a realistic potential for the existence of juror partiality.l"
45 Crim. Code 638(1).
46 Crim. Code 638(1)9b)-(t).
47 E.G. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings and Practice In Canada, 2nd Ed., pg. 17-6.
48 Id. 17-5.
49 R. v. Hubbert (1975) 29 C.C.C.92d) 279, 31 C.RN.S. 27, 110.R.(2d) 464 (C.A.); affd [1977] 2
S.C.R. 267, 38 C.R.N.S. 381,33 C.C.C. (2d) 207 (Note), 15 O.R.2d 324; R. v. Sherratt [1991] 1
S.C.R. 509,3 C.R.129, 63 C.C.C.(3d) 193.
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Pursuant to the Criminal Code, the judge retains the threshold power to determine if the
challenge meets minimum standards sufficient to allow it to proceed." The trial court
exercises discretion. Appellate review of such a decision is based on whether or not it
was a proper exercise of discretion and not whether or not the appellate court agrees with
the decision."
If the judge determines that the threshold is met, then written questions are submitted to
the judge that the attorneys would propose to ask of the challenged prospective juror
before two triers. The judge may also ask preliminary questions to determine if the juror
. . diff 52lS m 1 terent.
Setting forth a procedure that has a historical foundation but is virtually unique in modem
times,s3 the statute requires that the decision be made by triers as follows:
"The two jurors who were last sworn, and if no jurors have
then been sworn, two persons present whom the Court may
appoint for the purpose, shall be sworn to determine
whether the ground of the challenge is true.?"
50 Crim. Code 639(1), 638.
51 John Granger, The Criminal Jury Trial in Canada, 2nd Ed. (Carswell, 1996)pg. 165.
52 Tanovich, et al., supra, note 40, at 147.
53 R. Blake Brown, Challenges for Cause, Stand Asides, and Peremptory Challenges in the
Nineteenth Century, 38 Osgoode Hall Law J. 453. This article traces the role of triers to decide
challenges for cause as they were used in the 18th and 19th centuries. Both New York and
Massachusetts stopped using triers and permitted the Court to decide these challenges by the end
of the 19th century, 476-477.
54 Crim. Code 638(1)(b) to (f); Ewaschuk, supra, note 17, at 175.
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The two triers must decide the challenge unanimously.f Ifthere is another challenge, the
last seated juror replaces one of the two triers and sits in judgment on the next
challenge. 56 If the triers cannot agree, then they are replaced and two other triers are
sworn. 57
In this proceeding the judge charges the triers that the burden of proof is on the
challenger and that the decision of the triers must be based on a balance of the
probabilities." The judge further charges that by that standard they must determine if the
juror's indifferent - that is impartial as between the Crown and the accused. 59 This
process is repeated with each challenge."
C. Unanimous or Majority Vote - The Requirement for a Guilty Verdict
But for two states, all other U.S.A. jurisdictions require a unanimous verdict." This
custom is pursuant to common law in the Federal courts." Canada requires unanimous
55Tanovich, supra note 40, at 167.
56Neil Vidmar, The Canadian Criminal Jury System: Searching for a Middle Ground, 62 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 141,144-145, (1999).
57640(4) of the Criminal Code.
58R. v. Hubbert, supra note 49 ..
s9Tanovich, et al, supra note 40 at 166.
60Granger, supra note 51, at 188.
61U.S. Dept. of Justice Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court Organization (1998) pg.
278-281. There are two American jurisdictions that are exceptions to the rule. They are
Louisiana 10/12 unless capital or may be confined to hard labor and Oregon 5/6 of 12 except in
murder where the verdict must be unanimous.
62Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S.Ct. 253 (1930) - there were three elements to trial
by jury when the U.S. Constitution was adopted, (1) the jury should consist of 12 men, (2) the
trial should be in the presence of a Judge who decides the law, (3) the verdict should be
unanimous.
42
verdicts/" England and Wales have a discretionary time limit variation for majority
verdicts that makes the English system different from the States of Louisiana and Oregon,
who also do not require unanimous verdicts." In England and Wales, the court in its
discretion, after jury deliberations exceed two hours, may allow a majority verdict,
requiring a vote of ten jurors when the jury is composed of eleven or twelve jurors. The
majority must be at least nine when the jury has been reduced to ten."
Some commentators have opined that England and Wales opted for majority verdicts to
achieve greater efficiency and more convictions in their criminal justice system."
However the Crown Prosecution Service reports that even with majority verdicts, forty
percent of the Crown Court cases tried to a jury result in acquittal.f In America the
acquittal rate by a jury in Federal District Court is 17 percent, and "The national hung
jury rate in a criminal case is about 2.5 percent in the Federal Courts and five percent in
the State Courts according to one survey".68
63 Rv. Pan, (1999) 134 C.C.C. (3d) I (para 98) gives the common law history of the unanimous
verdict in England and Canada.
64 Likewise in the U.S. the 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not require an unanimous
verdict but the common law of all states and any statutes adopted on the topic do require an
unanimous verdict in criminal cases, see note 20, U.S. Dept of Justice.
65 England and Wales departed from the Common Law tradition in 1967 with the adoption of the
Criminal Justice Act, 1967, §13, now Juries Act, 1974, §17.
66 A. Saunders and R. Young, Criminal Justice (Butterworths, 1994) p.361-364.
67 Statistical Service, Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Issue 16196, Supp. TBL. (1996) page 4.
68 Federal Justice Statistics Data Base (2003); Michael J. Saks, What do Jury Experiments Tell
Us About Jury Decisions. 6 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 1,40 (1997);
Kenneth S. Klein and Theodore D. Klastorin , Do Diverse Juries Aid or Impede Justice? 1999
Wisconsin Law Review 553,562, (1999) N. 53; Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. Hans and G.
Thomas Munsterman, How Much Justice Hangs in the Balance, 83 Judicature 59 (1999).
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D. Post-Conviction Judicial Power to Set Aside A Jury Verdict
A Canadian trial judge can set aside inconsistent verdicts.?" but may not aside a verdict
on the grounds that it is unreasonable or that it cannot be supported by the evidence. A
jury verdict may be set aside on appeal where it is found that the verdict is unreasonable
or not be supported by the evidence. The Crown may not appeal an acquittal."
New York and California offer a mechanism wherein the trial judge may only set aside a
conviction, not an acquittal. A federal court can set aside a conviction but not an
. I71acquittal.
England and Wales do not accord the trial court the ability to set aside a perverse
verdict.72
E. Intra Trial Juror Dismissal By Trial Judge Or Misconduct Or Other Non-
Health Reasons
Jury trials provoke circumstances wherein juror conduct, or intervening circumstances, or
events can raise questions regarding the impartiality of jurors during trial.
69R.v. Sweetland (1957) 42 Cr.App.R. 62 (C.C.A.)
70 Canada Criminal Code §686 l(a)(i); R. v. Yerbes (1987) 2 S.C.R. 168; R. v. Riniaris [2000] 1
S.C.R. 381, 2000 S.C.C. 15; R. v. Molodowic [2000] 1 S.C.R. 420, 2000 S.C.C. 16; R. v. A.G.
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 439; 2000 S.C.C. 17.
71 New York Criminal Procedure Law 290.10, McKinney's Vol., 11A, (2005) Trial Order of
Dismissal allowed after jury verdict if the evidence is not legally sufficient to support a verdict
and 440.30 Motion to Vacate Judgment and to set aside verdict. Given a showing the Court may
order a hearing that may include juror testimony where misconduct is alleged. California Evid
Code §1150; Penal Code §1181. Court is allowed to accept Affidavits or to hold a hearing where
indicated in its discretion.
72 Auld Report, supra, note 16, at Chap.5, ~99-108.
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The English standard for the discharge of a jury before a verdict is reached is based on
the trial judge becoming "so minded to (discharge the jury) because jury tampering
appears to have taken place,,73 While the statute requires the Court to place both sides on
notice and to allow representations, 74it does not authorize an American style proceeding
in which the juror or jurors are questioned by the judge. 75 The judge can continue the
trial without a jury if he is satisfied that jury tampering has occurred and that to continue
would be fair to the defendants, but must terminate the trial if he considers it to be in the
interest of justice." In that event the judge may order the re-trial to occur without a
jury.77
In R v. Smith and R. v. Mercea," the Law Lords confirmed that it would be inappropriate
for the Court to question jurors while deliberations were ongoing about allegations made
by one of the jurors that the jury was violating the Court's instruction, unlike the U.S.A.
(as we will see below) where the judge can pre-deliberation, intra-deliberation, or post-
deliberation question jurors regarding potential misconduct. However, the European
Court of Human Rights in Sander v. U.K made it clear that while the judge may not
inquire of the jurors, the judge must discharge the jury where the objective indication is
one of prejudice." One commentator took issue with this decision acknowledging that
73Criminal Justice Act, 2003, Part 7, 4[1](a)(b).
74 Id. Part 7, 46(2).
7S In Gregory v. United Kingdom, (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 577, the European Court at 593-594 said
"It was also accepted by both the applicant and the government that it was not possible under
English law for the trial judge to question the circumstances which gave rise to the note."
76 Criminal Justice Act 2003, Part 7, 46(3)(4).
77 Id. Part 7, 46(5).
78 R. v. Smith and R. v. Mercea [2005] UKHL 12.
79 Sander v. United Kingdom (2001) 32 E.H.R.R. 44. The Court opined that the trial judge's
further instruction advising against prejudice was inadequate and the jury should have been
discharged wherein twelve jurors in one note denied possible racial bias, but one of the jurors by
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prejudice exists "But the process of deliberation in the jury room tends to neutralize
prejudices" and arguing that majority verdicts also protect against prejudice.f"
The trial judge has far more flexibility in both Canadian and American Courts. The
Canada Criminal Code allows the trial judge to hold a hearing (with the judge primarily
questioning, sometimes the juror is sworn and cross-examination is sometimes allowed)
when a question of improper external influences or other forms of misconduct or
violation of the jurors oath are credibly raised. The Court may discharge the juror where
the circumstances warrant."
The u.s. Federal Rule of Evidence §606(b) is applicable only to post-verdict inquiries.
During a trial, Federal judges are empowered by common law to offset prejudice upon a
showing of possible misconduct, and may inquire as to jurors' thought processes to the
extent that this misconduct may have influenced the juror.82
a separate note apologized for telling racist jokes. However in R. v. OrgIes the Court of Appeal
Criminal Division reversed a guilty verdict because the recorder had questioned two jurors
separate from the rest of the jury about their reports of jury dishonesty, and rather called for the
entire jury to be questioned through the foreman in open court to determine if whether as a body
it anticipates bringing a true verdict. The Court appears to rely on the notion that dissension is a
internal matter, but extrinsic contact would permit individual questioning of jurors to determine if
they had been infected questioning the juror separately to avoid infecting the others jurors,
thereby allowing the Court to dismiss up to three jurors if so required under 516 of The Juries Act
(1974). R. v. OrgIes [1993] 143 New Law Journal 886.
8°Michael Zander [2002] The Complaining Juror, 150 New Law Journal, p. 723.
81 Canadian-Criminal Code §644; R. v. Sophonow (No.2) 198625 C.C.C.3d 4-15 (MAN C.A.);
R. v. Hahn (1995) 62 B.C.A.C. 6; R. v. Taillefer (1995) 100 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Que. c.A.); R. v.
Lessard (1992) 74 C.C.C.3d 552 (QUE. c.A.) R. v. Musitano, et al. (1985),23 C.C.C. (3d) 65,
25 D.L.R. (4th) 299 (ONT. c.A.).
82 United States v. Rowe, 906 F.2d 654,656 N. 3 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Richards, 241
F.3d 335,343-344 (3rd Cir. 2001).
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In California and New York there are statutory procedures which allow the Court to
discharge a juror before the verdict following a hearing or showing."
In American Courts (Federal and State) the most common method utilized for dealing
with reports of juror misconduct or potentially prejudicial occurrences is to question the
juror/jurors in camera with counsel and the defendant present, engaging in what one court
referred to as a "probing and tactful inquiry".84
Both New York and California authorize such a procedure. Considering New York first,
the state statutory law provides that:
"If ... the Court finds, from facts unknown at the time of the
selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly unqualified to
serve in the case or has engaged in misconduct of a
substantial nature but not warranting the declaration of a
mistrial, the Court must discharge such juror"."
The application of the statute is not without problems. For example, a juror told a court
officer during jury deliberations that she did not understand what was going on. While
this report was being discussed by the judge with the attorneys, the jury sent out a note
indicating they had reached a verdict/" The court took the verdict and then interviewed
83New York Judiciary Law §510, New York Criminal Procedure Law 270.35; Under New York
law a juror must be able to understand English; The further standard is that a juror not be grossly
unqualified or engage in substantial misconduct. California Penal Code 1120, 1150, 1089
provides that juror disqualification is based on misconduct, lack of knowledge of English and
inability to perform functions.
84People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290 at 299 (1982). Two cases decided at the same time by the
Court of Appeals. In one a trial jury saw two witnesses leaving court with a juror and inquired
about that. After questioning the juror who assured the trial court that she understood that this
was inappropriate and that the matter was not significant, the juror was dismissed and the trial
continued with an alternate juror. The court reversed the conviction finding this to be an abuse of
discretion.
85Criminal Procedure Law §270.351, McKinney's Vol7A,page 389. (2005).
86 People v. Sanchez, 99 N.Y.2d 622, 790 N.E.2d 766, 760 N.Y.S.2d 391 (2003).
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the juror "to determine whether she was grossly unqualified" under C.P.L. 270.35. The
court held that the juror was qualified and upheld the verdict. On appellate review it was
held that the court's inquiry was both misdirected and incomplete, falling short of the
"probing and tactful inquiry" that a court must undertake when it appears that a juror may
be grossly unqualifled''." The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court only asked
the juror about her age, address, citizenship and if she was ever charged with a crime
along with a single question as to whether she was able to understand and communicate
in English. Based on the standard established by Judiciary Law §510 88 the court ruled
that she was qualified to serve as a juror despite failing to ask her what she meant by her
"extraordinary statements to the court officer".89 The New York Court of Appeals
reversed and ordered a new trial because the court's inquiry was inadequate but cautioned
that it would have been "unnecessary and indeed inappropriate to subject the juror to
questions relating to her thought processes (about) the deliberations or other matters that
lie within the confines of the jury room"." On further review the actual transcript docs
indicate that the juror answered questions both during the jury selection and the post-
verdict proceeding when the judge questioned the juror, that she properly answered when
and where to questions about her conversation with the court officer and how that
sequenced with deliberations. The transcript also demonstrates that she deliberated with
the other jurors, and did ask fellow jurors to explain to her aspects of the case. There
does not appear to be any sound reason to set aside this verdict apart from the casual
87 See People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290, 299 (Ct. App. 1987)
88 Judiciary §510 (McKinneys) Qualifications for a New Yorkjuror are simply being a citizen
over the age of 18, able to speak and understand English.
89 People v. Sanchez, supra, note 86 at 293.
90 dl .,Record on Appeal, R. 623-624.
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statement made by the juror - and the transcript actually reflects a sufficient
understanding of English to allow the juror to properly answer several judicially posed
questions."
In another case equally as vexing, the Appellate Court ruled that the trial court
improperly discharged a juror who expressed concern about the racial composition of the
jury during the prosecution's case. After reviewing the trial court's inquiry, the
Appellate court concluded no information was elicited that would have demonstrated that
the juror was "grossly unqualified" and set aside the verdict."
California courts hold that once the judge is alerted to the possibility that a juror cannot
properly perform his duty to render an impartial and unbiased verdict, it must make a
reasonable factual inquiry into that possibility. The decision to investigate the possibility
of juror bias, incompetence, or misconduct, like the ultimate decision to retain or
discharge a juror, rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. A hearing is
required only when the court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would
constitute "good cause" to doubt a juror's ability to perform his duties and would justify
his removal from the case.93 California courts, like their counterparts in New York,
appear far more inclined to probe the deliberative process than England and Wales or
Canada. For example, the California Supreme Court has held that the statute requires the
court to probe if a juror appeared to have personal knowledge of a fact and did not
disclose the same, reversing a conviction based upon said failure.94
91 Id, Record on Appeal, R. 1256-1257.
92 People v. Anderson, 70 N.Y.2d 729 [1987].
93 Cal. Penal Code 1120, 1150, 1089. (2005).
94 People v. McNeal, 90 Cal. App.3d 830, 153 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1979) Ct; of Appeals 1st District.
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F. Post Trial Jury Speech Regarding the Verdict
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as the laws of New York and California
allow juror speech about jury room deliberations upon discharge from service. Canada
does not allow post trial juror speech, making it an offense for a juror "to disclose any
information relating to the proceedings of the jury when it was absent from the
Courtroom".95 England and Wales likewise prohibit juror speech, making it a crime to:
"disclose or solicit any particulars of statements made, opinions expressed, arguments
advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations in any
legal proceedings't." The rule is applicable to both in-court or outside of court
statements.
The basis for this rule is summarized as follows:
"If one juryman might communicate with the public upon
the evidence and the verdict, so might his colleagues also,
and if they all took this dangerous course, differences of
individual opinion might be made manifest which, at the
least, could not fail to diminish the confidence that the
public rightly has in the general propriety of criminal
verdicts't "
This rule is also reflected in statute. 98
95Canadian Criminal Code §649 found constitutional in R. v. Pan, [1999] 134C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont.
c.A.).
96Section 8{I) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981 ("Confidentiality of Jury Deliberations"); the
word disclose was defined in Attorney General V. Associated Newspapers 19942 AC 238 as
including juror disclosure to third-party who then passed the details on to the newspapers - thus
obtaining information from a juror, juror disclosing information and soliciting juror comment all
are within the definition of disclose.
97R. v. Armstrong [1992] All E.R. 153 (CA) at pg. 157per Lord Hewart C.J., cited in R. v. Pan, 2
S.C.R. 344, aff. 134 C.C.C. (3d) 1..
98§8of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, Criminal Code §139(2).
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It is helpful to review the longstanding common law that provides the foundation for the
statutory and common law that protects the intradeliberative process of juries.
III. Does The Ghost of Lord Mansfield Impede Present Day Justice?
A. Jury Behaviour and Confusion - The Rule Meets the Modem Juror
Since 1785, the common law has held that the details of the jury's deliberations must be
secret both during the trial and after the verdict is rendered. The seminal decision by
Lord Mansfield held that the trial court could not overturn a verdict based on several
jurors' affidavits despite the disclosure that they reached their decision by casting lots.
Lord Mansfield reasoned that the jury's internal deliberations were secret and could not
post-verdict be impeached even by the jurors themselves." This principle continues to be
followed over two centuries later in England and Wales,IOO the U.S.A.,IOl and Canada.i'"
99 Vaise v. Dclaval (1785) I T.R. 11,99 E.R. 944 (K.B.) 1 Dum E II; also Wigmore on Evidence
(McNaughton Rev. 1961) Vol.8 §2352 at p. 696. March 18,2005.
100JessicaHolroyd, Judging the Jury, March 18,2005, New Law Journal, who reasons that S8
contempt of Court Act 1981 prevents jurors from speaking out post-verdict and third parties to
question jurors and the Common Law Rule prevents the Courts from inquiring into jury
deliberations citing Rv. Mirza.
101As will be seen below, America has been a less doctrinaire applicant of the rule. See J.
Wigmore,8 Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Para. 2352 (McNaughton Rv. 1961): Jorgensen
v. York, Inc. Machinery Corp, 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1947). Both Wigmore and Judge Learned
Hand regard Lord Mansfield's rule as having no basis in policy or precedent as an evidentiary
rule.
102Philip Anisman and Allen Linden, The Media, The Courts, and the Charter (1986 Carswell)
at 366, Regardless of the functional relationship between impeachability and secrecy at Common
law, legislative changes in England and in Canada have asserted a need for secrecy in jury
deliberations. In 1969 in response to one incident in Quebec the Commission recommended that
"jurors should be prohibited from discussing what went on in the jury room in the course of the
trial." Subsequently in 1972 Section 576.2 of the Code was passed by Parliament which states in
part:
"Every member of a jury who ... disclosed any information
Relating to the proceeding of the jury when it was absent
from the Courtroom that was not subsequently disclosed
in open court is guilty of an offense punishable on
summary conviction."
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creating a longstanding intradeliberative privilege (the Rule). However, each jurisdiction
has a distinct application of the rule.
It is unlikely that Lord Mansfield could have foreseen the many changes in society over
three centuries that pose significant challenges for the contemporary jury. During the
Eighteenth Century, seventy-five percent of the population was excluded from juries. In
fact there were even special juries composed only of the highest class of citizens in
selected instances.l'" The rule is presently applied to a diverse society monitored by a
gargantuan media machine that makes jury trials a major focus of daily news and culture.
England and Wales have a virtually absolute rule "that the Court will never admit
evidence from jurymen of the discussion which they may have had between themselves
when considering their verdict or the reasons for their decision, whether the discussion
took place in the jury room after retirement or in the jury box itself."!"
In both Canada!", and England and Wales,I06 the Court is not able to reach into the
intrinsic deliberations of the jury at any time. The posture of both nations has provoked
remarkably similar judicial dissents calling for a change in the rule in both countries and
103 Douglas Hay, The Class Composition of the Palladium of Liberty, in "Twelve Good Men and
True: The Criminal Trial Jury in England, 1200-1800 ed. Is. Cockburn and Thomas A. Green
(Princeton, NJ.; Princeton University Press, 1998; James Oldham, The History of the Special
(Struck) Jury in the United States and its Relation to Voir Dire Practices, the Reasonable Cross
Section Requirement, and Peremptory Challenges, William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 623
(1998) and James Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 University of Chicago Law
Review 137 (1983).
104 Ellis v. Deheer [1922] 2 K.B. 113, Bankes LJ. at 117-118. See also, R.v. Andrew Brown
(1907) 7 N.S.W.S.R. 290.
105 Christopher Granger, The Criminal Jury Trial in Canada, 2nd Ed. 1996, "A jurors evidence
will not be accepted to impeach a verdict. Hence, a jury could base its verdict on inappropriate
considerations r could arrive at its decision by flipping a coin and the verdict would remain
unassailable. Likewise, a verdict cannot be impeached because the jury misunderstood the
Judge's directions or ignored important evidence". Pg. 332.
106 Contempt of Court Act, 1981, §8(2); R. v. Miah [1977] 2 CR. App. R. 12; R. v. Qureshi
[2002] 1 CR. App.R. 433 [2002] 1 W.L.R. 518.
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specific criticism of the rule in England and Wales by the Auld Report as we will see
below. Nevertheless, the spirit of Lord Mansfield's Rule remains alive and well, a
conclusion supported by a recent consultation paper which recommends a continued
application of the rule in its present form which includes prohibiting even monitored,
structured academic jury research.l'"
The U.S. Federal Courts, New York State, California, England and Wales and Canada
presently appear to share relatively narrow and defined standards for the challenge of jury
verdicts using juror testimony or affidavits, limiting any such proceeding to misconduct
based on extrinsic factors which affected the verdict.
The American application of the rule is reflected in Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence:
"A juror may not testify as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury's deliberation or to
the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the
verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the juror's attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror."
The common law adopts the rule as well.I08
107 Jury Research and Impropriety CP04/05. The paper does propose amending the statute to
allow limited research into a jury's deliberations as permitted by the Secretary of State and the
Lord Chief Justice under a code of conduct that would preserve anonymity of the parties. The
paper embraces the status quo - that is the preservation of §8 of the Contempt of Court Act
(1981) and Lord Mansfield's Rule.
108 Rake v. U.S., 169 F.2d. 739, 4th Circuit 1948; cert denied 335 U.S. 826 (1948).
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Even though Rule 606(b) is reflective of many American state statutes, it is instructive to
review the applications of these same general concepts in New York and California as
compared to Canada and England and Wales. In New York the standard is established by
the common law. Generally a jury verdict may not be impeached by proof of the tenor of
its deliberations, but only upon a showing of improper external influence. Improper
influence is not simply a corrupt attempt to influence the jury, as even a well intentioned
jury conduct which puts the jury into possession of evidence not introduced at trial.'?"
Although New York Courts utilize a standard comparable to the Federal Standard cited
above, they have been far more flexible and have overturned verdicts, or ordered
hearings into the verdicts rendered by juries in a number of instances such as the case in
which the jurors learned by newspaper account of a co-defendants plea prior to trial, II 0 or
the case in which a juror utilized her own car on her own time during the trial to test a
witness's testimony regarding sight distance in a comparable circumstance to the
testimony and then reported her findings to the jury. I I I
The California standard, established by statute as well as common law, provides that a
jury's mental processes may not be examined in evaluating the validity of a verdict.112
The jury's mental processes are beyond the oversight of a probing court, but acts,
109 People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388 (1979). A juror utilizing her own car, on her own time,
during the trial performed a "test" to see if a witness's testimony regarding sight distance was
accurate. The Court reversed the conviction based upon a hearing post-verdict in which the juror
acknowledged this test and that it was part of the jury deliberations.
110 People v. Testa, 94 A.D.2d 852; reversed and remanded, 61 N.Y.2d 1009,43 N.E.2d 1223
(1984) the Court of Appeals held that the trial Court did not abuse its discretion regarding the
soundness of the verdict given that it heard "conflicting testimony as to what transpired during
deliberations ... and whether this information had a substantial impact on the eventual verdict",
1009.
III P Ieop e v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388 (1979)
112 Cal. Evid Code §11S0.
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objectively ascertainable, may be admissible but not a subjective reasoning process which
can neither be corroborated nor disproved.' J3
Moreover, as noted earlier, the American practice is to allow jurors to comment on their
verdict and give public interviews post-verdict. This practice raises significant issues
about the rule and how it affects integrity of jury deliberations. In part the right to a fair
jury trial must be weighed against freedom of speech and freedom of the press. We will
first examine some common scenarios and decisions that jury behavior and problems
have spawned.
1. Alcohol, Drugs, and Sleeping - The Inattentive Juror
The V.S. Supreme Court in Tanner v. V.S.114 took a very restrictive view of Federal Rule
of Evidence 606(b) holding that the post-trial testimony of a juror was admissible only
where there was a prima facie showing of "extraneous influence". The Court embraced
the principle that it is inappropriate and inadmissible in an application to set aside a
verdict to show the actual impact of the tainting influence on the actual jury. Rather the
proper showing is that the influence would adversely impact upon a normal juror or jury,
an apparent attempt to preserve the secrecy of the actual deliberation. Despite proof from
certain of the Tanner jurors who acknowledged significant use of alcohol at lunch and
other times during the trial by the jury, the Court concluded that a hearing was not
indicated as the affidavits alleging these activities did not raise external influences, but
rather explored "the internal processes of the jury" - an exploration the Court declined to
113 People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Ca1.2d342, 78 Cal. Rptr. 196,455 P.2d 132; People v.
Dancks (2004) 32 Ca1.4th269, 82 P2d 1249.
'14483 U.S.I07(1987); FRE606(b).
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embark upon. us By contrast the California standard requires the trial court to conduct a
hearing given a similar complaint.i'" The California Supreme Court held that the trial
Court erred in not holding a hearing based on other jurors reports of a juror being
intoxicated and smelling of marijuana during the first two days of deliberations and thus
the Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.
Sleeping during a trial is a ground for discharge, 117 and the trial judge could rely on his
own observations and not hold a hearing on the issue.l "
2. Racist Comments, the Jury Oath, and Jury Deliberations
Racist comments by jurors during all aspects of the trial including deliberations pose
problems for all three nations. In America such comments have provoked a number of
hearings either during the trial or post trial, despite broad based, liberal voir dire ..
In a post-trial hearing on a motion to set aside the guilty verdict, a former juror testified
that he heard another juror comment during selection "I know that N__ R is guilty"; the
Court ordered a hearing to inquire into whether or not the juror lied during voir dire about
race or prejudice. The Court concluded that the jury member harbored an undisclosed
preexisting opinion of guilt against the Defendant based upon his bias warranting reversal
115 U.S. v. Tanner, supra note 114, at 120.
116 People v. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d 50S, 224 Cal. Rptr 112 (1986), overruled on other grounds in
People v. Reyes 19 Cal. 4th 743 (1998), cited in People v. Cleveland 25 Cal.4th 466 (2001).
117 People v. Rogers (2 Dept, 1999) 266 AD.2d 481; People v. LaTorres, 186 A.D.2d 479 (1st
Dept., 1982), Lv. denied 81 N.Y.2d 842 (1993); People v. Williams, 202 AD.2d 1004 (4th Dept.,
1994)
118 People v. Mclntyre, 193 AD.2d 626, Lv. denied. 82 N.Y.2d 757 (1993).
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and a new trial because he had represented in voir dire that he was not a racist and did not
have preconceived notions about guilt.119
There is a possible advantage derived from the detailed American voir dire because
racially biased speech or behaviour in jury deliberations are a likely contradiction of
previous testimony by the juror denying such opinions given during the voir dire. If a
seated juror was asked during voir dire about any bias or prejudice and denied the same,
and then expresses bias during deliberation, evidence of the juror's racist remark during
jury deliberations has been found to be a basis to show perjury by the juror thereby
warranting a new trial.I20
However, demonstrating a single juror's bias will not necessarily result in a new trial. For
example, an Appellate Court upheld a verdict even though several white jurors opined
that Defendant's murder of the victim, a member of his own race, suggested that "he
would not hesitate to kill a white person".':" In essence, the trial court does have a duty
to determine if the racist remarks demonstrated that the juror harbored sufficient
prejudice to impact the verdict.122
119People v. Rivera 304 A.D.2d 841, 759 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2nd Dept., 2003); See also, People v.
Whitmore, 45 Misc.2d 506 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co., 1965). The trial court upon motion after a
hearing overturned a conviction in part based on racist comments during deliberations, with
detailed portions of juror testimony included in the decision. See a/so, People v. Rukaj, 123
A.D.2d 277 (1st Dept., 1986); Court in dictum finds racist deliberations allegations should have
prompted a post-trial hearing, revered on other grounds.
120U.S. v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001).
121Fieldsv. Woodford, 281 FJd 963, 975-976 (9th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111 (9th
Cir.2001).
122McDonaldv. Pless, 238 U.S. 264,268-269 (1915); U.S. v. Henley, supra note 120, 1119-1120.
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Both the Court of Appeal and the European Court have placed great reliance on jurors
following their oath and the curative value of proper judicial instruction where race is
raised by the jury. For example, in the trial of a black man where the judge received a
note from the jury stating: "Jury showing racial overtones. One member to be excused",
the Court upheld a conviction where the judge recalled the jury and instructed that they
put prejudice out of their minds and decide the case as required by their oath based only
on the evidcnce.123
In R. v. Mirza the jury initially sent several notes questioning the Defendant's proclaimed
lack of understanding of English and questioning why he would need an interpreter-
including a note to the Court interpreter questioning "would it be typical for a man of the
Defendant's background to require your services, despite living in this Country as long as
he has?,,124 Counsel agreed to an admission that explained that the "Court proceedings
... are complex, serious and involve complicated legal terms. This (the interpreter) is a
safe-guard ... ". Prosecuting counsel in a final speech told the jury they should make full
allowances for Mirza's difficulties and defense counsel advised against prejudice
operating when they considered their verdict. The judge directed the jury in his charge to
draw no direct inferences.l'" The court prior to sentencing received a letter from a juror
characterizing other jurors as racist and accusing the jurors of basing their verdict on the
view that the use of the interpreter was a subterfuge. The letter asserted that the jurors
viewed the judge's warning about prejudice as "playing the race card" and referred to the
123 Gregory v. U.K. (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 577.
124 R. v. Mirza [2004] U.K.H.L. 2, #8a.
125 R. v. Mirza, supra note 124, #64,65; R. v. Connor and R. Rollock [2004] W.L.R. 201.
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other jurors several times as bigots.F" The Court of Appeal declined to set aside the
verdict and the Law Lords affirmed.
Mirza reinforces that the English rule regarding how and when to look beyond a jury's
verdict remains the subject of controversy. Presently the ability to look behind the
verdict is virtually non-existent by virtue of the common law and §8 of the Contempt of
Court Act 1981 (Confidentiality of Jury's deliberations) which provides that "it is a
contempt of court to obtain, disclose or solicit any particulars of statements made,
opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course
of their deliberations in any legal proceedings." This is regarded as a codification of
common law.127 The Law Lords, based on their decision in Mirza, Connor and Rollock
following the common law and the statute, limited any post-verdict inquiry despite post-
verdict letters from jurors describing inferentially racist conduct in one deliberation and
allegations of juror misconduct by failing to allegedly deliberate regarding a co-defendant
because the jury found that the co-defendant was guilty virtually immediately after
finding his fellow defendant guilty.128 Holding that the deliberations in the jury room
were privileged from disclosure and thus after further inquiry the Law Lords rejected the
dissenting argument that a failure to engage in an inquiry as to misconduct in Mirza was
potentially a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention in light of §3 of the
Human Rights Act 1998.129
126 R. v. Mirza, supra note 124, #67.
127 Vaise v. Delaval, supra note 99; Ellis v. Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113; Rv. Andrew Brown
[1907] 7 N.S.W.S.R. 290 at 299; R. v. Miah [1997] 2 Cr. App. R. 12.
128R. v. Mirza, R. v. Connor, and R. v. Rollock [2004] 2 W.L.R. 201.
129 In Gregory v. The United Kingdom [1998] 25 EHRR 577, the Court acknowledged the
importance of the secrecy of jury deliberations. It did not pass upon an American/Canadian
standard that allows looking at extrinsic non-evidential influences on the jury verdict.
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The kind of issue raised in Mirza would potentially be addressed by voir dire in America
and Canada. That England and Wales do not permit voir dire limits the ability of both the
judges and counsel to learn of prior existing juror biases, in contrast to the American and
Canadian approach.
American voir dire generally permits a very direct confrontation of the race issue
between lawyers and prospective jurors. Misrepresentation in voir dire can be the basis
for setting aside a jury verdict as discussed above. Canadian voir dire offers a more
moderate approach.v" In R. v. Parks the Court of Appeals for Ontario recognized that
reliance on the presumption that jurors will follow their oath may be trumped by racial
prejudice. Utilizing judicial notice to consider many studies indicating the existence of
racial prejudice in Canada as the basis to overturn the conviction of a black defendant for
manslaughter after a jury trial, the trial court refused to allow the following question to
prospective jurors:
"Would your ability to judge the evidence in the case
without bias, prejudice or partiality be affected by the fact
that the person charged is a black Jamaican immigrant and
the deceased is a white man?"!"
In a more recent case the Appellate Court gave trial courts a clear right to take judicial
notice of potential racial prejudice. The court reversed a trial verdict of guilty in a
l3~eil Vidmar, The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching for a Middle Ground, 62 Law &
Contem. Probs 141. 144, 145 (1999) "In many important respects, the contemporary Canadian
criminal jury may be viewed as hybrid of the English and American jury systems. This statement
does not imply a direct American influence on the conception of the jury because ... Canadian
judges have often expressly rejected American practices and in the very recent past, tended to
defer primarily to England when seeking guidance from case law.. Nevertheless, on a number of
dimensions, Canadian jury law and practice occupies a middle ground between that of these two
other countries."
131Rv. Parks (1993) 24 C.R. (4th)81, 84 C.C.C.(3d) 353, 150 R.(3d) 324, 65 O.A.C. 122 (CA.);
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1994) at 129 ofOAC.
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criminal heroin importation case where the trial judge refused to allow prospective jurors
to be asked:
"Would the fact that the accused are persons of Chinese
origin and visitors from Singapore affect your ability to
judge the evidence fairly and without prejudice?,,132
The Court found that "all visible minorities" were eligible "for this minimal protection:
based on the history of discrimination against visible minorities".133
Considering this decision with the prior nearly contemporaneous ruling of the Supreme
Court of Canada, in which the court held that Canadian Aboriginals were entitled to
question potential jurors for discrimination, there emerges judicial recognition of the
corrosive effect of racial prejudice. Canadian courts in several major jurisdictions no
longer require a threshold showing of possible prejudice where the potential is obvious,
and permit voir dire of prospective jurors about racial prejudice.t" The Supreme Court
of Canada further eliminated a possible racist device by finding the Criminal Code
provision permitting the Crown to stand aside jurors to be unconstitutional.l'"
American voir dire is famously more expansive than the less broad based right of inquiry
in Canada, permitting questions about racial prejudice where that factor is a "reasonable
possibility".136 The lack of voir dire in England and Wales in comparable circumstances
132R. v. Koh (1998) 42 0.R.(3d) 668 at 671; 1998Ont Rep. LEXIS 215.
133 Id. at 681.
134 R. v. Williams (1998) 1 S.C.R. 1128,124 C.C.C.3d 481.
135 R. v. Bain [1992] 1 S.C.R.91. .
136 Aldrige v. U.S., 283 U.S. 308 (1931); Ham v. South Carolina 409 U.S. 524 (1973); and
Rosales-Lopez v. U.S. 451 U.S. 182at 191 (1981) per Justice White prejudice can be inquired
about where there is a "reasonable possibility" that racial prejudice could influence the jury.
(Generally described as "defendant accused of a violent crime and where the Defendant and
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has provoked some concern about racial implications, principally by the Runciman
Commission manifested in the form of a largely ignored proposal that at least three
members from the same ethnic group as the Defendants be seated in exceptional cases
(for example, violent response by blacks to racial taunts by extremist group).137 The
restoration of peremptory challenges as a way of resolving concerns about the racial
composition of juries is contrary to the view of Lord Roskill:
"The existence of the peremptory right of challenge must
necessarily ... tend to erode the principal of random
selection and may even enable defendants to ensure a
sufficiently large part of a jury is rigged in their favor."!"
This view is shared by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).139
Some have argued that the present majority verdicts "allow the views of extremists to be
discounted in jury decisions. However, critics believe that this change was motivated
more by a desire to save the expense of retrials and that it undermines the principle that
guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt".140 While there have been studies
which suggest that the use of peremptory challenges were not associated with an
increased likelihood of acquittal, one must wonder if that is in part because the jury pool
at the time of the study still lacked racial and ethnic diversity.141 Chapter 3 will examine
victim are members ofa different racial or ethnic groups"; Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986)
applies the standard to State death penalty cases.
137 Viscount Runciman, Royal Comm'n on Crim. Just. Report (1993) [hereinafter Runciman
Commission) at 133-134.
138 Fraud Trial Comm. Report 1986 [hereinafter Roskill Report].
139R. v. Ford, [1989] 3 All E.R. 445 (Eng. C.A.).
14°Sally Lloyd-Bostock and Cheryl Thomas Decline of the "Little Parliament": Juries and Jury
Reform in England and Wales, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs 7 (1999).
141 Julie Vennard & David Riley, The Use of Peremptory Challenge and Stand By of Jurors and
Their Relationship to Trial Outcome [1988] Crim. L. Rev. 731.
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whether race is an external influence on jury deliberations and how the comparator
jurisdictions address the problem of race as an extra-evidentiary influence.
3. Jury Room Bullies
Bullying in the jury room is a recurrent post-verdict basis for applications to set aside
verdicts in America. A typical example is the case of a recent criminal conviction of an
attorney for aiding and abetting a terrorist. A post-trial motion was denied seeking to set
aside the verdict because of bullying. The jury was anonymous and there was a post-trial
order directing no contact between the attorneys and the jury members. A juror (who the
attorneys were ordered not to contact post-trial) alleged that the other jurors subjected her
to "a relentless verbal assault on my person and my position until I had no other choice
but to relent because of the fear I felt". The juror both wrote to the trial judge and was
interviewed by defense lawyers in violation of the court's order not to have contact with
juror's post-trial without application to the Court.142 In California, the State Supreme
Court held that a fellow juror exclaiming to the lone hold out during deliberations who
was an elderly woman, "If you make this all for nothing, if you say we sat here for
nothing, I'll kill you and there will be another defendant out there - it'll be me", was not
prejudicial misconduct impeaching the verdict.143 The New York rule is that a jury
verdict may not be impeached by statements going to the tenor of the jury's deliberations,
thus claims of intra-deliberative pressure are rejected.l''"
142Julia Preston, Juror says Her Guilty Vote was Coerced in Terror Trial, New York Times,
Sept. 2,2005, page B2. The motion to set aside the verdict was denied.
143Peoplev. Keenan [1988] 46 CALJd 478, 540.
144People v. Liguori, 149A.D.2d 624 (2d Dept, 1989), People v. Maddox, 139A.D.2d 578 (2d
Dept., 1988), People v. Browne. 307 A.D.2d 645 (3d Dept., 2003).
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In U.S. Federal Courts, evidence of intimidation that does not include extraneous
influences or information or physical intimidation is inadmissible to impeach a jury's
verdict where only intra jury psychological pressure is applied.14s One court reasoned
that allegations of these types of pressure are amenable to fraud by any juror who
remained silent until after the verdict is rendered and thereafter made these claims
. d 146pursuant to m ucement.
Jury room bullying is not a common claim in England and Wales or Canada, perhaps
because of the limitation on post-trial interviews. In both jurisdictions jurors are
prohibited by law from discussing the details of their deliberations, with no existing
meaningful mechanisms for investigating the deliberation post verdict for bullying.
4. The Celebrity Juror
In America post-verdict juror interviews are a common element of notorious trial
coverage. And while it is possible in the U.S.A. for a recanting juror to impeach his/her
verdict in the Court of public opinion, courts of law are unlikely to look beyond the
verdict unless there is an allegation of external influence.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a huge national
distinction in what jurors can say post trial, making it unlikely that the provision of the
145U.S. v. Briggs, 291 F.3d 805 (7 Cir. 2002), U.S. v. Francis, 367 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 2004).
14~.S. v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th CIR., 1976).
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England and Wales §8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 which limits the ability of the
press to question jurors post verdict would pass American constitutional muster.I'"
When jurors post trial disclose the details of jury deliberations, they create a potential risk
best framed by Justice Cardozo in support of the notion of confidentiality in jury
deliberations: "Freedom of debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked
if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to
the world".148
The high profile child molestation trial of Michael Jackson is a typical example. In a
magazine interview after the trial, a Jackson juror Raymond Hultman is quoted as stating
that "leading into the deliberations he and two other jurors believed Jackson was guilty".
The entire jury gave a collective television post-trial interview discussing the
deliberations as well as separate interviews to the assembled media. The jury foreperson
in a published interview described the internal discussions and arguments in the jury
room, setting forth in detail the process that resulted in the conversion of the minority in
favor of conviction, culminating in a unanimous not guilty verdict:
"Finally the three doubters accepted the view that the
prosecution had come up short in marshalling the
evidence". The doubters through Mr. Hultman stated, "I
think Michael Jackson probably has molested boys, ... but
that doesn't make him guilty of the charges in this case".149
147In America there are a series of case decrying pre-publication restraint on the press. The part
of §8 that limits the jurors ability to discuss deliberations probably does not pass American
constitutional muster and thus to the extent §8 restrains the press, it would be unconstitutional.
148 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
149People Magazine, June 27, 2005 at pages 60-61.
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Several other jurors were quoted as finding Jackson's fifteen-year-old accuser's mother, a
main prosecution witness, to be self serving, unbelievable and an opportunist.P"
This detailed post-trial interview in a widely circulated magazine accentuates the problem
posed by post-trial juror interviews. Given the frequency of comparable articles post-
verdict in other high profile cases, it is unlikely that any similarly situated jury will
believe that the jury room debate is private. Moreover, jurors in a routine case may be
concerned about the disclosure of jury room debate based on the public interviews in the
high profile cases. Certainly it is difficult for the accused to claim vindication given that
the jury regarded it as a case not proven even though there was a belief that Jackson was
a child molester. The magazine commissioned a poll that showed that forty-eight percent
of the surveyed disagreed with Jackson's acquittal and thirty-four percent agreed.l"
While jury verdicts should not and must not reflect vox populi - rather they are to
represent the fairly weighed decision of the trier of fact based on the judicial instructions
given to the jury, public confidence in the jury system is an important intangible element.
However, the criminal justice system and the courts must promote good will and seek
public confidence. " ... trial by jury is more than an instrument of justice and more than
one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives.,,152 The
explanation given by the Jackson jury demonstrates a reasoned basis for the verdict-
applying the beyond the reasonable doubt standard they acquitted Jackson of the specific
charges despite believing it was more likely than not that he was a child molester.
150 Id at 60-61.
lSI Id at 60-61.
IS2 Lord Devlin, Trial by Jury (1956) The Hamlyn Lectures (London: Stevens and Sons Limited,
1956)p.164.
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Unfortunately for the judicial system, the public story does not end here. In July of 2005,
a few weeks after the Jackson "not guilty" verdict, several of the jurors who had during
deliberations voted initially to find the defendant guilty and then changed their position,
appeared on a television talk show (The Rita Cosby Show, MSNBC) to allege that the
jury foreperson bullied them into finding Jackson not guilty. Both jurors, one of whom
was the aforementioned Mr. Hultman, indicated that they were attempting to negotiate
book deals and both announced that they believed Jackson was guilty of the specific
charges for which he was tried and acquitted.
This event further elevates the concern that jurors, unlikely to believe that their
deliberations will remain private after the verdict because of the prominence and
frequency of post verdict interviews, may be unwilling to candidly deliberate, thereby
jading intra deliberative debate and skewing the ultimate outcome. This problem may be
addressed by limiting juror post-trial speech as will be discussed later in the chapter. It
also prompts considering advising the jury that if they discuss the deliberations so that the
details are exposed to public scrutiny, that also opens the door to subject the jury to
judicial scrutiny including their personal testimony. This jury by its conduct would
waive the protection of Lord Mansfield's rule and should be advised in the instruction
that post-verdict discussions of the deliberative process may invite a proceeding at which
they would testify under oath.
Consider the following hypothetical. What if Jackson had been found guilty and after the
trial several jurors acknowledged that they voted to find him guilty based on their belief
that he molested children, even though it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt in
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the case before them? Should there be a mechanism to challenge that verdict? It is
unlikely that such a circumstance would warrant a hearing much less a setting aside of
the verdict. The verdict was reached without extrinsic misconduct and the thought
process described by the hypothetical juror's interviewed was exactly that - a thought
process.
It is also unbelievable that jurors selected for a high profile case will first ponder
prospective book deals or notoriety only upon the conclusion of the case after rendering
the verdict. It is simply not plausible that this opportunity is not considered by
empanelled jurors during the trial or deliberations. The extent that self interest of the
juror or jurors impacts upon their decision making and thus, the outcome is a potential
corruptor of the process. Likewise in a trial of local notoriety, if the present culture of
post-trial jury room disclosure by fellow jurors of the details of deliberations leads jurors
to anticipate a public post-mortem analysis of the deliberations, the intra-deliberative
debate could become nuanced and stilted. Jurors should be able to verbally muse as to all
options in the jury room without fear of the publishing of their thoughts. Because jurors
may have concern about public reaction not only to their verdict, but the content of the
debates and straw votes had during deliberations. With the loss of the candor and
spontaneity of the jury's deliberations comes a diminution of that ingredient essential to
any trial -fairness based on due deliberation.
The jury which convicted Lord Conrad Black on 5 of the 14 fraud and obstruction counts,
in post trial interviews with the press, indicated that they were motivated to reach a
verdict because a relative had advised a juror that the foreign press has said they were
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"too stupid to understand the complex case" That prompted the defense team to announce
that they had launched an investigation with the objective of moving to set aside the
verdict.!"
Conversely in other high profile cases juries have as a group declined to be interviewed
and to comment on their verdict'j" or to only comment on the condition of anonymity. I 55
The number of juries that comment as opposed to those who do not is unknown. Can we
postulate that those juries who do comment have caused a potentially corrosive effect on
public jury confidence?
While press interviews with jurors post-trial can be revealing, they may be viewed by the
public at large, who are future jurors, with a jaundiced eye. It might be very different if
the press accounts were reporting regular judicial incursions into the jury room, with full
blown proceedings such as occurred in People v. Ilarlan, with jurors taking the stand
forced to defend their deliberations because interviews given to the press suggest a
miscarriage of justice.l'" People v. Harlan will be discussed in detail below.
153 Mary Wisniewski, Defense in Black Case Looks Into Jurors Remark, Chicago Sun Times, July
17,2007 at 12i, httpllwww.suntimes.com/business/hollinger/470995. cst-nws-conradI7.articles
(July 17,2007).
154 Gary Gately, Man Convicted ill Costly Maryland Arsons, New York Times, Sept. 3, 2005 at pg
A 11 "Ending the 13 day trial in Federal District Court, the jury of seven men and five women
found Mr. Walsh guilty on 36 counts after deliberating about seven hours. Jurors declined to
comment."
155 Fernanda Santos, Second Defendant is Guilty of Killing of College Students, Fri. Sept. 30,
2005. New York Times B5 "We went over every piece of evidence. We looked at the testimonies
again and again to make sure we came to the right decision" said one juror who spoke on the
condition of anonymity because she said she feared reprisal "We're just regular people, but we all
gave our blood, sweat and tears, and in the end, we think justice was served". Convicting two
Brooklyn, N.Y. gang members in New York State Supreme Court of murder and robbery ofa 19
rear old college student.
56 People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448, 2005 Colo. LEXIS 310 (2005).
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5. The Confused or Mistaken Jury
Another example is also a real life and somewhat common situation, juror confusion or
misunderstanding of the law or the judge's instructions. For example, jurors in a capital
case who were given written instructions to take into the jury room, undisputedly misread
the Judge's instructions. The jurors wrongly concluded that if they were a hung jury,
unable to agree on the sentence, a life sentence would result. In fact, a hung jury would
have resulted in a new sentencing proceeding. The sole holdout juror changed her vote to
death in part because she was persuaded it was unfair to impose her will on the other
eleven jurors who favored death. The holdout learned of her mistake post-verdict,
contacted the judge and a post-trial application was made to no avail. This honest
mistake was confirmed by several of the pro-death penalty jurors. The Court declined to
set aside the verdict. I 57
The Federal Courts decline to set aside verdicts where the jury misunderstood or
misapplied the evidentiary rules given to it.158
In Canada a verdict cannot be impeached because the jury misunderstood the judge's
directions or ignored important evidence.159 In New York likewise jury confusion is
regarded as part of the jury's intrinsic deliberations and thus not amenable to
157 Scott E. Sundby, A Life and Death Decision - A Jury Weighs the Death Penalty, (Macmillan,
2005) 90-123.
158 U.S. v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634 (9th CIR., 2004).
159 R. v. Dyson (1971) 5 C.C.C.(2d) 401 (ONT. H.C.J.) per Haines J.
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impeachment of the verdict.l'" English Courts have routinely declined to probe juror
reports of errors in verdicts.l'"
6. Failures to Deliberate
The internal events of the jury deliberations may include a deliberative process that that is
violative of the juror's oath. The various jurisdictions are divided regarding whether or
not such behaviour warrants a new trial.
The U.S. Federal Courts do not generally permit testimony about the reaching of a verdict
by an improper method such as a majority vote (in a unanimous jurisdiction) or a chance
manner such as drawing lots, although FRE 606(b) is silent as to the issue.162
New York takes a different view, holding that it was an error not to conduct an inquiry
where a juror wrote a note to her employer before deliberations began that she would be
making it to work "beyond a reasonable doubt".163 A conviction was reversed and a new
trial was ordered where during deliberations a juror sent a note to the judge indicating
that several jurors reached a compromise verdict not based on the evidence but rather on
a desire to finish the deliberative process. The note advised that one juror in particular
the juror was voting contrary to any belief about the facts and law simply to complete the
160 People v. Paz, 159AD.2d 987 (4th Dept.), Iv. Denied, 76 N.Y.2d 793 (1990); on
reconsideration, Iv. denied 77 N.Y.2d 842 (1991).
161 Lalchan Nanan v. The State [1986] AC. 860, R. V. Milward [1999] 1 Cr.App.R. 61.
162 F.R.E. 606(b) Advisory Committee's Notes (1972); Scoglin v. Century Fitness, Inc., 780 F.2d
1316, 1319-1320 (81h Cir. 1985) (The Court barred testimony by a third person that a juror
advised that quotient verdict was used in a civil case, reasoning that the testimony was barred by
F.R.E.606(b). Moores Federal Rules Pamphlet, 2005, Part 2 Federal Rules of Evidence, 606.5, p.
408.
163 People v. McClenton, 213 AD.2d 1 (1st Dept., 1995).
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case. The Appellate Court criticized the trial judge's failure to determine whether that
juror did in fact vote in a manner inconsistent with his views of the evidencc.l'"
In California the narrow interpretation of the common law rule was expanded and it was
permissible to impeach the verdict of the jury because the verdict was reached by lot,
chance, showing of corruption, or statements in or outside of the jury room which would
likely influence the verdict irnproperly.l'"
In Canada, the court did not consider the evidence of a Sheriff who, eavesdrops while
standing outside a jury room, and as a result had overheard deliberations to the effect that
the verdict outcome would be a majority vote:
"The principle which precludes a court from accepting the
evidence of a juror, either oral or by affidavit, as to what
transpired in the jury room or jury box, for the purpose of
impeaching their verdict, is equally applicable to the
evidence of a stranger to such proceeding, regardless of
how extensive may be his information or the manner in
which it was obtained. It is only a matter of common sense
to say that an allegation of impropriety or irregularity in the
jury's deliberation, as suggested in the stranger's testimony,
could only be properly met by calling members of the
jury.,,166
In England and Wales the Law Lords were unmoved by a juror's report of a failure to
deliberate with regard to co-defendant Rollock first finding him not guilty and fellow
defendant Connor guilty after 6 hours and 46 minutes of deliberations. There was a
disturbance within the jury box when the jury announced their verdict. The jurors were
asked to retire to discuss their verdicts and returned in four minutes, finding both
164 People v. Fermin, 235 A.D.2d 328 (1st Dept., 1977).
165 People v. Spello, 6 CAL.App.3d 685 (1970, 2nd DIST); Johns v. City of Los Angeles (1978,
2nd Dist) 78 CAL.App.3d 983.
166 R. v. Perras (1974) 18 C.C.C. (2d) 47,51.
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defendants guilty by a vote of 10/2. The Law Lords reasoned that it was obvious that
there was deliberation about the commission of the crime by both defendants, thus the
brief return to the jury room prior to rendering judgment did not cause a clear sense of
.. di h LLd 167rmscarnage accor mg to t e aw or s.
B. Lord Mansfield's Rule Provokes Contemporary Debate and Exceptions
But Remains Vital Despite American's Talking Jurors
In Tanner v. U.S. members of the jury post-trial acknowledged to being under the
influence of alcohol during the trial. Despite that concession, the United State Supreme
Court declined to order a hearing regarding allegations of jury incompetence and
misconduct.168
Such a result provokes argument for the creation of a new threshold for the review of
jury verdicts based on the image of an impaired partying jury, which is inconsistent with
due deliberation. In practice, however, the jury's task is not amenable to standard
retrospective legal scrutiny. For example, there is no transcript of the jury room
deliberations. Unlike a legislative body, where the intent of the statute is of significance,
the jury is asked to resolve factual questions based on the law presented by the judge.
Thus, there is also no statement of intent authored by the jury as a whole or by individual
jurors. The deliberative process followed by a jury will likely include debate, hyperbole,
overstatement, invective, anger, compassion, and humor, but a single word verdict is the
result. Juries do not give a written rationale to explain their verdict unlike a trial by
judge.
167 R. v. Mirza, Connor, and Rollock, supra, note 128.
168 Tanner v. V.SA8 U.S., 107.
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In his dissent, Lord Steyn, quoting Lord Devlin, makes a compelling argument that jurors
are treated comparably to judges and thus the standard to evaluate juror conduct is a
breach of the oath:
"As the jury changed its character from a body of witnesses
into a body of persons who had to determine facts on the
evidence placed before them, it became a judicial tribunal
and fit to be invested with judicial attributes. The Judges
punished as misconduct any deviation by the members of
the jury from judicial standards and as a contempt of court
any interference by outsiders with the discharge of their
judicial duties. There is no code embodying this. The rules
came into existence piecemeal during the long period in
which the jury was changing character. Jurymen are
invested with judicial immunity. They have full judicial
privileges and are not accountable for anything said or done
in the discharge of their office, and any threats or abusive
language directed towards them as jurymen is punishable as
a contempt of court.,,169
Lord Steyn in R. v. Mirza argues for the application of this test as the basis for an
exception to the rule --<lidthe juror possibly violate his/her oath in the deliberations. This
test is rejected by the Law Lords in favor of maintaining an absolute rule against probing
into jury deliberations.
Violation of oath is not the present standard in England and Wales, where there is
presently very little flexibility to the rule. As we have previously noted, the nearly
absolute rule in England and Wales does have some exceptions, as in where a third party
saw the jury misconduct.V" or where the bailiff gave the jury extra evidential
169R. v. Mirza, supra note 128, at #6, quoting :ord Devlin, supra note 152, p.41.
170 Harvey v. Hewitt (1840) 8 Dow1598, 599 Bailiff overheard the jury drawing lots.
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information'{' or where a Ouija board was consulted in the jury hotel room while
sequestered.F? or where a juror did not understand English.·73
The Ouija board case demonstrates that the present rule has provoked a tortured treatment
by England and Wales of jury misconduct. Four members of a 12 person jury
sequestered for the evening in a hotel consulted an ouija board which advised them that
the defendant was guilty and the next day there was a unanimous vote for conviction.
The trial judge was notified of this occurrence and permitted an inquiry into the jury's
conduct at the hotel, reasoning that the event during hotel sequestration is not
deliberations.i " This is a rare distinction painfully reached carving out a dubious
exception to address an obvious injustice.
Otherwise the Law Lords have strictly applied §8 of the Contempt of Court Act and the
common law rule that the court will not investigate or receive any evidence about
statements made in the jury room in the course of the jury's deliberations after they have
retired to consider their verdict. The majority of the Law Lords in R. v. Mirza, R. v.
Connor, and R. v. Rollock, accepts the intrinsic influence/extrinsic influence distinction
established by Canadian courts and rejects both the American form of post-trial
proceedings wherein the jury would be questioned regarding the potential misconduct but
not about the actual deliberations and the violation of oath test of Lord Steyn.!" In R v.
Pan,176 the Supreme Court of Canada drew a distinction between (a) statements made,
171Rv. Brandon (1969) 53 CR. App. R. 466. Bailiff advised the jury of prior convictions
172 R v. Young (Stephan), [1995] 2 Cr. App. Rep. 379.
173Ras Beharilal v. King-Emperor (1933) 50 T.L.R. 1.
174R. v. Young (Stephen) supra note 172..
175R. v. Mirza-; R. v. Connor; R. v. Rollock, supra note 124 per Lord Hope of Craighead at ~120.
176Rv. Pan; Rv. Sawyer, [2001] 2 SCR 344, ajJ. 134 C.C.C. (3d) 1.
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opinions expressed, arguments advanced and votes cast by members of a jury in the
course of their deliberations, which were held to be inadmissible and (b) evidence of
facts, statements or events extrinsic to the deliberation process whether originating from a
juror or a third-party, that may have tainted the verdict, which were held not to be
inadmissible under the common law rule.
By contrast, Lord Steyn, in his dissent in Mirza did not view Section 8(1) of the
Contempt of Court Act as holding that the jury's internal deliberation is impenetrable
where there is an apparent miscarriage of justice. Moreover, Lord Steyn asserts that the
common law rule must be modified to detect and remedy miscarriages offering the
potential of the juror oath as the basis for inquiry into juror behaviour.l "
It is readily apparent from R. v. Young and R. v. Mirza that the actual deliberations are
absolutely protected in England and Wales -- not to be disturbed by any report of
misconduct, interpreting Section 8( I) of the Contempt of Court Act as an absolute
prohibition from any inquiry into the deliberative events in the jury room:
"To give the Court power, after verdict, to inquire into
those deliberations, would force the door of the jury room
wide open. If one dissentient juror or sharp-eared bailiff
alleged irregularities in the jury room, the Court would be
pressed to inquire into the jury's deliberations.l'V"
177 R. v. Mirza, supra note 124, at ~5 Lord Steyn's reasoning is as follows: "One is not dealing
with a cost benefit analysis: a miscarriage of justice bears on real individuals, their families, and
communities. If the law requires a individual case to be subordinated to systemic considerations
affecting the jury system, one may questions whether the law has not lost its moral underpinning"
and at ~17 "The Common Law rule is a judge made rule. Where the reason for a Judge made rule
stops, it may be appropriate to qualify its reach ... So far as Judges have propounded a rule
which, in light of experience, is potentially productive of injustice, it is not beyond their power to
put it right."
78 R. v. Young, supra note 172, at 382.
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The Mirza majority clearly valued the finality of jury verdicts as outweighing the
correcting of the occasional injustice.
Lord Steyn reasons that a caveat to the rule that would be based on the simple notion that
breaches of oath are amenable to post verdict factual inquiry would not open the door to
excessive review, but would permit examination of plausibly alleged injustices. This
would include the spectrum such as a failure to deliberate, ouija board use and/or lots and
racism.I79 He notes that while such a modification of the present rule may lead to more
post trial applications regarding jury conduct this is not a sound policy reason to ignore
all because it is likely some are true.I80
The nuances noted by the Court in R. v. Young, where "possible extrinsic influences on a
jury in retirement have been investigated by the Court", are narrow, ignore intrinsic
misconduct and therefore truly not exceptions to the rule in support of Lord Steyn' s
argument.'!'
179 Mirza, supra note 124, at ~16, Lord Steyn notes that in R. v. Young, supra, counsel for the
Director Public Prosecutions accepted the argument that "if the foreman of a jury took a coin out
of his pocket in the jury room, the evidence about the tossing of a coin in the jury room to obtain
a verdict was inadmissible".
18°Mirza, supra note 124, at ~12.
181R. v. Young, Note 172, at 383. The Court cites R v. Hood (1968) 52 CR. App.R. 265; Rv.
Brandon (1969) 53 CR App.R. 466 and R. v. McCluskey (l994) 98 C.R. App. R. 216; but each
case the Court reasons did involve an inquiry into the actual deliberations, as Hood involved a
juror acquaintance learned at trial, Brandon remarks by a bailiff to a juror about the Defendant's
record and McCluskey the use of a cell phone from the jury room on business - all as possible
extrinsic influences and not an inquiry into the deliberation. However the mechanism of inquiry
differed. In Brandon the Court's inquiry was based on facts that formed the basis for a reference
by the Home Secretary, by contrast in Hood the Court of Appeal considered the affidavit of a
juror obtained post verdict. The Court reasoned that this was not interfering with the internal
workings of the jury and extrinsic to the jury room deliberations because the contents of the
Affidavit only dealt with whether or not the juror was aware of the Defendant's prior criminal
convictions. The Court determined that the juror clearly was but examining "the formidable body
of evidence against the accused man" the Court concluded that there was no miscarriage of
justice. Hood at page 270.
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In summary Lord Steyn argues that the "Court of Appeal has the power in exceptional
cases to examine material regarding jury deliberations tending to show that the jury or
some of them were false to their oath" while accepting the general rule that deliberations
of the jury must remain secret.182 His view remains outside the mainstream, but
potentially resonant with time as we will see later in this chapter.
The Canadian application of the rule is comparable to England and Wales. As noted
above in R. v. Pan,183the Supreme Court of Canada upheld verdicts in three cases, two
tried concurrently, finding that the Canadian statutory requirements provide that jurors
not discuss jury room deliberations post trial. Therefore any intrinsic factors discussed
in the jury room could not be the subject of judicial inquiry, but extrinsic factors could be
the subject of post-verdict review. Again this is the subject of lively debate, as a
dissenter in the intermediate Appellate Court, Judge Finlayson assumed a posture
similar to that of Lord Steyn and argued that the rule should be more flexible, advocating
what he characterized as a case by case approach because it was "incumbent on the Court
to do more than maintain blind allegiance to a rule that may work an injustice".184 Judge
Finlayson, like Lord Steyn, argued that remedies should be fashioned in a way that works
justice in the particular case.
The most noteworthy exception to the hard and fast Canadian rule that intrinsic
information regarding deliberations should not be considered is an isolated case where
the Court investigated an allegation of third party communications to the jury, advising
182R. v. Mirza" supra note 124, ~8, 9.
183 Rv. Pan, supra note 176.
184 Id ..
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the jurors that they would be kept in deliberations if they did not reach a verdict. In
addition, the jury believed that the trial judge could not be asked for a clarification as to
what constitutes a hung jury.18SThe Supreme Court noted in Pan (supra) that this
"appears to be the only Canadian decision which has allowed the disclosure of jury
deliberations for the purpose of impeaching the verdict".186
The Supreme Court of Canada reasoned in R. v. Pan that finality is crucial to the justice
system, that a jury is a judicial body and thus the processes by which it arrives at a
verdict is comparable to judicial decision writing and therefore confidential. Noting that
America does not have a statute in any jurisdiction comparable to S. 649 of the Canadian
Criminal Code prohibiting jurors from public discussions of a jury verdict, the
consequence for America has been the spawning of extensive litigation regarding Lord
Mansfield's rule, generally adhering to the notion that intrinsic communications are not
permitted, but "extraneous prejudicial information" and evidence about outside
influences are admissible.!"
If America were to impose restrictions on juror comment post trial, there is a legal thicket
imposed by the First Amendment impeding any formal broad based prohibition on jury
speech. One suggested path around the barrier is the argument that although the
government cannot interfere "with the right of the press to publish jurors remarks, and
perhaps with the publics right to solicit such remarks, restriction on the jurors right to talk
I . . I bI ,,188may present esser constitunona pro ems.
185 R. v. Zacharias (1987) 39 C.C.C. (3d) 280 (B.C.C.A.).
186 R. v. Pan, supra note 176, at ~66.
187 Id., at ~66.
188 Note: Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 Harvard Law. Rev. 886 (1993).
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Courts have in certain instances withheld juror's names and addresses by post trial orders
directing that there be no discussion of jury deliberations post-trial between the media
and the public and jurors have been viewed with disfavor by the Appellate CourtS.189
Other Federal Courts have restricted post verdict contact between jurors and the news
media.!"
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit may well have upheld the most cogent
American procedure for juror post-trial interviews affirming a trial Court court order that
held:
No person may make repeated requests for interviews or
questioning after a juror has expressed his or her desire not
to be interviewed.
No interviewer may inquire into the specific vote of any
juror other than the juror being interviewed.l'"
Other types of American juries are accorded this protection. For example, grand juries,
the legally constituted body which renders indictments, in New York State operate in
secret. Grand jurors are compelled by statute from disclosing "the nature or substance of
any grand jury testimony, evidence or any decision result or other matter attending a
189Re Express News Corp 695 F2d 807 (5th Cir. 1985) (no showing of need to deny press access
to jurors); U.S. v. Sherman, 581 F2d 1358 (9th Cir., 1978) (no showing of a clear and present .
danger or a serious imminent threat to a competing interest to the First Amendment); Journal Pub.
Co. v. Mechem 801 F2d 1233 (loth Cir., 1986).
190 U.S. v. Harrelson 713 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir., 1983), cert, denied 465 U.S. 1041,79 L. Ed 714,
104 S.Ct. 1318; U.S. v. Franklin 546 F. Supp. 1133 (1982 ND Ind); U.S. v. Doherty 675 F. Supp.
719 (1987 D.C. MASS).
191 U.S. v. Harrelson, supra note 190, at 1118; see also, In Re Express-News Corp, 695 F.2d 807
(5th Cir. 1982) at 810 "Jurors, even after completing their duty, are entitled to privacy and to
protection against harassment"; and U.S. v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), explained in
U.S. v. Harrelson at 1118 as follows: "There we held generally that members of the press, in
common with all others, are free to report whatever takes place in open court but enjoys no
special First Amendment right of access to matters not available to the public at large. The
particulars of jury deliberation fall in the latter class, and the Courts narrow restriction was well
within its discretion."
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grant jury proceeding".192 By analogy it has been argued that Landmark
Communications Inc. v. Virginia'i" where the Supreme Court permitted the contempt
punishment of those who breached the confidentiality of a judicial proceeding, indicates
"that subsequent penalties for disclosures by participants in secret government
proceedings would not violate the First Amendment".194
One influential American commentator has called upon American jurisdictions to adopt a
prohibition comparable to the U.K.' s §8 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981, and
Canada's Criminal Code, recommending legislation that would make it a contempt to
obtain, disclose or solicit and particulars of statements made, opinions expressed,
arguments advanced or notes made by members of the jury in the course of their
deliberations in any legal proceeding.!" Despite an array of post-trial juror comment, the
call has largely gone unheeded.
Recently a jury verdict imposing the death penalty was overturned after post trial contact
between an investigator and a juror months after the trial raised the issue of jury
misconduct.l'" The concerns of the majority of the Law Lords in Mirza that a post-
verdict proceeding querying jurors could tum into an effort to examine the actual
processes followed by the jury are vindicated, as that is exactly what happened in People
v. Harlan. After the Defendant Harlan was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death, an investigator for the defendant interviewed some members of the jury. Those
192N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §190.254(a) (McKinney's 1993).
193435 U.S. 829 (1978).
19~ote: Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, supra at 903.
195Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Post Verdict Interviews 6
ILL. L. Rev. 295 at 301-302 (1993).
196People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448, 2005 Colo. LEXIS 310 (2005).
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interviews raised sufficient questions about the jury deliberations that the trial judge
ordered a hearing regarding whether or not the jury during its deliberations was subject to
extra-evidentiary influence, specifically reading by jurors of passages from the Bible
during deliberations. The post-verdict hearing was to narrowly determine what factually
in terms of extrinsic contact occurred and to decide whether this extrinsic material was
used in the jury's deliberations. The trial court did not limit the proceeding to testimony
simply about whether or not bible passages were used in the jury room as a part of the
deliberations and the specifics of the passages.l'" The testimony in the hearing was not
only that the jury read or had read to it several specific biblical passages from a Bible and
a Bible index and handwritten notes during deliberations, it also included a detailed
account of how the jury reached its verdict, including jurors testifying regarding their
reasoning and describing the breakdown of the voting, contrary to the objective test used
in Colorado. That test provides that to determine if the conduct prejudiced the jury, the
court must weight what influence the improperly introduced evidence would have had on
a typical juror and not on the specific jurors who rendered the verdict.198 Thus, the trial
court abandoned the test of whether the exposure would influence a typical juror or jury
and sanctioned an inquiry into the jury's internal workings and thought processes. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals decried the trial Court's failure to protect the jury's inner
workings but still overturned the jury's verdict which imposed the death penalty,
197People v. Harlan, supra note 196, at 461, the dissent of Judge Rice is illuminating: "However,
in this case, each ofthe 12 jurors testified not only about whether extraneous information was
brought into the jury room, but also about what impact, if any, the presence of a Bible in the jury
room had on those deliberations. As a result, there is no need to assess the impact of the biblical
passages on the "typical" jury. Rather we know from the sworn testimony of the jurors
themselves that not even one of the jurors was influenced by these biblical passages to vote for
the death penalty, and thus, the biblical passages were not prejudicial."
198Peoplev. Wadle, 97 P.2d 932 (2004); Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 1139 (1987).
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rejecting the prosecution's argument in that both sides had mentioned the Bible both in
opening statements during the trial and closing statements, and rather found the biblical
readings to be extrinsic, thereby justifying the original premise for the hearing.i'"
The facts in this case create a further irony. The jury charge in People v. Harlan
instructed the jurors as follows regarding weighing the death sentence:
"This consideration involves a process in which you must
apply your reasoned judgment in deciding whether the
situation calls for life imprisonment or the imposition of the
death penalty.
You must still all make a further individual moral
assessment of whether you've been convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the death penalty instead of life in
prison is the appropriate punishment." 200
Presumably a part of that moral judgment could have been based on biblical references
that were made by lawyers and witnesses during the trial. The referencing of the Bible
during summations introduced extrinsic evidence, therefore the moral reasoning of the
jurors during the deliberation could reference those quotations and references.
Moreover, during voir dire a juror who was later involved in the intra deliberative use of
the Bible was asked whether he ascribed to the idea of an eye for an eye, he replied, "No,
I can't", stating that his philosophy shaped by his readings of the Bible was "to be as fair
as I can in everything that I do". The defendant's father, who voluntarily turned
199Peoplev. Harlan, supra note 196. The specific biblical references heard by the jury were
Leviticus 24:202:N3 "fracture for fracture eye for eye, tooth for tooth, as he has caused
disfigurement of a man, so too shall it be done to him. And whoever kills an animal shall restore
it, but whoever kills a man shall be put to death." Also Romans 13:1 "let every soul be subject to
the governing authorities for there is no authority except from God and the authorities that exist
are appointed by God". From the juror testimony post hearing.
200 People v. Harlan, supra note 196.
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incriminating evidence over to the police, indicated in his testimony during the
sentencing phase of the trial that he had not given up on his son consistent with the
teachings of the Bible, stating, "God never gave up on a living man, I won't either", and
that "God gave life and only God can take it.,,201
In the summation during the trial the defense counsel, noting that there had been
testimony that the defendant had read the Bible with his father, compared the defendant's
father to the biblical figure Abraham, incorporating those references to the Bible into the
defense's plea for mercy. As noted above, the Supreme Court found that this was not a
waiver and modified the death sentence to life without parole based on the extrinsic
biblical information.
The foregoing incursions into the jury's deliberative process accentuate the continued
relevance of the rule and the risks associated with carving out exceptions to it. Modifying
the American rule to permit jurors post verdict to discuss their own views but not views
of other jurors, may be a reasoned compromise. Allowing courts in Canada and England
and Wales to inquire into plausible allegations of racism, physical bullying, and
violations of the juror's oath such as non deliberation or drawing of lots would protect
against documented miscarriages of justice.
IV. Juror Privacy and Protection
A. Juror Rights
Jury duty in the u.s. may appear to be the very definition of a hostile work place.
Herded around by authority figures in groups, required to give intimate details about their
201 People v. Harlan, supra note 196. Dissent of Judge Rice.
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life in front of a gathering of strangers that includes a person charged with a crime and
his/her family and friends, they are given restrictions as to who they may speak with and
the content of their speech, even bathroom use is regulated by an authority figure. They
are unable to ask questions without permission, but are charged with the ultimate
responsibility for the freedom of another based on facts presented by question and
answer. That person may be very dangerous and may have dangerous friends. They are
forced to render a verdict in public in front of the defendant and his/her family and
friends and are discharged without security outside of the courthouse even though the
Defendant likely knows where they live.202 The foregoing circumstances reflect
situations which provoke emerging concerns in America. In neither England and Wales,
nor Canada do these concerns presently seem as prominent.i'"
It is only in the last part of the 20th century that there has been serious consideration that
jurors actually may have rights and then only in limited quarters. For example, Harry
Kalven Jr. and Hans Zeisel in the highly regarded book "The American Jury" made no
reference to jury privacy issues or juror rights.i'" More recently in England and Wales,
the Auld report makes no mention of jurors' rights (although specific recommendations
to make jury duty less onerous are set forth).205
Both California and New York have developed statutory schemes which are highly
protective of jurors' privacy rights in criminal cases. Both states limit public access to
202 Citizen's Jury Project, Spring 2003, Report on Juror Concerns, December 1,2002.
203 See for example, The Auld Report (2001), supra, note 16, and Christopher Granger, The
Criminal Jury Trial in Canada (2nd Edition 1996, Carswell), neither raising jury rights as an
issue but each commenting on the need to improve jury accommodations.
204 Harry Kalven Jr., and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury, (1966).
205As noted earlier, this report did call for a broadening of the jury pool, which became law, and
rejected American style voir dire.
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jurors' private information over and above name and age. In each state access to the
jurors private information requires an application to the Court, in California to the trial
Court in which the juror served206 and in New York to the Appellate Division, the State's
intermediate Appellate Court.207
The State of California has structured one of the most comprehensive systems in the
U.S.A. for juror privacy and protection. Jurors' names, addresses and telephone numbers
are to be sealed subject to further order of the court. Under the California statutory
scheme anyone may petition for these records, but good cause must be shown to be
weighed against a compelling interest in the protection of juror identities. Recall
however that the Michael Jackson trial which occurred in California Superior Court, was
governed by these rules. The rules were effectively negated by the jury's post trial
disclosure of their names and the detailed description of the deliberations, epitomized by
the entire jury holding a press conference post-trial and thereafter repeated separate
public interviews.t'"
The California statute defines compelling interest as protecting jurors from threats or
danger or physical harm, but does not specifically acknowledge a right to privacy.
206 Cal. Civ. Prac. Code §206(b) gives jurors the absolute right not to discuss their verdict or
deliberations with anyone and requires their consent before contact. Cal. Civ. Prac. Code §237
strengthened jurors protections by permitting sealing juror information after a criminal case
where there was a compelling governmental interest. Both sections permit the defense to apply
for the information on notice to the prosecution and the jurors.
207 New York Judiciary Law §508 (McKinney's Pocket Part pg. 24) provides that juror
questionnaires and records "shall be considered confidential and shall not be disclosed except to
the County Jury Board or as permitted by the Appellate Division". Newsday v. Sise, (1987) 71
N.Y.2d 146,524 N.Y.S.2d 35,518 N.E.2d 930, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 2823, 486 U.S. 1056,
100 L.Ed.2d 924; Herald Co. V. Roy (4th Dept., 1985) 107 A.D.2d 515,487 N.Y.S.2d 435,
appeal dismissed 65 N.Y.2d 922, N.Y.S.2d 1031,483 N.E.2d 135, appeal denied N.Y.2d 610,
494 N.Y.S.2d 1025,484 N.E.2d 1052.
208 People Magazine, June 27,2005 at pages 60-61.
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However, there is an implied recognition of juror privacy rights in the form of a statutory
provision which requires the court to give jurors notice of any application for the release
of their names and other information and it allows the jurors affected to appear in writing,
in person, by telephone, or through counsel to oppose the application. The court may in
its discretion hold a hearing on the application or in the alternative may grant the relief or
deny the application setting forth its reasons.i'"
While minimal by the standard of England and Wales, the limiting of post trial access to
jurors by American courts has incited press concern about the First Amendment right of
access to information about the judicial system, coupled with ongoing questions as to
whether or not that right attaches during the trial (including voir dire) and subsequent to
the tria1.210
Following California's example, the Colorado Supreme Court over and above their
statutory scheme, adopted revised rules of procedure for all State Court proceedings
209Califomia Civ. Prac. Code §237 (West 1996). While other states have enacted measures
protecting juror privacy, this law is undisputedly the most comprehensive statute in America
protecting juror rights. Comparable statues are: rex Cod Crim. Proc. Code Ann. 35-29 (West
Supp. 1997) Colo Rev. Stat. 13.71.136 (1999).
210See In re Disclosure of juror Names and Addresses, 592 N.W.2d 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)
(surveying the case law on the subject; in re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 93 (1st Cir.
1990) (although decided on statutory, not constitutional grounds, stating that "impounding juror
names implicates the press. First Amendment right of access to criminal trials"); Contra Costa
Newspapers, Inc. V. Superior Court, 72 Cal. Rpt. 2d 69, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Sullivan V.
National Football League, 839 F.Supp. 6 (D. Mass 1993); In re Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc.,
837 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.lnd. 1992); State V. Swart, 20 Media L. Rep. 1703 (Minn.Ct.App. 1992);
United States V. Butt, 753 F.Supp. 44 (D. Mass 1990); U.S. V. Doherty, 675 F.Supp. 719 (D.
Mass. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 867 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1989); see also In
re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1988) (mandating access to jurors' names and
addresses under common law). In the following case, courts have granted access under the First
Amendment to completed juror questionnaires (which invariably contain jurors. addresses): In re
Application of Wash. Post (United States V. George), 20 Media L. Rep. 1511 (D.D.C. 1992);
Copley Press, Inc. V. San Diego County Superior Ct., 278 Ca1.Rptr. 444, 18 Media L.Rep. 1800
(Ct.App. 1991); Lesher Communications, Inc. V. Superior Ct., 274 Ca1.Rptr. 154,18 Media
L.Rep. 1331 (Ct. App. 1990).
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which seals "locating information of jurors" (particularly addresses) - both as to jurors
are participating in open court as empanelled jurors or through disclosure of court
records.i!'
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the public and the press have the right to attend
both jury selection and the actual trial in criminal proceedings, with the caveat that
criminal juries can be anonymous upon the demonstration of good cause as mentioned
above.212 The press cannot be enjoined from publishing the names of anonymous jurors
if they obtain the same, as such a injunction is an unconstitutional prior restraint of the
press in violation of the First Amendment.i'?
In California those statutes protecting jurors' privacy have received broad application,
with one Appellate Court concluding that a juror's refusal to be contacted post verdict
constitutes a compelling governmental interest which permits the Court pursuant to
statute to not release the juror's private information, in part because the history of
California statutes includes incidents of jurors being threatened post verdict.i" If the
defendant finds evidence of juror misconduct or external influences the judge may upon
21127Colo Law. 101, 103.07 (Aug. 1998) Publication of newly amended Colo R. Civ. P. 47 (a)
(4) and 347 (a) (4) and Colo. R. Crim. P 24 (a) (4).
212Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 55 (1980), Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [Press
Enterprise I] (holding that a First Amendment right of access applies to voir dire proceedings);
Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise
II][holding that a First Amendment right of access applies to preliminary hearings].
213 U.S. v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001).
214Jones v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1202; 31 Cal Rptr 2d 890, 107
A.D.2d 515 (1994); Cal. App. LEXIS RPTR 745 (1994) page 1209.
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such a proper showing compel the juror to attend court and be questioned at a hearing by
the judge.2lS
New York State by virtue of statute and decisional law will not release specific juror
information such as name, address and telephone numbers, without an order of the
Appellate Division, the State's intermediate appeals court.216 It is settled law in New
York that while jurors' names generally are publicly announced during jury selection,
obtaining the same thereafter requires such an order.217
England and Wales jurors do not have the right to speak post-verdict but they are also
protected from post-verdict interviews. Indeed the Courts routinely remind jurors of this
obligation both in the judge's charge and by notices in the jury room.2lS The Diplock
Commission identified the threat of intimidation as a factor in the decision to try alleged
Northern Ireland terrorists by Judge and not jury in Northern Ireland as of December
1973. Juror intimidation was disputed as a demonstrated basis for the use of non jury
Diplock trials, the proof of jury intimidation utilized by the Diplock Commission having
been characterized as "anecdotal and sketchy".219
Jurors' identities are protected in England and Wales by Contempt of Court Act 1981
Section II which permits a court to prohibit "the publication of that name or matter in
215Jones v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1202; 31 Cal. Rptr 2d 890,
107A.D.2d 515 (1994); Cal. App. LEXIS Rptr 745 (1994)
216New York Judiciary Law §509 (McKinney, 2007).
217Newsdayv. Sise, (2nd Dept., 1986) 120 D.D.2d 8, 71 N.Y.2d 146, certiorari denied 108S.Ct.
2823 (1987); Herald v. Roy, 107A.D.2d 515, 487 N..S.2d 435, appeal dismissed 65 N.Y.2d
922,1031 appeal denied 65 N.Y.2d 610.
218Philip Anisman and Allen Linden, The Media, The Courts and The Charter (Allan Manson
Ed., Carswell, 1986)pg 324.
219S.C.Greer and A. While, Abolishing the Diplock Courts: The Case for Restoring Jury Trial to
Scheduled Offenses in Northern Ireland, p. 52 (London; Cabden Trust 1986).
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connection with the proceedings as appear to be necessary for the purpose for which it
Was withheld". Previous to the passage of this statute, common law prohibition orders
Were issued in a variety of settings.22o While this section does not permit magistrates to
confer anonymity on themselves.r" the distinction between magistrates and jurors is
accentuated by the protections accorded jurors in Contempt of Court Act, 1981, Section
8.222
There are, however, glimpses of what England and Wales jurors think - and it ranges
from decrying the absence of amenities in the courthouse to the notion that English jurors
can ask questions, which is an option that is available but discouraged in the view of one
former juror.223 In Chapter 9 the views of England and Wales jurors and judges
regarding the trial process will be more fully discussed.
22°CliveWalker, Ian Cram and Debra Brogarth The Reporting of Crown Courts Proceedings and
the Contempt of Court Act (1981) 647 The Modem Law Review 55:5 65 (Sept. 1992).
221Rv. Felixstowe Justices, Exparte Leigh (1987), Q.B. 582.
222S.H. Bailey, The Contempt of Court Act [1981] 45 Mod. L.Rev. 301 [1982] at 310-31,
describing the jury interview after the trial of Jeremy Thorpe. In passing the Act the House of
Lords concluded that "any approaches to jurors were unacceptable, whether by "respectable
professors from Birmingham", "Marxist professors from the English Faculty at Cambridge" by
"any scriber or any journalist" or by that "most dangerous animal, the sociologist"'. H.L. Deb,
Vol. 416, Cols 371 (Jan. 20, 1981) (Lord Hutchinson).
223Stephen Lofthouse [1992] The Trials of a UK. Juryman. 142 New Law Journal561. "After
my spell in court I re-read "Jury Service: An Explanatory Leaflet" which is sent to jurors when
they are summoned. (The leaflet is printed in small typeface and is about as seductive a read as
Inland Revenue explanatory notes.) In a section headed "Asking Questions" it is stated that:" "A
juror may write down a question and ask the usher to pass it to the judge". But the inquisitive
juror is put in his place by the following sentence: "Remember the answer may be just around the
comer so wait until you are sure you need to ask a question. Remember also that the rules of
evidence may not allow certain questions to be put."
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B. Anonymous Juries, Invasive Voir Dire, and Juror Mental Health
American jurors are uniquely and increasingly public players in the trials in which they
deliberate. They are named in court routinely and are only anonymous on application to
the court with good cause shown.224
In Canada, while jurors may be identified upon being called in certain provinces, they
may also be anonymous in others_225 Canadian voir dire is far less invasive than in the
U.S., although both challenges for cause and preemptory challenges are allowed as
discussed earlier. A minimal number of questions are permitted which are submitted to
the Court prior to questioning for approval.226
American jurors are subject by name to detailed voir dire in many hideous criminal cases.
There are, however, few reports of jurors being threatened and harmed, with a zero death
rate.227 Fear and intimidation are not uncommon complaints as in the case where a juror
was discharged as grossly unqualified during a drug trial. The sworn juror stated that she
was frightened that "the people in this drug thing may know me" and she expressed
unequivocal fear of retribution.228
224 U.S. v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d CIR. 1979).
225 Christopher Granger, The Criminal Jury Trial in Canada (2d Ed. Carswell 1996) 332; Neil
Vidmar, Pretrial Prejudice in Canada: A Comparative Perspective on the Criminal Jury, 79
Judicature 249 (1976) at 351. No information was given to the lawyers during jury selection in
the criminal trial of Paul Bernardo except answers to eight questions. Names were not given.
226DavidM. Tanovich, et al., Jury Selection in Criminal Trials, supra, 147.
227Abraham Abramousky, The Choices Surrounding Use of Anonymous Juries, NYLJ, Sept. 11,
1993 at 3.
228Peoplev. Santana, 221 A.D.2d 175 (1st Dept., 1995), leave to appeal denied 95 N.Y.2d 962.
See a/so, People v. Chavez, 275 A.D.2d 888 (4th Dept., 2000) juror sobbing out of fear; and
People v. Tisdale, 270 A.D.2d 917 (4th Dept., 2000), leave to appeal denied, 95 N.Y.2d 839.
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However, a California court attributes the present level of statutory protections accorded
jurors to a near miss - a murder case where the defendant murdered his wife and solicited
his daughter's murder hired a private investigator to get the addresses of members of his
jury "for the presumed purpose of working harm",229and as noted above jurors report
fear of the defendant to the court in more than isolated instances.r'''
Jurors reporting fear to judges, jury administrators and academics is not uncommon in
most jurisdictions.i" Jury interviews in both murder and rape cases indicate juror fear of
the defendant. For example, two jurors in a rape case during the voir dire reported
answering personal questions from her jury questionnaire at the bench in the presence of
several men in suits and ties. The questions included the area of the community in which
she resides and the status of her children. Both jurors were surprised to learn shortly
thereafter that one of the men listening during the questioning was the defendant.232
Despite the paucity of incidents of actual jury retribution, there are well documented
reports of taunts, threats and adverse publicity directed toward jurors post-verdict.v'''
Jurors may well experience psychological trauma as a result of jury service although the
precise inciting mechanism of the harm is difficult to establish given that the experience
229Jones v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 26 CAL.App.4th 1202; pg. 1209 quoting Sen.
Com. On Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1200,1991-92 Reg. Session.
230People v. Carrasco, 262 A.D.2d 50 (1st Dept., 1996); People v. White, 204 A.D.2d 750 (2nd
Dept., 1994).
231NancyJ. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in
Criminal Trials, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 123, 1996. See a/so, Fernanda Santos, Second Defendant is
Guilty in Killing of College Student, New York Times, Sept. 20, 2005 at B5.
232Author interview with jurors.
233King,supra note 231. page 128-129.
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of sitting in judgment, hostilities that generally occur during the trial, deliberation and the
actual weight of rendering the verdict are all possibilities.F"
Several independent studies found that jurors in significant cases, such as murder cases,
have experienced post-verdict lingering emotional and physical problems associated with
jury service.i" A larger study concluded that jurors in both traumatic and not traumatic
trials did not develop secondary post-trial stress disorders. However, the study did find
that jurors in traumatic trials:
1) "Were almost six times more likely to develop a sufficient number and
type of symptoms to meet the DSM-III-R symptom criteria for depression
than jurors serving on non-traumatic trials". 236
2) Had a statistically significant higher rate of depression than the rest of
the population.F"
While some advocate providing care for jurors post-trial as well as debriefing sessions for
jurors to reduce post trial consequences.i" there are no cohort studies presently in place
which follow jurors in traumatic trials for a sufficient period of time to permit the
conclusion that jury service has a long-term impact upon jurors. Despite the fact that
some jurors in traumatic trials are situationally depressed by the trial, there is presently
no evidence that the depression impacted their decision making as jurors.239 To the
2341d., 128-129.
235 Stanley M. Kaplan & Carolyn Winget Occupational Hazards of Jury Duty 20 Bull. Am. Acad.
Psych. & L. 325 (1992). Forty interviews with jurors in violent criminal cases found twenty-
seven with post-trial physical and mental complains ranging from bad dreams to pos-traumatic
stress types of complaints.
236 Daniel W. Shuman, Jean A. Hamilton, Cynthia E. Daley, The Health Effects of Jury Service,
Law & Psych. Rev. 267 at 298 (Spring, '94).
237Id., at 298. A questionnaire was mailed to 312 jurors in traumatic and non-traumatic cases - 79
jurors who served on traumatic juries and 73 who served on non-traumatic juries answered. Thus
it was a larger and more scientific study than the Kaplan study.
238JamesE. Kelly, Addressing Juror Stress: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 43 Drake L.Rev. 97
(1993-1995).
239 Shuman, et ai, supra note 236, at 302.
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contrary, given the gory subject matter of traumatic trials, it could be reasonably assumed
that depression is a foreseeable consequence of the event.240 One barrister has aptly
described jury duty as not so much the proverbial fifteen minutes of fame but an
experience more akin to fifteen minutes of dental surgery.f"
A solution advocated by some is the anonymous jury, a concept that can vary in
definition. G. Thomas Munsterman and Paula L. Hannaford of the National Center for
State Courts define the routine use of anonymous juries as follows:
"As a matter of routine practice, the courts withholds the
names, addresses, and other identifying information about
jurors and their families form the parties, their counsel, the
public, and the media. The technique can be sued for either
civil or criminal trials. Procedurally, '''[T]o impanel an
anonymous jury, the court assigns a number to all persons
called for service. This number functions as the juror's
identification number for the entire term of jury service.
The summons for jury service instructs each member of the
jury panel to report to court and to identify him or herself
using the assigned number. Alternatively, the court assigns
the juror identification number when the jury panel member
first reports for service. All references to the juror (e.g. in
jury questionnaires, voir dire, and trial proceedings) that are
accessible to the parties, their counselor the public or
media are made according to this identification number". 242
All Federal Circuit Courts have permitted anonymous juries of public trials in lieu of
named jurors, based on a two part test associated with this exception to general rule.
There must be a real or actually perceived risk to jurors and a proper expression to the
jury of an explanation for anonymity that is not prejudicial to the Defendant.
240 Two death penalty opponents, Scott E. Sunby, A Life and Death Decision, A Jury Weighs the
Death Penalty" ( 2004, Macmillan); Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Jurors Stories of Death, (2004
University of Michigan Press) provides instances of juror post-capital verdict remorse and
depression - but these are not supported by scientific clinical studies.
241 John Cooper, Excessive Strain Falls on Jury Members. The Lawyer, May 8, 2000.
242 G. Thomas Munsterman and Paul L. Hannaford, Jury Trial Innovations 83 (1997).
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Anonymous juries are not routinely granted where there is no showing of risk to jury
safety.243
The anonymous jury is defined differently in New York --it means the name is withheld.
As noted above because in New York the juror's name is routinely provided but no other
detail, a totally anonymous jury can be empanelled upon a proper showing. 244
In California anonymous juries are empanelled without names, addresses, and other
identifying information, with some frequency upon showing a compelling reason,
generally defined as juror safety or potential for media intrusion into the jurors lives.245
In an intriguing twist in one California case the trial court upheld an anonymous jury for
the purpose of trial, but suggested that the defendant make an application for disclosure
of the jurors' names post trial in order to develop their prejudice argument. 246 A number
of other states also allow anonymous juries, requiring the showing of cause for such a
jury. with the decision to empanel an anonymous jury resting within the discretion of the
trial judge so long as such an empanelment occurs in a manner that avoids prejudice to
the defendant. 247 Other states view jury anonymity simply as providing juror names to
counsel but withholding the same from the press. 248
243United States v. Millan-Colon, 834 F.Supp. 78,83-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
244PeopleY. Watts, 173Misc.2d 373, 661 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
24sEricksonY. Superior Court,55 CAL..App.4th 735, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 230 (3d Dist. 1997).
246People Y. Phillips, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1307,66 Cal.Rptr.2d 380 (2d Dist. 1997); reh 'sdenied,
(Sept. 3, 1997) and cert. denied, 118S.Ct. 1395.
247William D. Bremer, Propriety of Using Anonymous Juries in State Criminal Cases, 60
A.L.R.5th 39 (2005).
248WilliamD. Bremer, Propriety of Using Anonymous Juries in State Criminal Cases, supra.
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While routine use of anonymous juries is advocated as a means to improve juror
confidentiality as well as decrease real and perceived risks to jurors, 249anonymous juries
are adamantly opposed by most civil liberties groups and defense lawyer
organizations.i"
"The use of anonymous juries, almost unthinkable in an
American Court even thirty years ago, is now touted as a
panacea for everything from jury tampering to "juror
stress" and threatens to alter the very concept of voir
dire.'.251
The American use of the anonymous jury commenced in u.s. v. Bames.252 It was
sanctioned as a device to protect the safety of jurors in a case where a notorious drug
dealer was on trial. The trial court held that there would be no voir dire on the juror's
names, addresses, religion and ethnic backgrounds based on a showing of risk to the
Jurors.
u.s. v. Barnes prompted concern as anonymous juries have evolved into more common
use, that by its very essence, anonymity would limit the effectiveness of peremptory
challenges.F"
While some commentary about anonymous juries was benign, simply noting that "A.
novel aspect of the Barnes decision was the argument that voir dire inquiry should be
249/d.
250 Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The CaseJor the Routine use oj Anonymous Juries in
Criminal Trials, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 123 (1996).
251 Abraham Abramousky and Jonathan I. Edelstein, Anonymous Juries: In Exigent
Circumstances Only, 13 St. John's lLeg. Commentary 457 (1999).
252604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979).
253Robert J. Christians Voir Dire- Defendants Are Not Deprived of the Intelligent Use of
Peremptories by Voir Dire Restrictions Intended to Protect Potential Jurors SaJety and Privacy,
55Not. Dame L. R. 281 (1979).
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limited in order to protect jurors' rights of privacy" ,254 other comment concluded that if
there were a balancing of rights, the Defendant's right to "a fair trial outweighs any
speculative injury to the jurors' privacy".255
The right to voir dire has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court to a limited extent,
but the Court has not given clearly defined perimeters establishing the scope or limits of
voir dire. For example, inquiries into a juror's religion has been permitted where the
defendant was a Jehovah's witness, and his religious beliefs were likely to be discussed at
trial, as is inquiry into racial bias where the Defendant is a minority or of a race different
from the prospective juror. These inquiries are only permitted on a showing of
compelling interest.256
Juror privacy rights were acknowledged by the Supreme Court in 1984, but the Court
noted that those privacy rights had to be balanced against the rights of the accused.257
While the Supreme Court did not articulate the basis of the juror privacy right, Weinstein
argues that Whalen v. Roe created "a second strain of the privacy: the "individual
254 Case Comments - Voir Dire Limitations Intended to Protect potential Jurors Safety and
Privacy. (1979) 55 Not. Dame. L. 281.
255SerenaKafker, The Defendant's Right to An Impartial Jury and the Rights of Prospective
Jurors, 48 University of Cinn 985 (1979). See also, Christians, supra note 254, page 288, note 57
which lists a few of the questions asked in Barnes like experiences with firearms, narcotics, the
law, racial attitudes. The Barnes voir dire was lengthy and detailed see supra note 253.
256 Pointerv. U.S., 151 U.S. 396 (1893); Swain v. Alabama, 38 US 202 (1965) Daily v. U.S., 139
F.2d 7 (7th Cif. 1943).See also Hain v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) inquiry regarding
racial bias appropriate.
257PressEnterprises v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). The issue before the
Court was public access to voir dire. The Court stated that "The jury selection process may, in
some circumstances, give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when interrogation
touches on deeply personal matters that person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of the
public domain". At 511.
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interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matter" _258 Weinstein further argues that this
privacy right has been extended to financial records, medical history and family life/59
using as the measurement of the disclosure of intimate information:
"the degree to which the person seeking to prevent
disclosure has sought to expose him or herself to public
scrutiny, the breath of the potential disclosure, the
adequacy of safe guards to prevent public disclosure, the
potential injury that might result therefrom and the type of
information sought".260
Utilizing the standard set forth by Weinstein, jurors cannot and should not be viewed as
seeking public attention by virtue of engaging in jury service and their privacy should be
protected zealously by the summoning government. They should be apprised of their
rights in this regard upon the commencement of jury service.
As part of an endeavor by American courts to protect jurors post-verdict, lawyers have
been limited in some states from post-verdict contact with jurors for self education
purposes as well as to discover grounds for impeachment of the verdict or to discover if
the jurors were biased or not properly qualifled.i?' U.S. Courts have denied applications
by the defendants and the press for juror information so that post trial interviews or
258 David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror's Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and
Policy Options, 70 Temple L.Rev. 1 (1997). The first strain of privacy rights according to
Weinstein encompasses "an individual's autonomy in making certain personal decisions", cited in
N17 as cases involving contraception, abortion, and marriage. Whalen v. Roe, 424 U.S. 589
(1977) at 599 and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). In Whalen
the Court considered the right of privacy of patients receiving dangerous medications against the
State's right to regulate the same. In Nixon the Court upheld the right of the public to see certain
offormer President Nixon's papers.
259 di .,pg 5.
260 Id, at 6.
261Dale R. Agathe, Propriety of Attorneys Communication After Trial19 A.L.R. 4, 1209 (2000).
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polling of the jurors could be conducted.if In one case an Appellate Court ordered the
judge to lift an order prohibiting all press contact with former jurors because it was a
prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment rights that was not narrowly
tailored.i'"
C. Invasive American Voir Dire
The common notion regarding the American jury trial is that voir dire exposes jurors
darkest secrets in front of strangers. Unlike the minimalist Canada and non-existent
England and Wales, American voir dire is penetrating and sometimes irrelevantly or
haplessly invasive.i'"
Invasive American voir dire is not a recent development. There is a longstanding history
of detailed American voir dire, which first departed from the English Common Law
tradition by allowing a challenge for partiality based on direct juror interrogation in the
1807 trial of Aaron Burr for treason. "American law retained and expanded the rule to
require only that the juror admit the existence of an opinion to support a good cause of
challenge. ,,265
262U.S.v. Davila, et ai, 704 F.2d 749 (5th Cir., 1983); U.S. v. Doherty, et ai, 675 F.Supp. 719
(1987) (Jurors names and addresses were impounded for seven days after the verdict; U.S. v.
Harrelson, et al v. El Paso Times, 713 F.2d 1114 (1983).
263Joumal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233 (loth Cir. 1986).
264PaulaHannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy A New Frameworkfor Court Policies and
Procedures, 85 Judicature 18 at N.1. Hannaford argues that background checks into jurors are
inappropriate and that some states have banned such activities, noting that the ABA standards on
Juror Use and Management decries independent investigation by attorneys of jurors.
265 R. Blake Brown, Challenges for Cause, Stand Asides, and Peremptory Challenges in the
Nineteenth Century, 38 Osgoode Hall L.J., 453, at page 472. This is a method distinguished form
England where juror partiality was raised in the 19th century through witnesses. Id. 462. The
article also notes the historical differences, stating "the literature suggests that jury challenges
were uncommon in English Courtrooms" between 1200 and 1800 at page 459.
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By statute New York State requires prospective jurors to fill out a detailed questionnaire
that is given to all parties which may be expanded to suit the specific case. The statute
specifically authorizes questions about the juror's place of birth, current address,
occupation, prior jury service, knowledge of, relationship to, or contact with the court,
any party or attorneys. Both the judge and the attorneys are permitted to voir dire jurors
beyond the questionnaire.i'" In capital murder cases, jurors are questioned separately and
may be questioned about racial bias_267Separate questioning of jurors in other cases is
within the sound discretion of the trial judge based on custom and practice_268 In a
serious fraud case recently tried Lord Black's prospective jurors were given a
questionnaire to complete even prior to voir dire. (See Annex D)
America trial lawyers will question prospective jurors regarding their income, religious
beliefs, where they live, and will even drive by their homes. These actions are regarded
as useful windows into the motivations, values and thought process of the jurors. The
broad based questioning occurs because the ascertaining of prejudice is not the only
objective of voir dire. The prime objective of each American trial lawyer is not to get a
fair or neutral jury - it is to get a jury favourable to the attorney's cause_269 Other
aspects of voir dire are designed to determine if the juror is intellectually and emotionally
able to serve on that specific case and to make certain the juror does not discover during
the proof they know key witnesses.
266 Criminal Procedure Law 270.15.
267 Criminal Procedure Law 270.15.
268 Hannaford, supra note 264, at 24 ..
269Andrew T. Berry, Selecting Jurors, 24 Litigation 8, at pg. 8 (Fall, 1997) "You don't (and
shouldn't) really want a fair jury. You want jurors predisposed to your side."
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Uniquely American questions are asked during voir dire about prior illegal behavior --
such as have you or any members of your family utilized illegal drugs-a question that
could very well violate the juror's Fifth Amendment rights against self incrimination and
will likely invite a less than candid response.i" Such invasiveness prompts juror
dishonesty in filling out questionnaires and in responding to questions. Hannaford
adroitly quotes a friend asked during voir dire for a drug trial that "he declined to identify
himself (as did everyone else on the jury panel) when the Judge asked whether anyone
had ever used illegal drugs, 'After all' he explained, I don't know what else they might
use the information for. Isn't there still a Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate
yourself?,,271
The question could be circumspect - rather than "have you ever used illegal drugs", the
phrase "would your life experience either personally or through family or friends make it
difficult for you to be objective in a case involving the alleged illicit sale of drugs" with
the express understanding that a positive answer results in the juror being excused.272
Narrowly tailored voir dire is regarded as limiting the Defendant's Sixth Amendment the
right to trial by jury,273yet there is evidence that juror prejudice is not as significant in
determining the outcome of cases as the American trial bar postulates. There is
270Richard Seltzer, Mark A. Venuti and Grace M. Lopes, Juror Honesty during the Voir Dire, 19
Crim. Just. 451 (1991). This study found that 25% of the questioned prospective jurors failed to
disclose prior criminal victimization by strangers or family members; see also Hannaford, supra
at 24.
27lHannaford,supra note 264, at 24. See also Mary Rose Expectations of Privacy: Jurors Views
of Voir Dire Questions, 85 Judicature 10 (2001).
272 The author's experience is that questions of this type can best be asked by questionnaire or in a
sequestered voir dire, not in the presence of the rest of the panel- so as to avoid educating other
jurors that they can get out of service by answering in the affirmative. See also, James W.
McElhaney, Trial Notebook, 24 Litigation 55, 56 (Fall, 1997).
273JamesGobert, Justice Democracy, and the Jury (Brookfield Vt.; Ashgate Publishing Co, 1997).
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reasonable documentation that lawyers exercising peremptory challenges frequently
strike jurors that are actually favorable to their cause.274 For example in England and
Wales voir dire is virtually non- existent and arguably in favor of the prosecution with the
right to ask jurors to stand aside, yet the defense has a far higher acquittal rate than in
America,275 and American jury verdicts enjoy an eighty percent rate of concurrence from
the trial judge_276
Further buttressing the argument that personal and penetrating voir dire is not only
invasive and offensive to jurors, it is generally not meaningful in achieving outcome
according to Hannaford who reports that "Social Science research demonstrates
repeatedly that the primary factors that influence jury verdicts are evidentiary'Y"
To ensure juror candor during voir dire and to prevent prejudice, a judge in a high profile
case pursuant to court order conducted voir dire in two parts:
1) An extensive jury questionnaire completed by all prospective jurors;
2) Questioning of jurors in private with the attorneys with a stenogra~hic
transcript redacted of names and other matters released the next day.' 8
274JamesW. McElhaney, Trial Notebook, 24 Litigation 55, 56 (Fall, 1997)
275 Penny Darbyshire, For the New Lord Chancellor - Some Causes for Concern About
Magistrates [1997] Crim. L.R. 681, at 889 reports a 40% acquittal rate in Crown Court; Andrew
Ashworth and Michael Redmayne, The Criminal Process, (3d Ed. Oxford University Press, 205)
supra at 264, report "the Crown Court has a much higher acquittal rate than magistrates courts";
Federal Justice Statistics Data Base 2003 - the acquittal rate in U.S. Federal Courts after a trial by
jury is 17%.
276WilliamL. Dwyer, In the Hands of the People (Aspen Press, 2002) at 134.
277PaulaHannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy, supra, 264.
mU.S. v. Stewart, et al., 360 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2004); 305 F.Supp2d 368 (SDNY, 2004).
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The Appellate Court struck the second part of the order opining that jury selection should
be public pursuant to settled law,279and that the appropriate remedy was an anonymous
jury.280
A high profile case with a very complicated fact pattern which included a number of
counts of fraud, offers an opportunity to evaluate voir dire where an anonymous jury was
empanelled. In the politically charged fraud trial of former Louisiana Governor Edwin
W. Edwards and co-defendants, the charges were 34 counts of racketeering (RICO),
mail and wire fraud, illegal wiretapping, money laundering and extortion. The
indictment specifically alleged that Gov. Edwards and his associates extorted kickbacks
from a contractor who was selected to operate a State authorized gambling casino.i"
Governor Edwards had previously been tried on other, unrelated official corruption
charges and there were documented attempts to improperly influence the jury, but the
efforts were never directly linked to him. The government moved to have the jury
empanelled anonymously based on the prior attempts to influence the previous jury.
After a hearing on the matter, the trial judge granted the motion based on the attempts in
the unrelated prior case against Edwards to interfere with the judicial process, primarily
to threaten or bribe witnesses. The trial proceeded with an anonymous jury, however the
279Richmond Newspaper Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 1980, "The right to attend criminal trials
is implicit in the First Amendment at 580; Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.S01
(1984). The right to attend a public trial includes voir dire. Waller v. Georgia 467 U.S. 39
(1984) the constitutional right to access may give way to the right of a fair trial or privacy interest
of prospective jurors but pursuant to Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (supra) the
presumption of openness is not easily overcome.
280U.S. v. Stewart, supra note 278.
28IU.S.v. Edwards, et al, 442 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. LA. 2006; cert denied, 126 S.Ct. 2948, 74
U.S.L.W. 3721 (U.S., June 26, 2006). Edwards and all of this co-defendants but one were
convicted. The Court pre-trial granted jurors anonymous status but also withheld the publication
of its reasons for anonymity until after the trial, in an attempt to avert prejudice to the defendants.
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judge withheld his written decision containing the reasons for an anonymous decision,
not releasing the detailed findings until the final verdict was rendered in order to avoid
any prejudice to the defendants that the specific reasons set forth in the decision might
cause. The court's written decision, released after a verdict of conviction was rendered,
granting the anonymous jury for the following reasons: 1) the nature of the crime
(official corruption), 2) prior allegations of jury tampering against some of the
defendants, 3) the effect of media coverage including the emotional political climate
surrounding the trial, and 4) the fact that each defendant faced a lengthy prison sentence
and significant fines.
A main argument on appeal was that Edwards and his co-defendants were deprived of a
fair trial because of the jury's anonymous status. The Appellate Court affirmed the
conviction, rejecting that argument reasoning both that there was a sound basis for
ordering an anonymous jury and that the jury questionnaire gave the defendants a great
deal of information about the jurors in the Edwards case.282 A detailed analysis of that
questionnaire offers insight into the detailed American voir dire in a complex fraud case.
Prior to the commencement of the voir dire phase of the Edwards' trial, a 116 page
questionnaire was mailed to all jurors. The questionnaire encapsulates in writing typical
voir dire in an American complex fraud case. Its detail further supports the Appellate
rejection of Edwards' claim of prejudice created by anonymity.i'"
282 U.S. v. Edwards, supra note 281, see also Annex 4, the juror questionnaire utilized by the
court in the prosecution of Lord Conrad Black.
283 Id., at 610 to 624.
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For example, the questionnaire asks:
1. Detailed health questions including what
medications taken.
2. Home ownership, listing of other places lived.
3. Detailed marital status.
4. Detailed employment history (absent jobs held) including present
job satisfaction.
5. Government employment history.
6, Detailed business background.
7. Education (including favorite and least favorite
subject) and military background.
8. Detailed questions about the spouse/partner that
cohabits with each of the jurors.
9. Civic involvement, including:
a. Leadership positions held;
h. Political affiliation;
c. Political philosophy, extremely liberal,
liberal, moderate, conservative, extremely
conservative, none of the above.
d. Political campaigning, contributions and/or
participation in campaigns.
10. Religious affiliation, frequency attending church.
11. Attitudes regarding gambling both generally and with regard to
the specific laws at issue in the case.
a. "Do you believe there has been corruption in
the awarding of Louisiana 's Riverboat
Gaming License? (#69)
12. Specific questions about:
a. Gov. Edwards
b. Witnesses who testify about the crime who
have been given plea bargaining agreements.
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c. Prior trials of Gov. Edwards.
13. Newspapers and magazines read.
14. Knowledge of pretrial publicity and the case.
The details of this voir dire, albeit anonymous, are in marked contrast to the jury
selection process in England and Wales where juries are virtually anonymous, and in
Canada.284 It is difficult not to conclude based on range of questions asked in the
questionnaire that the lawyers for both sides in the Edwards case received very detailed
insight into each prospective juror despite the anonymity.
The debate in America regarding juror privacy and how it balances with the Defendant's
6th, gth and 14th Amendment rights invites a careful examination of the philosophy and
motives which underpin and drive jury selection. As we have seen above, despite all
protests to the contrary, the objective of counsel in the American system of jury selection
is multi-focal:
1. To eliminate jurors with prejudice against their client;
2. To empanel jurors who will be friendly or favorable to their client;
3. To empanel jurors who will be favorably responsive to the themes
and important in the case;
4. To prevent the adversary from empanelling a juror who meets 2
and 3.
5. As a last resort, to empanel a juror who meets 1 through 4 and thus,
is neutral.285
284 See Chapter 9, infra.
285 Andrew T. Berry, Selecting Jurors, 24 Litigation 8 (1997).
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This must be contrasted with England and Wales, where a 1982 survey found that the
majority of barristers felt as a matter of principle that juries should be drawn at random
and that they rarely used the right to challenge, quoting one barrister:
"The jury system is, or in any event is intended to be, as I
understand it, a trial by your peers selected at random from
all walks of life. And I think it's wrong that a person
should try and engineer a better jury for himself, by
exercising the right of challenges'Y"
The American voir dire, the absolute opposite of the England/W ales objective of
randomness, is a journey to look into the soul of each prospective jury to attempt to
discern who they are, what they believe, and to predict how they will vote. Yet research
indicates this truly is a poor predictor and that perhaps detailed voir dire is over valued.287
D. The Canadian Alternative
The Canadian system of voir dire offers options to both England and Wales and the
U.S.A.
In a Canadian Criminal trial voir dire commonly consists of virtually no questioning by
the attorneys. The trial judge may inquire regarding health issues, hardship, or
relationship with attorneys or parties."" Indeed the Canadian philosophy of jury selection
in terms of the challenge for cause procedure outlined above is not to determine the
286 Judith Heinz, Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases: A Comparison of Regulation in the
United States, England and Canada, 16 Loy. L.A. Int'I & CompoLJ. 201 (1990-91) at 224 citing
Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar in Judging the Jury (New York, Plenium Press, 1986) at 48-49.
287 Paula Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy, 85 Judicature 18 (20 I) at 25 ..
288 Neil Vidmar, The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching for a Middle Ground, 62 Law and
Contemp. Probs. 141, 150 (1999).
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juror's personality, beliefs, prejudices, likes or dislikesi'", and is not a fishing expedition
to find a favorable or unfavorable juror,290 it is to determine if the juror is not
indifferent.29I
When a determination is made by the trial judge that a challenge for cause meets the
threshold for a hearing to determine juror prejudice, the attorneys are permitted to ask
questions of the jurors based on previously submitted written questions which are
carefully vetted and markedly contrast with the American voir dire.292
A high profile Canadian murder case has received careful analysis by a leading scholar.
In the trial of the "Scarborough Rapist", Defendant Paul Bernardo was accused of two
COunts of first degree murder, kidnapping, unlawful confinement, and aggravated sexual
assault, and one count of indignity to a corpse. The questioning of the jurors for cause
was limited to eight questions after a brief introduction by the judge to the case,
describing to the assembled panel of 980 jurors the nature of the crime, the fact that
certain of the evidence would be graphic and gory and the likely duration of the trial
would be four months.293 Ultimately 225 jurors were called in a selection process that
took five days, lengthy by Canadian standards. The eight questions asked of prospective
Jurors were:
1. Have you heard, read, or seen anything about this case in the media
newspapers, radio or television)?
289R. v. Hubbert, supra note 49, 289-90.290Rv. Sherrat, supra note 49; Granger, supra note 51 at159.
291CanadaCriminal Code, S. 640(1) and (2). The notion is that the juror should be indifferent as
between the Crown and the defendant.
292U.S. v. Edwards, supra note 282, for example discussed at length, supra, and which contains a
detailed jury questionnaire.
293NeilVidmar, Pretrial Prejudice in Canada: A Comparative Perspective on the Criminal Jury ,
79 Judicature 251 (1996).
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2. Have you obtained information about it from anywhere else?
3. Have you read, heard or seen anything about the accused, Paul
Bernardo's character, background or life style?
4. Have you read, heard or seen anything about Karla Homolka or
about her trial?294
5. As a result of this case, some groups and organizations have
circulated petitions or have sought support concerning issues
which relate to this case, the victims, or their families. Have you
supported any of these groups or associations, for example, by
signing a petition, writing a letter of support, or by making a
donation?
6. As a result of any knowledge, discussion, and/or contact with any
group or organization, have you formed any opinion abut the guilt
or innocence of the accused Paul Bernardo?
7. If you have formed an opinion about the guilt or innocence of the
accused, are you able to set aside that opinion and decide this case
only on the evidence you hear in the courtroom and the
Judge's directions on the law?
8. Answer the following questions with a yes or no:
Is there anything that we have not asked you about why you could
not judge this case fairly and impartially according to the evidence
heard at trial and the Judge's directions on the law?295
Canadian courts have limited questions in voir dire in other circumstances as well. The
general principal is that questions might be designed to learn juror bias but not to learn
who the jurors are, meaning what are their positive belief systems and values.i"
294 Neil Vidmar, The Canadian Criminal Jury Searchingfor a Middle Ground, 62 Law &
Contemp. Probs., 142-143. Homolka had been charged arising out of the same crimes. She was
Bernardo's wife and an admitted accomplice in certain of the crimes. She received a reduced
sentence and was to give evidence against Bernardo as a result of a plea and sentencing trial that
received extensive publicity. Hence the question as stated above
295 Neil Vidmar, Id, 144, referencing R. v. Bernardo, Jury Trials (National Judicial Institute, Nov.
27-29, 1995).
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The Court in R v. Williams identified four classes of prejudice - interest, specific,
generic and conformity.i'"
The narrow Canadian threshold for voir dire with regard to prejudice includes rejection of
voir dire regarding:
-strong views regarding sexual assault of children.i'"
-offense based challenges, including elderly abuse, police, spousal abuse,
have received mixed results_299
-sexual offenses.i'"
-drug cases301
-Political beliefs but sometimes allow voir dire depending on the social
issue as in abortion.302
Canadian voir dire accepts questioning regarding:
-Race (generic )303
-Publicity (conformityj'i'"
-Aboriginal status (generic )305
296prankArmstrong, Jury Selection - Challenge/or Cause (1973) 23 C.R.N.S. 13.
297R. v. Williams (1998) I S.C.R. 1128, 124 C.C.C.3d 481.
298 R. v. Find (1998) 131 C.C.C.3d (aNT. CA.) (Jurors are not expected to be indifferent towards
crimes.)
299David Tanovich, et aI, Jury Selection in Criminal Trials, supra note 40, at 119-127.
300R. v. Bether (1997) lIS C.C.C.(3d) 421 (aNT. CA.) See also Tanovich, note 40, at 128-33.
301R. v. Hallway (1992) 8 O.R.(3d) 114 C.A.
302DavidTanovich, et aI, supra note 40, at13S-136.
303R. v. Williams, supra note 297.
304R. v. Zundel (1987) 31 C.CC. (3d) 97 (aNT CA) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 80 N.R.
317n.; R. v. Keegstra (1991) 63 C.C.C.(3d) 110 (Alter. C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 66
C.C.C.2d vi.
305R. v. Rogers (2000), 38 C.R. (5th) 331 aNT. S.C.J.
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-Sexual preference (generic i06
-HIV status (generic)307
-Mental challenge (genericj''"
Canadian jury voir dire should be relevant, succinct, fair,309 in an attempt to determine
the juror's partiality but the questions "must not pry or intrude into individual juror's
personal and private lifestyles, antecedents, or experiences'V'" Thus, judges have not
permitted questions of jurors as to what race or class of society they are or what
organizations the jurors belong to or their fraternization with the race or ethnicity of the
Defendant. However, Canadian courts have allowed questions such as:
-Would your ability to judge the evidence in this case without bias,
prejudice or partiality be affected by the fact that the person charged is
... black ... ?311
-Do you have any beliefs or opinions about black men from Jamaica
(black Jamaican men) and the commission of crime(s), particularly crimes
involving drugs, that would prevent you from judging the evidence in this
case, without bias, prejudice, or partiality?312
In a departure from the previously indicated desire not to inquire into the jurors personal
life, experience, organizational memberships or personal beliefs over and above
prejudice, questions were allowed in a case of severe violence against two children. The
306R. v. Masson (1996) 3 C.R. (5th) 61 (ONT. Gen. Div. Clarke, J; the detailed affidavit of expert
witness Neil Vidmar is contained in David Tanovich, et al., supra note 40, at page 239.
307R.v. Masson, Id., the defendant was a physician.
308See David Tanovich, et al., supra note 40, at118, 136.
309R. v. Zwindel, 1987,56 C.R. (3d) 1,31 C.C.C.(3d) 97 (ONT. CA); leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused, (1987),56 C.R.(3d) xxvii, 61 O.R.(2d) 588 (note), 23 O.A.C. 317 (note) (S.C.C.).
31OChristopherGranger, supra note 105 at 177; R. v. Parks (1993) 24 C.R.(4th) 81, 84 C.C.C.(3d)
353, 15 0.R.(3d) 324, 65 O.A.C. 122 (CA); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1994), 28
C.R.(4th) 403 (note), 87 C.C.C.(3d) vi (note), 17O.R.(3d) xvii (note), 72 O.A.C. 159 (note)
(S.C.C.).
311R. v. Parks, {1993] 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353, 24 c.n. (4th)81,15 O.R. (3d) 324, 65 O.A.C. 122
(Can.), appeal denied, [1994] 28 C.R. (4th)402n, 87 C.C.C. (3d) vi, 72 O.A.C. 159n (S.C.C.)
312R. v. Morgan (1995) 42 C.R.4th 126 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div»; R. v. Kerr (1995) 42 C.R.(4th) 118
(Ont. Ct., Gen. Div.).
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questions presented asked the jurors about psycho sexual disorders and what volunteer
organizations the juror belongs to that might be relevant to the crime.313
Underlying this approach is the Canadian belief in judicial instructions - the existence of
a presumption that sound judicial instructions may overcome the jurors' individually held
beliefs and that based on those instructions all but the most biased jurors will be able to
put aside hislher beliefs and biases and follow the law as given by the judge.l!" In
Canada, the judge has an affirmative duty to:
1. Summarize the evidence impartially but
substantially review the evidence.
2. Put questions to witnesses to clarify an obscure
answer, a misunderstanding, or a relevant omission.
The judge has discretion to:
1. Call witnesses (rarely used);
2. Offer an opinion about the credibility of a witness or the
significance of evidence.i"
The Canadian system therefore offers a toned down version of the American voir dire.
The trend in America is to limit voir dire. Many jurisdictions now engage in either
judicially conducted voir dire or a combination of judge and lawyer conducted voir dire.
In ten United States jurisdictions the judge alone conducts voir dire, in the Federal
313 Christopher Granger, supra note 105, at180.
314R. v. Sherratt [1991] 1 S.C.R. 509; 122 N.R. 241; 73 Man. R. 161; 63 C.C.C.(3d) 193.
L'Heureaux-Dube, J. offered the standard to overcome the presumption. "Thus while there must
be an 'air of reality' to the applications, it need not be an "extreme case ... The threshold question
is not whether the ground of alleged partiality will create such a partiality in a juror, but rather
whether it could create that partiality which would prevent a juror from being indifferent s to the
result. In the end, there must exist a realistic potential for the existence of partiality on a ground
sufficiently articulated in the application, before the challenger should be allowed to proceed".
Note 10 at pp. 535-536 S.C.R.; pp. 211-212 C.C.C. If the Court finds this potential for bias then
a mini trial as to bias proceeds before a mini jury pursuant to the procedure described at 24,
Criminal Code 638(1)(b) to (f).
315 Neil Vidmar, The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching for a Middle Ground, 62 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 141, 144-145.150 (1999).
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System and thirty-six states have a shared voir dire between the attorneys and the judge.
O I f . I· I . d· 316n your states requtre exc usive y attorney VOIr Ire.
E. Experts In the Jury Room
Expanding the jury pool by eliminating occupational exemptions from jury service poses
new risks to jury deliberations, possibly remedied only by voir dire.
In the present environment when experts become jurors, i.e. physicians, lawyers, police,
etc., the prospective juror in America is frequently asked during vior dire whether or not
they can put their special knowledge aside and in essence not become an expert in the
jury box. The Auld Report recommended and Parliament adopted in the Criminal
Justice Act 2003 a modification of the English standards for juror eligibility, creating a
system which requires physicians, lawyers, police, employees of lawyers to be called for
jury duty. English reliance on random selection could pose a problem as there exists no
real opportunity for voir dire on the issue of expert in the box, that is a juror with special
expertise or training becomes an expert witness who guides the jury offering opinions
without being subject to the rules of evidence or cross examination.317 American Courts
take succor in the opportunity provided by voir dire to cull out unsworn experts in the
jury box. Thus when a party in a U.S. case allows a juror with a background in criminal
justice to sit on a case, a motion for a new trial because of possible prejudice was denied,
the judge holding that the juror's sharing with other juror's expertise on the appellate and
criminal law process should have been expected when the juror's background was
3J6 u.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court Organization, 1998,273-276.
3J7Criminai Justice Act 2003, §321, abolishing categories of previous excused from jury services
including doctors, lawyers, police officers, etc.
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revealed during voir dire. The act of accepting that juror was in the court's view an
implied waiver of any use by the juror ofhis/her training.l'"
There is some longstanding instruction in the common law because for years American
jUrisdictions including New York, have not excluded registered nurses from jury duty as
a result of their professional standing and knowledge. Consequently, nurses as jurors
have provoked reversal and the ordering of a new trial where they have in juror
deliberations substituted their own professional opinions in place of expert proofs at trial
and shared their opinions as part of deliberations.l'" A lawyer who was an administrative
law judge was dismissed from a jury when he acknowledged that he was second guessing
the trial judge's rulings and the legal soundness of objections, thereby indicating an
inability to follow the judge's legal instructions.V''
Unexplored by any meaningful study is the effect of placing previously excluded experts
on juries - lawyers, doctors, police, etc. There is anecdotal data, such as a case where a
juror law student instructed his fellow jurors on the legal standard during deliberations.V'
In Chapters 8 and 9 questions posed to American judges and lawyers and English judges
will provide their concerns about this issue.
In another twist on the presence of expert jurors, a court held that where a juror indicated
reliance on professional training in deliberations by affidavit, a hearing was not required
and the verdict was affirmed because the juror's use of professional expertise merely
318 Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d. 663, 683-684 (4th Cir., 2002).
319 People v. Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d 569 (2000); See also, People v. Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d 358 (2001).
32oPeoplev. Cherry, 188Misc.2d 799 (2001).
321StevenBrill, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington Post Libel Trial, Am. Law, Nov. 1982, at
l.
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confirmed the medical proof at trial, it was not communicated to other jurors, and did not
violate defendant's right to have the case decided on the evidence adduced.322 The
Federal Courts have held that jurors discussing their personal experiences with sexual
harassment, and sensitivity training they received in their employment was in the nature
of personal experience or common knowledge and thus not a basis to set aside the
verdict.323
V. Conclusion-The Shadow of Lord Mansfield
It is tempting to argue that time has over taken Lord Mansfield's rule and that present
reality creates new circumstances which call out for greater adjudicative access to the
jury's intrinsic and internal deliberations. As we have seen, the greater press/media
scrutiny of modem trials, coupled with the sensationalism, post-trial interviews of jurors
and the prospect of juror book deals, all suggest that a rule that was created in the mid-
18th century must be ripe for reconsideration. The all white, all male, landed jurors of
Lord Mansfield's day have been replaced by far more diverse contemporary juries.
The hubbub surrounding juries today points to a fundamental flaw in the rule - it treats
jurors by a different standard than the judge and thus allows actions by jurors during
deliberation to go unchallenged-- actions which if engaged in by the judge would
constitute reversible error. The U.S.A., England and Wales, and Canada have all devised
statutes which follow the rule and protect the intrinsic deliberations of juries to varying
degrees. However, it has been observed that "in the United States, the issue of
impeachment has not been distorted by Lord Mansfield's evidentiary ruling to the extent
322Peoplev. Camacho, 293 A.D.2d 876 (3rd Dept., 2002).
323Rahn v. Junction City Foundry, Inc., 161 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1247 (D. Kan. 2001).
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that it has in England and Canada. ,,324The Auld report notes that the English version has
caused the Court of Appeal to engage in legal gymnastics:
"The jurisprudence of the Court, in its laudable attempt to overcome the
unduly restrictive prohibition in Section 8 of the 1981 Act, is logically
hard to justify. It will not enquire into what jurors have done or said in the
course of their deliberations in the jury room, but it will do if they are
elsewhere, say while in a hotel overnight. In my view, the effective bar
that Section 8 puts on an Appellate Court inquiring into and remedying
possible bias or other impropriety in the course of their deliberations is
indefensible and capable of causing serious injustice.,,325
The Auld report proposed a modification of Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act "to
permit, where appropriate, inquiry by the trial judge and/or the Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division) into alleged impropriety by a jury, whether in the course of its deliberations or
otherwise'V"
The Auld report does not specify the exact nature of the misconduct apart from a specific
reference to racism. We can infer that a Ouija board, drawing lots and a general failure to
deliberate fall within the categories of misconduct. What, however, about a perverse
verdict, a misunderstanding of the law or a verdict which nullifies the law?
Of course, Lord Steyn in R. v. Mirza offered the dissenting opinion that the Court of
Appeal did have the power to order an inquiry where there had been a breach by jurors of
their oath despite the provisions of Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act.
324 Anisman and Linden, supra note 218, pg 365.
325 Auld Report, supra note 16, Chapter 5, ~98.
326 Id.
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The standard identified by Lord Steyn - breach of oath - is worthy of consideration and
analysis for all jurisdictions. A verdict based on racist deliberations, or having failed to
properly weigh or evaluate evidence as in the Ouija board or rolling of dice cases -
arguably breaches the oath of the juror, unlike a perverse or nullifying verdict. In that
event, should each jurisdiction provide both sides the right to review deliberation, or is
such a verdict, given the jury's role as a trier of fact, well within the jury's sound
discretion?
Scan Enright argues that the case for the repeal or amendment of the non-disclosure rule
repeal is not just a means of assessing the workings of a jury trial but also is a means of
curing gross miscarriages of justice. 327
Minimal voir dire regarding prejudice specific to the immediate trial and the specific
parties before empanelling a jury would provide some prophylaxis against the
miscarriages that the rule presently allows, prejudice that looms larger as random juries
include experts in the jury box in a far more socially diverse America, Canada, and
England and Wales than Lord Mansfield could have ever imagined.
Limiting America's talking jurors to expressing only their view and prohibiting
disclosure of the opinions expressed by others in the jury room also makes sense.
The United States Supreme Court allowed that testimony by a juror about a verdict in
some instances could not be excluded without "violating the plain principals of
justice".328
327Sean Enright, Unlocking the Jury Room, [1989] 139 New Law Journal, 655.
328 McDonald v. Pless, supra note 122, at 268-269.
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This view is the minority view in England and Wales and Canada, as articulated by Lord
Steyn and Judge Finlayson. The proper remedy is to allow juror comment about their
own perceptions or thought process, but to prohibit discussion of the specifics of
deliberations or comments by other jurors during deliberations, except to report perceived
breaches of the jurors oath.
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CHAPTER 3
EXTRA-EVIDENTIARY INFLUENCES ON CAPITAL SENTENCING
OUTCOMES AND OTHER COMPLEX CASES - JURY CHARGES, JURY
CONFUSION, RACE AND PUBLIC OPINION
I. Introduction
Some have defined the jury as "the conscience of the community" which provides
independent verdicts free of the ordinary political influcnccs.f" Others, discussed
throughout this work, view juries as unable to cope with the modem complex trial,
vulnerable due to a number of alleged infirmities that will be examined in other chapters.
In this chapter the claim that jury verdicts can be impacted by extra evidentiary
influences is examined in the most studied and evaluated form of complex jury trial, the
capital murder case as well as serious fraud cases.
The existence of improper extra evidentiary influences such as coercion, speculation,
confusion, racism, politics, religion, and intra-deliberative bullying raise serious questions
regarding the ability of jurors and judges to fairly resolve criminal cases, despite the
tremendous intellectual energy which has been expended attempting to achieve verdicts
unfettered by outside influences. Capital cases have received extensive scrutiny. For that
reason, any analysis of jury and judicial function including outcomes in criminal cases
must include the capital jury. Indeed capital juries fall squarely within any definition of
complexity because of the complex statutory law that juries must apply to the facts as well
329 Sally Lloyd-Bostock and Cheryl Thomas, The Continuing Decline of the English Jury, 53
F.N.4; Neil Vidmar, World Jury Systems (New York: Oxford U. Press, 2000) quoting M.D.A.
Freeman, The Jury on Trial (1981) 34 Current Legal Probs 65.
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as the very nature of the subject matter of the trial which determines life or death with
regard to the defendant.
Do extra evidentiary influences impact trial outcomes? Is the existence of these factors
rampant or rare? According to some commentators and appellate courts, a coerced verdict
or sentence, or a verdict, motivated by factors outside of the law and the facts applicable to
the case, rendered by either judge or jury, occurs on an ongoing basis in capital trials
despite the fact that a casual observer might assume that the American system would take
the most care and achieve the most fair and accurate verdicts in capital cases. While the
Concerns are magnified in capital cases, many of the same issues and concerns raised about
juries in capital cases arise in white collar fraud and other criminal cases. Indeed, issues of
juror competence, pre-existing bias, impact of publicity and public opinion and capacity to
comprehend complicated proof and judicial instructions arise to some degree in all criminal
trials. Because of American constitutional requirements, all felony crimes are treated in
like manner (except for capital sentencing where the jury is required to find aggravating
and mitigating factors which will be further discussed below) but the heightened scrutiny
requirement imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in capital cases also make capital case
jury deliberations an important starting point.33o
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants "the accused ...the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
330Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). The Court noted at p. 888 " ... unlike a term of years,
a death sentence cannot begin to be carried out by the State while substantial legal issues remain
outstanding. Accordingly, federal courts must isolate the exceptional cases where constitutional
error requires rhetorical or re-sentencing as certainly and swiftly as orderly procedures will
permit."
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been committed ...'.331 The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment (which has been the basis for the U.S. Supreme Court to impose a
heightened scrutiny standard on capital cases) and the Fourteenth Amendment applies
federal due process to the States.332 The interplay and interpretation of these three
amendments has formed the foundation for the judicial and academic discourse regarding
capital outcomes. The Supreme Court has held that the defendant in a capital case is
entitled to have a jury determine not just guilt or innocence, but also any aggravating or
mitigating factors which apply to the imposition of a capital sentence. Thus all but the
actual capital sentence must be determined by the jury.333
There are recurrent areas of alleged inappropriate external influences. According to some
authorities, capital jurors are subject to coercion in the actual trial during jury selection,
because of the contents of certain judicially rendered jury charges during jury deliberations,
and as a result of interaction, behaviours, and certain generalized misunderstandings and
misconceptions that are a part of the common knowledge of the venire. Capital punishment
and the distinctively American jury selection process offers students of comparative law a
valuable opportunity to study jury function in deciding life or death, the ultimate jury issue,
utilizing for that analysis the process followed by juries carefully questioned and selected
by both the prosecution and defense (often taking weeks to choose a jury). How jurors are
vetted for prejudice, suitability and other factors function in capital cases may be
331Does LaValle encroach upon the legislative constitutional prerogative by preventing the
legislature from determining that a defendant by choice or default may receive death, LWOP, or
regular life, a sentence that allows for the possibility of parole? That is not the issue considered
in this work, although the limitations imposed by the court in LaValle certainly provide severe
restrictions on the information presented to the jury.
332 U.S. Const Amend. VIII; U.S. Const Amend. XIV.
333 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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instructive regarding the value of voir dire and the overall ability of jurors to competently
decide such complex cases.
Another school of thought holds that elected judges also are subject to extra evidentiary
influence or coercion because they are captives of public opinion, with some literature
arguing that elected judges, and particularly judges in State courts, are more likely to
preside over death penalty verdicts than judges who are appointed. Others contend that
appointment and/or ambition to be appointed to a higher court impact upon judicially
determined outcomes. Given the interest in expanding the role of judges as triers of fact in
many jurisdictions in North America and England and Wales, the conduct of the judiciary
in the cauldron of capital cases may also be instructive. Other factors alleged to affect
capital outcomes include: public opinion, the very act of selecting a capital jury, the politics
of judicial selection and retention, and race.
This chapter will attempt to examine each specific extra-evidentiary influence on capital
sentencing outcomes in an effort to discern whether the criticisms launched at judges and
juries (frequently from both ends of the political spectrum) are fair. Chapter 2 has explored
juror rights and privacy issues. Interwoven with those issues are contrasting laws of the
United States and the United Kingdom which attempt to protect juries from the litigants
post-verdict from going behind the verdict in a legal second guessing of jury decision
making. Both jurisdictions have limited legal mechanisms which can cull out after the fact
any extra evidentiary factors that might have influenced the verdict. We will review the
conduct of judges and jurors, evaluate the limitations placed on juries by decisional law,
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analyzing whether the limitations result in jury speculation and inferences which may
undercut the integrity of the process and affect the outcome of capital jury verdicts.
II. Jury Coercion Defined
When Chief Justice Vaughn in Bushells' case held that juries could not be punished for
their actual or contemplated verdicts, that ruling was the precursor of the post-modem era
which accords juries more favored treatment pursuant to statute as well as custom and
practice.r'" Even after Chief Justice Vaughn's pronouncement, juries experienced another
two-hundred plus years of abuse at the hands of the courts. Under ancient common law,
jurors were kept together by the court until they had agreed upon their verdict.335 Coerced
verdicts were viewed as proper and appropriate. Blackstone's Commentaries sanctioned the
holding of jurors without food and drink until there was unanimous agreement, as well as
that a deadlocked jury may be taken by the judge with him to his next venue in a cart rather
than wait for them. 336
In the 18th and 19th centuries, the concept of the jury as hostage became more controversial.
Justice Kent referred to this treatment of jurors as a "monstrous doctrine", decrying also the
carting of jurors from "one assize to another". 337
During the 19th century as these practices became more discredited, appellate courts
commenced overturning verdicts where the trial court failed to provide jurors with proper
334 Douglas Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contents of Jury Reform, 25 Hofstra L. Rev.
440-441 (1996).
335 Thompson and Merriam on Juries, 2310 (1884).
336 Id.
337 IPeop e v. Olcott, 2 Johnson's Cases 301 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1801).
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accommodations during prolonged deliberations or exhorted or browbeat deadlocked juries
into a verdict.r"
Jury coercion was defined elegantly in Ingersol v. Lansing
"Every attempt to drive men into an agreement which they would not have
reached freely is a perversion ofjustice".339
There was expansion upon that definition in State v. Bybee:
"No juror should be induced to agree to a verdict by a fear that a failure to
so agree would be reflecting upon either his intelligence or his integrity.
Personal consideration should never be permitted to influence his
conclusions and the thought of them should never be presented as a motive
for action. ,,340
While an all encompassing definition of 'jury coercion" is elusive, jury coercion which
may occur as a result of:
1. the language of a statute,
2. a jury charge,
3. a general belief fueled by non-evidential hearsay,
338A sampling of the case law at this time includes the following: Failure to agree was an
imputation on Judge and jury. State v. Bybee, 17 Kansas 462 (1877); jury locked up not allowing
dinner, Hancock v. Elam, 62 Tenn 33, 3 Baxt. 33 (Sup.Ct. 1873). A message sent by the Judge to
the deliberating jury that he would take the jury to next town with him if the deadlock continues,
Spearman v. Wilson, 44 Ga. 473 (Sup. Ct. 1871); days of deliberation in the courthouse, the judge
warning he will leave and come back in two days if they do not decide by nightfall, Ingersoll v.
Town of Lansing, 51 Hun 101 (1889); for 4 days the jury is out (four days and four nights)
without cots or beds sleeping in the Courthouse, the judge advises the jury a deadlock is an
admission of incompetency, People v. Sheldon, 156 N.Y. 268 (1898).
339 Ingersol v. Lansing, 51 Hun. 101,103 (1889).
340 State v. Bybee, 17 Kan. 462 (1877).
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4. racial prejudice, and
5. intra jury deliberative behaviour.
Therefore, jury coercion is defined in this thesis as an improper extra evidentiary influence
on the jury's decision making, to be distinguished from the jurors using common sense, life
experience and moral beliefs in their analysis of the facts according to the judge's
instruction.
The notion of extra evidentiary influence is also vague, but it is a major underlying premise
for the American system of voir dire - the means or process by which jurors are questioned
to determine whether or not prejudice exists and through which the jury is selected because
the system of voir dire exists to determine whether or not jurors will be effected by external
influences like unique knowledge of the case or prejudice.341 As we will see, there are
some who believe that the very process creates prejudice.
III. Statutory Language and Jury Instructions: The People v. LaValle expansion of
the definition of jury coercion.
In a leading ruling regarding jury coercion, People v. LaValle, the New York State Court of
Appeals by a 4-3 vote struck down New York's death penalty statute as violative of the due
process clause of the New York State Constitution.342 By virtue of this decision, the
majority of that court greatly expanded the definition of jury coercion as it is applied in the
341 Nancy Jean King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 Law and Contemp. Probs. 41 (1999), 53-
59.
342 People v. LaValle, 3 NY3d 88 (2004). People v. LaValle is the third capital case in which the
Court reversed a death sentence since the adoption of the death penalty statute in 1995. The prior
two decisions were rendered overturning death verdicts without declaring the statute
unconstitutional. See People v. Cahill2 N.Y.3d 14 (2003), and People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383
(2004).
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u.s. The LaValle majority reasoned that because the statute compelled the trial judge to
advise the jury in his/her charge that if the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict of
either death or life without parole (LWOP) in the penalty phase of the trial, then the Judge
would sentence the Defendant to 20-25 years to life with a chance of parole (regular life
sentencej.l" The Court further held that the statute must require a charge that will advise
the jury of deadlock consequences, but that the statutory charge before them was coercive
and thus unconstitutional. This is true in England and Wales, as well as, where majority
verdicts are permitted. Juries are not advised of the possibility of a majority verdict until
they have deliberated for an extended period oftime.344
The New York death penalty statute is unique in that it advises the jury of the possibility of
parole in the event of deadlock as a part of the judge's original charge to the jury without
according the jury an actual vote on that sentence as an option. Ordinarily a deadlock
instruction of any type is not given in the initial judicial charge to the jury but is
administered only if the jury after deliberation declares impasse. The majority of the Court
of Appeals in LaValle reasoned that advising jurors that impasse would result in a sentence
that included the possibility of parole was a coercive influence because jurors may
surrender their honestly held beliefs when deliberating on the death penalty to avoid the
future release of the offender occasioned by deadlock.
343 The New York death penalty is codified at Penal Law 125.27, (McKinneys 1995). It requires
the jury to determine the sentence. The section which provides for the "deadlock charge" is as
follows and is contained at: Criminal Procedure Law §400.27 Vol. IIA, 146 (Pocket Part)
(McKinneys 1995):
"The Court must also instruct the jury that in the event the jury fails to reach a
unanimous agreement with respect to the sentence the Court will sentence the
defendant to a term of imprisonment with a minimum term of between 20 and 25
years and a maximum term of life."
344 Author interview with nine England and Wales judges set forth in Chapter 9.
126
The New York death penalty law is also the only American capital punishment statute that
requires the court to instruct the jury that deadlock will result in a lesser sentence. Three
other states, Missouri, New Jersey, and Oregon authorize the judge to give a lesser sentence
in the event of deadlock - but "is one of the alternatives that the jury considers during
deliberations'Y"
The majority of the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the State Legislature was
seeking to influence jury outcomes by advising the jury that a failure to impose a sentence
of death would make the convicted defendant some day eligible for parole, thus in LaValle
the majority reasoned as follows in finding the statute to be coercive:
" ...the jurors in a capital case are given instructions that may coerce
them into surrendering their conscientious beliefs. The fear in this
case was not that the juror would be deprived of meals or rest, or
that failure to agree would have wasted everyone's time. Rather, the
motivating fear in the minds of a juror in a numerical minority is
likely to be that a vote for life without the possibility of parole is
really a vote for life with the possibility of parole.346
The court continued:
"Thus, if there is one lone juror who truly believes that the death
sentence is not warranted, then a non-death sentence must be
imposed. (See CPL 400.27 [11] [aD The jury may not direct
imposition of a sentence of death unless it unanimously finds
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factor(s)
substantially outweigh the mitigating factor(s) established, if any,
and unanimously determines that the penalty of death should be
applied. ,347
345 Laurie B. Berberich, Jury Instructions Regarding Deadlock in Capital Sentencing, 29 Hofstra
L.Rey. 1301; 1326(2001~
346 P Ieop e v, LaValle, supra note 342, at 126.
347 IPeop e v, LaValle, supra note 342, at 126-127.
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This holding is squarely contrary to two existing schools of thought, which will be more
fully explained below:
A. Capital case jurors are entitled to disclosure of the likely consequences of
deadlock so that they do not speculate. Later in this chapter below the
advantages and risks of full disclosure to juries of legal options are
discussed.
B. Coercion is conduct by language or physical activity that mandates a
verdict. LaValle's holding that giving jurors sentencing choices creates a
coercive decision making process is analyzed in the context of research
about jury speculation. This chapter also provides a review of the research
about jury decision making recognizing that in capital cases incapacitation
is important to jurors - a reality LaValle avoids.
A. What Should the Jury Know and When Should They Know It?
While they would applaud the result, the reasoning in the LaValle decision violates the
long held arguments of many leading death penalty opponents, including Bowers and
Steiner, who assert:
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"If you were a juror on a capital case, wouldn't you want to know what the
punishment would be if you did not vote for the death penalty? Wouldn't
you want to know how soon such defendants, not given the death penalty,
become eligible for parole or how soon they usually are paroled? Wouldn't
you want to know whether you and your fellow jurors could impose a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole? Wouldn't you want to
have that option if you were asked to decide who should live or dieT.348
From Bowers and Steiner's review of280 death case transcripts, in 25 percent of the cases
examined the jurors ask questions about parole and following the judge's response, the jury
typically returns a verdict of death. "This suggests that parole concerns may often be the
critical last issue upon which a decision for life or death depends". 349
Decisions and studies in the last twenty years have also suggested that capital jurors are
deeply interested in whether or not the defendant is eligible for parole''" For example,
Hood proposed a model instruction for Virginia jurors that advised the jury: "Under the
Laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, any person sentenced to life imprisonment for
capital murder is eligible for parole after 25 years". Hood's proposed instruction gives the
jury a full recitation of the Defendants' rights regarding time off for good behavior as well.
The Hood proposal is included in the National Legal Research Group's December 1988
348 William 1. Bowers & Benjamin Steiner,Death By Default, An Empirical Demonstration of
False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 605; at 677-678. Bowers and
Steiner cite Justice John Paul Stevens in Brown v. Texas, 118 S. Ct. 355 (1997) who argues for
jurors being told of parole eligibility in capital cases, utilizing "citizen surveys in a number of
states that indicate(s) people find the death penalty less attractive the longer offenders would stay
in prison before becoming eligible for parole..." at page 609.
349 Id., at 629. To further make the point, Bowers and Steiner state at page 610 "Although the
assumption that jurors disregard parole in their decision-making has undergirded the thinking of
the Courts about how jurors should make capital sentencing decisions, the empirical data shows it
is a false description of what jurors actually do - a legal fiction".
3S0Pope v. State,45 S.E.2d 831 (GA 1986); Anthony Paduano and Clive A. Stafford Smith,Deadly
Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty. 18Colum
HumRts. L. Rev. 211 at 221-23 (1987); Turner v. Commonwealth364 S.E.2d 483 (VA 1988).
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"Report on Jurors Attitudes Concerning the Death Penalty". Hood reports that jurors
would disregard an instruction not to consider parole, that their belief was that a life
sentence would actually translate into ten (10) years served, that the amount of time served
was important to sentencing and that they would be significantly influenced by disclosure
of the mandatory minimum+"
Paduano and Smith concluded that if jurors were assured in the sentencing instructions that
if a person was sentenced to LWOP, they would serve at least twenty years, two-thirds of
the jurors responding indicated that they would reject a death sentence and would be more
likely to sentence the Defendant to life in prison.352 The studies cited above found that
without specific instructions, jurors were likely to infer that LWOP would result in a prison
term with parole, thereby influencing jurors in sentencing to vote for the death penalty to
incapacitate the Defendant.
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that the false suggestion of parole
eligibility in a capital case when in fact the Defendant is not eligible for parole can be
coercive, reasoning in Simmons v. South Carolina that the Defendant was entitled to have
the jury advised of non-parole eligibility only when the State makes future dangerousness
an issue and the only alternative to death sentence is LWOP. The State argued for
Simmons' execution asserting his predatory history toward women. The U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Defendant should be allowed to argue that he was parole ineligible
reasoning that "the State may not create a false dilemma" by arguing the Defendant is
351 WilliamW. Hood, III. The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in
Capital Sentencing, 75 Va. L.Rev. 1605 (1989) at 1624.
352 Paduano and Smith, supra note 350.
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dangerous when if convicted and given LWOP he is not a danger to the public. 353 The
Court apparently did not embrace the raising of straw men during the trial, but fails to offer
insight regarding how to deal with jury speculation about the length of sentence.
On the other hand, instructions similar to the LaValle instruction have been found by the
u.S. Supreme Court to not violate the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
For example, in California v. Ramos, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a California Jury
instruction which advised jurors in a capital case that the Defendant would be eligible for
commutation by the Governor even though given a sentence of LWOp.354Thereafter, the
California Supreme Court declared that instruction unconstitutional on State Constitutional
grounds in People v. Ramos relying on reasoning used by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in State v. White.355
At issue in People v. Ramos was a California jury instruction which advised the jury that if
LWOP was given that the governor may commute the sentence. The charge did not advise
the jury that the Governor had the right to also commute a death sentence. The Court
found that permitting the jury to consider a pardon or commutation was extraneous and
thus violative of the due process clause of the California State Constitution. In State v.
White the jury asked the Court during capital murder deliberations if the defendant was
given LWOP if parole was possible. The trial court advised the jury it was, reading the
353 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
354 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) at 1026-27. The Court notes that 25 states refuse to
instruct juries in capital cases regarding parole, believing it is not a valid issue for the jury to
consider.
355 People v. Ramos, 689 P.2d 430 (Cal. 1994); State v. White, 142A.2d 65 at 76 (NJ, 1997).
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statute to the jury. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, faulting the charge by
omitting an admonition to the jury that "parole was not relevant to the deliberation'Y'"
In People v. LaValle the court relied in part on the reasoning of other state courts by
following People v. Ramos, supra, and White, supra, and rejecting the United States
Supreme Court's analysis in California v. Ramos, supra, and in Jones v. U.S., supra.357 In
Jones v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the Eighth Amendment does not require
that the jury be instructed as to the consequence of their failure to agree." The defendant in
Jones requested an instruction which would have advised the jury that LWOP was the
sentence the Defendant would receive in the event of deadlock on the death penalty. The
Supreme Court reasoned that the instruction requested was contrary to the State's interest
in having jury unanimity and was not essential for the jury to determine the Defendant's
sentence regarding death.
The LaValle holding offers a major twist from Jones regarding jury knowledge and
awareness because of its finding that jury knowledge of a sentence that includes the
possibility of parole as a consequence of deadlock is coercive. LaValle also expands the
New Jersey and California Courts analysis in finding coercion based on the New York
charge, rather than a failure to provide a legally sufficient charge of the jury need to not
consider parole, as stated in State v. White.358
356 State of New Jersey v. White, 142A.2d 65 at 76 (NJ, 1997).
357 IPeop e v. LaValle,supra note 342, at note 14,People v. Ramos, supra note 354, 27. State v.
White, supra note 355, at note 28. California v. Ramos,supra note 354, . Jones v. US, 527 U.S. 373
(1999).
358 People v. LaValle, supra note 342; California v. Ramos, supra note 354; State v. White, supra
note 355.
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B. Is Giving Jurors Honest Information About Choices Coercive? Interviews with
Death Penalty Jurors
The LaValle case uniquely reasons that the New York State Legislature coerced capital
juries by providing that the jury must be advised that a jury deadlock on death or LWOP
will result in a statutorily mandated sentence "regular life" (a life sentence with the chance
of parole after twenty-five years). LaValle's holding clearly limits legislative options.
One wonders under the LaValle reasoning, if the jury could constitutionally be given the
choice of an actual vote on options of death, LWOP, and regular life, but what then would
be the deadlock consequence? A possible option is to allow the judge to sentence in the
event of deadlock. Pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, such an arrangement would not violate the
Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution so long as the jurors rendered a verdict on the
aggravating factors and mitigating factors to be used by the sentencing judge. 359 Another
possible approach would be the empanelment of a new jury to determine sentencing. Such
an approach would have a cost in tenus of economics as well as upon the emotions of the
victim's families and the fact witnesses.
Taken to its logical extension, LaValle appears to hold that giving the jury full disclosure
about a lesser verdict in a deadlock situation is coercive. Assume the death penalty was
abolished in New York and the jury could give as a maximum punishment LWOP: would
advising the jury that a regular life sentence or some other lesser sentence was the deadlock
consequence be coercive? Certainly Bowers and Steiner would maintain based on their
research that the full knowledge of all permutations of a verdict and sentence is not
coercive and rather would give the jury a complete look at the alternatives so that they
359 R· Arimg v. izona, 536U.S. 584 (2002); U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
133
could make a knowing judgment. 360 Just because a juror might conclude that a minimum
sentence of25 years is too little based on a calculation of the defendant's age in twenty-five
years, because he might still commit havoc upon release and thus opts for LWOP - is that a
coerced thought process? And as we will see below, jurors consider future dangerousness
and deeply doubt the truthfulness of LWOP. Having a lesser alternative before the jury
may well give credibility to LWOP.
The LaValle decision is also curious in that the majority cites favorably Bowers and Steiner
but the finding is contrary to their main contention that jurors will speculate about the
possibility of parole, not believing that LWOP actually means a lifetime of incarceration
thereby making the choice of death or LWOP unbelievable. Most states with the death
penalty now provide LWOP as a sentencing option and in most of these states jurors are
expressly informed of this option, though very few jurors believe that LWOP is the
punishment usually served by those not given death_361
Based on this conclusion, Bowers and Steiner argue that jurors should receive a candid and
panoramic view of the sentencing options so that the ultimate decision is not reached
because of speculation. The LaValle majority instead crafts for the jury an astigmatic view
of those options, thereby inviting the very speculation that Bowers and Steiner eschew.
Liebman also argues that the failure of trial courts to clue jurors on the minimum number
of years that must be served for LWOP has a disastrous result. "These beliefs again led
jurors to vote for death".362 By contrast, the statute which the LaValle majority declared
360 William J. Bowers & Benjamin Steiner,Death By Default, An Empirical Demonstration of
False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 605; at 677-678.
361 Id., at 708.
362 James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death. 100 Colum. L. Rev. 2030, 2117 (2000).
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unconstitutional actually gives jurors a clear notice that a default would result in a regular
life, eliminating jury speculation about when LWOP would be triggered and conveying by
comparison that it truly is a life sentence.
According to Garvey, capital jurors fmd that the most significant aggravating factors in a
death penalty verdict are the brutality of the crime, the existence of a child victim, future
dangerousness and lack of rernorse.i'" Given the foregoing, it is not surprising that jurors
would be deeply concerned about the duration of the sentence. It is unreasonable to ask
jurors to contemplate sentencing an individual without providing all available options
which may occur by law because a lack of disclosure invites speculation, particularly when
there is usually a limited constellation of options available to juries in capital cases - death,
LWOP, or regular life. Depending on the nature of the crime (brutality), the defendant's
conduct in the Courtroom (remorse), other aggravating factors such as relevant criminal
record, and (where included as an aggravating factor) future dangerousness, the jury will
logically be concerned not only about the defendant's long term legal prognosis, but also
the risk he poses if paroled. Uncertainty about the actual period of incarceration can
convert the death penalty deliberation from a primarily retributive result to disproportionate
emphasis on achieving an incapacitative sentence. It is therefore likely that when jurors
believe a defendant is a future danger, that death may be the preferred incapacitative
sentence because there is uncertainty about the actual integrity of LWOP. The advantage
of placing the three options - death, LWOP and regular life before the jury is that they are a
rational and logical array of options. The jury is presented a full picture of the statutory
363 Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think. 98
Colum L. Rev. 1538 (1998).
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menu of sentences available which meet rational sentencing possibilities and diminish
speculation.
As noted above, major contemporary jury studies yield findings which inferentially suggest
that the LaValle Majority's expansion of the traditional notion of jury coercion (from
physical hardship, such as keeping a jury that is deadlocked without food or long hours or
in an unattractive setting, or a specific judicial charge that suggested a result) to a statutory
coercion by jury charge is counter-intuitive and unrealistic. The data from the studies cited
above suggest that some jurors will not believe that LWOP is in fact, life, and that said
jurors will be concerned that LWOP is not either retributive or incapacitative thereby
inducing those jurors to vote for death. Therefore, an unanticipated consequence of
LaValle may very well be further speculation with the death penalty as an incapacitative
result. The mere charge that deadlock will result in LWOP (which is the only logical
deadlock charge in the wake of LaValle) will be greeted with disbelief.
Our interviews with several of the jurors in two capital punishment cases, resulting in a
death verdict (People v. Cahill) and resulting in a LWOP verdict (People v.Owens)suggest
that the very explanation of regular life as the consequence of deadlock reassured the jurors
that LWOP is in fact for life. 364 The six jurors interviewed were actual recipients of the
deadlock instruction that was declared unconstitutional in LaValle. The jurors believed
that LWOP was in fact that and accepted that if LWOP was given that the Defendant would
never be eligible for parole. While a tiny sample, these findings are inconsistent with the
364 People v. Cahill, 2 N.YJd 14 (et.App. 2003); People v. Owens, 188Misc.2d 392 (2001);
CatherineKohler Riessman,Narrative Analysis, (Sage Publications, 1993).
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findings of Bowers and Steiner.365 One possible explanation for the difference is the notion
that giving the jury the full spectrum of options - death, LWOP, or 25 years with
possibility of parole, diminishes suspicion about the integrity that LWOP is truly an
incapacitative sentence for the life of the offender. The jurors interviewed reported that as a
part of their sentencing deliberations they agreed that resorting to deadlock was
unacceptable, and that regular life was not a desirable result. Each juror agreed therefore
that achieving a unanimous verdict was their highest priority based upon their evaluation
that the offender should not be parole eligible. The process that they report in the jury
room, which will be examined in a later chapter, thereafter resulted in opposite verdicts -
death in People v. Cahill ( a white man) and LWOP in People v. Owens (a black man).
IV. Isn't incapacitation the elephant in the jury room?
A number of states have excluded future dangerousness as an aggravating factor to be
weighed by the jury. The apparent reasoning is that the exclusion from presentation to the
jury a charge on the issue of the defendant's future potential danger to society if ultimately
freed after serving his sentence, removes from the jury's consideration an issue that some
think is speculative.i'"
This is part of the myth that future dangerousness is not considered in jury deliberation and
sentencing in any state regardless of the statutory construct. While future dangerousness is
365Bowers and Steiner, supra note 360 at 677.
366TheLaValle majority amplifies that the death penalty statues of Oregon, Oklahoma, Virginia,
Wyoming and Texas all have future dangerousness as an aggravating factor. The note quotes Ex.
Crom. Proc. Dole Art. 37.0171 §2[b][I] which asks the jury to decide "whether there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society". Supra note 342, at fn 12 of LaValle.
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a statutory sentencing factor in certain states, it is not in New York.367 As we will see
below, it is an actual factor in New York and in all capital sentencing situations -
regardless of the statutory framework.
The New York death penalty statute does set forth the fourteen aggravating factors the jury
may consider. Certain of these factors are the most common in other similar statutes and
they inferentially may cause a jury to consider future dangerousness and thus
incapacitation. The aggravating factors include:
1. Contemporaneous felony killings which are from 35% to 80% of all
capital murder cases.
2. Predicate felonies. The New York Death Penalty statute sets forth
aggravating factors which include as a factor the existence of two or more
qualifying criminal convictions within the ten year period preceding the
commission of the first degree murder for which the defendant is being
sentenced.
3. "The defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner pursuant
to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting torture upon the
victim's death". Torture is defined as "depraved" infliction of extreme
physical pain "evidencing debasement or perversion or that the defendant
evidenced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain."
4. The slaying of multiple victims.368
367Whileperhaps collateral to this argument, remember that in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
U.S. 154 (1994) in a plurality opinion, the court held that if a defendant's future dangerousness is
at issue as a factor regarding aggravation, due process requires that a jury be informed of the fact
that State law makes the defendant ineligible for parole.
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The LaValle Majority correctly asserts that the New York statute does not require the jury
to assess future dangerousness. The majority opinion states:
"The deadlock instruction interjects the fear that if jurors do not reach
unanimity, the Defendant may be paroled in twenty years and pose a threat
to society in the future. Yet, in New York a Defendant's future
danzerousness i . he i id ,.369a ger s ess IS not a statutory aggravation t e Jury may consi er.
Any sentencing entity, whether judge or jury, will want to know the defendant's legal
history and will be weighing incapacitation. The New York statute, for example, does not
include as a factor future dangerousness, but it does provide that prior relevant felony
convictions constitute a possible aggravating factor to be weighed by the jury as well as the
violence of the crime, and the relevance of that history is to show the defendant's
chronicity and recidivism. When deliberating upon a first degree murder sentence, the
notion that a jury will not weigh the defendant's possibility of release in the future, creating
the risk that he may continue to commit new crimes in the future, is unrealistic and
inconsistent both with basic common sense, as well as research findings into jury decision
making -- because jurors use world knowledge and evaluating the future dangerousness of
a proven killer is a basic thought process. Our interviews of members of two capital
punishment juries suggest that early in their deliberation each jury made the unanimous
368 N.Y. Penal Law §125.27, (McKinneys, 1995); James R. Acker, When the Cheering Stopped:
An Overview and Analysis of New York's Death Penalty Legislation, 17 Pace L.Rev. 41, 69-85
(1996).
369 IPeop e v. LaValle, supra note 342, at 118.
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determination that the defendant should not be eligible for parole ever_370 Garvey found
that future dangerousness was the most significant factor leading capital jurors to vote for
death in sixty-one South Carolina cases. 371
In a radical view, Bowers asserts that the Supreme Court holds that the jury's function is a
"retributive assessment of the defendant's blameworthiness and guilt; it has made little
mention of deterrence and explicitly has characterized incapacitation as a secondary
considcration'Yf
Capital jurors do consider future dangerousness and that consideration is reasonable and to
be expected. To ask a jury not to weigh incapacitation in a capital case (and to suggest that
they would not) is almost the logical equivalent of asking the jury to defy the laws of
gravity. They are sitting on a capital murder case, they are given aggravating and
mitigating factors such as those under the New York statute to decide like the murder of a
witness, murder during the commission of a crime, or two prior qualified felonies within
ten years, but they are not to consider future dangerousness as a part of their decision
making?
To understand if it is realistic to attempt to limit juries, rather than to give them realistic
instructions, it is helpful to review how juries make decisions.
There are three generally accepted cognitive theories of juror decision making:
370 People v. Cahill, supra note 343; People v. Owens, 188Misc.2d 392 (N.Y.Sup. Ct., Monroe
County,2001).
371 Garvey, supra note 363, at 1542.
372 William 1. Bowers, Marla Sandys & William Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital
Sentencing: Jurors Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83
Cornell L. Rev. 1476 at 1482,Footnote 17 (1997-1998).
140
1) Algebraic models: The most common utilizes Bayes' theorem wherein the judgment
process is suggested to be starting from the probability of guilt and adjusting
multiplicatively by new evidence into laws of mathematical probability "within the
mathematical probability system there is a prescription for coherent probability revision
in light of the evidence (Bayes Theorem) .... It is generally recognized that the Bayesian
system is an invalid description of human behavior under most conditions".373
2) Cognitive Judgment Heuristics "the reigning metaphor that the juror carries a 'cognitive
toolbox' of useful inference heuristics in long term memory, and selects relevant judgment
tool algorithms, or strategies to solve the problem of making a legal decision". 374
3) The Story Model: Pennington & Hastie put forth the story model theory of jury decision
making which has achieved some acceptance while discrediting other theories of decision
making.375 The story model acknowledges and factors the role of extra evidentiary
information into jury decision making following the story model.
The story model includes three component processes:
1) Evidence evaluation through story construction;
2) Representation of the decision alternatives by learning verdict category
attributes;
373 DavidW. Schum and Anne W. Martin, Formal & Empirical Research on Cascaded Inference
in Jurisprudence, 17 Law & Socy Rev. 105 (1982).
374 Garvey, supra note 364 at 42. William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & Benjamin Steiner,
Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors Predispositions, Guilt-trial Experience,
and Premature Decision Making, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1476 at 1482, FN 17 (1997-1998).
375 Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story
Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519 (1991) at 544-549.
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3) Reaching a decision through the classification of the story into the best
fitting verdict category.I"
Active story construction under this theory occurs by reasoning from world
knowledge and from evidence.
Utilizing a model derived from a simulated case in which the facts are that Johnson knifed
Caldwell after they got into a fight, the authors offer the following as "a typical deduction
from world knowledge":
Hp1. A person who is big and known to be a troublemaker causes people to
be afraid.
P2. Caldwell was big.
P3. Caldwell was known to be a troublemaker.
C. Johnson was afraid.
In this example, the juror matches features of Caldwell from undisputed evidence (P2) and
a previous inferential conclusion (P3) to world knowledge about being confronted with
such a person (PI) to infer that Johnson was afraid.,,377
The story model theory, based on mathematical testing, caused Pennington and Hastie to
conclude that it is "an excellent method for explaining and predicting juror decision
376p' d H .enrungton an ashe, supra note 375. at 522.
377 Penni & H .enmngton ashe, supra note 375, at p. 524.
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making in criminal trials".378Reid Hastie examined the use of the story model in
evaluating the decision making process of jurors_J79He explains the role of emotion and
expertise as elements which contribute to how jurors construct a story out of a set of
facts. Using the outcome of the 0.1. Simpson case as an example, Hastie holds that in
certain factual situations, European American jurors will construct a different story from
the same narrative evidence summary than African Americans because, for example,
many African Americans have experienced or know of police misconduct and bigotry:
"This background of experience beliefs and relevant stories made it likely that African-
Americans would construct a story in which a police officer manufactured and planted
key incriminating evidence." According to Hastie, this experience would contrast with
the experience of European American jurors who would be less likely to have such a
view of the police.38o
It is the world knowledge factor which must concern those who believe that juries base
their decision making free of extra-judicial influences. As Pennington and Hastie maintain,
world knowledge is a significant factor which can be molded by judicial instruction.i"
Thus there is a material difference between telling a jury that you have two options and if
you can't agree, the judge will sentence with a different, lesser option that includes parole
and as compared to simply advising the jury that there are two options and neither includes
the chance of parole. Given that the research indicates that if limited to two sentencing




381 Pennington and Hastie, supra note 375. FN 55.
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date of ten years served, the deadlock option provides the jury with the third possibility
which their world knowledge suggests to them is likely anyway. Can that knowledge be
coercive any more than any other situation where the jurors know that a lesser finding will
result in a lesser sentencef82
Since juries cannot be cleansed of their world knowledge and indeed are exhorted in most
jury charges to use their common sense in evaluating the evidence, is not a more reliable
outcome achieved by the jury knowing as much as possible to allow the legal reality to be
assimilated into their decision making process and a result obtained? And since
incapacitation will be weighed as to whether future dangerousness is an actual factor or not,
doesn't giving the jury a complete range of options regarding sentencing, including
deadlock knowledge, remove the speculation that concerns about future dangerousness will
naturally spawn?
In the final analysis, the LaValle majority both failed to address the issue of jury
speculation about parole when the choice is between LWOP or death and failed to confront
the reality that future dangerousness, whether charged or not, will always be a factor in the
jury deliberations. Jury uncertainty about incapacitation, given the unspoken concern about
future dangerousness, is potentially a far greater risk to an outcome driven by extra-
evidentiary factors than any coercive influence associated with the New York statutory
deadlock charge.
382Bowersand Steiner, supra note 360, conclude that jurors believe they know that LWOP results
in parole after a relatively short sentence served and the more brief that jurors believe the
sentence will be, the more likely they will vote for death.
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Although addressed at length in later chapters, permitting jurors to be aware of the prior
bad acts of the defendant or the defendant's criminal record could have a significant impact
on outcome. One likely motivation is incapacitation. A simulation study performed by
Sally Lloyd Bostock in England and Wales regarding juror knowledge of the history of the
defendant's prior crimes demonstrate that jurors with such knowledge were more likely to
convict, however the results are seen as more nuanced by Mike Redmayne.i'"
Juror knowledge of a defendant's history must necessarily raise the spectre of
incapacitation through the finding of guilt, as well as the belief that given past crimes the
defendant is more likely to have committed the crime at bar.
v. Is Jury Selection Coercive Thereby Creating Pro Death Penalty and Racially
Biased Juries?
Pursuant to Witherspoon v. Illinois in capital jury selection the exclusion of those jurors
who declare that they could never vote to impose the death penalty (or would not be
impartial in deciding guilt) is allowed in any circumstance, even if the aggravating factors
are found and no mitigating factors are proven. This process is called death qualification -
finding jurors able to vote for the death penalty if the evidence indicates it.384
Thompson, et al define excluded potential jurors as guilt nullifiers and penalty nullifies--
defining nullifiers as jurors who refuse to follow the law in deciding the case:
"The jurors who are excluded during death qualification fall into two
partially overlapping categories. Guilt nullifiers are those whose feelings
383 Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant's Previous
Criminal Record; A Simulation Study [2000], Crim. L.R. 734; Mike Redmayne, The Relevance of
Bad Character, [20020 61 Cambrdg LJ. 684, 699-714.
384 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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about death penalty render them unable or unwilling to be impartial when
deciding guilt or innocence in a capital case. Penalty nullifiers are those
who are unable or unwilling to be impartial during the penalty phase of the
trial. The two categories partially overlap because some potential jurors are
both guilt nullifiers and fenalty nullifiers, but a significant number would
nullify only on penalty.?' 5
The most recent standards for disqualification are set forth in Wainwright v. Witt, (limiting
the State's power to exclude opponents of death penalty) and Morgan v. Illinois, (requiring
the exclusion of some strong proponents of capital punishment) and Lockhart v. McCree
which holds that the exclusion of the death penalty opponents from the guilt phase of
capital trials is constitutional.i'" Gross argues that the exclusion of death penalty opponents
affects the decision on guilt or innocence and that the very discussion of the death penalty
during voir dire "tends to create the impression that guilt is a forgone conclusion"_387
Cowan, Thompson, and Ellsworth concluded in 1984 that the process of death qualifying a
jury makes the jury more likely to vote for conviction. Moreover, they argued that the
death qualification process frequently eliminates jurors who might otherwise have provided
insights and diverse viewpoints within the jury room that could have affected outcome_388
Haney's examination of the possible biasing effects of the death qualification process
concluded, based upon a study conducted of mock jurors, that those mock jurors who went
38S William C. Thompson, C.L. Cowan, & P.E. Ellsworth, Death Qualifications After Wainwright
v. Witt and Lockhart v. McCree, 185 Law & Hum. Behav. 187 (1984).
311<Wainwrightv. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). Lockhart
v. McCree, 6 U.S. 162 (1986).
387Samuel Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriage of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 125 at 147 (1998).
388Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson & Phoebe C. Ellsworth The Effects of Death
Qualification Jurors Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberations, 8 Law &
Hum. Behav. 53 (1984).
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through a death qualification voir dire were more likely to believe that the defendant was
guilty and that capital punishment was indicated than mock jurors who did not experience
the death qualification process.389
The present practice in most states of the U.S. in capital cases is to present a large jury pool
with detailed questionnaires. The custom and practice is to give a brief overview of the
nature of the case, the questionnaires are filled out and turned in and copies provided to
each of the attorneys. For example, in both Cahill and Owens hundreds of potential jurors
were summoned for the initial meeting with an overview presentation by both sides, and
then questionnaires are filled out and evaluated over several weeks. Certain of the venire
are eliminated based on their responses to the questionnaires because they are not death
qualified. Other forms of disqualification by consent occur with judicial supervision as the
judge and the attorneys review the questionnaires. The remaining jurors then are again
summoned and individual voir dire occurs with the judge and counsel. The voir dire still
includes peremptory challenges and challenges for cause.390
Thus, to some extent assumptions regarding the effects of biasing during voir dire are
mitigated.'?' The author is unaware of any studies that show that individual voir dire has
the effect of tilting the venire toward a death sentence.
389CraigHaney, On the Selection of Capital Juries - The Biasing Effects of the Death-
Qualification Process, 8 Law & Hum. Behav. 121 (1984).
390JudithHeinz, Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases: A Comparison of Regulation in the
United States, England and Canada, 16 Loyola LA Int'I & Compo LJ. 201. Even though
virtually eliminated in England and Canada, and viewed as a racist tool by some American jurists,
peremptory challenges remain alive and well in the U.S.A. as noted in the prior chapter.
hI Id.
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Based on detailed interviews, Fleury-Steiner argues that "death-qualified" citizens who
make life or death decisions as jurors are characterized by a politics of the insiders - a
constellation of beliefs that ignores prevailing social and economic inequities, and, by
default, blames "immoral outsiders" for their own marginality".392 Fleury-Steiner asserts
that capital jurors "do not focus directly on defendant's racial inferiority but affect outcome
in racially significant ways in a process of at least two steps:
1. They construct themselves as a small group, and through this sense they
respond to the accused and to characteristics of the accused.
2. The small group identity they construct is one of insiders, and through it
they cast the accused as an outsider. Racial and other characteristics of the
accused figure in as related to outsider identity.'J93
Fleury-Steiner unabashedly acknowledges his personal bias against the death penalty -- a
bias that is discernable from the juror survey which he conducted using narrative analysis.
Having co-authored the study which argues that death qualification leads to "a penchant for
conviction and a predisposition for imposing death", those conclusions certainly are
contributors toward his bias.394
Fleury-Steiner melds the underlying finding of racism with reports of intellectual bullying
and browbeating within the jury room, reporting that jurors who hold out against the death
penalty were subject to verbal abuse and intimidation in certain cases. He ascribes a
392 Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Jurors Stories of Death: How America's Death Penalty Invests in
Inequity, at 9 (The University of Michigan Press 2004).
393 Id at 8.
394 Bowers and Steiner, supra note 360, at 654.
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racist's rationale to juror observations such as a lack of remorse by the Defendant and he
gives subjective interpretations to jurors' statements that might otherwise be innocuous.l"
There are three problems, if not flaws, in the entire analysis which is critical of death
penalties jury selection put forward Fluery-Steiner and by Bowers, Thompson, Cowan, and
Haneyr'"
l. The elimination of jurors who acknowledge that they cannot follow the law
(preconception) or keep an open mind with regard to the subject matter of the trial
(bias) is a fundamental American legal principal which acknowledges that jurors
must weigh facts and witnesses based on their collective backgrounds and
experiences. For example, the jury charge in New York State provides:
"You have been told that you are the judges of the facts, as I
am of the law. Judging the facts includes judging how
believable are the witnesses called to prove them. You are
to determine what weight to give any evidence, how big it is,
or how little it is, or how lacking it is. It is for you to
determine that for yourselves, what evidence you will
accept, what evidence you will reject, and you are to
determine how good or how poor or how great or how
flimsy it may be. That you determine for yourselves.
How are you going to determine how much belief you are
going to give any witness? There is no yardstick. Each of
you, as judges of the facts, determines that for yourself.
Each of you applies you experience in life, your own
intelligence, and every test you have found useful in your
own life experience to decide whether anybody-he or she,
business or social contact, friend of acquaintance-has talked
to you frankly, or has lied. Every living soul forms some
means of method of judgment of other human beings in this
regard-you do it every living day.
395 Fleury-Steiner, supra note 392, at 51-52 and 58; Koehler- Riesman, supra.
396 Bowers, supra note 372, William C. Thompson, C.L. Cowan & P.E. Ellsworth, Death
Qualifications After Wainwright v. Witt and Lockhart v. McCree, 13 Law & Hum. Behav. 185
(1989).
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To decide in your own mind, as you must, how far, if at all,
every witness is to be believed, you apply your own personal
everyday test of truth or falsity, which in your own life you
have found practical and reliable. You may consider the
appearance of the witnesses on the stand, whether they
looked and acted as if they were attempting to answer the
questions frankly and honestly, whether they seemed to be
trying to hold back, or whether they impressed you as being
outright in attempting to lie.
Each one of you is to determine this thing we call
credibility-the believability of each and every witness-for
yourself. On your own personal, mental decision about this,
you will base how much credit, how much belief, and how
much value, you will give to the testimony of each
witness. ,,397
The above charge exhorts jurors to use their common experience, their experiential
toolbox. While at the same time following the law, how can a juror who cannot
apply the law because they oppose the death penalty fairly follow this charge, and is
it surprising given this charge that jurors of different races and/or from different
socio- economic backgrounds might arrive at different conclusions from the same
evidence?
2) Their studies do not fully embrace the advent of Batson v. Kentucky and its
progeny, as well as the now highly prevalent use of questionnaires and
397 HowardG. Leventhal, Charges to the Jury and Requests to Charge in a Criminal Case in New
York,2 CH [NY] 4.41 (2004)
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individualized voir dire so that prospective jurors do not hear repetitive references
to the death penalty over many full hours.398
3) While not applicable to the studies by Cowan and Haney, a number of capital
trials are impacted by a tacit or actual acknowledgment of guilt by defense counsel
at jury selection or early in the trial. Thus commencing from voir dire, the jury is
aware that the contention by the Defendant and the purpose of the trial is not one of
innocence but rather mitigation. Because the defense frequently advises the jury
during voir dire that mitigation is the main defense posture, the failure of the data of
Thompson and Bowers to consider this nuance raises the concern that their claim
that jurors are predisposed to guilt and thus prematurely considered punishment in
the guilt phase is unfair because guilt is not actually being contested, in reality the
only contest is regarding the aggravating factors_399 Thus the predisposition toward
guilt may in many cases be directly related to the admissions by the defense of guilt
in the voir dire and opening statements.
398 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1985). The conventional wisdom is that applying a racial
test to exercise the use of peremptory challenges (the right to strike a juror for no reason given)
violates equal protection. Batson was limited in that it applied only to the prosecution, only to
criminal trials and only to racial challenges. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 500 V.S. 614
(1991) the Court inferentially expanded Batson to criminal defense lawyers. In Powers v. Ohio,
499 V.S. 400 (1991) the Court expanded the application to any racial exclusion, regardless of
whether or not the excluded are of the same race as the defendant. The issues are now resolved
intra-trial by hearings in which a good faith non racial basis must be given for the exercise of
peremptory challenges if requested by the opposition and the judge believes facially there is a
question.
399 This practical reality is epitomized in the State of New Jersey v. White, supra note 356, the
Court noting at page 73 that "Frequently punishment is the only real issue in a homicide trial".
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McAdams otTers a countervailing view regarding the issue of racial unfairness in capital
jury verdicts offering the conclusion that "we have a criminal justice system that punishes
those who murder whites more severely than those who murder blacks.,,40o
If correct, McAdams upends the argument that the race of the defendant is an essential
clement in arriving at the conclusion that the death penalty is given to blacks
disproportionately and the system's more likely to execute blacks - what McAdams labels
the "mass market" racial disparity argument.t"
McAdams, utilizing nationwide United States Crime Statistics, argues in support of the
other option to the mass market argument - the specialist argument, which holds that there
is a lack of concern for black murder victims:
1) He acknowledges that blacks are over represented on death row.
41.7% of the death row population from 1977 is black and 38.7% of
all prisoners executed since then were black.
2) However, he finds that in 1965, 5124 murders and non-negligent .
manslaughters were committed by blacks, whereas 4405 were
committed by whites.




3) He also finds that blacks murdered blacks in 4422 cases. Blacks
murdered whites in 69 cases, whites murdered whites in 4124 cases,
and whites murdered blacks in 281 cases.402
4) In analyzing the race of the suspect and the race of the victim
based upon a large previously published study, McAdams argues
that:
A. Black on white murders are treated no differently than
white on white murders.
B. Whites who murder blacks are treated more harshly than
blacks who murder blacks.
C. Blacks who murder whites and whites who murder
whites are treated more harshly than if the victim was
black'?'
McAdams makes the point that adjusting for aggravating factors is indeed difficult, if not
guesswork, and thus attempting to evaluate outcomes by statistical analysis is not without
risk.
As fully discussed in Chapter 2, why juries reach certain decisions and whether they are
influenced by external non-evidential matters such as religious beliefs or racist judgments
is difficult to determine because of the general protection in the U.S.A. and England and
402 Id .• at 155.
403Id .• at 161-170.
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Wales of the jury's deliberations. The two most significant cases examined in Chapter 2
which are relevant to the issue of prejudice and the procedural and philosophical problems
associated with going behind the jury's verdict, are People v. Harlan and R. v. Mirza.404 In
People v. Harlan a capital jury's consultation of bible passages while sequestered in their
hotel and in the jury room was found to be an extra evidentiary factor resulting in the court
overturning a death verdict. In England and Wales in Mirza, where the protection of the
jury deliberation process far exceeds American protections, the Law Lords declined to
conduct a hearing on the accusation that race was interjected into jury deliberations with a
vigorous dissent from Lord Styn, despite an allegation by a juror of specific statements
indicating a bias against the defendant, who was an immigrant who required an
interpreter.l'"
VI. Is Jury Confusion Coercive?
The previous chapter examined jury confusion from the perspective of Lord Mansfield's
Rule and limitations on post trial examination of jury outcomes.
It is also argued that jury confusion is the basis of coercive jury verdicts. Bentele and
Bowers utilized Capital Jury Project interviews to conclude that capital jurors in the
sentencing phase are improperly influenced by the guilt phase of the trial, misinterpret the
judge's instructions and believe that a finding of aggravation mandates capital punishment
404 People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448,2005 Colo. LEXIS 310 (2005); R. v. Mirza, [2004] WL61975;
[2004] UKHL2; [2004] 1 AC. 1118; [2004] 2 W.L.R. 201.
40S People v. Harlan, supra note 404; R. v. Mirza, supra note 404.
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and discount mitigation as the giving of excuses.l'" Particularly concerning is the
argument that misinterpreted jury instructions result in the jurors believing that a finding of
aggravation requires a sentence of death. Cowan, et al found that jurors used in a mock
trial setting had a less than perfect memory of instructions given that day answering 11.58
of 18 true/false questions correctly about the charge.407
Bentele and Bowers describe their fmdings as follows: In their interviews, some jurors
explicitly stated that it was their belief that aggravation required death; others used
language that more indirectly conveyed the same impression. Accordingly, jurors reported
that at the penalty deliberations, they arrived at a death sentence based on the presence of
one or more aggravating factors that, to their minds, led necessarily to that penalty. Jurors
in all the states in the study described this determinative role of aggravating factors. Even
in California, where jurors are instructed to consider sentencing factors that are not
designated as aggravating or mitigating and then to weigh aggravating against mitigating
circumstances, a surprising number of jurors reported their belief that a particular fact in
aggravation required a death sentence. Not surprisingly, in light of the structure of its
statute, the perception that death was the mandatory sentence under certain circumstances,
406 Ursula Bentele& William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is Overwhelming:
A~gravation Requires Death and Mitigation is No Excuse, 66 Brook L. Rev. 1035 (2001).
4() Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson & Phoebe Ellsworth, The Effects of Death
Qualification: Jurors Predisposition to Convict and On the Quality of Deliberations, 8 Law &
Hum. Behav. 53 (1984). This further calls into question the accuracy of the Capital Jury Project
interviewsconducted with jurors about the judge's charge months if not years after the trial.
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particularly if jurors thought the defendant would be dangerous in the future, was most
. d h d' d . T 408promment un er t e irecte statute In exas.
The authors point out that none of the above-referenced states require a death penalty
sentence even if aggravating factors were found. Based on lay juror interviews
substantially after the trial, they extract out parts of jurors' interviews to show confusion.
For example in interviews with Kentucky jurors, four South Carolina jurors and three
California jurors where future dangerousness were a statutory factor, Bentele and Bowers
conclude some jurors conveyed a distinct impression that finding an aggravating factor
was the end of the inquiry. They infer from the following statements that there were
juror misperceptions of the jury charge which resulted in a death penalty determination:
J: In fact we had to according to the judge's instructions
give capital punishment.
J: If there was no reasonable doubt he gave us our choices,
there was no choice if there was no reasonable doubt. We
could find him guilty - I mean we already found him
guilty.409
J: Two major ...robbery and murder. To South Carolina law,
that would be sufficient reason to give him the death
penalty.t'"
J: If you followed it and got yes for this part and yes for this
part it all kind of fell inplace it seemed like, ... it just kind of
progressed us into ...there is really not much choice, well you
always want to have a choice I guess but.. ..411
J: What would the defendant do if set free? Would
408 Ursula Bentele and William 1. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt Is Overwhelming:
Aggravation Requires Death and Mitigation is no Excuse, 66 Brook L.Rev. 1032 (2001).
4(J9 Id., atl035.
410ld ., at 1033.
411 Id., at 1033.
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[the defendant] kill again? The law said the defendant must
get death because he murdered-the solicitor explained that
this was required by law.412
J: But after studying the law, what the law requires and her
danger that she would be even if she was in prison, that
another vote was taken and it was unanimous.l':'
In interviewing several California jurors, they report:
J: "That it was pretty well cut and dried ....You know, in
order to get the death penalty, you got to have this to give
support to the death penalty ....'.414
J:Kind of what it did was allow her to vote yes without,
sort of it was the wording, it wasn't that we changed her
mind, but somehow she was able to accept the argument, I
think she finally had to admit that he would easily hurt
someone else and that our instructions said in that case we
were required to give death." 415
J: The instruction, what the law specified. From what I
remember the law said ifhe's guilty of murder and the
murder was committed with special circumstances that the
death penalty was appropriate'V''"
The interviews which are the basis of the author's conclusions were conducted long after
the verdict was rendered. In some instances the above-juror comments inaccurately state
the law. In other circumstances the authors appear to misinterpret the jurors' statements.
The absence of follow up questions is telling to clarify if certain of the above jurors were
stating that the judge's instructions mandated the death penalty, as compared to their
expressing that the facts and the instructions caused the jurors to conclude that their verdict
was death.
412Id., at 1033.
413 Id., at 1033.




The Bentele and Bowers study was preceded by Eisenberg and Wells' conclusions that:
jurors' false expectations about alternatives to the death penalty influenced sentencing
decisions; that jurors do not understand burdens of proof as described in the Judge's
instruction; and that the confusion works against the defendant.l'" By implication the
interviews, based on a fifty-page interview instrument, presumably occurred after some
time elapsed from the date of actually hearing the judicial instruction in Court. No
representation is made that the juror was given the actual instruction to review for the
purpose of refreshing recollection - thus the consequent conclusions that the jurors did not
understand the burden of proof regarding aggravation and mitigation is not surprising and
not persuasive that jury confusion or misapplication of the jury charge led to the verdict.
This is not to discount the possibility that jury confusion has happened and could occur in
the future.
Elizabeth Thornburg, in her analysis of civil juries, argues for general verdicts whenever
possible given the possibility of jury confusion resulting from special verdicts.t"
Some authors have argued that capital jury charges are confusing and that the charge
should be both delivered orally and given in writing to the jury.419 Presently there does not
exist any data to evaluate the effectiveness or problems related to this change.
417 Theodore Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital
Cases, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1993-1994).
418 ElizabethG. Thornburg, The Power and the Process: Instructions and the Civil Jury. 66
Fordham L.Rev. 1837 (1998).
419 James R. Acker and Charles S. Lanier, Law. Discretion and the Capital Jury: Death Penalty
Statues and Proposals for Reform. 32 Crim L. Bull .•1134, 1173-1178 (1996).
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However, the only fair way to truly measure the jury's understanding of complicated legal
instructions is to interview the jurors immediately post-verdict and/or to allow them to
review the charge post-verdict.
VII. Is Race as an Extra Evidentiary and/or Coercive Force Upon Juries?
We have seen above that the content of voir dire and the elimination of jurors who are
opposed the death penalty has caused some to argue that the process jades the remaining
jurors toward death and creates a jury that is more likely to convict minorities and vote for
the death penalty.
According to certain commentators, race is an extra-evidentiary influence that can even rise
to coercion in the jury room. Thus, how jurors are selected during voir dire and how they
deliberate are connected - who they are influences how they evaluate evidence while
interacting with others in the jury room.
A) Jury Selection
"One of the largely unique aspects of the American Jury
system is that it confers upon the parties the unilateral power
- in the form of peremptory challenges - to remove
prospective jurors for any non-racial or non-gender based
reason".420
420 DavidC. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil AlanWeiner, Barbara Broffitt,
The Use oj Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Case: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3
U. Pa. 1. Const. L. 3 at 10 (2001).
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In a series of decisions, the United State's Supreme Court has banned the use of race by
counsel as a basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge, finding it is prohibited by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, reasoning that a prospective juror's race
is unrelated to his fitness as a juror. This was extended to gender.'.421
The Baldus study quoted above is the more recent of five studies regarding the racial
implications of the peremptory challenge.422 The Baldus study finds that Batson,
McCollum and JEB have not succeeded in avoiding race and gender based discrimination.
Baldus argues that this is concerning because Bowers reports that, having sampled 340
penalty trials from 14 states, the presence of one or more blacks on the jury was associated
with lower death sentencing rates in black defendant cases.423
Baldus, et al found little change in the rate of peremptory strikes of blacks in jury selection
post-Batson and McCollum. They offer two explanations, the first that moderate
discrimination is unlikely to have judicial sanction, the second is a real belief on the part of
both the prosecution and the defendant that the race of the jury will effect outcome. Baldus
confirms Bowers' findings that the presence of black jurors reduces the probability of the
death sentence. In fact, Baldus found that where black jurors exceeded the median, there is
a nine percent decline in death penalty convictions.V"
42 1Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 29 (1986) Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 at 59 (1992). JEB
Ex Rei TB, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
422 Baldus, Woodworth, et al., supra note 420, at 23.
m Baldus, Woodworth, et al., supra note 420, at 23; William J. Bowers, Death Sentencing in
Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors Race and Jury Racial Composition,
3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 171 (2001).
424 Baldus, Woodworth, et al.,supra note 420, at 108.
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The research of Hastie, Pennington, and Saks and Kidd regarding juror decision making
ofTers a scientific explanation for these findings utilizing either heuristic analysis or the
story model. Each juror brings to the process either a tool box of experience or an
established format of life experience and understandings that will be incorporated by the
juror in making decisions.425
B) Jury Deliberations
Analysis of outcomes has some value in evaluating the role of race in the jury deliberation
process.426 Sorensen and Marquart cited statistics showing that white offenders have the
highest conviction rate, higher than black or hispanic offenders. However, the authors
stated:
"While this finding refutes suggestions of racial
discrimination based on the race of the offender, it appears
that racial discrimination on the basis of the race of the
victim exists. Cases involving white victims are twice as
likely to result in conviction than are Hispanic-victim cases,
and five times as likely to result in conviction than are cases
involving black victims. From this analysis, it appears that
homicides involving white victims are the most aggressively
prosecuted in the pre-sentencing stages, while homicides
involving black victims are prosecuted less vigorously
during the pre-sentencing stages of processing. This
discrepancy reflects a devaluation of the lives of black
victims. ,,427
42S Michael J. Saks and Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial
by Heuristics, 15Law & Soc. Rev. 123 (1980-1981); Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, supra,
at pg. 544-549.
426 Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro, Death & Discrimination: Racial Disparities in Capital
Sentencing, Northeastern Community Press (1989) at 47.
427 Jonathan R. Sorensen and James W. Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury Decision Making in
Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 743 (1990-1991) at 775.
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Sorenson and Marquart offer the following caveat regarding their findings:
"Intra-racial killings occur more often between individuals
with a prior personal relationship. This legal variable could
partially explain the discrepancy in conviction rates. In
addition, killings involving white offenders or white victims
may involve the most serious felonies or most dangerous
types of weapons. (Hence, it is necessary to simultaneously
control the effects of these legal variables when considering
the effects of racial combinations on pre-sentence decision-
making). ,,428
Baldus, et aI, find that the identity of the victim is significant in jury considerations. In a
study of Philadelphia capital cases and non-capital cases for six years between 1983 and
1993, Baldus concluded that while the D.A. 's office endeavors to prosecute capital cases
across the board in a uniform way, juries were:
1. 14% more likely to give a black a death sentence than a similarly situated non-
black defendant.
2. More likely to impose death sentences for want of a finding of mitigation when
the victim was non-black;
3. More willing to find statutory aggravation present in black defendant with non-
black victim cases.429
In this regard Baldus is revisiting an earlier theme.43o Baldus chronicled the capital murder
case, McCleskey v. Kemp in which the offender alleged that his death sentence was
428 /d .• at 775.
429 David Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner, Barbara Broffitt,
Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: an Empirical and Legal
Overview with Recent Findings/rom Philadelphia, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1638 «1998).
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unconstitutional because it had been imposed discriminatorily based upon his race and the
race of his victim (a white police officer).431 As a consequence, McCleskey alleged
Fourteenth Amendment due process violations and an Eighth Amendment violation by
virtue of his death sentence, alleging that his indictment was cruel and inhuman treatment.
An application was made to the District Court which resulted in two weeks of hearings in
which Baldus and his team argued that the defendant, who is black, had a significantly
higher chance of a death sentence because the victim was white. These arguments were
rejected by the District Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals and the u.S. Supreme COurt.432
Garvey, in a study of 41 South Carolina capital jury cases, found that while the race of the
defendant generally appears to have little effect on juror reactions to aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, it does appear to influence juror reactions to future
dangerousness. 433 Garvey found that sixty-one percent of white jurors felt future
dangerousness was a significant factor that would make them more likely to vote for the
death penalty, whereas only thirty-seven percent of black jurors viewed future
dangerousness the same way.434The unanswered question from Garvey's survey is why.
VIII. Coercive Forces Effecting Judicial Decision Making
Legal scholars have debated for some time whether or not judicial ambition or incumbency
preservation can have a coercive effect on judicial decision making in capital cases, many
430 David Baldus, George Woodworth, Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Equal Justice and the Death
Penalty - A Legal and Empirical Analysis, (Eastern U. Press, 1990).
431 McClcsky v. Kemp. 107 S. Ct, 1756 (1987); see also McClesky v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338
(ND GA. 1984).
4J2 Id.
m Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think? 98
Col. L. Rev. 1560 (1998).
434 Id.; Garvey at FN 92 page 1560 cites two other studies which also indicate that future
dangerousness plays a significant role in jury sentencing decisions.
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concluding that extra-evidentiary matters are a factor. Others find judicial fact finding to
be more competent, reassuring, and reliable.
The most powerful critic of allowing elected judges to preside over or decide capital cases
is Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court John Paul Stevens, who in a
stinging assault in Harris v. Alabama, stated:
"I am convinced that our jury system provides reliable
insulation against the passions of the polity. Voting for a
political candidate who vows to be "tough on crime" differs
vastly from voting at the conclusion of an actual trial to
condemn a specific individual to death. Jurors'
responsibilities terminate when their case ends; they answer
only to their own consciences; they rarely have any concern
about possible reprisals after their work is done. More
importantly, they focus their attention on a particular case
involving the fate of one fellow citizen, rather than on a
generalized remedy for a global category of faceless violent
criminals who, in the abstract, may appear unworthy of
life.'.435
Liebman maintains:
"The last thing an elected trial judge wants (trial judges in
death sentencing states are almost all elected; many of them
began their political careers as prosecutors) is a district
attorney's angry statement on the evening news blaming 'the
peoples' defeat in a capital case on a trial judge's decision
to suppress evidence, limit questioning or withhold a desired
instruction".436
Liebman, Fagan and West appear to contradict Liebman's earlier argument and that of
Bright and others that elected judges do not have the courage or integrity to preserve
fundamental rights, stating:
435 H' 1ams v. A abama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 at 1039 (1995).
436 James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 2030, at 2111.
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"Appointed federal judges are sometimes thought to be more likely to
overturn capital sentences than state judges, who almost always are elected
in capital-sentencing states. In fact, state judges are the first and most
important line of defense against erroneous death sentences. They found
serious error in and reversed 90% (2,133 of the 2,370) capital sentences that
were overturned during the study period.'"m
Regarding the extent of serious error, Liebman, et al found the following:
"Even before any federal courts become involved, state courts across the
country find serious error in close to half (at least 47%) of the capital
judgments that reach their two checkpoints .
.State courts found capital error rates of 40% or more in five-sixths of
death-penalty states. They found serious error in 60% or more of the capital
judgments in a fifth of those states .
.A number of the states in the nation's "death belt" (where most American
death sentences are imposed and the largest death rows exist) have some of
the nation's highest rates of serious capital-sentencing error- by the lights of
the state's own elected judges: Florida at 58%; Alabama at 59%; South
Carolina at 62%; North Carolina at 65%; Mississippi at 69%; and Maryland
at 77%. ,.438
This is in contrast to Bright's and Keenan's findings in "In Judges and the Politics of
Death". They argue that elected judges appoint incompetent counsel and failed to protect
basic constitutional rights.439 Bright notes that in certain circumstances judges have been
defeated for reelection after issuing constitutional rulings because they were characterized
as pro-defendant. He also cites the prominent role of Governors who appoint judges, and
437 James Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan and Valerie West, Broken System: Error Rates in Capital
Cases, 1973-1995 (2000), www.thejusticeproject.org.
438 Id.
439 Stephen B. Bright and Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between
the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 73 Bos. L. Rev. 759 (1995).
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Presidents GHW Bush and Clinton in seeking strong anti-crime oriented appointed Federal
Judges.
Bright likewise holds out that many of the elected judges in the State of Texas commit
judicial indiscretion in death penalty cases. Bright maintains that the elected Texas
judiciary adversely impacted death penalty cases by appointing incompetent counsel to
handle trials and appeals.440 Indeed, he asserts that in Texas there is no requirement that
defense counsel be awake, prepared, free of conflicts or adequately compensated in capital
cases. Bright argues:
"The Texas Judiciary has amply demonstrated the need for full review of
convictions and death sentences by independent, life-tenured federal judges
who are not in danger of being voted out of office for an unpopular, but
legally required, decision.'.441
A helpful consumer survey reported by Daniel W. Shuman and Anthony Champagne
shows that judges selected according to a "merit" plan - an expert commission
recommending to the Governor a list of qualified candidates for appointment - are not
necessarily superior to popularly elected judges.442 Indeed, surveys found not only were the
educational, experiential or "cosmopolitan" characteristics comparable, a ranking by
lawyers of 324 Supreme Court judges found that the merit selection plan eliminated the
440 StephenB. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1805 at
1818 (2000).
441 u.. at 1832.
442 Daniel W. Shuman and Anthony Champagne, Removing the People From the Legal Process:
The Rhetoric and Research On Judicial Selection and Juries, 3 Psychol. Pub. Poly & L. 252
( 1997).
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poorest quality judges; however, elected judges received the highest ranking.t'" "If
lawyers' rankings of judges can be trusted, elected judges had a far greater range in quality
than Missouri plan judges (merit) in that election produced the best ranked and lowest
ranked judges,.444
It should be noted that surveys in civil cases show that judges generally have a high regard
for jury outcomes in trials before them.445 Chapter 8 reports a survey for this paper
regarding outcomes in bench and jury trials that will further examine the role of the judge
in complex cases.
IX. Does Public Opinion Have a Coercive Influence?
In Proffitt v. Florida. and Jurek v. Texas, the Supreme Court established guidelines that
addressed the jurisprudential defects delineated in Furman v. Georgia.l'" The Gregg and
Jurek Courts set forth a bifurcated process in which guilt would first be determined, then a
separate stage in which punishment was to be decided declaring specific and clear statutory
guidelines for making a life or death decision and automatic review on appeal by the
State's highest Court.
Death penalty opponents have published extensively on the coercive nature of public
opinion and electoral politics, which they claim results in death sentences in
443 Henry Glick, The Promise and Performance of the Missouri Plan, 32 U. Miami L. Rev. 509,
520-1 (1979).
444 David W. Shuman and Anthony Champagne, supra at note 123 at 126.
44S Neil Vidmar and Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 Brook L. Rev. 1121
(2001) at 1176.
446 Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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disproportionate numbers before elected judges with appellate review conducted by elected
Judges, as well as a tendency by juries to be in favor of death.
Many efforts have been made to evaluate the public's posture regarding the death penalty.
In 1995 Bowers, Vandiver and Dugan argued that the standardizing polling questions
(SPQ) about the death penalty have been phrased in such a way that has invited the
misinterpretation that has occurred.t" Bowers argues that the SPQ "asks whether or not
people favor the death penalty, not whether they think it is the best or most appropriate
punishment for convicted murderers. Thus it reflects acceptance, but does not indicate
preference for the death penalty over alternative punishments. ,,448
Bowers' polling data further reflects a public preference for lengthy imprisonment and
restitution when the public is further questioned. Indeed, 1991 citizen surveys found that
New Yorkers preferred LWOP and restitution - a form of restorative justice - to the death
penalty. The survey showed that 47.4% strongly favored capital punishment and 23.2%
somewhat favored it. However, the survey found that 54.5% of the sample preferred
LWOP if the "sentence to life in prison (was) with absolutely no chance of ever being
released on parole or returning to society". [Parenthesis added] The preference grew to
73.0% with LWOP and restitution.t"
Samuel R. Gross is critical of the phraseology of Bowers' questions:
"The questions are worded forcefully and we asked
repeatedly with escalating non-death sentences - from
447 William J. Bowers, Margaret Vandiver, and Patricia Dugan, A New Look at Public Opinion on
Capital Punishment: What Citizens and Legislators Prefer, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 77 (1994-95).
448 Id at 85.
449 Id at 103
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'parole after 25 years' to 'no chance of parole' plus
restitution. . ..
The Bowers .. version of the life without parole question -
"would you prefer this (punishment) as an alternative to the
death penalty?" Some respondents who agreed might have
meant that they wanted life without parole to be available,
along with the death penalty, as an alternative. If so, they
should be categorized as supporters of capital punishment
because the death penalty is always discretionary in the U.S.,
whatever the lesser penalty.'.450
Gross reports that a series of studies show that most Americans "believe that murderers
h d life imori Id' 451w 0 are sentence to 1 irnpnsonment are re ease In twenty or ten or even seven years.
Gross concludes that the public is more interested in retribution than incapacitation,
concluding that "most Americans favor the death penalty because they feel that killing is
wrong; their favorite explanation is 'a life for a life".452 However, the pendulum regarding
public opinion may be shifting. A 2005 poll found that 56% of New Yorkers surveyed
stated that they favor life without parole or with the possibility of parole for people
convicted of murder. Contrasted against a 1994 poll, 34% said that they supported the
death penalty, a significant drop from 47% in 1994.453
x. Applications to England and Wales and Canada
The research that has followed American capital punishment jury verdicts is
overwhelming, detailed, invasive, and frequently tainted by the opinions of the researchers.
450 Samuel R. Gross, Public Opinion on the Death Penalty, 83 Cornell L. 1448 (1998) at 1454-
1456.
451 Id., at 1456-1467.
452 Id., at 1472.
4SJ Michael Slackman and Margorie Connelly, Pataki 's Rating Declines Sharply in Poll of State,
N.Y. Times, February 15,2005 at At.
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Recognizing the philosophical differences, capital punishment is a uniquely American
criminal sentence between the comparator nations. The function of capital sentencing
juries is distinctly relevant to the comparators. First there is the obvious fact that imposing
a capital sentence is the gravest form of verdict to be rendered. Second, the complexity,
that is the combination of emotion and the weighing of statutory factors having already
rendered a verdict of guilt, poses unique opportunities to study how the jury works and
examine the impact of the detailed knowledge of the crime and the judge's charge on juror
decision making.
Americans can lay claim to tremendous experience, some positive, much negative, in the
problems posed by diverse society in a court oflaw. More and more the problem posed by
race, as accentuated in the prior chapter in the case of R. v. Mirza, demonstrates that legal
prophylaxis against verdicts that may be tainted by race is easier said than done. And as
the capital cases demonstrate, there is little confidence in some quarters that resorting to
trial by judge for greater fairness is a realistic remedy. In the prior chapter it is suggested
that voir dire may provide some protection against racial bias on the jury in England and
Wales and Canada, where the jury is randomly selected.
Issues posed by intra evidentiary influences such as race and jury charges (judge's
summing up) remain a source of concern.
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A. Juries
Honess, Levi and Channan in a simulation study found that twenty six percent of the
simulated jurors utilized heuristics, "general 'rules of thumb' about 'how the world works"
in their reasoning".454
Such a reliance by jurors on heuristics could include accepting racial stereotypes about
blacks, hispanics, jews, orientals, aboriginals, virtually every non-Caucasian defendant
tried in England and Wales, the U.S.A. or Canada. Specifically applying the hindsight bias
jurors would regard defendants behaviours as consistent with experiences that led to their
developing a negative stereotype about race or ethnicity, i.e. one group is lazy, another
group is greedy and dishonest, a third group tends to be fmancially sharp.4ss Indeed the
comparator jurisdictions agree with the Court of Appeal in R. v. Smith that jurors can rely
on their past experiences, but if that past experience includes racism or stereotyping, that
could cause a miscarriage of justice by permitting a juror with bias or prejudice to sit in
judgment.Y"
Daly and Pattenden set forth at length the problems associated with the England and Wales
system of determining juror bias:
"The juror may be questioned but only after cause to challenge is
shown. This means prima facie evidence of bias must already exist.
Since the United Sates practice of questioning members of the
venire to detect prejudice is not followed, this is unlikely unless the
juror has been heard to make a racist remark or bears on his person
454 T.M. Honess,M. Levi and E.A. Charman, Juror Competence in Serious Frauds Since Roskill:
A Research-based Assessment, Journal of Financial Crime 17, 23 (2003).
m Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation, 79 Or. L.
Rev. 61,66.
456 R. v. Smith [2003] EWCA Crim. 283,
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some visible sign of racism. Canadian courts have accepted survey
evidence or taken judicial notice of local prejudice against visible
racial minorities as prima facie evidence but there is no precedent
for this in English law.'.457
Daly and Pattenden note that articles 6 and 14 of the ECHR offer protections to defendants
that they will be tried by an impartial tribunal without regard to "race, colour, language,
religion, national or social origin", but also strongly make the case that based on the
Human Rights Act 1998, judicial preemptive questioning, majority verdicts discretion to
discharge, discretion to warn, and post-verdict allegations procedures are not adequate
protections for defendants against juror racism or prejudice.458 The Canadian approach,
which is set forth at length in Chapter 2, also permits courts to accept survey evidence of
prejudice or to take judicial notice of it in certain communities, which would then
precipitate voir dire.459
It is not a stretch to consider that concerns about race would extend to other crimes
including serious frauds cases. Defendants of many ethnicities, colour, or religion must be
concerned about the effect of race stereotyping on trial outcomes. If race is the finding
factor in murder trial death penalty cases or other violent crimes, isn't it a fair inference that
racial prejudice would infect a complex trial, particularly cases that involve international
business people of all diverse backgrounds, races, and religions?
457 Gillian Daly and Rosemary Patten don, Racial Bias and the English Criminal Trial Jury [2005]
64 Cambridge Law Journal 678, 685.
458 Id 687,699.
459 R. v. Williams (1998) 15 C.R. 1128, 123 C.C.C.3d 481.
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As noted in Chapter 2 in England and Wales the defendant does not have the right to
evaluate the jury's verdict to see ifit was tainted by racism.46o
Lord Steyn's call, in R. v. Mirza, for post verdict hearings on the injection of racism is
certainly a more practical solution than Daly and Pattenden's solution of recording all jury
deliberations and making the same available for limited review by the Court of Appeal
based on a plausible allegation of racial bias infecting the jury deliberations.f"
Conversely the absence of racial balance on juries has been a source of concern in England
and Wales and Canada, as well as in the U.S.A. Several studies have urged different
proposals to make racially balanced or representative juries in nations that function
pursuant to random jury selection.462 The Runciman Royal Commission on Criminal
Justice in 1993 recommended that either the prosecution or the defense should be able to
insist upon up to three jury members from the same ethnic minority as the accused or the
victim. The Auld Report made general recommendations that there be ethnic and racial
minorities on juries where race could potentially be a relevant factor in the case. In
response to the Auld Report, lawyer's organizations proposed that upon application by the
lawyers pretrial judges be empowered "to secure a panel with an appropriate ethnic mix
from which the jury is to be drawn".463
In Canada minority aboriginal representation on criminal juries remains a problem:
460 R. v. Mirza, [2004] U.K.H.L. 2.
41>1 R. v. Mirza, supra note 461; Daly & Pattenden, supra note 458, at 703-705.
41>2 The Auld Report, supra note 16, viscount Runciman, The royal Commission on Criminal
Justice ch.8, ~~26-28 (HMSO 1993) at 133-134.
41>3 The Criminal Courts Review Report - Comments from Lawyers Organizations, Department
for ConstitutionalAffairs, Chapter 5 Juries, para 46,
httpllwww.dca.gov.uk/criminallauldcom//org;the Auld Report, supra note 660.
173
"Despite the fact that aboriginal peoples were the accused in fifty-
five percent of the cases, aboriginals served on only twenty-seven of
the sixty-six jury trials and typically as only one of the six
members. ,,464
B. Summing Up
Sir Robin Auld in his review of the criminal justice system recommended that:
The judge should no longer direct the jury on the law or sum up
evidence in the detail that he does now," 5
Indeed the Auld report recommends that the jury be free from any contact with the law and
the judge function to filter the law from the jury, based on his belief that jury's are unable
to comprehend complex legal and factual issues. This opinion mirrors the view of the
Roskill report that juries are unable to comprehend. A 1993 Crown Court study found that
jurors frequently had questions about the judge's charge, but were unaware that they could
ask questions of the judge about the charge.466
The same study demonstrated that 33% of jurors polled felt that the judge's charge was
tilted toward conviction or acquittal, almost equal toward the prosecution and the defense.
The study found that the juries in a significant percentage either convicted or acquitted
4M Neil Vidmar, The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching For A Middle Ground, 62 Law and
Contemporary Problems 141, 171 (1999).
46S Auld Report, supra note 16, Chapter 11,44.
466 M. Zander and P. Henderson, Crown Court Study, Research Study No. 19 for the Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) 32 percent of the jurors had questions about the judge's
summing up, 27% did not ask.
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based on the judge's perceived tilt.467 Of course the case of the conviction of David
Bentley in 1953, a miscarriage of justice occasioned by the trial judge summing up to the
jury in which he virtually directed a verdict of conviction by noting that the jurors had title
but to convict was famously overturned in 1998 with an opinion by Lord Bingham
castigating the judicial directions to the jury.468
XI. Conclusion
Any effort to evaluate the fairness, effectiveness and efficiency of the jury system using
statistical analysis as the sole standard is fraught with danger. Interviewing former jurors
months or years after their deliberations leaves the interview subject to criticism, whether
there is a qualitative or quantitative attempt to gauge the jurors' understanding of the
Judge's legal instructions and the law under which the case was decided. Moreover, failing
to take into account the nuances that each individual case presents is directly contrary to the
notion that each case is tried on its individual merits.
Serious analysts of jury behavior make cogent arguments that jurors bring to the
deliberative process their common sense and experience - and depending on whom they
are that may differ and affect how facts are analyzed. That people from different races,
socioeconomic groups and religions may view the same set of facts differently, drawing
inferences that are not uniform and reaching different conclusions, is not per se an
indication of bias or prejudice on the part of the juror, nor does it demonstrate a flawed
outcome. Indeed, jurors are exhorted to use their "experience in life, your own intelligence,
467 Id at 214-218 .
.u.s R. v. Bentley [1998] T.L.R. 492.
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and every test you have found useful in your own life experience" to determine the
credibility of witnesses or the weight given to evidence.l'"
Because judges and jurors respond differently to comparable situations suggests that a fair
conclusion from the various forms of statistical analysis reviewed above is just that --
people do make decisions based in part on who they are. It is apparent that both elected
and appointed judges make error and similarly elected appellate judges have a substantial
record of reversal of those errors. While the high error rate is of concern, it is difficult to
evaluate whether the mistake is in the interpretation of existing law or whether the error is
actually the appellate court's correcting the trial court based on the latest evolution of death
penalty jurisprudence.
The issues of race, complex jury instructions, and the reliability of juries are recurrent
concerns in the comparator jurisdictions. Judicial participation either before the jury or in
judge only trials is also the object of concern in the comparator jurisdictions. Chapters 2
and 3 demonstrate that both juries and judges are subject to some external influences and
biases, even in the most extreme form of trial.
The next chapter will look at the more specific problems associated with serious fraud
cases, explaining how corporations and corporate officers fare in jury trials, while
exploring some of the criticisms and alternatives available to the justice system.
469 HowardG. Leventhal and Budd G. Goodman, Charges to The Jury and Requests to Charge in
A CriminalCase in New York (11:Callaghan, 1988).
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CHAPTER 4
CONSIDERING JURY CAPACITY IN COMPLEX CASES
I. Introduction
A series of arguments have been advanced to support either disenfranchising juries from
hearing complex cases, retooling jury charges so that juries can better understand the
complexities of the cases before them, or restructuring the jury pool to create a class of
super jurors, highly educated and sophisticated and therefore better equipped to deal with
the sophisticated details of serious fraud trial. This chapter will examine the major
arguments regarding jury capacity in complex cases.
II. Unconstitutional Complexity and Issues of Jury Comprehension - Are Juries Up
To the Task?
A. Jury Outcomes
Have juries demonstrated through outcomes that they are able to grasp complex fraud
cases? Are the factual and legal details of a serious fraud trial so complex that the maze
of detail and law thwart a fair jury verdict thereby giving rise to a judge only trial as the
only mode of trial that can accord due process? This was the reasoning given by the
proponents of judge only trials for certain serious fraud cases, as well as the rational
given by a small number of American courts in directing a nonjury trial in complex cases.
We will examine the question in England and Wales below looking specifically at the
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Serious Fraud Office, a special agency established to prosecute such cases. America does
not have an equivalent entity and thus, there is no readily available control source to rely
upon for the statistical analysis of jury outcomes in major or serious fraud cases. There
are a number of high profile prosecutions which offer useful anecdotal information into
jury function.
However, outcomes of recent American trials brought against corporate leaders suggest
that in some instances juries are able to achieve verdicts without proclaiming confusion
or a hung jury. In fact, it is likely that jury incapacity is a less than persuasive argument
for bench only trials in complex cases. Conversely it is also likely that in certain
instances a judge only trial provokes more efficiency both administratively and legally,
offering an option that high profile corporate defendants and their indicted officers might
well consider.
For example, two American corporate chairs had different jury results. World Com CEO
Bernard Ebbers was found guilty after a complex trial and Health South CEO Richard
Scrushy was acquitted in a separate case of equally complex charges of financial fraud.470
In the second largest alleged case of accounting fraud in American history, the so-called
Cendant trials, the results were more mixed. A third CEO corporate leader, Kirk
470 The Scrushyverdict was labeled "The Corporate O.J. Verdict" by Dean Jeffrey Sonnenfeld of
the Yale Law School, asserting that the acquittal was against the weight of outstanding evidence
particularly in light ofScrushy's defense that he knew nothing about the company finances and
could not see what was transpiring in the corporation he founded. The Leherer ReportlPuhlic
BroadcastingSystem, 5/23/06. The Ebbers verdict was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. Tom Perrotta Circuit Affirms Ebbers Verdict, New York Law Journal, July 31, 2006, at
I. In another unrelated trial Scrushy and the former governor of Alabama, Donald Seligman were
convicted of various frauds. Kyle Whitmire, Former Alabama Governor is Found Guilty of
Bribery, New York Times, June 30, 2006 at A14. .
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Shelton, the vice-chair ofCendant was convicted on all twelve counts of conspiracy,
securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud in January 2005 while the jury was
deadlocked regarding the Chairman Walter A. Forbes. Forbes' second trial also ended in
a hung jury on February 9, 2006. His third trial resulted in a conviction. The length of
each trial is likely a factor in the outcome. The first trial extended over eight months. In
the second trial the prosecution took four weeks to present its case. In the successful
third trial the prosecution took three weeks to present their case offering some succor to
those who argue in favor of'brevity.?" (As we will see in Chapter 9, England and Wales
judges who try serious fraud cases argue for indictment pruning and brevity as a matter of
both principle and trial tactic.) The foreman of the second jury (who is a maintenance
technician) when interviewed post-trial stated regarding the complicated accounting
testimony, "I was able to sort it out," despite the fact that the case ended in a hungjury.472
The foreman's analysis is consistent with the apparent long held public opinion reflected
in the U.S.A. Poll results obtained in the 1990s by the National Law Journal/Lexis of
800 jurors in civil and criminal cases showed that a majority "said that even the most
technical cases should be heard by lay juries - rebuffing those critics who claim that trials
involving scientific complex issues call for "expert" juries".473
..7IStacyStoweChief Guilty At Cendant In Third Trial, The New York Times, November 1,
2006, at Cl, C4.
412 Stacey Stowe,A Second Mistrial Is Declared in Fraud Case Against the Former Chairman of
Cendant., The NewYork Times, Fri, Feb. 12,2006, C6.
m The View From the Jury Box, 15National Law Journal, Feb. 22,1993 at 25; This view is
shared by Neil Vidmar who notes that jurors in the very complex medical malpractice trials only
found for the plaintiff about 25% of the time and that other research has indicated that jury
verdicts tend to agree with assessments by independent reviewers hired by insurance companies.
Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests. The Contingency
Fee System. Juries. and Social Policy, 38 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 1217, 1235-1237 (2005).
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The Enron corporate collapse is generally viewed to be the largest corporate fraud case in
the world to date. The jury that tried the Enron Chairman of the Board and the CEO had
little problem following complex proof. That jury tried the indictments of Kenneth Lay
and Jeffrey Skilling, deliberating six days to find the two former corporate leaders of
Enron guilty. Lay, the former chairman of the board, was found guilty of securities fraud
(he lied to employees, credit rating agencies, and analysts alleging Enron was healthy
when it was not); wire fraud (told this same story in a video conference in September,
2001 assuring them of a "great" third quarter performance while knowing that in mid-
October there would be a massive loss and 1.2 billion dollar write down in shareholder
equity), and mislead credit agencies with the same fact situation. Skilling, who was the
President and C.E.O. was convicted of a conspiracy in which he gave false reports to the
Securities and Exchange Commission and Wall Street Analysts; created raptors (four
financial structures backed by Enron stock which were used to hedge inflated asset
values) and keep hundreds of millions of dollars of Enron debt off the books. The jury
found that Skilling knew that the raptors were wrongly treated as independent of Enron;
committed wire fraud transfers; committed securities fraud, in that the 2000 and 2001
reports to the SEC were intentionally misleading as well as misleading to credit agencies;
gave false statement to auditors; engaged in insider trading having sold $62.6 million of
Enron stock when he learned the shares were inflated by the internal effort to cover up
the company's true financial condition.V"
474 Alcxi Barrionuevo, 2 Enron Chiefs are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy Trial, The New
York Times, May 26, 2005, at I, C4-5; Bruce Nichols The Jury Holds CEO's to Account, May
26,2005, The Dallas Morning News as carried by the Syracuse Post Standard, A-6.
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The Skilling defense relied on the issue of complexity, maintaining that the Enron
prosecution had wrongfully pursued complicated transactions which were difficult to
understand but were legal, ordinary business practices which were being criminalized
because of their complexity and because Enron had failed famously.t" Post trial
interviews with jurors reported that their decisions were based on the cumulative
evidence, they did not accept the complexity argument as either rationale for the legality
of the transactions or an excuse for the defendants, and concluded that there was criminal
fraud and consequent culpability.t"
The prosecution of Enron related cases resulted in sixteen guilty pleas, seven convictions,
one outright acquittal, and a mixed verdict of some acquittals and a hung jury on other
charges against five Enron defendants. To be more specific 5 juries in Enron cases
including the Lay and Skilling trial, found the company's accounting firm guilty of
obstruction of justice, a separate jury convicted five executives, one an Enron vice-
president and four officers of Merrill Lynch, and acquitted one of fraud; a third jury was
hung against five other Enron executives on certain accounting fraud charges and
acquitted them of others.477 From these results alone emerges evidence that juries gave
the charges due deliberation, evaluated each case on the facts, and rendered mixed
41S AlexiBarrionuevo, supra note 475, at AI, C4, Vikas Bajaj and Kyle Whitmire, I Didn't Know,
Did Not Sway Houston Jury, New York Times, May 26, 2006, AI, CS.
476 Id.; see also Jim Lehrer News Hour Report, May 25, 2006, PBS interview with Professor
SamuelBeall (a former member of the Enron Task Force) who argued that this verdict vindicated
the jury's ability to evaluate corporate conduct - "could corporate activity be structured at such




verdicts, finding some defendants not guilty and giving acquittals on some counts and
convicting defendants on other counts.
The best example of juror capacity to understand a complex case is the indisputably main
event in the scandal, the conviction on May 26, 2006 of Lay, the chairman of Enron, on
ten counts of conspiracy, wire fraud, securities fraud, bank fraud and false statements and
Skilling, the CEO, on nineteen counts of conspiracy, wire fraud, securities fraud, false
statements, insider trading. Skilling was acquitted on nine counts of insider trading .
•
Little was left to doubt about the jury's collective thought process in arriving at the
convictions. All twelve jurors and three alternates conducted a one-hour press
conference immediately following rendering the verdict. By occupation the jurors were a
dairy farmer, payroll manager, two engineers, a ship inspector, court clerk, personnel
manager, retired sales assistant, dental hygienist, elementary school teacher, and
elementary school principal. The testimony and attorney arguments had lasted 56 days
and the jury had deliberated for five days" ... they were shown thousands of pages of
corporate documents and spread sheets; they took 27 boxes worth of evidence with them
into the jury room where they deliberated.vt"
The jurors were selected in one day primarily by the trial judge, U.S. District Court Judge
Simeon Lake, utilizing a fourteen page questionnaire. In their post trial interviews, they
acknowledged (comparable to what experienced English trial judges say about serious
478 Vikas Bajaj and Kyle Whitmire, "I Didn 'I Know, Did Not Sway Houston Jury", New York
Times, May 26, 2006, P2, CS.
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fraud trials in their country) that this case ultimately turned on credibility.479 After
hearing from twenty-five prosecution witnesses and thirty-one defense witnesses
including Skilling and Lay, the jury concluded that the dual defense theories that Enron
fell not because of accounting fraud (the accounting was, according to the defense
complex, but legitimate) but rather because of adverse publicity which created a
devaluation of the stock were both without credibility:
"The 12 jurors and three alternates ... said "they were
persuaded by the volume of evidence the government
presented and by Mr. Skilling's and Mr. Lay's own
appearances on the stand, that the men had perpetuated a
far reaching fraud by lying to investors and employees
about Enron's performance.v "
The case against Lay was the more difficult to bring and to prove because he was, a chair
of the board, more removed from the day-to-day transactions:
"Prosecutors eventually defined and pinned down Mr.
Lay's misdeeds by focusing on what amounted to the most
basic of childhood transgressions. After analyzing millions
of pages of documents, deconstructing complex accounting
mechanisms, unwinding complex trading transactions and
interviewing scores of witnesses they found a theme that
carried the day: Mr. Lay chose to lie - to his shareholders,
his employees and his banks - and those lies were his
crimes. ,.481
m Id, .at CS.
4KO Alexi Barrionuevo, 2 Enron Chiefs are Convicted In Fraud and Conspiracy Trial, New York
Times,May 26, 2006, 1,C4.
4HI Alexi Barrionuevo and Kurt Eichenwald, The Enron Case that Almost Wasn't, The New York
Times, June 4, 2006 BI, 7. See also, Kurt E. Eichenwald, Conspiracy of Fools (Broadway
Books/RandomHouse, 2005) Chapter 21.
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"And prosecutors ruled out insider trading and corporate
looting indictments not because the jury would not
understand these more complex theories, but rather because
there was great doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence
as a matter oflaw.'.482
The case against Skilling was complicated by the defense which denied the actual
existence of the financial losses Enron had incurred prior to his departure and defended as
legal and consistent with existing accounting practices the very actions alleged as illegal
in the indictments.i'" Under Skilling's contentions to the jury, when he left Enron
months prior to Enron's collapse, the company was in relatively sound financial
condition and had followed acceptable accounting practices. He argued to the jury that
the collapse was not on his watch and was the result of a confluence of market events and
bad publicity creating a loss of market confidence in the company thereby causing a rapid
devaluation of the stock. The jurors in their verdict rejected Skilling's rationale entirely,
convicting him on all of the accounting related counts of the indictment. In their post
conviction explanation to the media, they made it clear that they not only found Skilling's
defense to be incredible, they also found the accounting to be dishonest and believed that
he had committed fraud. 484
Or consider the fate of the previously mentioned Richard Scrushy, the former Chief
Executive of the health care conglomerate Health South. Acquitted of fraud charges in
2005 in Birmingham Alabama, he was convicted in 2006 of bribing the Governor of
Alabama Don E. Seigelman $500,000 in return for certificates of need for two hospitals.
"X2 B . d . hamonuevo an Eic enwald, supra note 481, B1, 7.
4Xl Alexi Barrionuevo, Ex-Enron Chief Defends Shift of Con tracts, New York Times, April13,
2006, CS.
"114 Bajaj and Whitmire, supra note 478.
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The trial was conducted for six weeks, with eleven days of difficult deliberation in which
the jury twice claimed it was deadlocked, the foreman in a note to the judge claiming
several jurors had been "lackadaisical" and had refused to deliberate. The jury rendered a
verdict which found the former Governor guilty of conspiracy, bribery, mail fraud and
obstruction of justice. The jury found Scrushy guilty of bribery, conspiracy and mail
fraud. It acquitted Mr. Siegelman's former Chief of Staff and his former transportation
director on charges they had participated in a racketeering scheme.
One observer in evaluating the jury's performance stated:
"1 think that we underestimated the jury's capacity to
render verdict on a complex body of evidence ... Perhaps
the jury has voted to bring about a higher standard of
government in Alabama. ,,485
Lord Conrad Black, based on fifteen weeks of testimony by more than forty witnesses
and the consideration of seven-hundred documentary exhibits, was convicted by a jury of
obstruction <?fjustice and three counts of mail fraud. He was acquitted on nine charges
including mail fraud, wire fraud, racketeering, and tax fraud. The jury deliberated for
twelve days before reaching its verdict, which also convicted Lord Black's three co-
defendants on comparable charges.i'" The jury of nine men and three women included a
real estate broker, an accountant, an engineer, a postal worker and a hair stylist.487
Several of the jurors told the press that while they felt that racketeering charges with
4X' Kyle Whitmire, Former Alabama Governor Is Found Guilty of Bribery, New York Times,
June 30, 2006, at A14 quoting William Stewart, emeritus professor of political science at the
University of Alabama.
4H6 Susan Berger, A Spectator's View of the Weeks Courtroom Happenings, CBC.
bttp://www.cbc.comlnews/backgroundlblackcontadlfromthe-inside070 16.html, July 16, 2007;
4H7 Andrew Herrman's, Jury 'Hearts Went Out' to 'St. Mark';
http://www.suntimes.comlbusinesslhillinger/4698 58, CTS- NWS-conrad 16.artic1es.
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which Black was charged were credible, there was not enough proof to convict. One of
the jurors observed that although at the start of the trial she was confused, eventually
"you begin to understand".488
It is well known that defendant behaviour during the pendency of the prosecution ofa
u.S. case can affect sentencing. For example the United States Second Circuit Court of
Appeals acknowledged that other officers of World Com received light sentences, one
defendant five years, and two defendants one year because they plead guilty and
cooperated.P" In the 1989 conspiracy and tax fraud post trial conviction of Paul A.
Belgerian, the judge in sentencing Belgerian to four years advised the defendant he
lengthened the term based on his testimony on cross examination that he did not know he
was legally required to file a tax return.490
A major serious fraud trial involved the racketeering and corruption trial of former
Governor George Ryan of Illinois. Ryan was found guilty of eighteen counts of
racketeering and obstruction of justice after a nearly six month trial heard from 115
witnesses and large numbers of documents. The jury deliberated for ten days before
finding that Ryan while in office as the Secretary of State of Illinois awarded licenses for
bribes, gave contracts to contributors and quashed investigations into his office.491
4H8 Associated Press, Jurors in Black Case Speak Out, Chicago Tribune Online Edition,
bt_tp:llwww.chicagotribune.comlnews/local/illinois/chi-ap-il-blacktrial-iurors, 1,2023199.
4X9 Conviction of Ex World Com Chiefis Upheld, Associated Press, New York Times, July 29,
2006,C2.
4'H1 Alexi Barrionuevo, Enron Prosecutors Aim to Rattle, Not Be Rattled, New York Times, April
13,2006, Cl, 3.
..91 Natasha Korecki, Abdon Pallasch, Mark J. Konkol and Steve R. Warmbir, Guilty on All
Charges, Chicago Sun-Times, httpllwww.suntimes.comloutputlryanlcst_nsw_ryan183.html.
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Each of these trials, gleaned from the recent American headlines, show juries hard at
work in complex cases, making decisions that appear to be reasoned and arrived at after
careful consideration.
B. Unconstitutional Complexity
The factual details of a corporate criminal trial will likely involve corporate governance,
accounting, banking and other complex areas which as we have observed above, some
argue in America and England and Wales that lay juries are not capable of
comprehending. In America the notion of unconstitutional complexity has been
advanced, principally with regard to civil cases but with some application to criminal
cases as well."? The definition of unconstitutional complexity has two branches: 1) the
facts which form the basis of a criminal violation or a breach of civil duty are so
complicated that when applied to the law the Defendant could not have possibly
understood that there was a breach, and, 2) a jury could not because of complexity apply
the law to the facts to allow a decision that would satisfy due process requirements.
The doctrine of unconstitutional complexity emerged in the late 20th century when
several judicial decisions adopted the theory. According to one commentator,
"fortunately, courts have begun to reject pro jury arguments in cases of complexity",
asserting that for example, the case of Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp provided "an
4'12 David M. Nocenti, Complex Jury Trials, Due Process, and the Doctrine of Unconstitutional
Complexity, 18 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs 1, FN 1 (1983) in which the author argues that the
U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment gives the Defendant the right to a competent decision
maker. but that this right is trumped by the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, however "if the
jury truly cannot decide rationally, however, then the doctrine of unconstitutional complexity
must be invoked".
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even greater indication of the declining value placed on the jury trial. ,.493 Nocenti notes
that applications to the trial judge for a non-jury trial asserting unconstitutional
complexity in civil cases have met with varied results.494 More recent decisions appear to
discredit the doctrine of unconstitutional complexity. Since 1977 at least five federal
district courts and two federal courts of appeals have engaged in lengthy analyses while
finding that there is the right to trial by jury in complex civil litigation.t" The United
States Supreme Court has held that jury trials were not appropriate for some cases,
finding that judges, not juries, are better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent
tenns.496
Any recent trend toward unconstitutional complexity has been reversed however by other
federal courts which have reached decisions in which they declined to apply the
doctrine."? Advocates for the doctrine of unconstitutional complexity also cite Justice
4'J3 Matthew Forbes, Juries and Jurors: Jurors On Trial: Constitutional Right versus Judicial
Burden: An Analysis of Jury Effectiveness and Alternative Methodsfor Deciding Cases, 48 Okla.
L.Rev. 563, 573 (1995), citing Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp, 610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1979)
certdenied447 U.S. 906 (1980).
494 D id N .aVI ocenti, supra note 492, FN2, pg. 1-2.
495 See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (denying jury
trial demand); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F .2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) (granting jury trial
demand), cert denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); Zenith Radio Corp v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (granting jury trial demand), rev' d sub nom. In re Japanese
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 3d Cir. 1980); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp., v. IBM
Corp, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (denying jury trial demand), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); Bernstein v. Universal
Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (denying jury trial demand); Radial Lip Mach., Inc.
v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (granting jury trial demand); In re
U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F .R.D. 702 (SO. Cal. 1977) (denying jury trial demand), rev'd, 609 F.2d
411 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1980).
496 Marksman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,388 (1996).
497 See Cotton v. Witco Chern. Corp., 651 F .2d 274 (5th Cir. 1981) (granting jury trial demand),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1256 (1982); Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1977) (granting ,
jury trial demand, aff'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978); Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F.Supp. 199 (D. Or.
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White's footnote in Ross v. Bernhard which observed that "practical abilities and
limitations of juries" is a factor a court may examine in determining the scope of the
Seventh Amendment.i'" While the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals followed this
reasoning, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals did not, but did acknowledge that
unconstitutional complexity may require a bench trial in "exceptional cases" .499
The use of constitutional complexity in Federal Criminal cases is more problematic.
Although Singer v. U.S. upheld the requirement in Rule 23 of prose cutoria I consent for a
bench trial, the Supreme Court left open the use of judicial authority to overrule such an
objection if the trial judge concludes that an impartial jury could not be obtained.soo
There is very little case law on this issue. In at least two cases the Appellate Courts have
held that the trial Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to override the
prosecutor's objection to a demand for a bench tria1.501 On the other hand, two trial
courts have held that the complexity of a matter to be tried by a jury is a basis for the
court to override a prosecutorial refusal to consent to trial by jury and granting
defendant's request for a bench trial.so2 Thus, these several American courts have
considered the opposite scenario from that posed in the debate in England and Wales
1977)(grantingjury trial demand); Jones v. Orenstein, 73 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (granting
jury trial demand).
498S' V .mger v. .S., 396 V.S 531,538 N.lO (1970).
499 GrahamC. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 V. Colo. L. Rev. 53, 81 (2001); In Re
Japanese Elec Prods Antitrust Litigation (supra); However, the Ross v. Bernhard footnote is seen
as limited in application by later cases, see Rita Sutton, A More Rational Approach to Complex
Civil Litigation in the Federal Courts: The Special Jury, V. Chi. Legal F. (1990), 583-584.
SIlO Singer v. U.S., 380 U.S. 24 (1965) at 37-38; Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
SOl U.S. v. Gabriel, 125F.2d 89, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1997);U.S. v. Clark, 943 F.2d. 775,784 (7th Cir.
1991).
S02 U.S. v. Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1,14 (D. N.J., 1979), U.S. v. Panteleakis, 422 F.Supp. 247,
249-50 (D. R.I., 1976).
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about bench trials in complex criminal cases. In England and Wales the defense bar is
fighting to maintain the jury trial while in these two U.S. cases the defense is seeking a
bench trial and the prosecution is opposing the same. This is quite different from
England and Wales, as we will see below, where the organized bar stridently opposed the
implementation of 43 CJA 2003 and now the passage of Bill 6 of 2006_07.503 However it
should again be noted that both pieces oflegislation are lopsided in that they do not give
the defendant the opportunity to request the mode of trial. Moreover, unlike America
where the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the defendants absolute
right to a jury trial, the England and Wales defendant could lose the right to a jury trial
under both 43 C.J.A. 2003 or Bill6 of2006-07 (the present legislation pending in
parliament that would permit judge only trials in serious fraud cases) even if objecting to
a bench trial.
C. The Jury Capacity Debate in England and Wales - Are Bench Trials the Answer?
The debate in common law jurisdictions has been framed as essentially between the
pragmatists who opine that jurors are incapable of competently handling complex trials
and the principled advocates of the jury system who reject the claim of jury incompetence
and dispute the existence of the legal right to take cases away from juries.504 Nowhere
are the battle lines more clearly drawn than in England and Wales. Section 43 of the
SOl Press Releases: Law Society of England and Wales, Preserve the Right to Jury Trial- Law
SocietyBriefing - Law Reform and Legal Policy (6July 2005); Don't Abolish Juries in Frauds
Trials (25 Nov. 2003); Government Climbs Down Over Abolishing Juries in Fraud Trials
(3/14/06), www.lawsociety.org.uk.
S04 Michael Levi, Blaming the Jury: Frauds on Trial [1983] 10 Journal of Law and Society 257,
267-268.
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Criminal Justice Act of 2003 (CJA 2003) provides in pertinent part that the prosecution
may request a trial by judge due to complexity, a marked departure from the mandatory
jury in indictable (major) criminal cases. The government achieved passage of the entire
act, promising further consultation prior to the implementation of this controversial
provision. The Bar Council and Law Society led the opposition to the implementation of
this section of the Act of2003, succeeded in obtaining a recent announcement by the
government that it will not call forward (implement) this provision. 43 CJA 2003 notably
grants the right to apply for a non jury trial only to the prosecution - the defendant cannot
make an application for a non-jury mode of trial.
Thereafter in 2006, the then Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith renewed the effort in the
form of Bill 6 of 2006-2007 which minimally reshuffled 43 C.J.A. 2003 providing that a
Iligh Court Judge may determine that a serious fraud case could be tried by judge only
upon the application of the prosecution or apparently on the court's own motion. The
legislation passed the House of Commons but failed to muster sufficient votes to achieve
a second reading in the House of Lords, where it remains presently in legislative limbo.505
One indicator of jury capacity to comprehend and understand fraud cases is verdicts
taken as compared to mistrials or failures to conclude the trial to verdict. The notion that
serious frauds trials have resulted in a significant number of hung juries or mistrials,
caused primarily by trial length resulting from case complexity, is not supported by
recent statistics. The Serious Fraud Office is an investigating entity that instructs
~osJames Lumley, U.K. Plans to Try Complex Fraud Cases Without Juries (update 2),
B1oomberg.com htpp/ /www.bloomberg.com (June 21, 2005); Bill 6 of 2006-07, supra.
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prosecuting barristers. The Annual Reports from 2002-2006 of the Serious Fraud Office
have documented only two cases ending in a mistrial (no verdict by the jury), out of 68
cases tried to verdict and each mistrial was caused by inability of the jury to agree on a
verdict. There were no trials that collapsed prior to jury deliberations.i'" Even though
England and Wales are (non unanimous) majority verdict jurisdictions, no trials
prosecuted by the Serious Fraud Office were reported during 2002-2005 to have broken
(mistrial) due to length.i'" The most in famous recent mistrial (broken trial), the Jubilee
Line case (not a Serious Fraud Office prosecution) never reached the jury for verdict.
Although the many reasons for the collapse is discussed at length in later chapters, the
jury has been exonerated from any role in the case's failure by Crown Prosecution
Service inspector General Stephen Woolers in a report of his investigation for the
reasons(s) for the collapse of the case.508 A subsequent article by Sally Lloyd-Bostock
confirms this finding based on interviews with a number of the jurors in the case and a
formal testing of their comprehension of the facts.509 Likewise, a recent American study
concludes that case complexity was rarely a reason for a hung jury.i'" In a subsequent
506 Annual Reports of Serious Fraud Office, 2002-2006; see the 2004-2005 Annual Report. In
the January 2004 trial of Richard John Spearman, the jury was unable to reach a verdict. At the
second trial on June 4, 2004, he was convicted; Annual Report 2003-3004. In the trial of Leslie
Rosenthalon June 26, 2003 the jury reported that it was unable to reach a verdict and the Judge
ordered a not guilty verdict. In certain cases the Judge directed a verdict of not guilty during the
proof. In others the Judge directed a not guilty verdict after all of the proof was in. These
holdings are not mistrials by hung jury.
S07 Id.
S08 StephenWooler [2006] Review of the Investigation and Criminal Proceeding Related to the
Jubilee Line Case, L.M. Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMCPSl) The case is
discussed at length in Chapter 9.
SOlI Sally Lloyd-Bostock [2007] The Jubilee Line Jurors: Does their Experience Strengthen the
Argumentfor Judge Only Trials in Long and Complex Cases? Crim. L.R. 255.
SIO Paula L. Hannaford-Agor,Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott, G. Thomas Munsterman, Are
/lung Juries a Problem? The National Center for State Courts (2002) at pg. 77. Valerie Hans
and Neil Vidmar. The American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 Law & Society, 1323, 1348
(1991) FN 109.
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article, the same authors appear to clarify their findings, stating that "complexity may
playa role in hung juries" and that jurors "on average in hung cases were more likely to
say that it was difficult for other jurors and themselves to understand the evidence, the
expert witnesses and the judge's instructions on the law" than their counterparts who
reached a verdict.i!'
A recent practice protocol promulgated by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Divisioni12
was prompted by the holding in a recent case that trial duration can compromise a just
result and drain public resources,S13 The protocol provides insight into the thought
process of the court and offers a menu of management alternatives for complex cases:
For example, the Court urges that the police reduce the duration of defendant interviews,
urges that only senior barristers try cases of more than eight weeks duration and
recommends that the same trial judge to manage such a case "from cradle to grave,S14
The Court regards case management hearings as an important mechanism for controlling
the duration of the trial. During such a hearing, the defense and the prosecution are
expected to set forth the issues in the case consistent with the protocol:
"(b) There should then be a real dialogue between the
Judge and all advocates for the purpose of identifying: (i)
su Valerie P. Hans, Paul L. Hannaford-Agor, Nicole L. Mott, and O. Thomas Munsterman, The
flung Jury: "The American Jury's Insights and Contemporary Understanding, 39 Crim. L.
Bulletin 33, 44, (2003).
mProtocol for the Control and Management of Heavy Fraud and Other Complex Criminal Cases
F005] 2 All ER 429.
IlRv. Jis) [2004] EWCACrim. 696 at 113-121, [2004] All ER(D) 32 (Apr) at [113]-[121].
514 Protocol for the Control and Management of Heavy Fraud and Other Complex Criminal Cases
[2005] 2 All ER 429.
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the focus of the prosecution case, (iiI the common ground,
(iii) the real issues in the case .... ,,5 5
The Court of Appeal suggests that collaboration is in the defendant's best interest
because duration of the trial and confusion in presentation would cause "his good points
to become lost in a welter of uncontroversial or irrelevant evidence". The Court also
observes that stipulated facts (admissions or agreed facts) regarding uncontroversial
matters should be proved by concise oral evidence, and timetabling (time limits on
proot).S16
The practice protocol also urges judicial intervention to reduce the number of charges
brought.i'" In addition, the practice protocol advocates for early detailed expert
disclosure so that areas of agreement may be achievedsI8 and exhorts the judge to use
time limits to control "prolix cross examination'Y'" Thus under this rule a proactive
managerial approach takes on potentially substantive dimensions because issues are to be
narrowed. In the process each party should commence the trial with sufficient knowledge
about their adversary's case so that a cogent, efficient plan for trial can be developed.
Chapter 9 will detail the opinions of nine English trial judges about the conduct of serious
fraud trials, the competency of the juries, and the effectiveness of the protocols.
m Id 3(2)(b).
m Id 3 (2)(c).
mThis is not uniformly seen as desirable. The former Master of the Rolls Lord Donaldson
decried this concept in the House of Lords arguing that it prevents the jury from hearing all of the
alleged criminality and can affect sentencing.
m Id. 3 (e) VII.
Sl9 Id. 3 6 (v).
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D. American Jury Critics and Defenders
American policy makers and academics have attempted to address the same issues
reviewed above in England and Wales. For example, there were no correlations between
hung jury rates and possible contributing factors such as population density, community
diversity (measured by percent non-white) or community crime rates.520 One study
indicated that eighty-six percent of jurors surveyed felt that "no verdict was better than an
uncertain one ... however fourteen percent of the jurors believed that their over-riding
'duty' was to reach a decision regardless of their certainty about it.',s21
The criticisms of American jury function have resulted in proposals for retooling juries
in complex cases.522 The most striking is a proposal to have better educated jurors
selected for complex cases, citing a number of studies supporting this position.523
S20 Id. at 26.
S21 Carol J. Mills and Wayne E. Bohannon, Juror Characteristics: To What Extent are They
Related to Jury Verdicts, 64 Judicature 22, 29 (1980).
S22 Franklin Stricr, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47 DePaul L. Rev.
49 (1997-1998).
m R R. Hastie, S. Penrod, & N. Pennington, Inside the Jury, 135-137 (Harvard U. Press 1983),
135-37, (showing that jurors with higher education had superior recall of the judge's instructions
and of the facts of the case); James Marshall, Law and Psychology in Conflict. 59-100 (1980)
(suggesting the superiority of college-educated jurors in greater and more accurate retention of
detail); Robert P. Charrow & Vida R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1306, 1320 (1979) (finding that
college-educated jurors performed better than non-co lIege-educated jurors in ability to
comprehend standard jury instructions); Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury
Instructions that Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. Crim. Law198, 224 (1984) ("Jurors with greater
experience and learning apparently comprehend and apply jury instructions better than those who
are less experienced and/or less well educated."); David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan,
Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 Judicature 478, 483 (1976) stating that jurors with
college education scored higher at comprehending the legal principles involved after receiving
jury instructions than those without college experience); F. Stodtbeck et al., Social Status in Jury
Deliberations, 22 Amer. Soc. Rev. 713 (1957) (stating that education and occupation are
correlates of juror competence); ABA Report, supra note 25, at 25 (finding less educated jurors
experienced greater difficulty with key factual and legal issues in four complex cases).
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There is a body of research in support of this notion that the deliberating jury encounters
significant problems arriving at a decision in complex cases.524 It is not surprising that by
virtue of trial complexity, decision making is likely to be difficult. And as this is
explored elsewhere, the superiority of judicial verdicts in complex cases is difficult to
demonstrate in part because Judges function under different rules which make their
decision making less constricted by the rules of evidence and subject to more lenient
appellate scrutiny.
Hans, et al utilizing experimental jurors found based on comprehension tests that solid
majorities of jurors are basically competent in handling the biological elements in expert
evidence about mtDNA.S25
Ilans and colleagues do suggest that educating jurors about the science before the
commencement of the trial and the use of more educated jurors would increase jury
comprehension.
524 Streier, supra note 522, at N. 25 citing Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information
Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 Law & Soc. Rev. 123, 149 (1980-81)
(describing errors in judgment resulting from faulty heuristics people tend to use in order to
integrate complex information); William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate
Statistical Evidence?, 52 Law & Contemp. Prob., Autumn 1989, at 9, 24-41 (citing the different
types of errors jurors make in interpreting statistical evidence); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1334 (1971)
(arguing that laypersons overemphasize mathematical evidence); Jury Competence in Complex
Cases, A.B.A. Special Comm. On Jury Comprehension 25 (1989) [hereinafter, ABA Report]
(investigating jury functioning in four complex cases).
m Valerie P. Hans, David H. Kaye, Judge B. Michael Dann, Erin J. Farley, and Stephanie
Albertson, Science in the Jury Box: Jurors' Views and Understanding of Mitochondrial DNA
Evidence, p. 34, Cornell Law School Research Paper No. 07-021.
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1025582.
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In defense of jury decision making, Vidmar et al., found in 1997 that criminal conviction
rates in Federal Courts had increased since 1945, thereby refuting the suggestion that jury
confusion may result in leniency.526 Vidmar et al., also report that the number of trials
increased in California from 1980-1981 but the conviction rate remained the same and
that in New York conviction rates (and the number of jury trials) remained constant from
1985 through 1995, with a slight upturn in convictions between 1992 and 1995.527
Vidmar in 1994 reviewed a series of studies of juror performance in complex civil cases,
concluding that juror failure was less attributable to the complexity of the facts than to
procedural failures, failures by the judge and attorneys, or outright confusing expert
testimony. These are the parallel to conclusions reached in England and Wales with
regard to the collapse of the Jubilee line prosecutions.r" Vidmar also cites three studies.
of medical malpractice case verdicts which he asserts confirm competent juror function in
this type of complex civil case.529 Heuer and Penrod find that judges and juries decide
cases perceived to be complex the same as juries in most instances.f"
VII. Conclusion
The foregoing suggests that there is less than a compelling argument that jury
comprehension of serious fraud cases imperils the achievement of justice either in form
m N. Vidmar, S. Beale, M. Rose and L. Donnelly. Should We Rush to Reform the Criminal
Jury? Consider Conviction Rate Data, 80 Judicature (1996) 286, 287. In England and Wales,
during the House of Lords debate on CJA 2003, the high conviction in frauds cases caused one
experiencedLord to argue that perhaps jurors are giving prosecutors convictions because they are
unable to comprehend the complexities of the case.
S21 Id., pg. 289.
m Sally Lloyd-Bostock,Jubilee Line Jurors, supra note 509.
m Neil Vidmar,Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving Scientific
Medical Issues? Some Datafrom Medical Malpractice, 43 Emory L. J. 885,905-909 (1994).
HO Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity, A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its
Effects, 18 Law& Hum. Behav. 29 48 (1994).
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or substance. Indeed despite the many assaults on jury integrity we have seen in
preceding chapters the American juries have competently rendered the ultimate complex
verdict, the death sentence, and that a variety of external or extra-evidentiary factors that
may threaten jury integrity do not appear to be prevalent in any of the comparator
jurisdictions.
A modification of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to allow the defendant to
choose a judge only trial would permit a corporate defendant (or any defendant) to opt for
a judge only trial without the approval of the prosecutor, the same right that is accorded
to all defendants in States like New York State.S3l Granting this mode of trial option
would accord any defendant a potentially prompt, substantially less expensive trial. For a
corporate defendant, it may mean the difference between economic survival and
bankruptcy. The prosecution of Kenneth Lay offers some insight. Pursuant to "an
unusual compromise" the trial judge with the parties' consent broke off from the charges
against Lay four bank frauds charges, "in part because of the technical nature of the
charges" and tried these by bench trial while the jury was deliberating fraud allegations
against Lay and Jeffrey Skilling. This arrangement resulted in a shortened, truncated
bench trial in which the judge exhorted the lawyers to keep moving.532
Solving the problem in England and Wales is more complex given the tradition that only
juries hear the most serious offenses (indictable). Criminal Justice Act 2003 nor Bill6 of
HI N.Y. Civil Practic~Law §§ 260.10, 320.10, (McKinneys, 2005).
m Vikas Bajaj, A 2nd Criminal Trial Begins for Former Enron Chief, The New York Times,
May 19,2006, at C4. On May 25, 2006, immediately after the jury verdict, the Judge found Lay
guilty of four counts of bank fraud, the non-jury trial was completed in the six days the jury
deliberated.
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2006-07 give mode of trial choices to the defendant. This is perhaps the proper time to
modify the approach in England and Wales to permit the defendant to choose the mode of
trial in indictable offenses, thereby allowing a High Court Judge to be the trier of fact in
complex cases where the defendant so chooses.
The next several chapters will examine in detail the law of modes of trial choices, how
mode of trial decisions are made in New York and California and the impact of those
decisions, as well as the evidentiary character of a bench versus jury trial, concluding




THE PRESENT LAW OF MODE OF TRIAL CHOICE IN COMPLEX
CRIMINAL CASES AS COLOURED BY PROPOSED REFORMS
I. Introduction
Trial by judge has emerged as the preferred mode of trial for complex trials in the opinion
of a significant group of commentators in common law nations.r"
Juries also have ardent defenders, armed with supporting data such as a detailed
sociological study of actual jurors which concluded that jurors comprehended the law,
understood the facts, and only departed from the judge's instructions as a matter of
conscious judgment.!"
As we have already seen in Chapter Two, the role of the jury and how it functions in the
comparator countries is based in part on the legal culture. For instance, according to two
leading commentators, there are fundamental distinctions regarding the role of the jury:
"American juries still have more power and discretion than
English and Canadian juries. American juries play an
important role in deciding whether or not the death penalty
should be given to persons convicted of first degree
murder. Additionally, thirteen states give the jury the
authority to prescribe the length of sentence for defendants
convicted of other serious crimes; when English and
Canadian lawyers and judges are asked about the American
m John Jackson & Sean Doran, Judge Without Jury, Diplock Trials in the Adversary System 1-2
(Oxford U. Press 1995).
n4 Martha Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 Law and
Society Review, 781-798 (1979).
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Judicial System, they express disapproval concerning the
powers given to American juries. In their countries, juries
are far more subservient to;udges. Judges alone pronounce
the law and set sentences." 35
The judge/jury relationship in the comparator countries is not precisely the same because
cultural preferences have influenced the statutory and common law as well as national
constitutions. America's constitutional preference for juries is explained as follows:
" ... The American people are still afraid of delegating too
much power to one individual, a fear which has lived at
least as long as our Constitution. A judge with the sole
ability to adjudicate disputes is seen as a potentially deadly
cancer which may grow and spread throughout the entire
system of justice. Thus, we are willing to live with the
widespread ills of a jury system, which we perceive to be at
least nonfatal.,,536
Changes in the English civil justice system which eliminated juries in most civil cases,
the long term use of so-called judge only Diplock trials in Northern Ireland, and the more
recurrent parliamentary efforts (which are examined in this Chapter) to permit bench
trials in certain serious fraud cases, may reflect a more diminished commitment in
England and Wales to the jury trial than that held by the Americans or the Canadians. It
must be acknowledged that the present institutional suspicion of the English jury is not a
recent development, as Langbein observes:
mValerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar; Judging the Jury, 31-32 (New York, Plenium Press, 1986).
SJ6 Matthew Forbes, Juries and Jurors: Jurors on Trial: Constitutional Right versus Judicial
Burden: An Analysis of Jury Effectiveness and Alternative Methodsfor Deciding Cases, 48 Okla
L. Rev. 563,583 (1995).
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"Because of the grave risks of error and bias that are
inherent in using such decision makers, the common law
courts have never left juries to their own devices. Rather,
the judges have undertaken to guide and oversee the work
of the jury."S37
Despite the prominence of the jury in American and Canadian legal culture and lore, the
judicial role in the three comparator countries has expanded. For example, the judge's
gate keeping role regarding the admissibility of novel expert testimony has greatly
expanded particularly in the U.S.A. This trend is also clearly demonstrated in England
and Wales in the loosening rules of evidence such as hearsay which grant greater judicial
discretion. Likewise the increased emphasis on judicial pretrial and intra-administrative
control of all trials in all three countries, and in particular complex trials, highlight the
ascendance of the judge in complex cases.
The ultimate judicial role, trier of fact, as well as the decider of law, remains possible in
two of the three jurisdictions for serious fraud cases.
This chapter will explore the trends and exceptions regarding mode of trial, examining
how the choice is made and discussing alternatives. This chapter will also review the
mode of trial options in the comparator countries, will examine the various proposals to
modify or change the mode of trial selection process and will weigh the constitutional
legislative and judicial policy considerations at play in this discussion.
m John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trials, 321 (Oxford, 2003).
202
Given the trends briefly reviewed in this introduction, the method by which the mode of
trial is selected requires careful consideration.
II. Mode of Trial Debate In England and Wales
As noted in Chapter 4, the emergence of trial by judge as a preferred mode of trial in
England and Wales is demonstrated both by the long tenure of judge only Diplock Trials
in Northern Ireland as well as parliament's passage of Sections 42 and 43 of the Criminal
Justice Act, 2003 (CJA 2003) (which have not been called forward to date), which
authorizes judge only trials in complex cases pursuant to an application by the
prosecution only and the order of the Chief Justice.s38 To briefly recite the history
covered in the prior chapter, the Blair government, in a tactical compromise during the
Parliamentary debate on CJA 2003, agreed that the implementation of Section 42 and 43
would require further Parliamentary action if the entire bill was passed.s39 An attempt to
obtain further approval was subsequently blocked in the House of Lords, resulting in the
Government agreeing to not call the legislation forward. In late 2006 a new bill was
sponsored which would permit a High Court Judge to determine that a serious frauds case
should be permitted to order a judge only trial.s4o That legislation passed the House of
$)I As noted in earlier chapters, Diplock Trials in Northern Ireland are Judge-only trials which
will be discussed at length infra.
m Official Report, Commons (20/11103; Cal 1027-28) (Statement of Mr. Blunkett). The promise
was madeby Mr. Blunkett, then the Home Secretary, when asked if the bill passed, was he
representingthat there "will not be any serious fraud trial by a single Judge in England and
Wales?" His response was: "I am prepared to give that undertaking. It is part of the agreement
that we will retain the clause, but move forward towards looking at the alternative, solutions ...
That safeguard is appropriate. I give a finding that we will follow that agreement." This
exchange is the undertaking that further parliamentary action would be required to bring into
force §43 Criminal Justice Act 2003.
540 The Trial by Judge Provisions, 43 CJA 2003 have not been brought forward and an effort to
pass amended legislation to implement judge only trials has passed the House of Commons but
failedon second reading in the House of Lords. See a/so, City & Financial,
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Commons but failed to achieve a second reading in the House of Lords.i" Both attempts
to create trial by judge only in serious fraud cases have proposed the judiciary as the sole
decision maker as to the mode of trial. Commencing early in the Blair government's
advocacy of judge only trials, the defendant was permitted the choice of mode of trial, a
concept that was abandoned with time, as we will see later in this chapter.
III. Overview of Mode of Trial Issues in the U.S. and Canada
Chapter 4 addressed specific complaints about juries in complex cases in the U.S.
Despite the over two century existence of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution which establish the right to trial by jury in criminal and civil cases, the
American jury is likewise the object of criticism in all types of cases. Consider Heuer
and Penrod's opening paragraph of their investigation of the very definition of "trial
complexity":
"The jury has often been accused of being unfit to render
fair and rational decisions in complex litigation. Though
such criticism has tended to focus on the civil jury, the
criminal jury has not been immune. Among the critics, for
example, is Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law School,
who said, "The jury trial is the apotheosis of the amateur."
"Why should anyone think that 12 persons brought in from
the street, selected for their lack of general ability, should
have any special capacity for deciding controversies
between persons?" (citations omitted). In their summary of
the jury competence dispute, Hans and Vidmar quote the
English scholar Glanville Williams: 'It is an
http://www.cityandfinancial.com(last visited 22 Mar. 2006). The new bill, Bill6 of2006-07
(The Fraud Trials Without a Jury) Bill 2006-07 passed Commons but on 3/20/07 a wrecking
amendment caused the House of Lords to delay its second reading for six months.
~41The implicationsof the ongoing parliamentary debate and the practical implications of the
issues raised both by 43 C.J.A. 2003 and Bill6 will be examined in Chapter 9, which considers
the opinions of nine English trial judges regarding the proposed legislation and the present status
of serious fraud trials.
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understatement to describe a~ury ... as a group of twelve
men of average ignorance. '" 42
Comparing jury trials with judge only trials in an effort to evaluate mode of trial choices
and policies is a nuanced exercise. The motives of the parties when they choose a judge
only trial must be examined. There must be a careful factoring of the impact of intra-trial
events on verdicts in order to test the premise that judicial verdicts are superior to jury
verdicts. In certain American jurisdictions as well as in Canada there is a degree of self-
selection because the defendant is empowered when confronted with the most serious
criminal allegations (no such option is permitted in England and Wales) to choose a judge
only mode of trial. Because the very selection by the defendant of the option of a judge-
only trial is a tactical decision, a statistical comparison of outcomes may not be a reliable
exercise. For example, some bench trials can be a trial in form rather than in substance, a
mechanism for the guilty defendant to avoid a guilty plea ("a slow plea") while achieving
sentencing leniency.t" Even when hotly contested, bench trials can become a different
version of an adversary proceeding, undercut by judicial interference in the form of
invasive interrogation with different evidentiary rules and broader standards for appellate
review than jury trials.s44 Therefore any conclusions based on a comparison of trial
outcomes in judge only cases as compared to jury trials should be skeptically utilized.
~2 Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity, A Field investigation of Its Meaning and Its
Effect 's, 18Law and Hum. Behav. 29 at p. 29 (1994) citing Valerie Hans and Neil Vidmar,
Judging the Jury (New York Plennium Press 1986) at 114.; see also Jerome Frank, Law and The
ModemMind 186 (Anchor Books 6th ed 1963) assailing juries as poor fact finders, ignorant and
fJejudiced and unable to follow complex legal rules.
}Stephen1. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 Harv. L. Rev 1037 (1984).
S-44 Jackson and Doran, supra note 533.
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IV. Comparing Rates of Conviction and Acquittal in Judge Versus Jury Trials
It is logically perilous for many reasons to draw the conclusion that one mode of trial is
more just and/or more efficient than the other from a comparison of conviction/acquittal
rates between bench and jury trials. Record keeping may vary and in exercising the
choice of the mode of trial, the strategic objective of choosing a bench trial may be very
different from the strategic objective in selecting a jury trial. It is useful to begin the
analysis by examining an illustrative anomaly in bench trials - the City of Philadelphia
practice which was followed in the 1980s which offered bench trials in lieu of jury pleas.
Referred to in some jurisdictions as a "slow plea", a study of Philadelphia bench trials
concluded that these were actually very brief (on average 80 minutes per trial) but real
trials which still had a reasonable rate of acquittal. Shulhofer found a twenty percent
acquittal rate in bench trials of this type in Philadelphia - with no comparative statistic
given for jury trials. To further demonstrate the problems posed by statistical
comparisons of this type, the Schulhofer statistical conclusions were at variance with the
official statistics for that time frame which show a thirty percent acquittal rate in bench
trials in same Court. The official statistics regarding the bench trial acquittal rate
exceeded the jury trial acquittal rate but the official explanation was that there were
different record keeping practices which, for example, recorded an acquittal where
Defendant was found not guilty on one charge but found guilty on another charge upon
the conclusion of the same trial. S4S This example illustrates that jury trial as compared
S4~ Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable? 97 Harvard L. Rev., 1037 at 1087
(1984). There is a 20% acquittal rate for bench trials and 25% rate of conviction on lesser
charges only. Table V, supra at page 1080. The official statistics show a 30% acquittal rate in
bench trials, higher than the jury acquittal rate because record keeping anomalies, i.e. showing a
acquittalwhere Defendant found not guilty on one charge but found guilty on another charge on
conclusion of the same trial, at 1076.
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to bench trial outcomes are only truly comparable if there are similar protocols followed
in assembling the data. The how or why of case selection for mode of trial is an
important factor. The defendant's motivation for choosing the bench mode of trial may
be instructive for comparative purposes. For example, the defendant according to
Schulhofer in most cases opted for a "slow plea" or truncated factual trial before a judge
to achieve not an acquittal but rather a lesser sentence. This underlying objective jades
comparing statistical outcomes (Le. conviction versus acquittal) with jury trials, where
the defendant's primary objective is presumably to achieve a verdict of acquittal.i'"
Kalven and Ziesel have utilized a more accurate approach for evaluating jury function.
Rather than comparing the overall statistical outcomes of actual trials, Kalven and Ziesel
measured judge/jury disagreement by utilizing a standard questionnaire to poll judge/jury
disagreement in 3576 jury trials, exploring the actual trial judge's opinion of the jury's
verdict in each of these trials. They found that the trial judge agreed with the jury's
verdict in 75.4% oftrials.s47 A more recent smaller American study modeled after the
Kalven and Zeisel study found comparable judicial agreement with jury results.s4s A
S46 Rocco laDuca, Judge Finds Utican Guilty in Fatal Crash - Was Driving Drunk in Accident
that Killed 22 Year Old Woman, Utica Observer Dispatch, May 26, 2006 Bl. An anecdotal
example is the case ofIrfan Derrisevic (the defendant) who was accused of reckless
manslaughter,a crime carrying a fifteen year sentence. The Defendant refused a breathalyzer test
and his blood test two hours after the accident was slightly within legal limits. The testimony at
trial was that based on those levels he was over the legal level for alcohol in his blood at the time
of the accident. He opted for a bench trial while accused of reckless manslaughter for killing one
person and maiming another while driving under the influence of alcohol. He was also charged
with other lessermanslaughter and assault charges. He chose a bench trial in part because his
level of intoxicationwas low. He was convicted by the judge of the lesser charges and thus will
face not more than seven years of incarceration.
WHarry Kalven, Jr., and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury, pg. 56 (1966).
s..8 Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Waters, G. Thomas
Munsterman,Stewart J. Schwab, and Martin T. Wells, Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases:
A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel's The American Jury, 2 Journal of Emp. Legal Stud.
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comment on the Kalven and Zeisel findings observes that the rate of agreement between
judge and jury is impressive:
" ... (it is) better than the rate of agreement between
scientists doing peer review, employment interviewers
ranking applicants and psychiatrists and physicians
diagnosing patients and almost as good as the 79% or 80%
rate of agreement between Judges making sentencing
decisions in an experimental setting. ,,549
In an attempt to further test that statistic, this study conducted a survey of all New York
State judges who preside over jury trials. Sixty-five percent and sixty-three percent of
the judges reported that of the trials before them they agreed with the juries verdict
respectively in civil and criminal cases seventy-five percent of the time or greater.550 By
contrast fifty percent of the attorneys surveyed agreed with bench and jury verdicts in
cases they tried.551
The jury/judge agreement rate is particularly impressive because juries are deliberative
bodies with multiple opinions converging into one verdict while judges alone are sole
decision makers. The method utilized by Kalven and Zeisel is also highly persuasive
because the Judge is commenting on the jury's final determination in a case in which
171 (2005). In a smaller study with a less broad based sample the authors find comparable
judge/jury agreement and conclude that Judges tend to convict more than juries, but not due to
case complexity, at 204.
'49 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124, 1153 (1992), citing Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and
Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 Law & Contemp. Probs 243 (1988).
HO Chapter Eight, infra, discusses the specifics of the study sample and findings. The Judicial
Questionnaire used is Annex A.
m Id. The Attorney Questionnaire that was administered for this study is Annex B.
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each heard the same proof, removing the nuances and caveats resulting from comparing
actual verdicts by a judge versus jury in unrelated cases which always have dissimilar
facts. The obvious problem with this compared opinion regarding outcome is the
dynamic of both the compromise verdict and the hung jury. Itmay be helpful to know
the number of votes and the ultimate rationale of the compromise to aid the judge/jury
agreement factor. If the majority of jurors agreed with the judge but selected
compromise over mistrial, that knowledge might enhance the outside observer's comfort
level that the jury understood the case, had different conclusions and ultimately reached a
compromise verdict. The rate of agreement found by Kelvin and Zeisel is also
impressive because juries in the U.S.A., England and Wales, and Canada can and on
occasion do fail to reach a verdict because of deadlock. It is unlikely that a judge will
ever agree with deadlock as a trial result, consequently judicial agreement with jury
rendered verdicts is likely a higher percentage than is reported in the literature.
Comparing statistical outcomes can also offer some surprises. For example, reported
outcomes of criminal cases terminating in all U.S. District Courts from 1995 to 2003
show that while juries acquitted 15 percent of the defendants, judge's acquitted 46% of
the Defendants tried in a judge only tria1.552 California juries from 1980-81 through
1994-95 had a conviction rate of 82.1 percent, while New York State from 1986-1995
had a jury conviction rate of 72.3 percent.t" Hannaford-Agor, et al in a survey of the
mSee Federal Justice Statistics Database, the U.S. Government, (2003).
m Neil Vidmar, Sara Sun Berle, Mary Rose, and Laura F. Donnelly, Should We Rush to Reform
the Criminal Jury?, 80 Judicature, 286, 289 (1997). The authors did not compare acquittal rates
by bench trials, however, they did recite a study which found Judge acquittal rates in OWl cases
had increasedcompared to 1958 but jury convictions remained the same. Citing Rebecca
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thirty largest American counties found that judges convicted in 76.4 percent of the cases
but acquitted in 23.6 percent as compared to juries convicting in 71 percent, acquitting in
21.7 percent with a 6.2 percent hung jury and 4 percent other mistrial rates.554
In England and Wales, as we will see below, the acquittal rate is much higher before
juries in indictable cases than before lay magistrates in either way or non-indictable
offenses. However, Wasik asserts that the procedural differences between the forums
again make comparisons difficult.555 Moreover, because majority verdicts are not
permitted in England and Wales, outcomes are also more difficult to compare with the
U.S. and Canada, which are unanimous verdict jurisdictions.
Canada has experienced outcomes similar to those reported in the U.S. For example a
government study of statistics in selected Canadian provinces and territories in 2003/04
demonstrated that "found guilty" rates in Superior Court, a venue in which more serious
cases were heard by a jury, were "somewhat lower than for a provincial court case in the
same jurisdiction", where the judge is the more likely trier of fact.556 The explanation
Bromley,Jury Leniency in Drinking and Driving Cases, Has it Changed? 20 Law & Psychology
Rev. 27 (1995).
~~4Paula Hannaford-Agor, et al, Are Hung Juries a Problem? The National Center for State
Courts(2002)pg.20.
m MartinWasik,Magistrates: Knowledge of Previous Convictions, [1996] Crim. L.R. 851.
Wasik notes that in summary trials before lay magistrates that the defendant is frequently
unrepresentedor has an inexperienced solicitor, the defendant's case frequently consists only of
his/her testimony and the evidential issues are much less sophisticated than in Crown Court,
where indictable offenses are tried.
~S6Juristat, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada [2003-04] Catalog No. 85-
002 Exp. Vol. 24, No. 12,pg. 9, The found guilty rate in provincial court was 58% as compared
to 47% in Crown Court - the acquittal rate in Crown Court is 15%as compared to 2% in
provincial Court. Canadian jury verdicts must be unanimous.
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offered of the outcomes in Magistrates Court in England and Wales is comparable to
Wasik's analysis:
"The higher acquittal rate in Superior Court is based on
proof problems associated with more complex cases as well
as the number of charges, the availability of witnesses, the
complexity of the case, and by implication the
sophistication of defense counsel". 557
A recent study comparing the trial conviction rate of bench versus jury trials in United
States District Courts demonstrates that the conviction/acquittal rates may assist
lawyers/solicitors in practical decision making, but are not helpful guideposts for
evaluating the quality of comparative justice or fairness. The study found that the jury
trial conviction rate was 84% and a bench trial conviction rate was 55%.558 Leipold
engaged in an intensive effort to evaluate this huge variation in outcome, only to arrive at
informed but speculative conclusions but no definitive findings. His notion was that the
type of case selected for trial by judge alone had diminished prosecutorial intensity
because of the subject matter (like public order trials in England and Wales Magistrates
Courts) which in turn made bench acquittals more likely. In fact there is a high
percentage of misdemeanor cases encompassed in the statistics. Based on those
variations, Leipold rejects the notion that jurors are over and judges are under convicting.
He also opines in the article that Federal District Court judges, appalled at the severe
sentencing guidelines imposed by Congress, chose to acquit at bench trials rather than be
m Id. at9.
m Andrew D. Leipold, Why are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 151
(2005). The average conviction rate for juries since 1946 is 75% in all Federal cases, increasing
to 85% in the last ten years. The average conviction rate for Federal judges in all criminal cases
since 1946 is also 75%, but the rate for the first ten years, 1946-1955, the rate was 85% where in
the last ten years, the rate of conviction is 54%. Pg. 164.
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compelled by law to impose mandatory sentences pursuant to statutory guidelines which
many of them view as harsh and disproportionate.P" He further opines that each case
which becomes a bench trial in Federal Court has factual or legal elements which draw
the parties to a trial by judge rendering the absolute statistical comparison uninstructive
by virtue of the self selection process. 560
Mindful of the pitfalls associated with merely utilizing conviction and acquittal rates to
compare judge and jury, a more detailed analysis of why a judge or jury is selected may
assist in evaluating the trial process for each mode of trial as well as the outcomes.
v. Choice of Mode of Trial- When, How and Why?
The election of the mode of trial, where the opportunity to choose exists, is an important
threshold consideration for both the prosecution and defense in the comparator
jurisdictions. For the analysis in this chapter to be balanced, an examination of the
rational behind the choice of trial by judge only or jury is required.
In the comparator jurisdictions, the defendant is accorded some choice in certain
American and Canadian jurisdictions. Presently there is no opportunity to choose
complex serious frauds trials or any other indictable offense in England and Wales -- all
H9 Id .• at 213-214. At the time of this study mandatory sentences, later declared unconstitutional
for most crimes were required by statute.
~ Id.•at 214, referencing a survey by a Federal Judge who found that other Federal Judges
selectivelyaltered the standard of proof from a preponderance of the evidence to a higher
standard in sentencingproceedings.
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such offenses are required to be tried by a jury.561 Only in either way offenses (less
serious crimes) can the defendant choose trial by jury or judges (lay magistrates). The
magistrates may also on their own commit the case to Crown Court based on guidelines
set forth in the Magistrates Court Act 1980.562
In certain U.S.A. jurisdictions, and selected Canadian Courts the defendant may choose a
judge-only trial for major crimes but with significant caveats. In the U.S. District Courts
and California state courts, the parties may agree to a bench trial, otherwise without such
an agreement the trial will be by jury. In England and Wales, the trial of an indictable
offense must be by jury but other intermediate offenses or either-way offenses can be
tried by Magistrate Court or a Crown Court jury at the election of the defendant. The
following is a more detailed explanation of the present status of mode of trial selection,
looking first at Diplock trials, an international bellweather for the efficacy of judge-only
trials in common law jurisdictions.
A. Diplock Trials
The so-called Diplock trials have cast a long shadow over the comparator jurisdictions.563
The judge only trials were named after Lord Diplock, who after study proposed non-jury
trials for terrorist related crimes in Northern Ireland in response to the concern that jurors
could not be expected to fairly try alleged terrorists because of terrorist intimidation.
While Diplock trials were never in effect in England and Wales, they were the legislative
~I Part II of the Criminal Law Act1977; §49 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.
~2 Pt. II of the Criminal Law Act 1977; Magistrates Court Act 1980 §19.
~} John Jackson and Sean Doran, Judge Without Jury, supra 13, "From a constitutional
perspective, Northern Ireland has been described as a kind oflaboratory in which the strengths
and weaknesses of different models of practice may be gauged".
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work product of the United Kingdom Parliament, consequently their existence has
helped to frame the mode of trial debate in England and Wales throughout the last thirty-
five years. From their inception in 1973 in Northern Ireland, Diplock trials became a
major bench mark for mandatory non-jury criminal trials, creating a presumption against
trial by jury for a select category of accused.i'" Under the Diplock rules the Attorney
General for Northern Ireland decides if a jury trial will occur in each case if the crime is a
statutorily scheduled offense.i'" To further explain, if the crime is a scheduled offense it
is presumed to be non-jury unless the Attorney General for Northern Ireland deschedules
the specific crime by certification (although certain crimes such as burglary or robbery, or
using an explosive or firearm, are not subject to deschedulingj.f"
The decision to deschedule the specific crime is in the Attorney General's discretion,
based on the described statutory finding that criminal activity of the accused is not part of
the emergency or have no terrorist connection.567
Given the cumbersome mechanism for excluding certain crimes, it is not surprising that
there is a longstanding criticism that too many non-emergency non-terrorism related
crimes are tried by judge only. A 1983 evaluation of a sample of Diplock trials,
concluded that 40 percent of the cases examined had no connection to either the
~ Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973.
~s Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991;Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act 1973. The offenses include murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, false imprisonment, assault,
woundingwith intent, arson to name a few.
S66 John Jackson and Sean Doran.,Diplock and the Presumption Against Jury Trial: A Critique.
[1992] Crim. L. R. 755. In this article the authors assert that the presumption is inefficient and an
u~ust way to determine mode oftrial.
S6 Id,758.
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emergency or terrorism.i'" Doran and Jackson note that between 1987 and 1993 the
Attorney General has certified out between 52 percent and 67 percent of the cases each
year thereby permitting those cases to be tried by ajury.569
Doran and Jackson further contend that Diplock trials, like other judge only trials, have
adversarial deficits which include the judge imposing during the trial by judicial
questioning hislher theory of the case (defined in America as the story line of the case,
that is how the facts meld into a story that demonstrates legal guilt or innocence); the
judge limiting the trial scope by virtue of such a theory; the loss of jury nullification, and
simple prejudice associated with invasive judicial questioning by the sole trier of fact.57o
Boyle refers to judicial questioning and the absence of a jury as creating a "closed shop in
the hands of professional lawyers" observing that fairness is potentially compromised in
judge only trials.m This is to be contrasted to some extent with Damaska's view that
judicial decision making, while likely to be case hardened, is also more likely to focus on
the relevant and ignore the prejudicia1.572 Case hardening was not a prevalent problem in
Diplock judges, according to Doran and Jackson who in evaluating outcomes found that
S6I D.P.J. Walsh, The Use and Abuse of Emergency Legislation in Northern Ireland, 16,59-60,
80-82, (London: Cobden Trust, 1983). See also, H.C. Debs, standing Comm. D., co/411 [3
March 1987]; See also, Gerard Hogan and Clive Walker, Political Violence and the Law in
Ireland. pg. 107 (Manchester University Press, 1989).
~ John Jackson & Sean Doran, Judge Without Jury, supra note 533, at 22, The percentage of
offenses certified out 198758%,198854%,198952%,199052%,199159%,199256%,1993
67%.
'70u,292-297.
m Kevin Boyle, Human Rights and the Northern Ireland Emergency in Human Rights in
Criminal Procedure, 140, 160 (John A. Andrews, Ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982).
m Damasks, Mirjan, Atomistic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence, 198-99 (New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1990).
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there was "a greater tendency for defendants to be acquitted in Diplock cases."S73
Indeed a review of the legal literature does not demonstrate by virtue of statistical
outcomes or even an overwhelming body of anecdotal evidence that Diplock verdicts
manifest a pattern of palpable unfairness and injustice.574
B. England and Wales
The menu of options for mode of trial selection in serious fraud cases is complicated in
England and Wales by recent political history and present legal precedent. For example,
as noted above, indictable offenses are triable by jury only, while minor crimes (summary
offenses) are triable in Magistrates' Court before lay judges.575 A third category, either
way offenses, which provide a choice to both the prosecution and the defendant, may (but
not always) be more serious than summary crimes. In either way offenses, the accused
may choose to have the case tried by a jury in Crown Court. The magistrate may also
direct a Crown Court trial of either way offenses.s76 A comprehensive study found that
the Defendant opted for Crown court in 30 percent of that Court's trials and the
magistrate had made a direction in 52 percent of the cases.
m Doran & Jackson, Judge without Jury, supra note 533, at 224-225. Even though this was a
small sample of 43 cases, the result is surprising.
S14 A somewhat critical review of "Judge Without Jury" in 1997 criticizes the clinical nature of
the work and its preoccupation with accent on details such as that trial judges questioned 56% of
the prosecution witnesses but 84% of the defense witnesses - however there is no substantive
refutation of the author's generally positive conclusions about the Diplock trials fairness. See
Virginia E. Hench, 1'/1 be the Judge - I'll be the Jury, H-Net Reviews, May 1997, httpllwww.h-
net.orglreviews/showrev .cgi?path=27 414868966685.
m Part II of the Criminal Law Act 1977; §49 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.
S16 Paragraphs 36 of Schedule 3 to the CJA of2003 which would amend 519 and 20 of the
Magistrates Courts Act 1980. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 would permit the Defendant to inquire
from the Magistrate if their sentence would be custodial if they pled.
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In the early 1990s either way offenses were 82 percent of the cases tried in Crown
Court.S77
However, Parliament on several occasions, as well as the Runciman Royal Commission
and the Auld Report, have recommended doing away with or limiting either way cases,
thereby taking away the defendant's right to choose the mode oftria1.578 By contrast as
previously noted, under existing law, if the case is indictable the defendant may only be
tried by jury and may not opt for a judge only trial.s79
It is likely an advantage for the defendant to have the right to a choice of mode of trial
because it allows the defendant to evaluate chance of acquittal by a jury rather than by
maglstrate.i'" Criminal Justice Act 2003 recognizes that plea decisions are relevant to
mode of trial choices.m Cost may also be a significant factor. While there is little
research as to the impact of cost on defendant's decision making, American studies show
mChairman: Viscount Runciman of Doxford, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
Report, pg. 85, see also Footnote 2, [1993] HMSO (hereinafter Runciman Royal Commission).
". Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales by the Regent Honorable Lord Justice
Auld [September 2002]A http:/www.criminal_courts_review.org.uk/ccr_od.htm. #25, #119-172,
Recs 32-36, Summary # 10, "The Defendant should not have an elective right to trial by judge and
jury in "either way" offenses"; Runciman Royal Commission, supra., pg. 87, "We do not believe
that this decision should be left to the defendant although he should have a voice in the matter."
S7Y Criminal Law Act 1977 (as amended) divides criminal jurisdiction into three classes: a)
offenses triable only on indictment before a judge and jury, b) offenses triable only summarily by
magistrates, c) offenses triable either way. However, the Auld Report recommends that the
defendant, with the judge's permission be given the right to opt for a judge only trial in Crown
Court. See. Auld Report, supra note 16, at para. 110-118, Recommendation 31.
SIlO C. lIeddeman and D. Moxon [1992] Magistrates or Crown Court? Mode of Trial Decisions
and Sentencing, London, HMSO. D. Rielly and J. Vennard [1988] Triable-Either-Way Cases:
Crown Court or Magistrates Court, London, HMSO; D. Moxon (ed) Managing Criminal Justice,
the Outcome of Contested Trials, (1985). The foregoing reports indicate an improved chance of
acquittal (57%) in Crown Court as compared to Magistrate's Court (30%).
m CJA 2003, Schedule 3 discussed previously.
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that jury trials are lengthier and more costly than bench trials.582 The survey conducted
for this paper did not find that cost of trial was the most significant factor in the opinion
of New York State judges and lawyers in the making of mode of trial decisions.583 A
recent practice direction in England and Wales regarding complex criminal case
management emphasizes that trial length should be shortened in part "to make proper use
of limited public resources'V"
However, a substantial number of "either way" defendants choosing a jury trial still
choose to plead guilty by the day oftria1.585 In summary, Magistrates Courts deal with 95
percent of the criminal cases, juries determine the outcome of less than 1 percent of all
cases, and 60 percent of Crown Court defendants plead guilty before tria1.586
As noted in the previous chapter, the present England and Wales policy that emphasizes
improvement of jury trial management in serious cases was preceded by two recent
decisions of the Court of Appeal which have exhorted trial judges to take control of
lengthy jury trials, impose time limitations, start each day of trial on time, emphasizing
that time in such a trial is not unlimited, stating:
mRichard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform, 193-94 N. (2d Ed. 1996); The
National Center for State Courts, On Trial: The Length of Civil and Criminal Trial, 8-9 (1988).
Both works conclude that jury trials are two to three times longer than non-jury trials; See Posner,
supra note 583, FN 15 citing the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, which states that the
administrative costs for jury trials are ten times greater than non-jury most likely because of jury
expenses, the cost of duplicative experts, and the extensive court personnel associated with a jury
trial.
m Chapter 8, infra.
'84 Control and Management of Heavy Fraud and other Complex Criminal Cases - a Protocol
Issued by The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales [2005] All Eur (D) 386 (Mar).
mViscount Runciman The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (HMSO 1993)at 87.
'" Gary Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal System, 7th Ed., 524 (Cavendish, 2004).
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"Justice must be done ... It is not however a concomitant
of the entitlement to a fair trial that either or both sides are
further entitled to take as much time as they would like .
,,587
These administrative options are attempts to streamline the complex jury trial given a
failure to persuade parliament that trial by judge is a an acceptable choice of mode of
trial. The choice of mode of trial debate has recently been dominated by the
government's failed attempt to call forward Section 43 of the CJA 2003 which would
have permitted only complex fraud cases to be tried before a judge only if an application
for such a trial was made by the prosecutor and granted by the Lord Chief Justice or his
designee.i" As noted earlier in this thesis, under strong opposition from both the Law
Society,s89 and the Bar Council, the government retreated from its efforts to call forward
Section 43 of the CJA 2003 (the Law Society advocating giving the managerial
guidelines proposed by the Chief Judge time for implementation and analysis) and has
now proposed virtually the same legislation, differing only in that the present bill would
allow a High Court Judge to determine if the trial will be by judge or jury. As further
m R. v. Jisl, et al [2004] EWCA (Crim.) 696 #114; R. v. Chaaban [2003] EWCA (Crim.) 1012.
,_. In November,2002 when CJA 2003 passed the House of Commons, then Home Secretary
David Blunkettgave David Hughes, the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the undertaking that "we
will retain the clause but move forward on looking for alternative solutions" to Judge only fraud
trials. The Houseof Lords held up 43 CJA 2003 arguing a lack of proper consultation.
y.'~w.publications.parliament.ukLord Kingsland, 21 June, 2005.
m The Law Society, Preserve the Right to Jury Trial- Law Society Briefing - Law Reform and
Legal Policy (6July 2005); Don't Abolish Juries in Frauds Trials (25 Nov. 2003); Government
Climbs DownOver Abolishing Juries in Fraud Trials (3/14/06), www.lawsociety.org,uk.
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noted above, while the bill passed commons it was unable to muster the votes to proceed
to a second reading in the House ofLords.59o
The history the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which was discussed initially in chapter 4
requires further amplification. Early in the process of promoting what ultimately became
43 CJA 2003, the concept of permitting the defendant to choose the mode of trial was
initially included in the legislation. In an effort to pass the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the
government dropped the clause permitting the defendant the choice of mode of trial on
indictment in the Criminal Justice Bill 2002-2003 based on strong opposition to that
language.l" Despite this significant compromise as noted, the government in 2003 was
forced to further amend the bill to provide that the Serious Frauds trial by judge provision
would require further parliamentary action which has not yet been successfully
obtained.592
In late 2006, the Frauds Trials Without Jury Bill was proposed to implement virtually the
same scheme which was resisted in CJA 2003 permitting bench trials in certain serious
frauds cases but this version would authorize a High Court Judge to decide mode of
S90 James Lumley, U.K. Plans to Try Complex Fraud Cases Without Juries (update 2),
Bloomberg.com htpp//www.bloomberg.com (June 21,2005).; Bill6 of2006-07, supra
WI H.L. Debates, 5 July 2003; C768-82, Blunkett Furious as Lords Throw Out Reform of the Jury
Trial, The Guardian, 20 Nov. 2003.
mBBC News, £60m Fraud Case Col/apse Probed, March 23, 2005, http//news.bbc.co.uk.
"Anthony Upward, QC for the prosecution requested the trial be discontinued because the
evidence was no longer a "living story and had lost its immediacy and impact"; City & Financial;
3/23/06, The Conduct of Fraud Trials: New Proposals, www.cityandfinancial.com; The proper
caption of this case is Regina v. Stephen Rayment, Mark Woodward-Smith, Paul Maw, Paul
Fisher, Mark Skucner, Grahm Scard, and Anthony Wootton.
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trial.S93 Once again the defendant was not accorded the privilege of mode of trial
selection in the legislation. The ability of the defendant to have mode of trial choices has
been lost in the debate over jury competence and heightened judicial managerialism.Y"
The counter argument raised by the Law Society advocates managerial ism rather than
judicially imposed bench trials:
"Juries are not to blame for lengthy trials. The solution lies
in better case management. The new criminal procedure
rules and complex case protocol introduced by Lord Woolf
in March must be given an opportunity to work before any
decision is made to abolish juries. ,,595
The Law society has not recently advocated for the defendant to have a choice of mode of
trial. Chapter 9 will discuss the issue of mode of trial choices and the effectiveness of the
present protocols from the perspective of England and Wales judges.
c. U.S.A.
The choice of mode of trial is an important pretrial strategic decision in an American
criminal case. As noted above, bench trials are selected in some American jurisdictions
WJ Bill6 of2006-07 (The Frauds Trials Without a Jury) Bill2006-07, which presently has passed
the Ilouse of Commons but failed its second reading in the House of Lords on March 20, 2007.
,.,. Id.
'9' The Law Society of England and Wales, Don't Abolish Juries in Fraud Trials, 11125/05
www.tawsociety.org.uk. The Law Society reference is to Lord Woolf, the then Chief Justice of
Englandand Wales,who promulgated detailed control and management guidelines for all courts
hearing fraud and complex fraud cases. Control and Management of Heavy Fraud and Other
complex CriminalCases - A Protocol Issued by the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales
[2005] All ER (D) 386 (MAR).
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because they are utilized as a plea bargaining device; specifically one analysis concluded
that because of slow plea type trials in Philadelphia in the 1980s, "Defendants opting for
bench trial accept a higher likelihood of conviction in anticipation of a more lenient
sentence. ,,596
Kalven and Zeisel concluded that concern about sentencing is a factor in the U.S.A. in the
choice of mode of trial (similar to either way offense decision making in England and
Wales as noted above), concluding that many defendants opt for a bench trial in order to
preserve their right to trial, believing that the sentencing will be more lenient if convicted
in a non-jury forum.597 Leipold's recent study entitled "Why are Federal Judges So
Acquittal Prone?" ponders the apparent failure of the criminal bar to perceive this
statistical reality and more frequently seek trial by judge only in U.S. Federal District
Courts. The very theme of the article accentuates the significance of choice of mode of
trial in pretrial decision making in the U.S. As we will see in Chapter 6 that choice can
impact the circumstance where corporations and other legal fictions are tried as criminal
dcfendants.l'"
,% Stephen1. Schulhofer,Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 Harvard L.Rev., 1037, 1087 (1984).
There is a 20% acquittal rate for bench trials and 25% rate of conviction on lesser charges only.
See TableV,supra at page 1080.
'97 Id., at 1066.
'91Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone? 83 Wash U.L.Q. 151
(2005). One caveat to his argument regarding the perceived failure of the defenses bar is whether
or not the Court may order a bench trial over the prosecutions objection. In FN 28, Leipold
asserts that Singer v. U.S., 380 U.S. 24 (1965) at 37-38, upholding Rule 23's requirement of
prosecutorialwaiver, left open judicial override where the defendants right to a fair trial might be
adversely impactedby a jury trial.
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1. California
In California there is a right to a jury trial but a jury may be waived in a criminal case by
the consent of both parties when expressed in open court by the defendant and the
defendant's counse1.599 The standard used to determine if the defendant has capacity to
waive a jury trial in a criminal case is the same as the standard to determine competence
to stand tria1.60oParties may waive a jury trial in civil cases, but the court is empowered
to order a jury in any event.601 In fact, a recent case decided in the California Supreme
Court, holds that both the State Constitution and California Code of Civil Procedure
§631(d) prohibit contracting parties from waiving a civil jury trial, requiring that such a
waiver must be orally uttered in open court or waived by failing to timely a jury during
the timetable established during the litigation or failing to pay the jury fee.602
2. New York State
In New York State the defendant has the right to trial by jury and may exclusively elect
trial by judge. The defendant's right to choose the mode of trial was not recognized by
state courts until 1957.603 The present statutory law accords the defendant near absolute
control over the choice of mode of trial in that the defendant may choose the mode of
S99 Art. I, §16, Cal. State Const., Trial By Jury, "A jury may be waived in a criminal case by the
consent of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant and defendant's counsel."
600 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396-97 (1993). James Fife, Restarting Criminal
Proceedings After Restoration of Defendant's Competence, 27 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 93 (2004).
601 Cal. State Const. Article I §16 Trial by Jury; Cal. Code of Civil Procedure, Trial by Court
§631 (Dcerings, 2005) permits the Court in civil cases to order a jury trial even though has been
a failure to request the same.
602 Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th944 (2005); Daniel M. Livingston, Pre
Dispute Jury Waivers After Grafton Partners: Pretrial Waiver of the Jury Just Became More
D1f!cult in California. 47 Orange County Lawyer 38 (2005)
6() See Harry Kalven & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Boston: Little Brown 1966) at 22-23.
223
trial for all crimes except murder in the first degree, which must be tried by a jury. 604
The judge is obligated to order a bench trial unless it is determined that the request is
tendered as a strategy to procure an otherwise impermissible procedural advantage or if
the defendant is found to be not fully aware of the consequence of the choice he is
making.60s
The evidentiary rules and procedures in a trial by judge are the same as in a jury trial- in
a judge only trial the court is bound to consider only competent evidence in reaching a
verdict,606but the survey conducted for this paper found that the attorneys questioned did
not view that the defacto rules of evidence in a bench trial were the same as in a jury
trial.607
3. U.S. Constitution
The defendant has the constitutional right to a jury trial if the punishment for the crime is
more than a six-month sentence.t'"
604 N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law §260.10; 320:10 (McKinney, 2006).
60~ N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law 320.20 (McKinney, 2005). The main impermissible strategic
advantage associated with demanding a bench trial appears to be utilizing that request to obtain a
severance from a joint trial with other co-defendants. Courts have denied demands for a bench
trial in such a circumstance. People v. Firestone, 111 A.D.2d 696, lv. denied 65 N.Y.2d 927
(1985).
6Of) People v. Torres, 249 A.D.2d 229, 673 N .Y.S.2d 72 (1 sI Dept., 1998); People v. Dazi, 195
A.D.2d 571, 600 N.Y.S.2d 276 (2nd Dept., 1993).
607Chapter8, infra.
601 Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) which stands for the holding that
the right to trial by jury attaches for crimes carrying over six months incarceration became that it
is arbitrarily determined to be a significant liberty interest; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145




In Patton v. U.S., the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant had the right
to waive a jury trial and be tried by a judge, but a subsequent decision does not find that
right to be absolute.609 Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure only an
agreement of the parties waive a jury trial and it is settled law that the prosecutor may
veto a waiver of the jury by the defendant.t'"
An example of jury waiver is the 2006 business fraud case against former Enron
Executives (discussed at great length in Chapter 4), the late Kenneth Lay611 and Jeffrey
Skilling, who were charged with a series of crimes alleging a defrauding of stockholders.
By stipulation the prosecutors and the defendant Lay agreed to sever personal, non-
business related bank fraud charges against Lay from the jury trial and permit those
charges to be tried by a bench trial which was conducted while the jury deliberated on the
business fraud tria1.612 Lay was found guilty by the jury and immediately that verdict was
rendered by the jury, was found guilty by the Judge in the same court session regarding
the personal allegations of bank fraud.613
609 Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
610 Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a) ,see Singer v. U.S., 380 U.S. 24 (1965) upholding the ability of the
prosecutor to reject a waiver by a defendant of a trial by jury and require a jury trial.
611 Lay died suddenly several months after the verdict and prior to his sentencing.
612 Vikas Bajaj, A 2"d Criminal Trial Beginsfor Former Enron Chief, The New York Times, May
19.2006 at C4. In fact, the bench trial commenced immediately after the jury trial, while the jury
was deliberating, with the same judge who tried the fraud case. Lay was found guilty by the
judge immediately after the jury verdict - the bench trial having been completed in several days.
(1) Alexi Barrionuevo, 2 Enron Chiefs are Convicted In Fraud and Conspiracy Trial, New York
Times. May 26. 2006, 1 C4.
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The United States Supreme Court has upheld a two tier system, wherein in municipal
court defendants can opt for a bench trial, appeal the verdict if convicted, and as of right,
and receive a jury trial. The constitutional concept of double jeopardy according to the
U.S. Supreme Court does not attach to this unique system of bench trials in which the
verdict can be appealed to a jury by the Defendant. 614An acquittal at bench trial
precludes the prosecution from seeking a jury trial. In only 9% of the cases in
Massachusetts did the Defendant seek another trial after a bench trial, thus:
"The system allows the State to dispose of the thousands of
criminal proceedings quickly and inexpensively because
most defendants, are either acquitted by the first-tier bench
trial judge or do not appeal because first-tier judges usually
impose mild sentences.Y'"
A comparable system is in place in at least seventeen of the states of the United States
(but not New York or Californiaj.t" Obviously the decision to have a bench trial is again
a less nuanced decision than if the trial is the ultimate fact finding event.
D. Canada
Any crime committed in Canada carrying a five year jail sentence or more must be tried
to a jury,617however the defendant may opt to have the trial before a judge only.618 The
614 Lydon v. Justice of 80Ston Municipal Court, 536 F. Supp. 647,649 (D.Mass) aff'd 698 F.2d 1
(I tC Cir. 1982) rev 'd on other grounds, 104 S.Ct. 1805 (1984).
615 Adam N. Volkert, Fifth Amendment - Double Jeopardy: Two Tier Trial Systems and the
Continuing Jeopardy Principle, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 653,670 (1984).
616 Id at 670.
611 Section 11, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom .
... Sections 536 and 561 of the Criminal Code.
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Attorney General may require the accused to be tried by judge and jury, in that event, a
judge has no jurisdiction to try the accused without a jury.619
VI. Judicial Disqualification and Peremptory Challenge
As we see in chapter eight of this paper, integral to the choice of mode of trial is the
identity of the judge. If the judge is perceived as biased or case hardened, and will be the
trier of fact, the notion of systemic fairness will be undercut if trial by judge is imposed
upon the defendant as in 43 CJA 2003 or Bill6 of2006-07. If the defendant has a choice
of mode of trial, the perception of unfairness or concern about case hardening will
diminish making the judge only trial a more viable option. The survey conducted for this
paper, as more fully discussed in chapter eight, found that the identify and personality of
the judge was an important factor in making mode of trial choices in New York State.
This section will review methods of judicial disqualification and the California system of
peremptory challenge of judges and offer suggestions to encourage positioning judge
only trials as a viable mode of trial option.
A. The California System of Peremptory Challenges of Judges
The motion to disqualify the judge is to be made within thirty days of the first appearance
in the case or within twenty days of a party being added to the case.620
619Section 568 of the Criminal Code.
620Cai.Civil Practice Code (C.C.P.), P 170.6(3); In Industrial Indemnity Co., et al v. Superior
Court of Santa Clara County, et al., 214 Cal.App.3d 259 (1989) 264, the Court upheld the twenty
day rule for add-on parties reasoning that since the case is underway, abuse of the statute is likely
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Once a judge has decided a contested issue in the case, a motion for a peremptory
challenge is untimely.621
In all of the comparator jurisdictions, trial judges are randomly selected. The choice of
the trial judge is significant in both jury and non-jury trials, but looms much larger in
non-jury cases. Unlike the jury selected either randomly or as a result of vior dire and
peremptory challenges, the trial Judge will be the sole trier of fact, not subject to the type
of interaction and exchange ideas that naturally occur during jury deliberations. Itmay
be that leaving the verdict to one person, the trial judge, who is randomly selected, offers
American defense counsel a pause in the decision to waive the jury.
In all jurisdictions counsel may move to challenge the judge for cause, Le. prejudice
and/or interest in the case pending. But that is quite different, indeed remote from having
the right to peremptorily challenge the judge.
California offers a form of peremptory challenge. The American Federal Courts "use a
single assignment system, under which a case is assigned to a specific judge for virtually
all purposes to and including trial. California State Courts have traditionally used a
because the Judge will have issued rulings and the add-on party will be able to challenge for
reasons other than bias.
621 Barrett v. Superior Court. 77 Cal. App. 4th 1 (1999).
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master calendar system under which different phases of a case ordinarily take place
before different judges".622
"A party who seeks to disqualify a Federal judge assigned
to a case must establish the existence of a statutory ground
for disqualification - ordinarily the existence of a bias or
prejudice on the part of the judge.',623
In California attorneys in either a civil or criminal case are entitled to one peremptory
challenge of the trial per side, whether civil or criminal.f" The statute, §170.6 of the
California Code of Procedure, hereinafter C.C.P., makes no mention of peremptory
challenge and rather it provides that each attorney or party may make a motion alleging
prejudice which is then automatically granted one time without any showing other than
the allegation.f"
The California process permits a party to file a general affidavit alleging without any
specifics that in the party's opinion the assigned judge has prejudice toward them,
without being required to establish prejudice as a matter of fact to the satisfaction of the
court.626 The right to move to peremptorily challenge the trial judge is generally on a per
side basis, with leave given by the court upon application to allow more that one
62Z Justice Eileen C. Moore and Michael Paul Thomas, Cal. Civ. Prac. Procedure, Chap. S §S.7
((Thompson West Books, 2006).
62) Id.• Chap. S, §5.7; 28 U.S.C.A. §144,455.
mMoore and Thomas, supra note 623; Cal. Civil Practice Code §170.6; Home Insurance Co. v.
Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr, 3d 885,34 Cal. 4th 1025, 103 P.3d 283 (200S).
62' C.C.P. §170.6(3)
626 C.C.P. §170.6 (5) actually sets forth the format:
'That (the name of judge) the judge before the trial of the (case name) is pending is
prejudiced against the party or the interest of the party (or his attorney) so that affiant cannot
or believes that he or she cannot have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the judge."
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defendant to separately challenge if that defendant demonstrates interests that are
substantially adverse to the other party.627
B. England and Wales
The law of judicial disqualification and recusal was clarified if not expanded in a decision
by the Law Lords that a fellow law Lord improperly sat in a case in which a charitable
organization for which he was the chief fund raiser became a party to the action.628
The decision is noteworthy not just because of the holding, but also because the court
found that the judge in question, Lord Hoffmann, was in violation of the first branch of
apparent bias in that he was a judge in his own cause and not the second branch, which is
engaging in behaviour or conduct which may give rise to a suspicion that he is not
impartial. The issue was whether Pinochet Ugarte had immunity from acts while head of
state after relinquishing head of state status, thereby protecting him from extradition to
Spain. Amnesty International was granted leave to intervene in the proceedings
advocating Pinochet Ugarte's extradition. Lord Hoffman sat on the case and voted
against the position ofPinochet Ugarte, who was ordered extradited by the Law Lords. A
subsequent proceeding was brought before the House of Lords asserting that Lord
621 Home Insurance Company v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, supra; School Dist
ofOkaloosa County v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1126.
621R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte
(No2) [2000] 1AC. 119, [1999] 1 All. ER 577, [1999] 2 WLR 272.
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Hoffman as fundraising chair for the incorporated charity which funded Amnesty
International was sitting in judgment of his cause, a prohibited act.629
Lord Browne-Wilkinson in rendering the main judgment reasoned with Lord Goff of
Chieveley that the prior order extraditing Pinochet Ugarte should be set aside and
referred to a new committee because of the relationship between Lord Hoffman and
Amnesty International, not withstanding any actual opinions he may have about Pinochet
Ugarte's case. The reasoning was that by virtue of his relationship with Amnesty
International's fund raising entity, he was sitting in judgment of his cause.
The general assumption is that a biased judge creates a denial of natural justice. Bias is
defined as:
"Pecuniary bias but other forms of bias are relevant as
where, for example, the chairman of the magistrate's states
that he always prefers the evidence for the prosecution
given by the police. It was held in Seer Technologist Ltd v.
Abbas, the Times, 16 March, 2000, that it was
inconceivable that any legitimate objection could be taken
against the judge pure~ on grounds of religion, gender, age
or sexual orientation." 30
According to John P. Frank "English common law practice at the time of the
establishment of the American Court system was simple in the extreme, judges were
disqualified only for financial interest. No other disqualifications were permitted, and
629 Dimesv. Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HL Cas 759, 10 ER 301; R. v. Rand
(1866) lR 1QB 230 and R. v. Gough [1993] 2 AUER 724, [1993] 2 AC 646.
610 Denis Keenan, Smith& Keenans English Law, (14th Ed. Pearson Education Ltd. 2004), page
73.
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bias, today the most controversial ground for disqualification, was rejected entirely".631
Medieval recusal practice was more complex, permitting a judge to be declined for cause
such as his relationship to a party, ifhe is hostile to a party, if the judge has been a
counsel in the case.632 Bentham is reported to have proposed the disqualification of
judges "exposed to any cause of partiality, including intimate acquaintance, enmity and
family relationship'V'"
Leubsdorf notes that permitting the parties to select the impartial trier of the dispute has
a long history dating back to ancient Rome and including 17th Century England.634 The
point is both ancient law including that of England and Wales and present law in the form
either way defendants being able to select either Magistrate's Court or Crown Court,
accord the litigants, and particularly the defendant, with some control regarding the mode
of trial.
6)1 John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale Law Jouma1605, 611-612 (1947). See also
E. Richard Bodyfelt, Editor in Chief et al Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or Bias-
Common Law Evolution Current Status and the Oregon Experience, 48 Oregon L. Rev. 311,
315-320 (1969).
612 John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, supra note 631,610 FN 13,1516.
6J) John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 237, 248,
FN 64 (1987).
6U John Leubsdorf, supra note 633, at 249-250 FN 70 citing B. Frier, The Rise of the Roman
Jurists (1985) "describing choice by Roman litigants of judges from official panel); C.C.F.
Mann: The Formulization oflnformal Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443, 446, FN 73 (1984) discussing voluntary nature of arbitration in Seventeenth
Century England and reliance on continuing commitment of the parties; "Indeed, Elizabethan
Chancellors frequently persuaded litigants to submit to arbitration by local notables. " See also,
John Philip Dawson, A History of Lay Judges, 163-70 (1960).
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C. U.S.A.
American Judges have both statutory standards and judicial codes of ethics to govern
their conduct on issues of disqualification and recusa1.635
Moreover, along with California, at least 17 states have statutory provisions which permit
judicial disqualification by a method comparable to the California conclusory
Affidavit.636
United States District Courts require a specific finding that he/she must disqualify or
recuse. For example pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 144 when a party makes an allegation in
affidavit form alleging judicial bias and requesting judicial disqualification, another
Judge is assigned to make such a determination based on a detailed affidavit required by
the statute. U.S.C. §455(a) requires the judge to remove himselflherself"in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned"?" Of course, the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, DR 8-102, provides that "a
lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against a judge ... "
Lawyers are reluctant to utilize this method of disqualification out of fear of retaliation, a
concern particularly relevant in a judge-only trial because "in a bench trial, a judge's bias
m 28 U.S.C. 144,28 U.S.C. 455(a) and Rule 2.12 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. "A
judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonablybe questioned", then reciting bias, prejudice and relationship issues.
6J6 John Leubsdorf,supra note 633, FN 13, from the author's independent review this note
remainscorrect in 2006.
631 28 U.S.C. §455(a).
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or prejudice against the lawyer is even more destructive of fairness than it is in a jury trial
because a jury trial may counter balance judicial prejudice. ,,638
The United States Congress seriously considered permitting peremptory challenges of
judges in Federal cases in the past, most recently in 1970 and 1980,. A note analyzing
the 1980 effort concluded that the Federal system would not benefit from a California
type recusal system.639
For example in the California system, peremptory challenge can be made by either the
client or attorney,640 unlike the Federal System which requires an affidavit of personal
prejudice filed by a party.641
One commentator asserts that the California system encourages judge shopping, causes
judicial waste, creates a personal affront to the judges and erodes the appearance of
justice.642 A 1969 study of the effect of a similar law in Oregon concluded the opposite,
"there are very few indications that the statutory procedures are being used to select,
instead of disqualify judges.'.643
611 David C. Hjelmfelt, Statutory Disqualification of Federal Judges, 30 U. Kan. L. Rev. 255,
255-256 (1981-1982).
619 Edward G. Burg, Meeting the Challenge: Rethinking Judicial Disqualification, 69 Cal. L.
Rev. 1945 (1981) see FN 1 which recites the recent congressional history of peremptory
challenges of judges.
640 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 170.6 to be contrasted with an application for disqualification due to
actual prejudice, which must be signed by the client. Cal. Civ. Prac. Code 170.5.
64·28 U.S.C. 144.
642Edward Burg, supra note 639, at 1471-1477.
641E. Richard Bodyfelt, et al; supra note 631, 399-400; the study also concluded that a judge is
disqualified for statutory prejudice (a good faith belief that the judge is prejudiced - no further
allegations or proof required) once in 200 cases.
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The most compelling of these complaints is the issue of judge shopping. An example of
a California case is useful. A California judge dismissed charges against prostitutes as
discriminatory as the "Johns" or customers were not arrested. The next day the same
judge was peremptorily disqualified by the prosecutor in prostitution cases. The judge
declined the disqualification alleging the "motion was based sub-silentio only on her
prior dismissals, but the refusal was ultimately reversed't''" It is quite clear that given
the judge's ruling the day before, the prosecution sought disqualification of that judge in
a comparable case. The appellate court held that the prosecution was well within its
right.
VII. Conclusion
The mode of trial choices and judicial challenge methodologies as examined among the
comparator jurisdictions offer contrasting approaches. Because New York in the area of
the mode of trial choice and California by virtue of its system of challenging judges
identify a unique format to the rest of the comparators, the next logical step is to evaluate
the application of those formats to daily administration of justice, with the objective of
formulating possible alternatives.




CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK - CHOICE OF MODE OF TRIAL AND
CHALLENGES OF JUDGES CONSIDERED - IS THERE A CASE FOR GIVING
TilE DEFENDANT THE CHOICE OF MODE OF TRIAL AND TilE PARTIES A
CHALLENGE OF THE JUDGE?
I. Introduction
New York State and California each have in place components of a system which, if
combined, could improve the perception of fairness of the bench trial and offer resolution
to the mode of trial debate in England and Wales and the U.S.A.
Shifting control over the choice of mode of trial to the defendant in the comparator
jurisdictions would be one of several integral steps aimed at offering the bench trial as a
rational option to the jury trial, thereby avoiding concerns about the ability of a jury to
comprehend the evidence in serious fraud trials. Specifically permitting both sides of the
case to either stipulate to a specific judge for a bench trial or if they cannot so stipulate,
then offering a peremptory challenge of the randomly selected judge to preside over the
bench trial would give the defendant incentive to consider trial by judge. Each proposal
would modify the present balance of decision making and give the defendant more rights
than accorded by 43 CJA 2003 or Bill 6 of 2006-07, which both give the prosecution only
the right to apply for trial by judge and a High Court Judge the sole decision making
discretion regarding mode of trial. Itwould likewise alter the U.S. Federal District Court
mode of trial selection which requires agreement between the parties for a bench trial and
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would introduce into all comparators, England and Wales, U.S. District Court, New
York, and Canada, the California method of peremptory challenge of the judge. Coupled
with the establishment of uniform rules of procedure and evidence as discussed in the
upcoming chapters which would be applicable to both bench and jury trials, the judge
only trial would be a more comfortable forum for the parties to select in complex civil
and criminal cases.
Even though New York State permits the defendant, without any significant restriction, to
select the mode of trial, the choice ofa bench trial as the mode of trial in New York State
is no more frequent than the more restrictive California, according to the data presented
below. This is true even of corporate defendants who are accused of crimes in New York
State court. As will be more fully elucidated in Chapter 8, a survey conducted of the
bench and bar in New York State suggests that there is reluctance to select a judge only
trial because of concerns about the judge's identity and personality, Le. who the judge
will be. Consequently the California system of peremptory challenges to the judge may
make that mode of trial more attractive, particularly if the parties are offered the
opportunity to stipulate to a specific judge trying the case.
Such a plan could potentially offer succor to the organized bar and the majority of the
I louse of Lords who have great resistance to the government plan in England and Wales.
If the bench trial becomes a more predictable option, with predictable evidentiary rules
and restrained judicial behavior, corporations and complex fraud defendants may
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diminish the negative pre-adjudication effects of indictment by virtue of a more compact
and prompt adjudication. Properly constructed, bench trials could become a more
frequent choice by the Defendant in complex cases.
II. The Recent New York State and California Experience with Bench Trials - A
Brief Statistical Comparison of Rate of Selection of Bench Trials and Trial
Outcomes
A. Choice of Mode of Trial
As noted in chapter 5, in New York State the defendant may choose the mode of trial and
may exercise that option at any time prior to jury selection. By contrast, in California
there must be a stipulation by both the prosecution and the defense to waive the jury and
try the case by bench trial. Unlike California, the parties in New York may not exercise
a peremptory challenge as to the trial judge; the judge assigned to the case is the judge
who will try the case subject to any challenge for cause, i.e., interest or prejudice.645 In
California, the parties are entitled to a virtual peremptory challenge of the trial judge as
discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
Because the California State constitution requires a joint waiver of a jury trial (that is
both the prosecution and the defendant must consent to a bench trial) a comparative
64' New York Rules of Courts -Uniform Rules - Trial Courts; P. 198, Subpart B, Assignment of
Criminal Actions §200.11 a-c (McKinneys, 2006).
238
analysis of bench trial statistics with New York State, where the defendant is the
exclusive selector of the mode of trial must consider that difference.?"
B. Rate of Choice of Bench Trial
Bench trials in New York State are opted for by Defendants in the same percentage as
bench trials in California.
In California, twenty-one percent of all felony cases tried were bench trials from 1999-
2005. In New York, nineteen percent of all felony case tried were bench trials from
2001-2005.641
C. Conviction Rates
Conviction rates may be relevant factors in the choice of mode of trial. The California
conviction rate in bench and jury trials is somewhat higher than in New York State. In
California:
82% of bench trials on felony charges resulted in convictions
18% of bench trials resulted in acquittals, dismissals, and transfers
83% of felony jury trials result in felony convictions
17% of felony jury trials resulted in acquittals, dismissals and transfers.T"
646 Art. 1, Sec. 16,Cal. State Constitution,"A jury may be waived in a criminal case by the
consent of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant's counsel".
N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law §320.l0, 320.20 permits the defendant to opt for a bench trial
(McKinneys2006).
"7Judicial Council of Califomia, Administrative Office of the Courts Annual Reports 1990-1991-
1999-2000 and 1995-1996 through 2004-2005; Statistics provided to the Author by the New York
State Office of Court Administration, 2001-2005.
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The following are the New York conviction rates in bench and jury trials:
70% of bench trials resulted in felony conviction
30% resulted in acquittal
71% of felony jury trials resulted in conviction
29% of felony jury trials resulted in acquittal.r"
By comparison for reasons suggested earlier in Chapter 4, Andrew Leipold has found that
the conviction rate at bench trial over a recent ten-year period by United States District
Court judges is 54%, while the jury conviction rate is 85%.650
D. New York State Statistics Regarding Indicted Corporations
As discussed at length in chapter 4, a criminal indictment of a corporation is very likely
to be a complex case, usually involving a form of fraud. As New York is a comparator in
which the defendant can exclusively choose the mode of trial, a review was conducted of
New York State's five year history of corporate indictments. All of the information and
statistics utilized herein are derived directly from the New York State Office of Court
Administration and are unpublished.
There were 214 cases brought from 2001-2005, of which 164 were resolved and 49
pending trial (the pending trial cases are shown as jury trials although the Defendant
...·Id .
... 9 Statistics provided for 2001-2005 from the New York State Office of Court Administration.
6SO Andrew D. Liepold, Why are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 151
(2005).
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could waive a jury immediately before the commencement of jury selection). There were
five jury trials and one non-jury trial, all resulting in convictions. There were, however,
twenty-nine outright dismissals and twelve dismissals due to a superceding indictment?"
Well over one-half of the cases brought against corporations demonstrated palpable
complexity by virtue of the charges as there were eight money laundering cases, ten cases
of a scheme to defraud, twenty-two enterprise corruption cases, twenty-nine conspiracy
cases, sixteen cases alleging criminal violations of various sections of the Environmental
Conservation Law (ECL) and thirty five grand larceny prosecutions. Other crimes
suggesting complexity included offering a false instrument, insurance fraud, falsifying
business records, and a scheme to defraud. The most serious fines/restitution levied
were $690,000 for grand larceny, $1,2000,000 for grand larceny; $6,000,000 for
enterprise corruption; $495,168 for grand larceny; $450,000 for violations of the
Environmental Conservation Law.
The one bench trial verdict found the corporation guilty of grand larceny in the first
degree, however the sentence was an unconditional discharge. The five jury verdicts
included offering a false instrument, enterprise corruption, a violation of New York
General Business Law (GBL) 650(2)(B)(I), a violation of the Environmental
Conservation Law (ECL) (conviction on a lesser charge than the top indictment charge of
reckless endangerment) and another finding of guilt under the ECL.
6S1 The precise timing of these dismissals was not ascertainable from the records of the New
York State Office of Court Administration.
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III. Conclusion and Proposals for Reform
It is starkly apparent in New York State that the bench trial is not a commonly selected
mode of criminal trial despite the defendant controlling the choice. While the sample
examined was small, it is surprising that only 1 of 249 felony cases brought against
corporations resulted in a bench trial. As has been previously noted, bench trials
constitute 19% of all the cases tried in New York.652
In California statewide statistics for a comparable period 2001-2005 demonstrate a
comparably lower percentage of bench trials than jury trials. In part this can be attributed
to the
The selection of the mode of trial is entirely the choice of the defendant under New.Y ork
law, but the only method for disqualifying the judge is a showing of prejudice.f" and
because the prosecution and the defendant must both consent to a bench trial in
California, these statistics suggest several possible narrow conclusions:
1) Allowing the defendants the option of selecting the mode of trial in complex
cases will not likely result in mass movement toward the bench trial. The New
York State rate of bench trials in slightly lower than more restrictive California.
6~2 Judicial Council of California Administrative Office of the Courts Court Statistics Report
StatewideCaseload Trends 1990-1991-1999-2000; 1989-1990-1998-1999 and 1995-1996-2004-
2005; a small fraction of the convictions for both modes of trial are for lesser misdemeanor
charges. No separation is made because the New York State statistics do not make a distinction,
they includeboth felony and misdemeanor convictions. Statistics provided directly to the author
from 2001-2005by the New York State Office of Court Administration.
653 People v. Moreno, 70 N.Y.2d 403,405 (1987); Hershowitz v. Tompkins, 184A.D.2d 402, 404
( I" Dept., 1992).
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2) Allowing the defendants to select the mode of trial does not deter pleas by
corporate entities. Put another way, the available choice of a bench trial does not
appear to provoke more trials.
3) The choice is principled and not solely to obtain advantage. The rate of
conviction/acquittal should not be a major factor. A defense lawyer reviewing
these numbers could not conclude that in these two comparator jurisdictions that
the defendant has a significantly reduced chance of acquittal in front of a judge
only and in Federal District Court, the defendant may have a better chance of
acquittal.
Therefore it is suggested that the current reluctance in England and Wales to offer the
defendant control over the choice of mode of trial is perhaps misplaced, assuming that the
California and New York State statistics are facially applicable to England and Wales.
Certainly the crimes alleged against the New York corporations discussed above have
roughly equivalent offenses under English law. As noted in Chapter 2 and 3, there are
differences in the comparator jurisdictions injury selection and on the issue of jury
anonymity. Chapter 4 does set forth some differences in corporate responsibility for
director and employee actions. England and Wales has in fact embraced New York
State's notion that broadest length and breadth of jurors should compose the venire and as
a consequence, therefore previously permitted exemptions from jury service by
occupation are not allowed. Thus one can postulate that if in England and Wales, as well
as under American Federal law and New York State law, permitting the defendant to
choose the mode of trial and allowing the parties to either stipulate to the judge and/or
have peremptory challenges to the judge for judge only trials may make that mode of trial
an attractive alternative to the jury in complex cases.
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Chapter 7 will examine the rules of evidence in the comparator jurisdictions and how
they are applied in both modes of trial. In Chapters 8 and 9 we will examine by survey
and interview how the New York State and England and Wales court systems work, as
well as testing some of the above proposals among judges and practitioners. Chapter 10
will offer more proposals for mode of trial choices, peremptory challenges and other
issues raised in this work.
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CHAPTER 7
COMPARATIVE EVIDENTIARY RULES JURY AND
BENCH TRIALS
"Trial by judge alone would have much of the structure
but, necessarily, many differences in procedure and
evidence from that of trial by judge and jury. The role of
the judge should not be considered as if it were something
in isolation. Without ajury it becomes more than that of an
umpire and distiller of law and facts for a separate fact
finding body; he is also the fact-finder. He is inevitably
more interventionist, testing and probing the issues of law
and fat as they are canvassed before him. There is a
greater dialectic between him and the advocates. And
there is less of a role or need for procedural and evidential
constraints designed to insulate lay fact finders from
potentially unfairly prejudicial evidence. "
The Auld Report
J. Introduction
The rules of evidence are a necessary element to the analysis of the complex trial
function of jury and judge. What the key rules are and how they are applied in judge and
jury trials is rendered salient by the well documented reality that the rules may differ
between bench and jury trials.
The subsequent chapters report on a survey of a group of American judges and lawyers,
as well as interviews with nine English trial judges. The application of evidence in jury
and judge only trials permeates these surveys and interviews and raises significant
questions in the U.S.A. and England and Wales about the consequences of mode of trial
choices. The overarching question raised is that in opting for a mode of trial docs that
decision precurse evidentiary decisions which will impact upon the ultimate outcome?
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To understand the ramifications of different evidentiary applications in bench as
compared to jury trials, the key rules of evidence are compared between the jurisdictions,
with some analysis of how they are applied in each mode of trial.
American evidentiary scholar James Bradley Thayer proclaimed that the law of evidence
was "a child of the jury," noting that "the greatest and most remarkable offshoot of the
jury was the body of excluding rules which chiefly constitute the English Law of
Evidence.6s4 For well over a century it has been the opinion of other evidentiary scholars
that the rules of evidence are jury trial rules and therefore "absurdly inappropriate to any
tribunal or proceeding where there is no jury.'.6S5 Skepticism exists about the usefulness
of many rules of evidence in America, Canada and England and Wales. Consequently it
is not surprising that the law of evidence is applied to a different standard in bench trials
as compared with jury trials.
An absence of a coherent evidentiary policy in the U.S.A. and in England and Wales
regarding the application of evidence contributes to making the possible selection of the
bench trial in each jurisdiction as a mode of trial an unwelcome leap of faith in complex
cases where it is likely that close and difficult evidentiary questions abound. Indeed as
6S4 James BradleyThayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 180-181,
508-509 (Boston: Little, Brown 1898); and Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law
Reform: Thayer's Triumph, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2437,2449-50 (2000) and Paul Roberts & Adrean
Zuckerman,Criminal Evidence 38-39 (2004).
6H KennethCulp Davis,An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Non-jury Cases, 50 A.B.A.J. 723,
724 (1964), quoting McCormick,S Encyc. Soc. Sci. 637 (644) (1931). Prof. Davis summarizes
the opinions of other scholars and groups in agreement such as Prof. Thayer, Sir Henry Maine,
the AmericanBar Association's Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence, Prof.
Moore, Prof.Wigmore, to name a few.
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we will see in the next chapter, bench trials are rarely considered in New York State, a
jurisdiction that permits the criminal defendant to choose the mode of trial.
If the bench trial is to be viewed as the jurisprudential equivalent to the jury trial in
common law nations and therefore selected by defendants in complex cases, it is logical
that the rules of evidence should also be the equivalent for each mode of trial or
calibrated in a way that the trier of law is consistent in each case so that the parties and
lawyers have a reasonable sense of what the rules will be for the bench trial. In short,
lawyers should not be gambling as to what the rules of evidence will be in a bench trial as
compared to a jury trial. A main purpose of this section is to evaluate the extent of that
gamble.
For example, as we will explore further below, the present law of England and Wales is
markedly distinct from America and Canada regarding the defendant's right to remain
silent. In England and Wales inferences can be drawn from silence, the defendant's
silence when confronted by the police is admissible in many circumstances. The failure
to speak up in defense of the charges may be weighed by the jury in England and Wales,
and specific jury charges are given by the judge based on such a failure. More
specifically and by illustration, negative inferences are drawn from a failure to give the
same explanation during interrogation as is given at trial or to give any explanation of
ostensibly incriminating evidence during interrogation.f" The defendant, if silent at trial,
is otherwise protected by Criminal Evidence Act 1898 from adverse comment by the
6~6Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 34-38, which supplements rather than
supplants the Common Law, which also permits inference. R. v. Burdett (1820) 4 B&Ald.9S,
120; R. v. Lepage [1995] 1 S.C.R.654.
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prosecution, but the judge or co-counsel for the accused may comment on the silence.657
Comment by co-counsel is permitted in the U.S. and Canada as well.658 This is a finely
balanced arrangement which can be upset at a bench trial. What are the implications for
the defendant at a hypothetical England and Wales bench trial who remains silent? Must
the judge advise the defense counsel that he/she will draw an adverse inference from the
Defendant's silence, thereby virtually compelling either testimony or a conviction?
What are the implications for the defendant who asserts that silence during interrogation
was on the advice of counsel? Isn't the bench trier of fact weighing that testimony with a
different eye toward reasonableness? Does the defense solicitor responsible for that
advice become a necessary witness?
In the U.S.A. and Canada the different presumptions regarding silence will likely make
the intra-trial calculation less problematic in the instance of declined testimony than in
England and Wales.
After careful study and extensive comment, an intentional erosion of the hearsay rule has
been enacted England and Wales, resulting in the abolishing of the hearsay rule in civil
cases and enacting a far less restrictive rule in criminal cases. The modification of the
hearsay rule is grounded in recommendations of the Runciman Royal Commission, which
6S7R. v. Martinez-Tobon,[1994] 2 All ER 90,98,1 WLR 388, 397 C; R. v. Rhodes, [1899] 1QB
77.
6S. Colin Tapper,Cross & Tapper on Evidence 49 n. 426 (lOth rev. ed., LexisNexis VK 2004)
citing Deluna v. V.S., 308 F.2d 140 (l962) and R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3, 80 C.C.C.
(3d) 421; John Sopinka, Law of Evidence In Canada 143, 396 § 8 (2nd ed., Butterworths, Canada
Ltd. 1999). In Canada the right to comment by a co-accused implicated by the defendant on the
defendant's pretrial silence is accompanied by an instruction that inferences may not be drawn as
to guilt by silence, but the silence may reflect on the defendant's credibility.
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advocated the abolition of the exclusionary aspects of the rule and the application of the
rule as a factor in weighing hearsay.659 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 incorporated the
recommendation of the Auld report that the rule be weakened so that hearsay would be
admissible subject to the principal of the best evidence, rather than generally
inadmissible.t'" The net result is that England and Wales has a different approach for
hearsay in civil cases as compared to criminal cases. There is a wide open abolition of
the rule in civil cases, and a more restrictive rule (albeit liberalized) in criminal cases. If
the present government's most recent legislation to permit serious frauds trials to be tried
by judge only goes into force, which rule will be applicable? Will there be further
loosening of the hearsay rule in criminal bench trials? Does the bench trier of fact, with a
more porous hearsay rule, engage in different weighing based on greater experience than
the jury? Does the bench trier of fact have a duty to advise that hearsay will be
discounted and the utterer should be produced given that conclusion will be reached in a
non deliberative setting, with likely attempts by counsel to achieve brevity in a bench
trial being weighed against the duty to fully and fairly present their client's case?
The law of England and Wales further diminished the longstanding common law right to
silence by permitting prosecution for silence (or a failure to cooperate) when questioned
during investigations of serious and complex fraud, "a clear exception ... to the rule
6~ ViscountRunciman, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice ch.8, ~~26-28 (HMSO 1993)
hereinafter RuncimanCommission.
MIl LordJustice Robin Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts in England and Wales eh. 11 ~ 104,
28214.31 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk (hereinafter, The
Auld Report) ("in this respect, as with evidence in criminal cases generally, moving away from
rules of inadmissibility to trusting fact finders to assess the weight of the evidence"). Criminal
Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 114-116.
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against compelling a witness to answer questions'Y?' A person who refuses to answer
questions posed by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) may be prosecuted and sentenced to
up to six months in prison. The only meaningful protection provided by the statute to the
interrogated person is that any answers given cannot be used against the person
questioned "unless they change their story".662 However a specific judicial instruction is
required regarding the defendant's silence.663There is no comparable provision in either
the U.S.A. or Canadian law.
II. The Role of the Judge
The role of the Judge expands in non-jury trials because he/she becomes the trier of fact
as well as the trier of law. It is important to understand how the expanded role impacts, if
at all, on the workings of the trial. The main issue, therefore is, does the expanded
judicial role in a bench trial create distinctly different substantive evidentiary rules from a
jury trial causing the selection ofa mode of trial also to be a selection of the rules of
evidence applicable to the case?
One view is that bench trials so differ from jury trials that there should be modified
evidentiary rules in America for non-jury trials, particularly regarding exclusionary rules,
formalizing the present de facto relaxation of the rules of evidence in bench trials. The
reasoning is that rules like the hearsay rule are created for the benefit of the untrained
61>1 Criminal Justice Act, 1987, c. 38, § 2 (8); The Runciman Royal Commission. supra note 660,
at 56.
61>2 Criminal Justice Act, 1987, c. 38, § 2 (8).
6I>} Criminal Justice& Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, §§ 34-38; R. v. McGarry [1991] 1Cr. App.
R. 377 (requiringan appropriate judicial direction (instruction) in every case regarding the
defendant's silence).
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juror, and that trial and appellate courts already conclude that the legally trained jurist
need not be encumbered by such technicalities.t'" A branch of this argument maintains
that trial judges, because of their legal training, are able to set aside prejudicial
information that might be learned from rulings to exclude evidence or from
plea/settlement negotiations.v'' The ability of judges to set aside prejudice and/or to
reason free of prejudice was evaluated by psychological testing which examined judicial
decision making to determine if the subject judges were susceptible to cognitive illusions.
The results suggest that judges demonstrate an egocentric bias, defined as a
disproportionate sense of their ability to evaluate situations and contend with them.666
However, the same study also found that:
"Judges are also in a better position to determine whether
evidence is relevant. Relevance is largely a statistical
concept that is easily misunderstood. Judges are less likely
664 Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Non-Jury Cases, 50 A.B.A.J:723,
724 (1965), The Report of the Special Committee on Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the
United States 4 (1962) which observed that there was "the general principle that the law of
evidence is relaxed in cases tried without a jury" .
.. , For example, in England and Wales, in Wetherall v. Harrison, [1976] Q.B. 773, 1 All ER 241,
244, Lord Widgery CJ. stated "Laymen sitting as justices ... lack the ability to put out of
their minds certain features of the case "; and Rose LJ. in Lilley v South Worcestershire
Justices, [1995] 4 All ER 186, [1995] 1 WLR 1595, ex P. Lilley, (1995) 1 W.L.R. 1995, 1998
"[J]udges, unlike lay justices, are lawyers who have had many years of training in the art, if art it
be, of excluding from their consideration irrelevant and inadmissible material.". See Martin
Wasik, Magistrates: Knowledge of Previous Convictions, [1996] Crim. L. R. 851, 851 n.3; This
view is widely followed in the United States as we will see later in this chapter in the section
regarding Appellate Review of bench verdicts, Davis, supra note 6654, is of this view, it
permeates the four corners of his article.
6IJ6 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 68
Cornell L. Rev. 777, 828 (2001). Heuristics according to psychologists are mental shortcuts
humans rely upon to make complex decisions. Id., at 815.
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to rely on heuristics like representativeness that can lead to
erroneous evidentiary determinations.v "
This conclusion provides support for the present arrangement in England and Wales
which does not permit magistrates (non lawyers) to try a defendant if they have learned
of a criminal record, but does allow judges to sit on jury trials where the judge is fully
aware of the defendant's criminal record.668
Coupled with Andrew Leipold's suggestion that federal bench trial conviction rates have
dramatically declined due to the general attitude of Federal District Court Judges that
mandated sentencing guidelines are draconian, the comparator countries may have a
misplaced comfort level about judicial capacity to maintain objectivity in light of
prejudicial information.t'"
Judicial recollection or memory may not be superior to that of the jury. Weighing
perceived strengths and weaknesses of jury as compared to judge decision making, one
analysis of the accuracy of juror memory found that individual jurors had memory
problems but that collectively jurors remembered 90% of the facts and 80% of the
667 Chris Guthrie et al., Id., at 826. The Representative heuristic is defined as "when people make
categoricaljudgments ... , they tend to base their judgments on the extent to which the evidence
being analyzed (e.g. the defendant's demeanor) is representative of that category". Id., at 805.
Thus, the authors, for example, assert that jurors are more likely than a judge to assume that a
person in court who is nervous or appears guilty is guilty, and a defendant who is at ease is not
Cilty.
MartinWasik, supra note 665, at 851, citing Paul Carr & Adrian Turner, Stone's Justice's
Manual" 1-39-1-45 (17thed., London: ButterworthsLaw 1996),and Wetherallv. Harrison,
[1976] Q.B. 773, 1All ER 241.
669 Andrew D. Leipold, Why are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 151,
211-213 (2005). The argument is that judges as triers offact should not acquit guilty people
because they believe the mandatory sentence is too harsh. Juries are not told the sentence for that
very reason. Why should the "trained" judge be accorded that luxury?
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judge's instructions.f" The judge in a bench trial will have the advantage of a longer
deliberation period (they do not have the obligation to render an immediate verdict) and
greater access to the trial transcript, but the judge may not have a significant advantage, if
any, regarding accurate knowledge of the facts given the collective reasoning and
memory demonstrated by jurors.
The ultimate conclusion reached by the American school of thought favoring less
restrictive evidentiary rules for bench trials is that hearsay should be weighed and not
excluded comparable to the existing system in England and Wales, consistent with the
notion that non-jury trials allow for an expansion of admissible evidence because the trier
of fact is a trained professional. 671
Trials in all of the comparator jurisdictions are conducted in the adversarial adjudicatory
mode. According to Doran, Jackson and Siegel, in the American bench trial there is a
loosening of evidentiary rules and procedures that affects the quality of adversarial
di di . 672 dia JU rcation. In part buttressed by the earlier work of Doran and Jackson regar mg
Diplock trials in Northern Ireland, the authors argue for the creation of protections during
non-jury trials which would mirror or at least closely reflect jury trial safeguards,
including:
670 R. Hastie, S. Penrod, & N. Pennington, Inside the Jury, 135-137 (Harvard V. Press 1983).
This was a simulation study and not an evaluation of actual jurors.
671 Davis, supra note 664, at 725, quoting Judge Learned Hand "the test of sufficient evidence
should not be jury trial rules of admissibility but should be "the kind of evidence on which
responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs". National Labor Relations Board v.
Remmington Rand, 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304 V.S. 576 (1938).
672 Sean Doran, John O. Jackson, & Michael L. Siegel, Rethinking Adversariness in Non-Jury
Criminal Tria/s, 23 Am. J. Crim. L. 1,27 n.8 (1999).
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I) Enforcing evidence rules at bench trials more formally;
2) Have pretrial exclusionary hearings before a judge who will not be the trier of
fact;
3) More control over judicial intra-trial inquisition;
4) The requirement of a reasoned judgment;
5) The delivery of a provisional statement of guilt that is open to consideration
and argument;
6) Discontinuance of an appellate abandonment to judicial decision making
wherein Appellate Courts credit the trial judge with discounting evidence
improperly admitted in a bench trial.
The rules for bench trials advocated by Doran, Jackson, and Siegel on the one hand and
by Davis on the other, offer a useful framework for the comparison of the rules of
evidence in judge and jury trials. A survey was conducted of New York State trial judges
and members of the American College of Trial Lawyers who practice in New York State
regarding many of these issues the results of which are reported in Chapter 8. Many of
these issues were also discussed with England & Wales judges as reported in Chapter 9.
III. Rules of Expert Evidence
Ilow experts testimony is customarily treated in a mode of trial can be crucial to selection
of that mode of trial. Significant variation in rules between the modes of trial creates a
potential disparity that would assault the shared objective in all of the comparator
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jurisdictions that the mode of trial not influence the substance of the trial and
consequently the outcome. The rules for admission of expert testimony in each mode of
trial are important predicates to mode of trial decision making because "disagreement
plays an inevitable role in science, just as it does in law".673
A. Jury Trials in America
Experts are crucial players in most complex fraud cases. Areas of expertise can range
widely, based on the facts of the case, with accountants, handwriting experts, computer
and system analysts, banking system analysts regularly providing court room opinions.
In England and Wales there are different hearsay rules for civil (non-jury) cases as
compared to criminal trials and significantly different expert rules.674 In America the
bench trial has an entirely different common law application of expert testimony, with
American judge-only courts allowing otherwise impermissible testimony, a phenomena
that will be explored more fully in this section.67s
The choice of mode of trial therefore may crucially impact the rules under which expert
testimony will be conducted. It is therefore essential to examine the existing state of
evidentiary rules regarding expert testimony.
67) Mike Redmayne,Expert Evidence and Scientific Disagreement, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1027,
1080(1997). Dr. Redmayne notes that the legal application of science in the courtroom tends to
exacerbatedifferencesbetween scientific schools of thought. A case which has strong scientific
differencesmay be tried in a very different way before ajudge as trier of fact in America, who
willlikcly hear both schools, rather than to a jury where the U.S.A. judge will apply the Daubert
or Frye tests to determine what scientific view will be presented to the jury. Daubert and Frye
will be discussed at length infra.
,74 Adrian Keane,The Modern Law of Evidence 572-583 (6th ed., Oxford U. Press 2006).
." See SeaboardLumber Co. v. U.S., 308 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cic. 2002).
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1. Expert Witnesses -- Novel, New, and All That Junk and the Boiling American
Dispute Between Frye and Relevance.
With the advent of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals in 1993, the United States
Supreme Court provoked even more confusion in the comparator jurisdictions.Y"
The Daubert decision, grounded on Federal Rule of Evidence Section 702, requires
judges to review novel science or novel applications of established science to ascertain
whether the basis for the testimony has scientific acceptance based on peer reviewed
literature, scientific testing, general acceptance of the theory and potential known rate of
error.
The Frye test of general acceptance and the more longstanding relevance test were the
two standards commonly applied by the courts in the comparator jurisdictions as experts
became crucial courtroom players in the second-half of the twentieth century. The
Federal Rules of Evidence Sections U.S.C.S. Fed. R. Evid. 701-706 (206), and Section 78
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 were statutory attempts to regulate the
use of experts in response to emerging legal trends. As we will see below, the Canadian
common law and the case law in New York and California seek to achieve the same
regulation. However, many commentators including David Bernstein argue that both
standards applied collectively and individually were less than effective in achieving the
61. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786,2792 (1993).
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proper monitoring of expert testimony and that scientifically questionable testimony was
infecting trials.677
During the second half of the twentieth century, American courtrooms were at the cutting
edge of the modem explosion of expert testimony. Tort cases in such complicated fields
as products liability and medical malpractice turned civil jury trials into virtual science
fairs.678 Criminal trials also became a battle ground dominated by experts in well worn
areas such as forensic accounting.V" handwriting and fingerprint experts, voice print
experts, forensic medical experts, biomechanists, ballistic experts, as well as new areas
such as crime scene reconstructionists, blood stain spatter specialists, microscopic hair
comparison experts, and ultimately DNA experts.t'"
The genesis of the modem debate over admissible scientific opinions occurred with
issuance of the decision in Frye v. U.S., in which the District of Columbia Circuit Court
671 David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21 Yale J. Int'l
L. 123 (1996) .
• 11 Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 53, 71-72 nn.65-67
(2001) .
•,., Kenneth D. Ackerman & Boss Tweed, The Rise and Fall of the Corrupt Pol. Who Conceived
the Soul of Modem New York (lst Carroll & GrafTrade Pbk. ed., Carroll & GrafPublishers
200S). An early use offorensic accounting was in the major serious fraud trial of the late 19th
century, the graft and corruption trial of William M. (Boss) Tweed who stole from the City of
New York coffers up to a quarter of a billion dollars. His defalcations were documented by
Attorney Samuel Tilden, who testified using a complex chart about Tweed and his cronies
engaging in money laundering of public funds through bogus corporations or overpaying
!~itimate bills. Id. at 236-240. .'
Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld, & Jim Dwyer, Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution, and
Other Dispatches From the Wrongly Convicted, 161-167 (Doubleday 2000). Labeling the Frye
rule a "witless echo chamber", the authors applauded the Daubert notion of the judge as
gatekeeper, maintaining that for example expert opinions correlating bite marks with human teeth
was unreliable and that 29% of wrongful convictions studies by their project included incorrect
hair analysis of microscopic hair comparisons. See also, David W. Barnes, General Acceptance
versus Scientific Soundness: Mad Scientists in the Courtroom, 31 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 303 (2004);
329-332.
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in 1923 utilized a new standard for the acceptance of expert scientific testimony.
Holding that the science propounded in court must be generally accepted in the field,68!
the Frye court inaugurated a departure from reliability as the basis for the admission of
expert testimony. Other leading American jurisdictions such as New York followed the
longstanding relevance of school of thought,682 reasoning that "any relevant conclusions
which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are
other reasons for exclusion".683 According to Bernstein between 1923 and 1993 there
was disagreement in the various American jurisdictions between relevance and general
acceptance.t'" with Daubert emerging in 1993 to provide the "flexible reliability test
focusing on whether the expert's testimony is based on the proper scientific methodology
and reasoning".68s The historical disagreement between relevance and general
acceptance is further embodied in the Second Edition of McCormick on Evidence which
quotes the key language of Frye:
"Just when a scientific principle crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
6111 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The case involved the Court's rejection ofa
machine that was a primitive lie detector asserting that "the thing from which the diction was
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
which it belongs". As Bernstein, supra note 678, at n.15, Frye did not immediately receive wide
acceptance of citation and thus its acceptance was "uncertain". That assertion is supported by a
review of New York's leading text on Evidence, Richardson on Evidence. The ro" Edition
published in 1973 cites Frye only once, in the section regarding the admissibility of evidence at
page 358.
611Z Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence (10th ed., Brooklyn Law School 1973). The courts
function is to determine the expert's qualification, the proper factual foundation, and the relevance
of the testimony to the case.
611} Charles T. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence 363-364 (1st Ed. 1954).
6U David E. Bernstein, supra note 677, at 126.
•• 5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,112 S. Ct. 2786,2792 (1993)
cited by David E. Bernstein, supra note 678, at 126.
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will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field to which it belongs." 686
Noting that Frye did not cite any precedent for the general acceptance principle it
pronounced, McCormick continued to embrace the relevance test, citing with approval
Coppolino v. State, a case wherein a Florida Court upheld a forensic medical test, devised
by a toxicologist, specifically for that trial which purported to determine the presence of a
chemical compound in a corpse. 687McCormick continued to embrace the relevance test
in 1978:
"Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a
qualified expert witness should be received unless there are
other reasons for exclusion. Particularly probative value
may be overborne by the familiar dangers of prejudicing or
misleading the jury, and undue consumption of time. If the
courts used this approach, instead of repeating a supposed
requirement of "general acceptance" not elsewhere
imposed, they would arrive at a practical way of utilizing
the results of scientific advances".688
Indeed the Frye test was not a widely a utilized standard in many U.S. jurisdictions until
the 1970s and 1980s.
2. New York, California and Daubert
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court handed down Daubert, the California Supreme
Court in People v. Leahy reaffirmed the application of a Frye-like "Kelly test" which had
616 EdwardW. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 1014 (2d ed. 1972). McCormick is one of the
several leading American evidentiary source texts.
.. 7 Coppolinov. State, 223 So.2d 68 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
..I Cleary,McCormickon Evidence, supra note 686, see 1978pocket part at 491.
259
been utilized since 1976.689 That longstanding test held admissible new or novel
scientific technique where there was the proffer of "foundational evidence disclosing
general acceptance of the test within the relevant scientific community.'.690 New York
has maintained a comparable test of relevance, rejecting Daubert to date.691 Other states
like Florida follow Frye out of the belief that it is a more vigorous test than Daubert.692
B. Daubert, Frye, and the Application of the Rules in the American Bench Trials
In bench trials, the rigidity that some attach to the Daubert and Frye principles vanishes
and evidentiary flaccidity prevails. As we will see later in this thesis, bench trials
generally have more relaxed rules of evidence and far less stringent appellate review,
particularly in the U.S. where the trial court may admit expert testimony that may not
meet the Daubert standard and then discount it. For example, two Federal Appellate
Courts have actually opined that the Daubert test provokes "concerns of lesser import in a
bench trial",693"bench trials have substantial flexibility in admitting proffered expert
testimony at the front end and then deciding for themselves during the course of the trial
whether the evidence meets the requirements of Rule 702",694and one United States
1>119 People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4th 587 (1994); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal.
1976).
- People v. Kelly, supra note 689.
6'11 People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1993). Edward W. Cleary, McCormick on
Evidence 873-874 at § 293 (4thed. 1992). Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 7.311 at 476
(I0dl ed., Brooklyn Law School 1973), citing People v. Allweis, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 49-50 (Ct. App.
1979); People v. Gupta, 87 A.D.2d 991 (N.Y. App. Div. 4thDept. 1982). Edward Imwinkelried,
Coming to Grips with Scientific Research in Daubert's Brave New World: The Courts Need to
Appreciate the Evidentiary Differences Between Validity and Proficiency Studies, 61 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 1247,1251 (l995).
Ml David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and the Science of Expert
Testimony § 1-3.0 at 12-12 n.8 (West Info. Pub. Group 1997); Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836
(Fla 2001).
6'J) Seaboard Lumber Co. v. U.S., 308 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
694 Gonzales v. National Bd. OfMed. Examiners, 225 F.3d 620,625 (6th Cir. 2000).
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District Court reasons that it is acceptable "to admit evidence of borderline admissibility
and give it the (slight) weight to which it is entitled.'.695 This standard, of course, would
be unacceptable in a jury trial in either a Daubert or Frye jurisdiction. Thus, it is apparent
that even if relevance is not the main standard to be utilized regarding the admissibility of
expert testimony in bench trials, it is a major temptation for the judge apply that standard
in a bench trial, thus expanding the mode of trial choice to not only the trier of fact but
also the evidentiary standard to be applied to expert testimony.
Surveys of New York State judges and lawyers discussed in Chapter 8 strongly suggest
that bench trials are very different from jury trials. Both the judges and lawyers report
that judges do not apply the rules of testimonial hearsay as vigorously in bench trials as in
jury trials. Lawyers further opined that New York judges were not vigorous in the
application of Daubert or Frye. This must be coupled with the fact that in New York
State the trial judge generally decides, even in bench trials, potentially prejudicial
motions such as: an application to have a hearing to determine if expert testimony will be
permitted for the full range of reasons; lack of qualification or experience of the expert;
an absence of a proper evidentiary foundation for the opinions proffered; a failure to fully
and properly disclose the expert pursuant to the civil or criminal practice rules; and an
absence of proper scientific basis for the testimony, such as meeting the Daubert or Frye
standard. In each instance, even if the trial judge excludes the testimony, he/she will
.." Smith Kline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Cor., 247 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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have heard the substance of the opinions in the form of an exclusionary motion or
hearing.696
The problem that is created by the disparity in application of evidence is obvious. If
there is a choice of mode of trial, novel scientific evidence or the novel application of
existing science each will be likely received at a bench trial while its receipt at a jury trial
is problematic. The implications in terms of outcome are vast and therefore where there
is a choice of mode of trial, the implications of that choice by the defendant must
embrace the different standards of admissibility.
C. Canada Rejects the Daubert Approach
Comparable to California, in R. v. Mohan (per Judge Sopinka), the Canadian Supreme
Court in 1994 adopted a test that would seem to combine Frye and Daubert but has also
caused great confusion and uncertainty.t'" Mohan delineated a four part test for
evaluating the admissibility of expert evidence:
1. evidentiary relevance;
2. the necessity of the evidence;
3. whether such evidence should otherwise be excluded;
4. whether the expert is properly qualified.698
696 Chapter 8, infra. reports on the results of a detailed survey on this issue administered to New
York State trial judges and attorneys.
IH1 R. v. Mohan, [1994] 89 C.C.C. (3d) 402, 2 S.C.R. 9.
f>YI Id. at 20; David E. Bernstein, supra note 678, at n.99, David M. Paciocco, Evaluating Expert
Opinion Evidence for the Purpose of Determining Admissibility: Lessons from the Law of
Evidence, 27 CR4th 302, 310 (1994). "[Frye] is not the law of Canada. Exactly what is, is not
quite clear .,," ; R.I. Delisle, The Admissibility of Expert Evidence: A New Caution Based on
General Principles. 29 C.R.4th 267,272 (1994), citing R. v. Doe (No.2) [1986] 31 C.C.C. (3d)
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According to one view, R. v. Mohan stands for requiring a general acceptance standard,
therefore the court rejected plaintiff's expert evidence in the form of psychiatric
testimony opining that the defendant did not fit the profile of someone who would
sexually assault a minor.699 Bernstein and a leading Canadian scholar depart on which
test the Canadian Supreme Court applied in deciding Mohan:
"Sopinka's opinion did not cite any American case law on
the issue of the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Nevertheless, one scholar has argued that "[t]he court in
Mohan appears to have arrived at the same position as the
court in Daubert, though with decidedly less fanfare"
because of the opinion's focus on the underlying validity of
expert evidence. The opinion's heavy reliance on general
acceptance, however, seems to be inspired by Frye more
than Daubert.v'?" (parenthesis added)
Reflecting the general confusion, Delisle opines differently, concluding that Mohan
reaffirmed relevance as the standard:
"In Canada, expert evidence will be received if it is relevant
to a fact in issue, the expert is properly qualified, the expert
evidence is helpful to the trier of fact, and there are no
exclusionary rules in operation. ,,701
353 (Ont, Dist. Ct.) (admissibility of polygraph opinion) and R. v. Johnston [1992] 69 C.C.C.
(2d) 395, 12C.R. (4th)99 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (admissibility of evidence of identification by DNA
profiling); DavidM. Paciocco& Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence 193 (Irwin Law 2005),
citing R. v. J J-L [2002] 2 S.C.R. 600 (in which the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledges
while it is not the only standard, general acceptance must be considered); David M. Paciocco,
Coping with Expert Evidence About Human Behaviour, 25 Queens, L. J. 305, 317 (1999).
Iffl R. JamesWilliams, Grasping a Thorny Baton ... A Trial Judge Looks at Judicial Notice and
Court IS Application of Social Science, 14 Canadian Fam. L. 179 (1996).
700 David E. Bernstein,supra note 678, at 146; R.J. Delisle, The Admissibility of Expert
Evidence: A New Caution Based 011 General Principles, 29 C.R.4th 267, 272 (1994). Bernstein
quotes theMohan decision's author, Justice Sopinka, in n.l53, a quote which indicates Mohan did
not adopt a single test but "rather, the Court's first apply the traditional exclusionary rules, the
expert evidence rule, and then invoke policy reasons specific to the particular proffered evidence
to determine admissibility. This appears to be the preferable route". John Sopinka, Law of
Evidence In Canada 597 (2nd ed., Butterworths, Canada Ltd. 1999).
701 R.J. Delisle, supra note 698, at 272.
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One commentator has proposed practice rules comparable to those in place in England
and Wales for civil litigation wherein the Court can order dialogue between the parties'
experts and, in its discretion, appoint a court's expert.702 There is little present
enthusiasm for the application of this concept in the criminal law in England and Wales,
the United States, or apparently in Canada, although a Federal judge pursuant to Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence may appoint the Court's own expert. This is not a
general practice in criminal trials - such an appointment is rare.
While Daubert-like pretrial hearings (voir dire) are held in Canadian criminal cases, they
are not utilized in Canadian civil cases.703
Thus the Canadian standard for the admission of expert testimony about novel science
weighs the necessity of the testimony, provides special scrutiny of reliability and the
closer the evidence about a novel scientific technique, "the stricter the application.,,704
The standard, as articulated, vests great discretion in the trial judge, either in a bench trial
or jury trial. The standard is not nearly as restrictive as Daubert or Frye, thus the
702 P. Brad Limpert, Beyond the Rule in Mohan: A New Modelfor Assessing the reliability of
Scientific Evidence, 54 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 65 (1996). Limpert calls for the systematic evaluation
of scientific uncertainty setting forth 7 types of uncertainty which arises during empirical
hypothesis testing.
70) Tania M. Bubela, Expert Evidence: The Ethical Responsibility of the Legal Profession, 41
Alberta L. Rev. 853, 869 (2004). .
7004 David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, supra note 698, at 194, quoting R. v. J J-L, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 600, ~ 37.
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concerns that mode of trial choice will impact on whether or not an expert will be
allowed to testify are minimal in Canada.
D. England and Wales
Will the judge only trials so eagerly sought by the government in certain serious frauds
cases receive expert testimony in a manner more consistent with the civil procedure
law?70SWill there be greater reliance on §30 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1988, thereby
foreclosing defendant's opportunity for cross-examination of experts? Given that a
"striking feature of English law is its liberal - according to one commentator 'incredibly
liberal' approach to the reception of novel forms of scientific expertise," a bench trial
which employs civil rules will likely be very different from a jury tria1.706 And as
Chapter 9 will describe in detail, a significant number of serious fraud qualified judges
interviewed believe that a judge only criminal trial will resemble civil bench trials.
Therefore the questions posed above are relevant to the consideration of non-jury trials
for serious frauds and are salient to the argument of this thesis that the defendant should
be entitled to choose the mode of trial. No answer is offered in the proposed legislation
currently pending before parliament.f" Nor does the research paper accompanying the
bill offer any detail regarding the evidentiary or procedural format for the judge only
70j Part 35 of the Civil Procedure Law and the practice direction thereunder create a presumption
that any expert evidence will be in writing, and § 35.7 permits the court to direct that evidence be
given by a single joint expert. See Adrian Keane, The Modem Law of Evidence 572-583 (6th
ed., Oxford University Press 2006).
11'" Paul Roberts & Adrean Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence 38-39, 323 (Oxford 2004), quoting
David Ormerod, Sounding Out Expert Voice Identification, [2002] Crim L. R. 771, 777.
101 Fraud (Trials without a Jury) Bill, 2006, Bill [6] of2006-07 (Gr. Brit.), which is pending as of
this writing, available at
h!.tr:llwww.publications.parliament.ukJpa/pabills/200607/fraud trials without a jury.htm.
265
trials that would be conducted pursuant to the act.708 Certainly the notion that a reduction
in the cost of trial and the time expended would occur in bench trials suggest alternatives
from jury trials.709
The recent (last thirty years) policy debate about the role of the expert witness in England
and Wales has demonstrated a reluctance by Parliament or the Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division) to modify the existing evidentiary standards for the admissibility of novel
science or novel applications of accepted science.
Notwithstanding expert related miscarriagesi'" and a rising tide of opinion advocating
that English law abandon the relevance standard,"! the Royal Commission on Criminal
Justice declined to recommend either the abandonment of the relevance standard or the
adoption of the reliability or general acceptance standards."! The focus rather has been
,,,. Miriam Peck, The Frauds (Trials Without a Jury) Bill2006-07, Research Paper 06/57 Home
Affairs Section (House of Commons Library 2006), available at
bttp:llwww.commonsleader.gov.uk/output/page 1757.asp.
M Id. at 11.
710 Preece v.II.M. Advocate, [1981] Crim. L. R. 783; R. v. McIlkenny, [1992] 2 All E.R. 417, 93
Cr. App. Rep. 287; R. v. Maguire, [1992] 1 Q.B. 936; R. v. Ward, [1993] 19 W.C.B. (2d) 239.
711 Peter Alldridge, Recognizing Novel Scientific Techniques: DNA As a Test Case, [1992] Crim
L. R. 687; Bernstein, supra note 677, at 169 nn.331, 330; R. v. Ward, 1 W.L.R. 619 (1993);
Steven Greer, Miscarriages of Justice Reconsidered, 57 Mod. L. Rev. 58,71-72 (1994) (role of
forensic evidence in causing and correcting miscarriages).
712 Viscount Runciman, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 160 (HMSO 1993). The
report is silent with regard to any move from relevance to a reliability or general acceptance test.
There is reference to Court being negligent regarding expert qualifications but not a regulatory
role. "We see no need for a system of statutory certification or accreditation of expert witnesses
nor for the maintenance of a register of experts by a government department". The Commission
then calls for greater vigilance by professional bodies but make it clear that even if there is a
certification process that judicial discretion should still be given deference. "We would not ...
go so far as to say that the Courts should necessarily exclude a witness who was not accredited
under such a system", 160-161. See Mike Redmayne, The Royal Commissions Proposal on
Expert Evidence: A Critique,2 Expert evidence 157 (1994).
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improving the credentials and consequently the credibility of experts, primarily as we
will see below, through a process of witness accreditation.
Bernstein notes that "Despite the lack of change in common law rules regarding scientific
evidence in England, there have been broader efforts to reform the forensic science
system",113 with substantial efforts pursuant to the Runciman Commission's
recommendations to create more equality in the access to good quality forensic services
for both the prosecution and the defense.i'" Dr. Chris Pamplin, the Editor of the U.K.
Register of Expert Witnesses views government proposed schemes to accredit expert
witnesses as not addressing real problems, labeling such proposals as "a convenient fig
leaf for the government," and rather argues for a Daubert like pre-trial screening of the
substance of expert testimony?"
Courts in England and Wales have not articulated either a Daubert or Frye-like test for
the admission of expert testimony, remaining committed to a test that includes relevance,
as well as a proper expert qualifications -- defined as a qualified expert offering an
opinion on something that either is not within the knowledge of normal people or
involves opinion outside the common ken.716 One opinion is that R. v. Turner717 and the
71) B .crnstcm,supra note 700, at 170-174.
7 ... RuncimanCommission, supra note 712, at eh. 9,144-161.
m Chris Pamplin, Taking Experts Out of The Court, 154New L.1. 1771 (Nov. 26, 2004).
116 WilliamE. O'Brian, Jr., Court Scrutiny of Expert Evidence: Recent Decisions Highlight the
Tensions,7 Int'l J. Evid.& Proof 172 (2003).
717 R. v. Turner, [1975] 1QB 834. Expert Testimony by a Psychiatrist was sought to evaluate
witness truthfulness. Justice Lawton famously observed to paraphrase that if psychiatric
testimonywere to be permitted regarding the truthfulness of witnesses we would have trial by
psychiatrists and not jurors. Thus, Turner has created a longstanding standard. See also
Alldridge,Scientific Expertise, supra note 711 at 687.
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common law on "the admissibility of expert evidence is regulated by the intersection of
three sets of doctrinal standards: 1) relevance; 2) witness competence, 3) relevance plus
expert evidence rules.,,718
The near unanimous view is that:
"Although English law imposes some limits on the subject-
matters of expert evidence, it has traditionally imposed
very few limits on the methodology or reliability of expert
testimony."?"
The Court of Appeal has excluded expert opinion offered in new areas of
science such as a psychological autopsy of a murder victim,720however
they also have permitted expert lip-reading evidence.F' With regard to
psychological profile cases, Rose L. J. opined that the English approach
was comparable to Frye, pointing out that on 17 occasions American
Appellate Courts had overturned profiling cases:
"The guiding principle in the United States appears to be
(as stated in Frye v. U.S., [citation omitted]) that evidence
based on a developing brand of science or medicine is not
admissible until accepted by the scientific community as
being accurate and reliable opinion. This accords with the
English approach in the case as reflected in Strudwick and
Merry." 72'2
71. Paul Roberts, Tyres with y" An English Perspective on Kumaho Tire and its Implicationsfor
the Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 1 Int'l Commentary on Evidence 5 (1999), available at
~ttp:l!www.bepress.comlice/voll/iss2/art5.
719 WilliamE. O'Brian, Jr., Court Scrutiny of Expert Evidence, 7 Int'I. J. Evid. & Proof 172
(2003).
no R. v. Gilfoyle, (2001) 2 Cr. App Rep. 57, ~25 (C.A.). The Court held the testimony was not
admissible because the otherwise well qualified expert had never performed a psychological
autopsy before and there was "no criteria by reference to which the Court could test the quality of
his opinions, there is no data base comparing real and questionable suicides and there is not
substantial body of academic writing approving his methodology." ~2S.
721 R. v. Luttrell, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1344,2 Cr. App. Rep. 520.
m R. v. Gilfoyle, (2001) 2 CR. App Rep. 57 CA; R. V. Strudwick, (1993) 99 Cr. App. Rep. 326.
The issue was whether expertise called only for testimony about an abnormal mental state -
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The Court of Appeal has ordered a retrial where evidence of an ear-print allegedly linking
the Defendant to the crime scene was adduced at trial, opining that post trial expert
evidence not available at trial demonstrated the unreliability of this type of expert
opinion,723 and has upheld voice identification testimony,724 and has limited the use of the
science of facial mapping:
"To demonstrate to a jury with, if necessary, enhancement
techniques afforded by specialist equipment, particular
facial characteristics or combinations of such
characteristics so as to permit the jury to reach its own
conclusion.F" This holding did not support an expert
giving an opinion as to the degree of probability or
likelihood of an affirmative identification because of the
absence of rational data base, despite the Court in Re
Attorney-General's Reference (No.2 of2002) opinion that
a conclusion could be drawn by an expert in this area. ,,726
The Crown Prosecution Service contends that in battered woman syndrome cases expert
testimony is admissible for purposes like: opinion/explanations why the victim didn't
leave the household she commonly occupied with the perpetrator; opinions about why the
victim minimized the severity of the crime; and opinions explaining the victim's
mental illness. The Court per Judge Farquharson appeared to reject the admissibility of testimony
as to abnormality.
12) R. v. Dallagher, [2002] EWCA Crim. 1903, (2003) 1 Cr. App. Rep. 195. In this case the
expert in the "novel technique of ear-print identification" had testified to an American Court and
in the Netherlands - cases in which convictions based on that testimony were reversed. The
Court of Appeal was apprised of these reversals and received the evidence of three experts
denouncing the scientific basis of the expert's opinion. The Court opted to reverse the conviction
not based on the experts lack of reliability but because he offered an opinion on the ultimate
issue.
724 R. v. Robb, (1991) 93 Cr. App. Rep. 161, even though "the great, great weight of informed
opinion '''held that the technique used was unreliable"'; see also Tony Ward, Expert Testimony
Issues in the U.K., 17 Security J. 41 (2004) ("Traditionally in criminal jury trials, the Courts have
taken the view that if the expert witness is "peritus" (skilled) in some area outside the experience
of the jury, then hislher evidence is admissible 'the rest is merely a question of value or weight,
and this is entirely a question for the jury''') citing R. v. Silverlock, (1894) 2 Q.B. 766, 771.
m R. v. Gray, [2003] EWCA Crim. 1001, ~16.
724Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of2002), [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 321, 327.
269
recanting of prior statements.727 The Court of Appeal has permitted expert testimony by
a social psychologist (who did not interview or examine the witness) that the nature of
the personality of the witness is such that the jury would have difficulty evaluating that
person's credibilrty.?" One observer regards this decision as confirming that where the
witness had an underlying medical condition, the jury may hear evidence which would
set forth medical conditions which would impact upon the witness's credibility as
opposed to testimony about whether or not the witness is credible.729
Most commentators believe that in criminal cases England and Wales is not moving
toward a Daubert like formula or the embracing of Frye, but rather consistent with the
Civil Procedure Rules would have all forensic experts regulated, as well owing a greater
duty to the Court and empowering judges to require adverse experts to discuss their
reports, while not advancing the civil concept of a court's expert for criminal cases.730
727 Michelle M. Dempsey, The Use of Expert Witness Testimony in the Prosecution of Domestic
Violence The Crown Prosecution Service, 7 n.5 (2004) (contends that this type of testimony is
admissible in New York State and California).
721R. v. MacKenney; R. v. Pinfold, [2003] E.W.C.A. Crim. 3643, [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 32. The
case, a 1981 conviction, was referred back to the Court of Appeal by the Criminal Cases Review
Commission (CCRC).
729Paul Roberts, Toward the Principled Reception of Expert Evidence of Witness Credibility in
Criminal Trials, 8 Int'l J. Evid. Proof215 (2004).
7)Orony Ward, Expert Testimony Issues in the U.K., 17 Security J. 41, 46 (2004); The Auld
Report, supra note 16, at eh, II, ~~ 130-2, 140-1, 136, 145-6; Peter Alldridge supra note 774, at
152-153, identifies some of the problems associated with a court's expert including the likelihood
or that witness's testimony receiving such an extreme weight from the jury as to impact upon the
adversarial process.
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R. v. Barnes provides a useful insight into the processes presently followed by English
Courts in addressing novel expert testimony as the Court did not allow an arborealist's
testimony because of qualifications to testify about finger print lifts.73l
E. Summary
A common thread existent in all of the comparator jurisdictions is the
recognition that expert testimony requires careful monitoring by the
judicial system, whether in the form of an accreditation process or through
the application of pretrial evidentiary screening as indicated by Frye or
Daubert.732
Presumably in a circumstance where the defendants could choose the mode of trial, there
would be clarification as to the procedural rules applicable to expert testimony, so that
the defendant would be assured that prosecution experts would be produced and that
proper cross-examination would occur pursuant to jury rules in a bench trial. One could
also hope that if the present effort to pass legislation permitting the trial of serious fraud
cases in England and Wales, that either legislatively or by direction from the Court of
Appeal the evidentiary rules for bench trials will be clarified.
7JI R. v. Barnes, [2005] EWCACrim. 1158 (C.A. Crim Div.); [2006] AJ. No. 409, 2006 ABPC
82, 2006 AB.C. LEXIS 401.
m David Bernstein,supra note 677, at 171; Christopher Oddie, Science and Administration of
Justice 15,43 (1991); Peter Alldridge, supra note 711, at 694-695, calling for a committee or
extra-judicialentity to decide novel science questions; Russell E. Stockdale [1991] Running with
the I/ounds, 141 New L. 1. 772,774; M. Neil Browne, Carrie L.Wilkinson, Linda L. Williamson
& Linda L. Barkacs, The Perspectival Nature of Expert Testimony in the United States, England,
Korea, and France, 18 Conn. J. Int'l L. 55,91 (2002).
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IV. Hearsay
The inconsistent application of hearsay in bench trials poses a problem for
anyone who believes that the bench trial should be comparable to the jury
trial in the U.S.A. In England and Wales as discussed above, the newly
expansive hearsay rule poses significant questions regarding the
application of the rule in bench trials if the movement to permit the trial of
Serious Frauds cases by judge only prevails.
The general rule in American courts is that hearsay is inadmissible both in
criminal and civil cases. There are a number of exceptions to that rule.
The rule and its exceptions are more closely applied in jury trials than in
bench trials.'33
As discussed in the previous section of this chapter, with regard to expert
testimony, the results of the survey conducted for this paper and reported
in Chapter 8 suggests that judges are less inclined to strictly enforce the
hearsay rules in bench trials in the U.S.A.'34
m U.S. Fed. R. Evid. 803 summarizes the main exceptions to the hearsay rule including present
sense impression,excited utterance, then existing state of mind, statements for purposes of
medicaldiagnosis, recorded recollection, various business records and public records and certain
exceptions regarding prior testimony where the declarant is unavailable to name a few. While
applicableonly to Federal lawsuits, it is a representative codification of the hearsay rule as
aEpliedin State Courts.
1• See Chapter 8, infra.
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In England and Wales, the hearsay rule is no longer exclusionary in civil cases, the
admission of testimonial hearsay goes to weight.735 However, notice prior to any trial is
required in order to use the hearsay and the adverse party has remedies which include the
calling of the utterer.736 England and Wales permits a judge in a criminal case to permit
into evidence the report of an expert who will not testify.737
Section 114 (1) d Criminal Justice Act 2003 gives the judge broad discretion to admit
hearsay if "the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for it to be admissible"
based on ten factors set forth in Section §114(2). Likewise if the utterer is dead, unfit to
testify for mental or physical health reasons, outside of the U.K., or intimidated the
statement upon proper identification of the utterer, if otherwise admissible, shall be
admined.?"
An English judge may exclude hearsay evidence otherwise admissible because the court
deems it to be unfair pursuant to Section 78 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 or
because evidence is deemed a waste of time pursuant to Section 126 Criminal Justice Act
2003. Moreover, the judge may stop the case and direct an acquittal where the evidence
is unconvincing pursuant to §125 Criminal Justice Act 2003. These prerogatives do not
m Civil EvidenceAct, 1995, c. 38, § 1 , abolishes hearsay "a statement made otherwise than by a
person while giving evidence in the proceeding which is tendered as evidence of the matter stated
... " §4 (1)(2) gives the factors to be applied in weighing hearsay.
7)6 Civil EvidenceAct, 1995, c. 38, § 2, and Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, c. 35, § 22.4 both allow
the adverse party to move for permission to cross-examine the maker of the statement and if
~ranted that right and the maker is not produced, the hearsay shall be excluded.
J7Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 530.
m Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 116 (l), (2); see Adrian Keane, The Modem Law of
Evidence281-83 (6th ed., Oxford University Press 2006) for an explanation of the prelude to this
legislation.
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appear to be as broad as Federal Rules of Evidence Section 404 which allows the court to
determine that admissible evidence shall be excluded because the prejudice outweighs the
probative value thereof.
American jurisdictions and the V.K. and Canada all have business record exceptions to
their hearsay rule.739
To some, the hearsay rule is a useless inconvenience in bench trials. A prominent
American commentator complained both at the time the Federal Rules of Evidence were
first proposed in 1970, as well as after their adoption, that the rules did not carve out an
exception so that in non-jury cases hearsay otherwise excludable in jury trials could be
admitted and weighed by the judicial trier of fact (a proposal that is remarkably consistent
with present English Civil System),140arguing as follows:
"Because Rule 8-02 makes hearsay
"inadmissible except as provided" and because
nothing else provides for admitting in nonjury
cases hearsay that would be inadmissible in jury
cases, adoption of the proposed Rules of
Evidence may mean that the widespread
practice in nonjury cases of admitting
technically inadmissible hearsay "for what it's
worth" will have to be discontinued. This result
would be unfortunate, since exclusion of
relevant and reliable hearsay rests heavily on the
jury system and may make little or no sense in a
nonjury case, especially when the hearsay
happens to be the best evidence obtainable on a
question of fact that must be answered. Thayer
called the law of evidence" a piece of illogical,
but by no means irrational patchwork; not at all
7)9 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 117; U.S. Fed. R. Evid. 802 (6) (7) (8); John Sopinka, Law
of Evidence in Canada (2nd Ed. Butterworths, Canada, LTD 1999) at eh, 18.
740 KennethCulp Davis,Hearsay in Non-Jury Cases, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1970).
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to be admired, nor easily to be found
intelligible, except as a product of the jury
system." Wigmore said that "any attempt to
apply strictly the jury-trial rules of Evidence to
an administrative tribunal acting without a jury
is a historical anomaly, predestined to probable
futility and failure." His remark seems equally
applicable to judges without juries. McCormick
was even more emphatic: "As rules they are
absurdly inappropriate to any tribunal or
proceeding where there is no jury." Admission
without a ruling in a nonjury case does no harm
and may be more economical than making a
ruling. In jury trials, rulings must be made
because the hearsay may prejudice the jury. In
nonjury trials, the judge is equally exposed to
the hearsay whether he admits it or excludes it.
Yet the literal words of the proposed rules
clearly prohibit the judge form admitting
hearsay "for what it's worth" without ruling on
its admissibility' this result of the rules may be
more important that any other with respect to
hearsay. A corollary to the position that judges
should admit hearsay "for what it's worth" is
what the Eighth Circuit in 1965 called the "well
established" rule that "in nonjury cases the
appellate court will not reverse on the basis of
the admission of incompetent evidence, "unless
all of the competent evidence is insufficient to
support the judgment or unless it affirmatively
appears that the incompetent evidence induced
the court to make an essential finding which
would not otherwise have been made".,,741
It should be noted that the suggested efficiencies associated with a softening of the
hearsay rule may be offset in England and Wales by a widening of so called collateral
cross examination against that witness reporting the hearsay, as the credibility of both the
741 Id. at 1365-66, citing James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the
Common Law 509 (Boston: Little, Brown 1898); J. Wigmore, Evidence § 46 (3d Ed. 1940);
McCormick,5 Encyc Soc. Sci. 637 (644) (1931); Joseph A. Bass Co. v. U.S., 340 F.2d 842,845
(8th Cir. 1965).
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utterer and the witness to the utterance are now subject to testing.742 Does the weakening
of the hearsay rule create an opportunity to place before the jury evidence and facts not
capable of proper measurement for truth and accuracy by cross-examination? Does the
present hearsay rule effectively regulate such an injustice? Can the hearsay rule be
regulated so that it is applied equally in both bench and jury trials? The adoption of
Criminal Justice Act 2003 has formalized the extensive discretion granted to the trial
judge in the area of hearsay. It can be argued that based on that discretion, as to hearsay
issues, it matters little whether the trial is a bench or jury trial- the judge will have broad
discretion under Rule 803(24) to admit the hearsay if it is evidence of a material fact,
more probative on the point than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts and if the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will be served by the admission of the hearsay into evidence (obviously subject to
proper notice to the adversary).743
"The fact that judges are now legally empowered to admit
much more hearsay than previously, in a greater range of
circumstances, does not entail any general shift in judicial
attitudes regarding the reliability of particular types of
information or a lowering of the law's guard against the
evidential infirmities of hearsay. In particular, and despite
its roving commission, section 114(1) (d) is unlikely to be
invoked to facilitate the admission of poor quality
information on a regular basis, to condone evidentiary
short-cuts for the sake of convenience, or to save poorly-
prepared prosecutions from directed verdicts of acquittal.
It is going to take a convincing argument, securely-founded
on considerations of probative value and justice, to
persuade a judge that hearsay evidence which cannot be
brought within any of the discrete exceptions created or
preserved by the CAJ 2003 should nonetheless be admitted
in the interests of justice under section 114( 1) (d). ,,744
742 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 124 (Credibility).
m Paul Roberts & Adrean Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (Oxford, 2004) at 662-63.
744 Id. at 663.
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With regard to documentary hearsay, Roberts and Zuckerman predict that
117 of the CJA 2003 will not result in "audit mentality" toward the
admissibility of documents but that trial court will likely be required to
have "conspicuous regard for the letter of the statute" in order to avoid
Court of Appeal reversal.I"
Interviews conducted for this paper with nine judges who try serious fraud
cases obtained their agreement that while the hearsay rules have been
greatly broadened, the judges, aware of that, are willing to invoke their
broad discretion to prevent unfairness. Several judges were of the firm
opinion that the hearsay changes in Criminal Justice Act 2003 had not
altered trial outcomes and that juries were most capable of balancing
hearsay by weighing the circumstances in which it is offered.i"
Rationalizing and standardizing the admission of hearsay between jury
and bench trials is important to maintain the integrity of the legal system.
Unequal standards, especially on hearsay, would give rise to the
suggestion that one mode of trial would be more likely to allow potentially
dispositive evidence than the other.
mId. at 642.
746 Author's interviews, Chapter 9, infra.
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Michael Siegel calls for a best evidence hearsay rule, a concept that may offer the way
forward to establish a standard applicable to both bench and jury trials in light of
concerns about the present application of the rule:
"The degree of consensus among twentieth century
evidence scholars concerning the intellectual bankruptcy of
the hearsay doctrine is nothing short of remarkable.vf"
Making a critique of the American rule which is relevant also to the liberalized England
and Wales hearsay rule, Siegel argues that cross examination of non-declarant witnesses
is likely to be ineffective, reasoning that the witnesses heard what they heard and will
likely be unshakable in that recollection. Moreover he asserts that calling the declarant is
also likely to be an ineffective strategy as "In the majority of cases, however, the essence
of the declarant - witnesses testimony would remain damaging to the opponents cause; it
would make little sense for the opposing party to suffer through an in-court repetition of
this testimony merely for the sake of impeachment'V" In addition under the weakened
rules the declarant may be unavailable, thereby rendering it impossible to impeach the
hearsay.
Siegel concurs with Nesson's argument that enforcing a hearsay rule helps to promote the
stability of verdicts and public confidence in the process.?" However he also agrees with
Park that the stability argument is undercut by exceptions to the hearsay rule and the
747 Michael Siegel,Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72
B.U.L. Rev. 893, 894 (1992), see n.5 for a review of those agreeing.
,... Id. at 920.
749 Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357 (1985).
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possibility that the declarant not called at trial whose declaration was consequently
excluded will post trial articulate evidence that will undercut the verdict.750
Lempert and Saltzburg argue that a loosening of the hearsay rule would favor rich and
powerful Defendants in civil cases and prosecutors in criminal cases/51 a position that
Siegel asserts is unsupported by any objective evidence, "Who would benefit more from
the abolition of the hearsay rule, organization or underdog, is impossible to predict".752
Siegel's proposed best evidence hearsay rule has some elements that are comparable to
Chapter 2 of Criminal Justice Act 2003 (entitled Hearsay Evidence) and to some sections
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.P' He proposes six rules, which are compared below
to specific sections of Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Federal Rules of Evidence:
1) Except as otherwise provided, the live testimony of an in court witness is the
best evidence of the asserted content of such testimony. This is similar to
114(6) CJA 2003.
2) Hearsay is the "best evidence" when the declarant is physically unavailable,
as by reason of death, disability assertion of privilege or refusal to attend the
proceeding from beyond reach of process. This is comparable to 116( 1)(2)
CJA2003.
3) Hearsay is the best evidence when the identity of the declarant is unknown
and cannot be discovered through diligent inquiry. This branch of the rule
would allow a probative shout from the crowd to be admissible even if the
declarant cannot be identified. There does not appear to be a Chapter 2 CJA
7~ Roger Park, The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of Verdicts, A Response to Professor Nesson,
70 Minn. L. Rev. (1986).
nl RichardO. Lempert& Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Modem Approach to Evidence 523 (2nd ed.
1982).
m Michael Siegel, supra note 747, at 926.
m The Auld Report proposed a best evidence hearsay rule, recommending that hearsay be
admissible if the original source or best evidence is not available. See Review of the Criminal
Courts of England and Wales, supra note 16; see also Adrian Keane, supra note 674, at 282-283.
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2003 provision that is comparable, indeed the CJA requires the declarant to
be identifiable, no more applicable rule under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
4) Hearsay is the best evidence when the judge determines that the pertinent
asserted material will not be found in the memory of a reasonable number of
declarants. Again there is no comparable provision in Chapter 2 CJA 2003,
although Siegel asserts that this provision expands upon FRE 803(6) and is
comparable to Section 117 CJA 2003. Regarding business and other
documents, each requires a foundation as to reliability. This rule would
permit the admission, for example, of telephone books and collaborative
financial documents, if there is not anyone source available with a
meaningful recollection of the hearsay material.
5) Hearsay is the best evidence when it is an aggregate representation of the
judgment of a large number of anonymous individuals. The judge may
require an appropriate foundation witness. FRE 803 and 117 CJA 2003 are
comparable.
6) Hearsay is the best evidence when the judge cannot possibly expect that the
declarant will cooperate on the witness stand with the hearsay proponent
because the declarant is an opposing party or strongly identified with an
opposing party. This is comparable to 114-116 ofCJA 2003. The Federal
Rules of evidence have no comparable provision.
Siegel advocates intra-trial and post-proof judicial jury charges which would warn the
jury about the hidden dangers of hearsay, including a charge regarding the declarant's
motive when the declarant appears to contradict the hearsay. He also suggests a missing
witness charge to be utilized in those cases where the declarant's actual unavailability can
be credibly disputed.754
The application of such a rule makes sense if the comparator jurisdictions are to calibrate
jury proof to judge only trials and would provide a more rational scheme than the present
erosion of the hearsay rule in bench trials.755 The creation of such a scheme both in the
1s.4 Michael Siegel, supra note 747, at 939,940.
m KennethCulp Davis, Hearsay in Non-Jury Cases, 83 Harr. L. Rev. 1362, 1367-1368, citing
with approval the relaxation of evidentiary rules in bench trials. Builders Steel Co. v.
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U.S.A. and England and Wales would give the defendant the opportunity to be
reasonably certain before choosing the mode of trial that in choosing either a bench or
jury trial that hearsay problems would be given the same treatment. Many of the England
and Wales judges surveyed believed the Criminal Justice Act 2003 expansion of the
hearsay rule is not a factor in case outcomes and consequently unlikely to weigh in mode
of trial considerations. 756Of course, a central concern in the United States is that a bench
or jury trial rule change regarding hearsay satisfy the confrontation clause of the United
States Constitution.P" One commentator has noted that "any reform which eliminated
the exclusion of hearsay as a general premise and replaced it with a general rule of
admissibility would raise serious constitutional questions.,,758 At the same time the U.S.
Supreme Court has upheld a number of exceptions to the hearsay rule over the years.759
The court has not given judges carte blanche in bench trials, for example, reversing a
conviction where the judge in a bench trial relied on hearsay testimony as the sole basis
for proving one of the elements of a crime."?
As we will see later in this Chapter, Appellate Courts in America and England and Wales
give bench verdicts and judicial evidentiary rulings in bench trials wide berth. The
American trial judge in bench trials frequently does not rule on key evidentiary issues
Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1950); Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FK, 148 F2d 378 (2d Cir.)
cerro denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 349 (D.
Mass. 1950) later disposed of without reference to the Court's admission into evidence a large
number of hearsay documents in a civil bench anti trust trial, U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 110 F.Supp 295 (D. Mass 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)
7~ Author interviews with 9 judges ticketed to try serious frauds cases (March-April, 2007). See
Chapter 9, infra.
m u.S. Const. Amend. VI.
mNote: Erosion of the Hearsay Rule, 3 U. Rich. L. Rev. 89 (1969).
759 Id. at 150 n.20. .
761) Moore v. U.S., 429 U.S. 20 (1976).
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only to be given the appellate benefit of the doubt. Canadian common law appears to call
for articulated rulings on evidence but not necessarily until rendering the final
decision?" A best evidence hearsay rule in the U.S. and England and Wales coupled
with a requirement to rule and explain in bench trials would give those events in America
a more comparable standing with jury trials. In England and Wales, judge only trials on
indictment if adopted should include these requirements.
V. Previous Convictions, Conduct and Bad Character
A record of prior convictions casts a long shadow over the trial preparation process on
behalf of the accused in all of the comparator jurisdictions.
A defendant with a prior criminal record but a substantial defense may be more likely to
choose a judge-only trial based on logic as well as jury research conducted in Canada and
observation and research in other jurisdictions. 762 The hope would be a judge would be
more likely to put aside the prior history particularly in light of a sound defense.763 In
serious fraud and other cases in England and Wales, Canada, and the U.S.A., therefore,
761 R. v. Sheppard, [2002] S.C.C. 26, 1S.C.R. 869; R. v. Braich, [2002] S.C.C. 27, 1 S.C.R.903
(regarding important legal decisions made during a bench trial), see R. v. Chappell, [2003] 172
C.C.C. (3d) 539, 15C.R. (6th) 350 (Ont. C.A.).
762 A.N. Doob& H.M. Kirschenbaum,Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s.12 of the
Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused; 15Crim. L. Q. 88, 88 (1972), citing M.L. Friedland,
Comments-Commentaries, 47 Canadian Bar Rev. 656, 656-662 (1969), and H.L. Teed, The Effect
0/S.12 of the Canada Evidence Act upon the Accused, 13Crim. L. Q. 70-8 (1971); Valerie P.
Ilans & A.N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated
Juries, 18Crim. L. Q. 235, 251 (1975), (concluding that, "The present research leaves little doubt
that knowledgeof a previous conviction biases a case against the defendant."). Mike Redmayne,
The Relevance of Bad Character, 61 Cambrdg. LJ. 684 (2002); Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects
on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant's Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study,
FOOO] Crim L. R. 734.
6) Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,& Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 68
CornellL. Rev. 777 (2001).
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one might hypothesize that a defendant with such a history would find a bench trial
attractive for that reason alone. Several England and Wales judges interviewed offered
that CJA 2003 had sufficiently broadened the admissibility of the conduct of the accused
that a bench trial might be an attractive mode of trial choice because life style evidence
(high living) might prejudice the jury.764
Section 99 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 eliminated the long-standing England and
Wales rule that either prior bad acts and/or bad characteri" "is prima facie inadmissible
for the purpose of showing that he or she committed the offense charged". 766 While prior
convictions historically could be used to confront the testifying defendant, trial judges
retained discretion regarding the scope of such a cross-examination.i'" The CJA 2003
abolishes those common law rules,168 codifies a broad definition of bad character.?" and
creates seven ways in which the bad character evidence can be permissible, thereby
greatly expanding the common law.770 Relevant to admissibility under this statutory
704 Author interview with 9 England and Wales Judges ticketed to try serious frauds cases,
Chapter 9, infra.
71>5 Paul Roberts & Adrian Zuckerman, supra note 743, at 504, define character as "relatively
stable traits or dispositions".
7"" Runciman Royal Commission, supra note 659, at 125-126. Although a similar fact pattern in
a prior conviction created a "similar fact exception. A further exception is the Defendant
testifying to good character or impugning the character of other witnesses - in that event the prior
convictions are fair game for cross-examination.
7b1 R. v. Lawrence, [1995] Crim. L.R. 815 (C.A.).
761 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 99.
7t11 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 98.
710 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 101 a-b includes as factors party agreement, evidence
adduced by the Defendant himself in questioning a witness or by the Defendant himself, is
important explanatory evidence relevant to an important matter, has substantial probative value in
relation to an important matter, is evidence to correct a false impression given by the Defendant
or the Defendant made an attack on another person's character.
283
scheme is whether the explanatory evidence provides germane background information
or is "extraneous conduct".771
The change is a recent development and thus cannot be factored retrospectively regarding
outcomes. However, one must wonder how the English jury confronted with hearsay and
evidence of prior conduct will weigh these factors. As reported in the prior chapter,
several of the English judges interviewed thought that juries were frequently offended by
prosecution's reliance on past bad acts, and that such evidence had little impact on the
jury. but some research is to the contrary. That this type of evidence may not be as
persuasive or prejudicial as many believe is supported by Redmayne's analysis of Lloyd-
Bostock' s study.772 Rachlinski is not optimistic that judges would be unaffected by a
prior criminal record, pointing out that "judges, like everyone else, are susceptible to
'11' f i d ,,773 hI usIons 0 JU gment. Itmay be quite different for fraud defendants than ot er
defendants with a criminal record. Redmayne points out that Lloyd-Bostock reported
that 66% of her mock jurors believed at the outset the defendant had a criminal record.
lie further points out that white collar crime is virtually seen as non-crime by the system
and the public. 774 Thus we might infer the existence of a prior criminal record of a
serious fraud defendant could have significant prejudicial effect due to the surprise factor.
711 Paul Roberts & Adrian Zuckerman, supra note 743, 528-534.
m Mike Redmayne, The Relevance of Bad Character,61 Cambrdg. L.J. 684 (2002) at 698-710;
Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects of Jurors hearing About the Defendant's Criminal Record,
FOOO] Crim. L. R. 734.
n Jeffrey 1. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation, 79 Or. L.
Rev. 61,101 (2000). .
714 Mike Redmayne, The Relevance of Bad Character, supra note 772, at 698-699, 702.
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The American rule as summarized in virtually all jurisdictions, is that prior bad acts or
convictions are not admissible and thus, is quite different - the defendant may introduce
his/her evidence of good character, but in doing so places prior acts and convictions
squarely in issue:
"The prosecution may not prove the defendant's bad
character unless and until the defendant has introduced
evidence of his good character. People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y.
427,457, 14 N.E. 319,338-339. This is a rule based on
policy, not on logic, for obviously if the defendant's
character is relevant to prove his innocence, it is equally
relevant to prove his guilt. The very real danger of undue
prejudice, that the jury might give excessive weight to
evidence of the defendant's bad character, justifies the rule
prohibiting the prosecution from initially attacking the
defendant's character. People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192,
172 N.E. 466.,,775 .
The Federal Rules of Evidence follow the general concept that questioning regarding
character or prior bad acts is subject to a balancing test of whether or not the probative
value outweighs the prejudice.I" A comparable rule is in effect in California, with the
following applicable sections of the California Evidence Code reviewed by the California
Supreme Court:
"As a general rule, evidence that is otherwise admissible
may be introduced to prove a person's character or
character trait. But, except for purposes of impeachment,
such evidence is inadmissible when offered by the
opposing party to prove the defendant's conduct on a
specified occasion, unless it involves commission of a
crime, civil wrong or other act and is relevant to prove
some fact (e.g., motive, intent, plan, identity) other than a
m Jerome Prince,supra note 682, at 147. Another rare caveat that would permit the introduction
of other crimes is the defense of accident or mistake. Thus if the fraud alleged is defended on the
notion that it was a mistake or error, prior convictions would be fair game.
716 Fed. R. Evid. 609.1 Prior convictions are admissible within 10 years and may be admissible
after 10years if proper notice is given and the Court concludes probative value outweighs the
prejudice.
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disposition to commit such an act. Under section 1102,
defendants in criminal cases may introduce evidence of
their character or character traits to prove their conduct in
conformity therewith, and the prosecution may use similar
evidence to rebut that evidence.
In 1995, the Legislature enacted section 1108 to expand the
admissibility of disposition or propensity evidence in sex
offense cases. Subdivision (a) of that section provides in
pertinent part that "In a criminal action in which the
defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the
defendant's commission of another sexual offense or
offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the
evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352
[permitting court to exclude evidence on weighing
probative value and prejudicial impact]." The section also
provides for pretrial notice to defendant of the evidence to
be offered, disclaims any intent to limit admission of
evidence under other provisions, and defines the various
terms used in the provision. In 1996, the Legislature added
a similar provision to allow admission in domestic violence
case of evidence that the defendant committed other acts of
domestic violence. ,,777 '
Under the American rule, the introduction of evidence of the prior similar crime when
relevant to motive or to prove intent may be permitted and if it is a crime of dishonesty,
no balancing test is required under the Federal Rules of Evidence.l"
Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act provides that the criminal record of an accused
person who testifies in his own behalf can be the subject of cross examination and if
denied, entered into evidence. While the jury is instructed that "evidence of previous
convictions should be used to determine the credibility of the accused and not his guilt,
m People v. Falsetta, 21 Ca1.4th903, 911 (1999). The Court upheld the statute and the test.
Thus in California a prior conviction for sexual conduct may be introduced to show propensity in
the Court's discretion.
711 Jerome Prince,supra note 682, at 141-142. Fed. R. Evid. 609.1.
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the Section is nonetheless unfair to the accused,,779 because research indicates that
defendants' are more likely to be convicted when a prior conviction is disclosed and
multiple convictions result in an even higher percentage of convictions.i'"
Even more broadly, Section 12 permits a witness to be cross examined regarding
discreditable conduct.I" The court may limit the use of prior convictions subject to its
discretion when the prejudice outweighs the probative value.782
The Canadian Supreme Court attempted to clarify in R. v. Handy the admissibility of
similar facts but rather only succeeded in confusing the issue according to Redmayne.
The rule appears to be that specific propensities but not general propensities are
adrnissible.i'"
Because it is a widely held belief in all jurisdictions that jury knowledge of the prior
criminal record or prior similar acts of the defendants is devastating for the defendant, a
bench trial may be the more attractive mode of trial to defendants with prior records.784
Particularly under the newly adopted expansive rule in England and Wales, a defendant
719 A.N. Doob& H.M. Kershenbaum, supra note 762, at 88 citing M.L. Friedland, supra note 763
and H.L. Teed, supra note 763, at 70-8.
7110 Id ; Valerie P. Hans& Anthony V. Doob, supra note 762, at 251 (concluding that "The present
research leaves little doubt that knowledge of a previous conviction biases a case against the
defendant").
711 DavidM. Paciocco& Lee Stuesser, supra note 698, at 404.
712 R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670,64 C.R. (3d) 15 (S.C.C.).
m R. v. Handy (J.), [2002] S.C.C. 56; Mike Redmayne, Similar Facts, Familiar Obfuscation, 6
IntI.1. Evid. Proof243 (2002).
7114 Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant's Previous
Criminal Record: A Simulation Study, supra note 772 but cf. Mike Redmayne, The Relevance of
Bad Character, supra note 772.
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who seeks to testify and has a reasonable defense in a serious frauds case but has an
unsavory background might also find a bench trial attractive.
VI. The Right of Silence, The Privilege Against Self Incrimination, Confession
Evidence, and Inferences
"The privilege against self-incrimination is a venerable
common law institution whose roots stretch back at least as
far as the seventeenth century".785
It was the longstanding holding of the English common law that a party had a right to
silence free from inferences to be drawn from that silence.786
The right of silence was adroitly summarized as including the following:
1. A suspect is under no legal obligation to assist the police with their inquiries;
2. An accused is not obliged to give advance notice of his defense;
3. Having been cautioned by the police, it is wrong to make adverse comments
about the accused's silence, declination to answer questions, or failure to
reveal a defense;
4. An accused cannot be compelled to testify by the prosecutor;
5. If the accused does not testify, that fact is not subject to comment by the
prosecution;
6. If the judge comments on the accused's failure to testify so that a jury may
draw inferences, the judge must also charge the jury that they must not
assume the defendant's guilt from such a failure.787
mPaul Roberts& Adrean Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, 392 (Oxford 2004).
7" Smith v. Director of Serious Fraud Office, [1992] 3 All ER 456, 3 WLR 66. Likewise the
common law holds that citizens have no duty to cooperate with a police investigation. Rice v.
Connolly, [1966] 2 All E.R. 649, 2 Q.B. 414.
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The parameters or the dimensions of the right to silence have been the subject of great
debate in all of the comparator nations, but England and Wales, has arguably seen the
traditional boundaries modified if not narrowed. Despite a clear majority of the Roskill
Royal Commission concluding that a negative inference should not be drawn from
silence during a police station interrogation, Parliament modified the common law and
rejected the Royal Commission's recommendations, eroding these rights in the form of
Section 34-37 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 as well as Section 2 of
the Criminal Justice Act 1987. One leading commentator opined that "it was pragmatic
arguments pushed forward by the alliance of the police and the Home Secretary, that led
to the extraordinary spectacle of the Government rejecting one of the Royal
Commission's most carefully reasoned recommendations", that being its call to retain the
right to silence in its present form.788 These changes have made major inroads into
English protections against self-incrimination, with little succor being offered by the
European Court of Human Rights. The European Court held that a conviction solely
based on inferences drawn from silence is incompatible with the right to silence, by
717 Adrian Keane, The Modem Law of Evidence 432-433 (6th ed., Oxford University Press
2006). The above referenced points are substantially from Keane although somewhat reorganized
and expanded upon so that quotation marks are problematic. Keane asserts that rule 24 of the
Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 which requires the defendant to give "the prosecution a written
statement of the finding or opinion which he proposes to adduce" is a further curtailment of the
rifht to silence, but fails to fully explain why.
7_ Andrew Ashworth, The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study 100-101 (2nd ed., Oxford
University Press 1998); see Andrew Ashworth & Michael Redmayne, The Criminal Process 95-
99 (3rd ed., Oxford University Press 2005) for a discussion of the practical effects of that
legislation.
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implication also finding such inferences to be consistent with the Convention of Human
Rights, if accompanied by other proof and a proper direction to the jury by the judge_789
Section 2 Criminal Justice Act 1987 has specifically eroded the right of silence in
England and Wales in the investigation of Serious Frauds requiring that a citizen must
cooperate with a serious frauds investigation or face prosecution for "failure to
cooperate't.?" There are certain advantages for the cooperating citizen because although
it compels a party questioned in a serious frauds investigation to answer questions, it also
provides that the answers given cannot be used against that party in court unless they
later change their story. By contrast, the defendant may not be called as a witness in the
prosecution's case but in serious frauds investigations a putative defendant is compelled
under a cloak of protection to provide potentially useful information to what would be a
case against them.?"
The legislative alteration of the dynamic of silence in England and Wales may make a
bench trial an attractive alternative for a defendant with an inconsistent story, or who has
opted not to cooperate with an investigation. The defendant may be better able to explain
to a judge the divergence in his/her statements from the time of the investigation to the
actual trial, or to explain that silence during the investigation was selected on the advice
of counsel with less damage to the defendant's case before a judge than before a jury.
Moreover, the application of the rule has great potential for confusing a jury. The
mCondron v. United Kingdom, [2000] Eur. Ct. H.R. 35718/97, (2000) 31 EHRR 1; Beckles v.
United Kingdom, [2002] Eur. Ct. H.R. 44652/98, (2002) 36 EHRR 13.
".. Criminal Justice Act, 1987, c. 38, § 2.
19' Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999, c. 23, § 53 (4).
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apparent change of story may be far more nuanced than the prosecution would be
prepared to acknowledge, but a judge may be better suited to evaluate the significance of
the change of position. A judge as the trier of fact would be far more tolerant than a jury
of a failure to respond to police inquiries based on a solicitors' advice, though Section 34
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994 allows either a jury or magistrate to
draw inferences from an accused's failure to disclose any fact which he/she relies upon in
the subsequent defense of the case when questioned under a caution if the fact or facts
were reasonably to be expected to be mentioned. Likewise, Section 35 of the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act allows a jury or magistrate to "draw such inference as
appears proper from the failure of the accused to give evidence or his refusal, without
good cause, to answer any question."
While counsel may explain the failure, the jury may properly conclude there is no answer
that "would stand up in cross examination and may draw an adverse inference.,,792
Notwithstanding the Law Society's guidance in the 1990s that a suspect should respond
to questioning on a solicitor's advice only when sufficient information was given prior to
interrogation about the case, the Court of Appeal did not find that to be a basis for the
trial court to decline to instruct negatively regarding the inference, but did concede that
the jury or magistrate could be told the circumstances surrounding the exercise of the
m R. v. Cowan, [1996] Q.B. 373, 381, [1995] 4 All E.R. 939, [1996] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 1; see also,
Ashworth, The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study (2d Ed. Oxford U. Press 1998). at 101;
Ashworth & Redmayne, The Criminal Process (3d Ed. Oxford U. Press 2005) at 94-99.
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right of silence.793 Again a trial by judge may diminish the damage associated with these
provisions.
Section 36 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 allows adverse inferences
to be drawn for unexplained body marks on the suspect's body or for evidence in his
possession or in his proximity when arrested. Section 37 of that act allows an adverse
inference to be drawn for a failure by the defendant to explain his presence at a place at
or about when the crime was committed. Both statutes assume a proper police warning
prior to questioning.
The Criminal Procedure Rules issued by the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs
articulate an over-riding objective to which all participants and the Courts are subject. It
asserts respect for the presumption of innocence, the right to silence, and attorney-client
confidentiality. It does however require the defendant to indicate in advance what is
disputed.794
", R. v. Howell, [2003] Crim. L.R. 405; R. v. Knight, [2004] Crim. L.R. 449; R. v. Argent,
(1997) 2 Cr. App. Rep. 27; R. v. Roble, [1997] Crim. L.R. 449; Ashworth & Redmayne, supra
note 854, at 96-99.
1M Department for Constitutional Affairs, The Objectives and Content of the First Criminal
Procedure Rules, 3/22/05, Part I, available at
httr:l1www.justice.gov.uk/criminal/procrulesfin/index.htm (Oct. 4, 2007). "Part 1 of the new
Rules contains the overriding objective to which all participants and the courts themselves are
subject, It is this objective that is at the heart of the culture change that the Rules promote. The
presumption of innocence and a robust adversarial process are essential features of English legal
tradition and of the defendant's right to a fair trial. The overriding objective acknowledges those
rights. It must not be read as detracting from a defendant's right to silence or from the
confidentiality properly attaching to what passes between a lawyer and his client. Such rights in
any event are guaranteed by the Human Rights Act 1998 to which the Criminal Procedure Rules,
like other legislation, are subject. But it is no part of a fair trial that questions of guilt and
innocence should be determined by procedural maneuvers. On the contrary, fairness is best
served when the issues between the parties are identified as early and as clearly as possible. Lord
Justice Auld made this point in his Review. The right to silence does not justify a refusal to
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The rules demonstrate an intent to narrowly protect the right to silence and to require the
defendant to disclose much more pretrial about their defense than has traditionally been
required.
While the precise dynamic of these new rules is difficult to measure, they certainly will
provide juries with more expansive credibility issues to weigh. A valuable resource to
assist in evaluating the task of the jury with regard to the diminishing of the right of
silence and problems posed by the changes in the law is the judges' summing up to the
jury. The following was charged to the jury in a serious fraud case where the defendant's
police interview was part of the proof. One co-defendant, Archer Smith, ultimately
testified against her superior Woodhead, who was accused of managing the company that
committed the fraud. The following is the charge or summing up given by the judge to
the jury regarding Woodhead's interview:
• When interviewed on 26 July 2001 he made "no
comment" to the questions put to him. That was his right.
provide the court with such information as is necessary for the effective management of the case
and: "To the extent that the prosecution may legitimately wish to fill possible holes in its case
once issues have been identified ... , I can understand why, as a matter of tactics, a defendant
might prefer to keep his case close to his chest. But that is not a valid reason for preventing a full
and fair hearing on the issues canvassed at the trial. A criminal trial is not a game under which a
guillY defendant should be provided with a sporting chance. It is a search for truth in accordance
.. ilh the twin principles that the prosecution must prove its case and that a defendant is not
obliged 10 inculpate himself, the object being to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent.
Requiring a defendant to indicate in advance what he disputes about the prosecution case offends
neither of these principles. The Committee, too, was not persuaded that it is just for a party to
obstruct or delay the preparation of a case for trial in order to secure some perceived procedural
advantage. or to take unfair advantage of a mistake by someone else. If courts allow that to
happen it damages public confidence in criminal justice. The new rules make it clear that courts
must not allow it to happen."
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His failure/refusal to answer questions does not and cannot
provide any support for the prosecution case .
• He answered questions when interviewed on the 29th
April 2002 - H3 25 to 34. (Jury Bundle 4.) The subject
matter was primarily the Midland No.2 Account, the
cheques to cash drawn upon it and the suggestion that the
cash was handed to Mr. Woodhead by Melanie Archer-
Smith .
• You know from the content of the interview that he firmly
denied the allegations .
• Likewise, he was asked about the "Cargo" cheque stubs
and "Cargo" invoices referred to by Roy Kelk. He denied
being responsible for the writing on the cheque stubs or for
providing the invoices.
• He made some admission, principally that he was in
control of Midland Coating Company Ltd for a short period
viz till December 1999 or March 1998.
• You are entitled to, and should, look at the whole of the
interview in deciding where the truth lies. Bear in mind,
however, that his replies were not on oath, not made before
you and have not been tested before you.
9. LIES
.The Crown submits that the answers in interview contain
a proved lie.
• The alleged lie is the Defendant's assertion that he was
not in control throughout the businesses of Midland
Coating Company and Seal Point.
.It is for you to say on all the evidence whether you are or
are not sure that that was a deliberate lie. Ifnot, concern
yourselves no further. If you are, and if you are sure that
the lie relates to a material issue, ask yourselves why the lie
was told .
• Ifyou are sure that the Defendant lied because he knew
the truth would help convict him of the offence, you would
be entitled to regard that as support for the prosecution
case .
• On the other hand, if you thought there was or may be
some innocent explanation for the lie (though none has
been advanced) you would not so regard it.
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The jury must engage the weighing of an interview that is inconsistent with the
defendant's posture in court in this case. Given Woodhead's refusal to answer in the
initial interview, it is reasonable to assume that on advice of counsel he then submitted to
an interview on 29 April, 2002 to avoid the negative inference of non-responsiveness.
Instead he is confronted with the inconsistency of that statement as compared to the proof
at trial.
The charge or summing up given with regard to his co-defendant not only creates a
further comparison and contrast for the jury that would not have been present under the
prior law, but this situation poses an even greater problem because the codefendant
Archer-Smith testified against Woodhead.
The charge or summing up on that issue was as follows:
.These are to be looked at only when considering her case.
They have no relevance to your consideration of
Christopher Woodhead's case .
• The Defence make two points in relation to the interviews
( i ) that the Defendant was prepared throughout to provide
detailed answer to police questioning;
( ii) that the answers she gave are consistent with her
evidence at trial.
• You are entitled to take both those points into account in
assessing the Defendant's truthfulness.
THE DEFENDANT ARCHER-SMITH'S EVIDENCE
.The Defendant's evidence is entitled to the same fair
consideration as evidence from any other witness .
• Bear in mind that the businesses under scrutiny
terminated in September 1999. The Defendant herself
answered police questions fully and is not responsible for
the length of time between September 1999 and trial.
Make appropriate allowances for the fact that the
Defendant is giving evidence about events that took place a
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considerable time ago and that there is bound to be scope
for genuine forgetfulness and confusion .
• Evidence given from the witness box is given in the case
as a whole .
• You are, therefore, entitled to consider Archer-Smith's
evidence as part of the case against Christopher Woodhead
particularly on the question of who had the money. One
note of caution: A Defendant may have a motive (eg self-
preservation) when giving evidence to the disadvantage of
a co-Defendant. This is not to disparage her evidence. It is
to alert you be aware of and to consider the possible motive
referred to.
The co-defendant Archer Smith was consistent in both interview and in court. Woodhead
was not. This factor is entirely beyond the traditional weighing of testimony because the
right of silence would have afforded Woodhead not only protection from inconsistency, it
also would have protected him from contrasting that failure with the consistent testimony
of his co-defendant. Woodhead was convicted, Archer-Smith was acquitted.795
Consider the summing up to the jury in another case where the defendant, Ajvindcr Singh
gave two interviews and then remained silent in the third interview because of his
solicitor's advice: 796
10. Each Defendant was, after arrest, interviewed by the
police. The Defendants Gemma Eggleton and Manjit
elected to answer the questions. Ajvinder Singh answered
all questions in his first two interviews.
10.1 The interviews of any Defendant are to be looked at
and considered only when dealing with the case of that
Defendant. The replies he gives can be relied on by him as
evidence in his case.
"" R. v. MelanieArcher-Smith and Christopher Woodhead, unreported, the summing up provided
to the author by his Honor Shaun Spencer.
,_,.R. v. Ajvinder Singh, unreported, the summing up provided to the author by His Honor Shaun
Spencer.
296
10.2 The Defendant Ajvinder Singh elected to remain
silent in his third interview. That was his right. He had
been cautioned at the start of the interview. He had been
told that he did not have to say anything.
10.3. The Defendant Ajvinder Singh was also told, as part
of the caution that it may harm his defence if he did not
mention when questioned something later relied on in
court.
10.4 As part of his defence in court Ajvinder Singh has told
you that the Uppal cheque related to the intended purchase
by a man calling himself Uppal of a consignment of soft
drinks to be imported from Spain; further, that the 3 page
fax produced by him in his evidence was a genuine
document which came into being at the time of the
transaction.
10.5 None of the above facts now relied on by the
Defendant Ajvinder Singh were mentioned by him in
interview. "Why not?" says the prosecution, "if that really
is a truthful explanation".
10.6 The law is that in certain circumstances, failure to
mention facts may count against a Defendant. This is
because you could draw the conclusion that the reason for
the failure by the Defendant to mention the soft drinks
transaction and the fax was because it is a false explanation
and the fax is a concoction; further that the reason for
relying on a false explanation and/or a concoction is
because he is guilty of the conspiracy to defraud alleged in
count 1.
10.7 You may draw such a conclusion against Ajvinder
Singh only if you think it is the only fair and proper
conclusion to draw and you are satisfied about the
following:
.that Ajvinder Singh could reasonably have been
expected to mention in interview the facts he now relies on
.that apart from his failure to mention the facts, the
prosecution evidence is so strong that it clearly calls for an
answer from him.
10.8 If you draw such an adverse conclusion against
Ajvinder Singh you may use it as additional support for the
remainder of the prosecution case. Itwould not be right to
convict wholly or even mainly on the strength of such an
adverse conclusion.
10.9 Ajvinder Singh says that you should not draw such a
conclusion against him. He says that he has answered all
questions in the previous interviews. He has not been
believed; why else would the police have frozen his assets?
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He saw no point in giving an account which, on past
history, would not be accepted.
10.10 He also says that he had received advice from his
solicitor to remain silent. The prosecution do not accept
that he was given such advice. The Defence have not
called the solicitor to give evidence on the question.
10.11 If you accept that he was or may have been so
advised that is obviously an important consideration. It
does not, however, automatically prevent you from drawing
any conclusion from his silence. A person given legal
advice has the choice whether to accept it and act on it or
reject it and give his account (ifhe has one). The caution
incorporated a warning that any failure to mention facts
relied on at his trial might harm his defence.
10.12 Having considered the above matters decide whether
Ajvindcr Singh could reasonably have been expected to
mention in interview the facts he now relies on.
10.13 If you consider that he had, or may have had, an
answer to give but that the genuinely and reasonably relied
on the legal advice to remain silent, you should not hold his
silence against him. If you were sure that he remained
silent not because of his legal advice, but because he had
then no answer, or no satisfactory answer to give and
merely latched on to the advice as a convenient shield
behind which to hide, you would be entitled to draw an
adverse conclusion.
Again there is the interplay during the trial created by the statute, that would not
otherwise exist, which questions the defendant's truthfulness, i.e.: is there an
inconsistency in the statements and is the silence in the third interview based on a
solicitor's advice with the consequent negative inferences to be drawn by the jury? This
portion of the charge given in this case, created by Criminal Justice Act 2003, establishes
an entirely new discussion about the truthfulness of the defendant that the right of silence
as previously constituted would protect.
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American courts in the early 1990s moved in the opposite direction from those in
England and Wales, holding that once warned against self-incrimination, the suspect's
silence was "insolubly ambiguous," thus once warned the silence of the defendant post
warning would not bear adverse consequence or a penalty. 797 798 However, while the
fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was the basis of the defendant's right to not be
a witness against oneself, that right is limited to "testimony" and "communication" thus
lineups extraction of hair, blood and DNA are constitutionally permissible.I"
Because juries would likely have less legal sophistication, they may not have a judge's
ability to sort through the distinction between the protection of the right to silence, the
heeding of counsel's advice during an investigation, and the making of an admission.
While it is difficult to determine the specific course in England and Wales, the higher rate
WI Charles H. Whitebread, & Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure (3rd ed., Foundation
Press, Inc. 1993).
,.,. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 662 (1966). Holding that the defendant, or
putative defendant once a target had a right to be advised ofhis/her right to silence. Miranda
provoked a sea change in American policing and its application and interrelationship with the
fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Miranda and its progeny clarify a four component
protection against State compulsion: 1) compulsion; 2) incrimination, 3) testimonial evidence-
evidence that communicates something beyond the physical characteristics of a person, hislher
identity, or appearance, 4) personalized compulsion - a person compelled to testify against
another. See also. Charles H. Whitebread, Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure 3d Ed.,
~ra note 797.
Holt v. U.S., 218 U.S. 245,31 S. Ct. 2 (1910). Justice Holmes states "the prohibition of
compelling a man in criminal Court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition ofthe use of
physical and moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body
as evidence when it may be material"; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826
(1966) (must submit to extraction of blood); U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967)
(participate in a line up); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951 (1967); U.S. v. Mara.
410 U.S. 19,93 S. Ct. 774 (1973) (produce a handwriting exemplar); U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1,93 S. Ct. 764 (1973) (produce a voice exemplar).
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of convictions (86%) in frauds cases some say suggests that juries may have difficulty
making these distinctions.f'"
Therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that the inferences associated with the 1994
Act should enhance the conviction rate in England and Wales. Moreover, the inferences
contained in Sections 34, 35, and 37 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 would likely be
found to be unconstitutional if enacted in America as violating the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. Because of the Fourteenth Amendment, the jurisprudence of the
U.S. Supreme Court in this area is applicable to California and New York.sol
The Canadian approach is comparable to the American rule and holds that: "Adverse
inferences cannot generally be drawn against an accused person because of his pretrial
siIcnce" .802
Section 7 and Section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter exclude statements that violate the
right to silence, the most common being deprivation of counsel.r" The Canadian
lOO 6S I Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) (2003) 781-782, The Remarks of Baroness Kennedy of the
Shaws as quoted in Research Paper 06/57, House of Commons Library, The Frauds (Trials
Without a Jury) Bill2006-07; The Former Master of the Rolls, Lord Donaldson of Lyrnington
speculates that fraud cases were beyond the jury's capacity. "It is said that juries are wholly
suitable for such trials because the conviction rate is 86 percent. That figure frightens me. It is so
out of line with the rule of conviction for non-fraud cases that I wonder whether the serious fraud
squad is right in claiming. I do not doubt that it does - that it picks all the winners, and whether
the jury simply does not understand and comes to the conclusion in some cases that people would
not have been charged if they had not been guilty".
III 1 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV makes applicable to the States key constitutional protections,
including the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.
102 David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law Evidence (Irwin Law 2005) at 284.
It)) Id. at 286.
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Supreme Court has held, for example, that the right to silence has been violated by asking
the accused during cross examination why he had not given the same explanation to the
police,804or why a defendant accused with the crime of having fled the scene of an
accident did not tell the police he was fleeing a robbery, the excuse given at trial,805 or
that alibi evidence need not be given until counsel consulted and proper notice given.806
Ilowever, the door can be opened807and a co-defendant may cross examine an accused
about pre-trial silence.808
Canadian Courts have excluded other evidence obtained from a confession which was
deemed illegally obtained.809 Evidence of this type has included high profile murder
investigations where the confession has been procured inappropriately including the
denial of the right to counsel.i'" Some leading Canadian evidentiary commentators like
David Paciocco are critical of the exclusion of physical evidence that might be obtained
as the fruit of the illegally obtained confession based on the Supreme Court's
interpretation of 24(21) of the Criminal Code.811 In England and Wales, the police and
the Criminal Justice Act §76(4) allows the admission of evidence obtained from a
confession whol1y or partially excluded.
11M/d., citing R. v. Chambers, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1293.
1M ld., citing R. v. Cones, [2000] 143C.C.C. (3d) 355 (Ont. C.A.).
...,. R. v. Cleghorn, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 175.
1111 R. v. W (M.C.), [2002] 165C.C.C. (3d) 129,3 C.R.(6th) 64, ~ 78 (B.C.C.A.).
'(JIII R. v. Crawford, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 858,37 C.R. (4th) 197 (S.C.C) (Sub. Nom. R. v. Creighton);
see also DavidM. Paciocco& Lee Stuesser, supra note 699, at 289 n.117.
"" ConstitutionAct, 1867,Part I, eh. 11 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C. eh 11, schedule B (1982).
110 R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, 146D.L.R. (4th) 609; R. v. Burlingham, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
206, 124D.L.R. (4th) 7.
... R. v. Feeney,supra note 810; and R. v. Burlingham, supra note 810 are the main objects of
Paciocco's criticism in DavidM. Paciocco, Getting Away With Murder: The Canadian Criminal
Justice Systemeh, 6 (Toronto: Irwin Hall 1999); For a critical review see Don Stuart,A Review of
David M. Paciocco, Getting Away With Murder: The Canadian Criminal Justice System, 44
McGill L. J. 1049 (1999).
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The practical problem associated with the narrowing of the right to silence is that juries
are being asked to draw inferences but will be instructed by the judge to make those
inferences only when they find that the prosecutions case has been proved to the extent
that an answer by the defendant is required.812
John Jackson views the implications of the increased judicial role in assessing evidence
based on inferences to be drawn from the silence of the defendant to see if "there is
enough strength to find a conviction" and to guide juries on the risks of over-reliance on
this type of evidence:
"As judges are coming to admit more readily evidence
which carries a risk of being treated in a prejudicial way by
a jury, this is a timely warning but there is no guarantee, of
course, that a jury will heed a judge's direction. A better
guarantee of fairness may be to allow defendants to opt for
trial by a judge where they consider that evidence may not
be assessed fairly by a jury, as is the practice in a number
of common wealth jurisdictions. Defendants given a choice
of mode of trial could not thereafter complain that they had
been compelled to submit to an unreasoned judgment of
their peers.',s13
Itmust be particularly chilling for a defendant in a document intensive serious fraud
cases to be compelled to cooperate, find that there are facts that he/she has forgotten and,
therefore, not disclosed and confront a finding that he/she failed to comply with the
requirement of the Criminal Justice Act 1987, §7, 9 and 10, of cooperation with the
investigation and therefore:
112 R. v. Birchall, [1999] Crim. L. R. 311,313.
m John D. Jackson, The Impact of Human Rights on Judicial Decision Making, in, Sean Doran &
John D. Jackson, The Judicial Role In Criminal Proceedings 118-119 (Sean Doran & John D.
Jackson eds., Oxford: Hart 2000).
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" ... the judge or, with the leave of the judge, any other party
may make such comment as appears to the judge to be
appropriate, and the jury, or in the case of a trial without a
jury, the judge, may draw such inferences as appear
proper.t" 14
Whether the right to choose trial by judge, as Jackson suggests, is a sufficient safeguard
to protect against inferences that may be both unfairly drawn and devastating to the
defense of the case is an open question. Decisions by the European Court of Human
Rights suggest that inferences drawn from silence do not violate the rights of the
defendant so long as there is independent evidence of sufficient weight to allow
conviction.l" One is compelled to ask if such prejudicial inferences cannot stand alone,
how can their impact on a jury, which does not ultimately present a reasoned judgment,
be evaluated? And particularly in a complex documents case, should inferences be drawn
from variations of an explanation given to the police at the commencement of
investigation, when recollections will likely be refreshed by later disclosed documents?
Aren't these inferences encroachments upon the defendant's right to be fully confronted
with the charges and the evidence, to gauge whether there is sufficient evidence for the
State to meet its burden and to then determine if silence is an indicated defense? Doesn't
the creation of said inferences in fact a diminish the prosecution's burden of proof
because as long as there is some evidence, if the defendant fails to respond in a serious
fraud case or is inaccurate in response so that negative inferences can be drawn, that
failure may be the ultimate persuading fact to ajury of the defendant's guilt? In some
114Ad' Knan eane, supra note 674 at 435.
lIS 'Schenk v, Switzerland, [1988] Eur. Ct. H.R. 10862/84, (1991) 13 EHRR242; Doorson v.
Netherlands, [1996] Eur. Ct. H.R. 20524/92, (1996) 22 EHRR 330.
303
ways this also alters the judge's role even more from the description of Mirjan Damaska
that:
"The judge stands at the gate of the fact-finding citadel,
charted with determining whether information to be passed
on to the ultimate fact finder possesses a sufficient
cognitive potential to be admissible. But the
trustworthiness of the information's carrier is not his
business: that lies in the exclusive province of the revered
jury.,,816
Docs a judge in a weak case that has some evidence in support of the prosecution's claim
put the inferences to the jury knowing full well of the potential prejudice? Thus the
calculation may well be that the other proof standing alone may not convict and the
inferences alone cannot be used to convince, but cobbled together they may well meet the
European Court of Human Rights standard. Will a judge alone trying the case be less
inclined to rely upon the inferences than a jury? Of course given the restrictions on jury
research in England and Wales it will be impossible to evaluate, but clearly the erosion of
the right to silence has created new and perplexing problems for the defendant that a
choice of the mode of trial might mitigate by being able to select trial by judge in the
hope that judge by virtue of legal sophistication would be better able to understand the
defendant's dilemma.
VII. Pretrial Exclusionary Proceedings - Jury As Compared to Non-Jury Cases
All of the comparator jurisdictions agree that in a jury trial, it is important for the trial
judge is to vet the prejudicial or inadmissible evidence outside of the jury's presence.
Moreover, the prejudice potentially caused to a jury by the exposure to such information
116 Mirjan Damaska , Evidence Law Adrift (New Haven: Yale University Press 1997).
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is not regarded as prejudicial if presented to the judge for a ruling in a bench trial based
both on the belief that the judge's training will allow him/her to set the information aside
in decision making, and in part because the jury is the ultimate trier offact.817 Wasik
citing Doran and Jackson muses ... "why should we be so sanguine in assuming that
those who are trained in the law are exempt from this kind ofprejudice,,,sls referencing
by contrast the statutory prohibition that an England and Wales magistrate who
determines a defendants bail application and thus learned of the Defendant's prior
criminal record may not then try the defendant.l'" On other issues that arise regarding
bias or prejudice for magistrates or jurors, Wasik asserts that the Gough case holds that
the test for both is the real danger of bias being used.s20 Finally Wasik identifies voir dire
before magistrates on the admissibility of character evidence, confessions, and prior
misconduct as potentially prejudicing factors of these lay triers of law and fact,
recommending that these matters be heard and decided in open court before the
Magistrate's clerk alone to achieve prophylaxis against potential bias.s21
By contrast, the transformation of the legally trained judge into the trier of fact in bench
trials has not historically been accompanied by an increased effort to protect that judge
from prejudicial information. Doran and Jackson note that Diplock trial Judges adamantly
deny any relationship between knowledge of prejudicial inadmissible facts, and a
suppressed confession or a suppressed prior criminal record and conviction, asserting that
Il7ln Canada-David M. Paciocco& Lee Steusser, supra note 698, at 14; In the USA - Kenneth
CuJpDavis,Hearsay in Non-Jury Cases, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1368 (1970); In England and
Wales - Paul Roberts& Adrean Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence 450-451 (Oxford 2004).
IIIMartinWasik,Magistrates: Knowledge of Previous Convictions, [1996] Crim. L. R. 851.
119Magistrates'Courts Act, 1980, c. 43, § 42 (1); Bail Act, 1976, c. 63, sch. 1 (Eng.).
121) Martin Wasik, Id., at n.20; R v. Gough, [1993] AC 646, 2 WLR 883, 2 All E.R. 724, 737.
121 MartinWasik, Id., at 861-862.
305
said knowledge can be set aside when reaching a verdict. There are potential problems
posed by judicial knowledge of a prior criminal record:
"One judge thought that the ultimate proof of this was that
even though most Diplock defendants have records, many
are still acquitted:
'One can say that in 95% of cases where the
defendant has a previous record for a
reasonably similar case, the Defendant is
guilty but knowledge of that is not enough to
convict. ,,,822
Greer and White maintain that declining acquittal rates in Diplock trials were suggestive
of case hardening of the judges trying the cases.823
The outcome certainly is different when jurors have knowledge of prior convictions. The
london School of Economics Jury Project concluded that admission into evidence of
previous similar convictions increased the chance of verdict of conviction by jurors.824
There is a similar finding in Canada after a comparable study.825 A comparable study
does not seem to exist evaluating bench trial outcomes for legally trained judges in any of
the comparator jurisdictions. A weighing of the Diplock bench trial outcomes and the
demonstration of detrimental impact of prior convictions upon trial jurors suggests, that
m John Jackson& Sean Doran, Judge Without Jury: Diplock Trials in The Adversary System
244 (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press 1995).
an S.C. Greer& A. White, Abolishing the Diplock Courts: The Casefor Restoring Jury Trial to
ScheduledOffenses in Northern Ireland 22-23 (London: Cabden Trust 1986.
124 The LSEJury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence [1973] Crim. L. R. 208-23.
m A.N. Doob& H.M. Kirschenbaum,Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s.12 of the
Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused; 15 Crim. L. Q. 88, 88-96 (1972). See also, Valerie P.
Hans & A.N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated
Juries, 18 Crim. L. Q. 235, 235-53 (1975).
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the choice of bench trial as the mode of trial in serious frauds cases could be beneficial to
the defendant, based upon the identity of the trial judge.
In none of the comparator jurisdictions are there statutes or guidelines which require
judicial recusal in the event of prejudicial information coming to the attention of the
judicial trier of fact. The issue of recusal is left to the individual judge's discretion. As
we will see later in this chapter, trained trial judges are seen by Appellate Courts as able
to distinguish between the admissible and the inadmissible, and are presumed to be able
to lay prejudice aside. The survey of New York State judges reported in Chapter 8
establishes that there is real exposure to such potential prejudicial circumstances, a
conclusion that is also reached as a result of interviews with England and Wales judges in
Chapter 9.
VIII. Questioning and Trial Participation by Judge and Jury
A. Judicial Questioning During Trial
In 1978 at least one observer noted that the American trial judge "is emerging as a more
active participant at trial, rather than a neutral observer",826 maintaining that judges
should not question witnesses in either jury or non-jury trials except for "a few carefully
monitored questions by jurors".827 Some observers argue that a common law judge
tU. Stephen A. Saitzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 Va.
L. Rev. 1 (1978) .
• 17 Id. at 63. Saltzburg argues that judge's may overcome problems with passivity which an lead
to injustice by suggesting lines of questioning to counsel, presumably off the record or out of the
presence of the jury, or declare a mistrial where a lawyer is unprepared or unqualified". Id. at 62.
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morphs into a civil law judge in non-jury trials, becoming an intervening questioner who
can and with some frequency does modify the tone and substance of the tria1.828
lord Bingham of Cornhill explained the distinction with clarity:
"The common law judge, it is often said, unlike his
counterpart in a civil law system ... is not concerned with
establishing the truth of what did or did not happen on a
given occasion in the past, but merely with deciding, as
between adversaries, whether or not the party upon whom
the burden of proof lies has discharged it to the required
degree of probability. ,,829
In Air Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade, the Court of Appeal refined the judicial
role:
"The due administration of justice does not always depend
on eliciting the truth. It often depends on the burden of
proof.',s30
Lord Bingham further acknowledges however that the Court of Appeal in Jones v.
National Coal Board defined the objective of the English judge as being:
"Above all ... to find out the truth, and to do justice
according to the law ... at the end to make up his mind
where the truth lies!,,831
IIISean Doran, John D. Jackson, & Michael L. Siegel, Rethinking Adversariness ill Non-Jury
Criminal Tria/s, 23 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 18-22 (1999). The authors note problems associated with
such a morphing such as the rules for burden of proof are very different in the inquisitorial model,
there is little oral evidence in that model and the Judges do not "come cold to evidence. They are
expected to read and digest the dossier and are permitted to base their findings on it." Finally the
inquisitorial model judge has much more control over what proof is actually placed in evidence.
129 Lord Bingham of Com hill, The Business of Judging 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press
2000) .
• 10 Air Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade, (1983) 2 A.C. 394, 411, 1 All E.R. 910.
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This appears to be an exhortation for judicial activism during trials particularly during
bench trials where the judge as the trier of fact is engaging in analysis of testimony as the
case is presented. English judges and American judges acknowledge a much more active
role during bench trials than during jury trials. However, it does not appear that such
activism is a major factor in attorney/client mode of trial choices as demonstrated by the
survey conducted of New York judges and lawyers. Obviously caution should be
exercised by the trial judge, whether with a jury or judge alone, to maintain neutrality and
passivity.
(Then) Denning J argued for minimal judicial intervention stating:
"In the system of trial which we have evolved in this
country, the Judge sits to hear and determine issues raised
by the parties, not to conduct an investigation or
examination on behalf of society at large, ...
Let the advocates one after the other put the weights into
the scales ... but the judge at the end decides which way
the balance tilts. ,,832
While referencing civil trials, Lord Denning notes a principle applicable to both civil and
criminal trials:
"The judge's part in all of this is to hearken to the evidence,
only himself asking questions of the witnesses when it is
necessary to clear up any point overlooked or left obscure ..
,,833
UI Jones v. National Coal Board, [1959] 2 Q.B. 55,63-64 per Lord Denning citing Lord Patrick
Devlin, The Judge, 43 Mod. L. Rev. 595 (1980).
III Id. at 63.
I)) Id. at 64.
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While all of the foregoing contemplated the jury trial, why should the role of the judge be
any different in a bench trial? Can and should a judge, in pursuit of the truth, in the
common law adversarial system, take over the bench trial, or at least the questioning of
key witnesses in a solo effort to obtain the truth and to do justice? Certainly the Diplock
experience and the "slow plea" bench trials indicate that judges in those cases engage in
this conduct with some frequency. However, the outcomes of such trials are not
uniformly pro prosecution.l" Doran, Jackson and Siegel maintain that the judge should
not exceed the bounds of questioning imposed upon jurors. Avoidance of altering the
adversarial balance is nuanced in concept and potentially difficult to achieve in practice
in bench trials. Doran, et al acknowledge that there is an adverse consequence to judicial
reservation of questions to witnesses which is also problematic for the advocates and
their clients:
"Excessive pussiacty is equally debilitating (to excessive
intervention) to the fact finding process in bench trials. A
single fact finder is likely to begin to form an opinion of the
case before all of the evidence is in. If this view is not
communicated to the parties in any fashion, the loser may
be denied the opportunity to present a case most likely to
persuade the closing mind. The jury provides a natural
protection against this problem because it cannot, as a unit,
have an opinion of the case prior to deliberations", (Matter
in parenthesis added). ,,835
In a very recent case the Court of Appeal, Civil Division ordered a retrial where the
judge "arrogated himself to a quasi-inquisitorial role which ... is entirely at odds with the
au See John Jackson & Sean Doran,Miscarriages of Justice: The Role of the Court Appeal in
Northern Ireland, Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, Seventeenth Report, at 224-
225. A small sample showed Diplock Trials had a higher acquittal rate than jury trial; Stephen J.
Schulhofer,supra note 545, at 1087, "There is a 20% acquittal rate for "slow pleas".
m Jackson, Doran,& Siegel, supra note 672, at 29.
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adversarial system".836 The Appellate Court graphically describes and condemns judicial
interruption during the trial for questioning in an adversarial mode punctuated by judicial
rudeness.s37
In Re (R) Litigant in Person: Judicial Intervention, the Court was critical of judicial
interventions, characterizing a judge's relationship with witnesses as "the judge must be a
shepherd and not a wolf,.838 Moreover, the extreme circumstance of the Court directing
a guilty verdict was decried in R. v. Wang,839 suggesting rather that finding insufficient
evidence and thus directing a verdict of not guilty is a far more acceptable judicial
posture.
Therefore the ultimate test of excessive judicial intervention in England and Wales
appears to be adversariness:
" ... the presence of the jury in the criminal trial makes
judicial restraint all the more necessary. The
interventionist trial judge runs many risks: of revealing his
own view of the facts to the jury, who may accord that
view undue weight; of making counsel appear less able
both in the eyes of the jury and in the eyes of the defendant;
of giving the defendant the impression that the judge is
"against him"; and ultimately of engendering in the
defendant (and possibly the ~eneral public) a loss of faith in
the trial system as a whole". 40
116 Southwark London Borough Council v. Kofi-Adu, [2006] EWCA Civ. 281, ~148. Judicial
bias was defined in R. v. Gough, [1993] AC 646,2 WLR 883, 2 All E.R. 724, 737: as "The
Court should ask itself whether having regard to those circumstances there was a real danger of
bias .. in the sense that he (the Court) might have unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with
favor, or disfavor the case of the party to the issue under consideration by him".
IJ7 Southwark London Borough Counsel v, Kofi-Adu supra note 836, at ~148.
IIIRayner v, Davies, [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1880.
1)9Rv. Wang, (2005) 2 Cr. App. Rep. 8, 169 J.P. 224, (2005) Crim. L. R. 645.
WI Sean Doran, Descent to Averness, 139 New LJ. 1147 (1989) (citing a number of judicial
interventions in which the trial judge primarily vigorously questioned in a cross-examination
311
Offering an extreme, the American Federal Rules of Evidence authorize a United States
District Court judge on hislher own motion or upon the suggestion of the parties, to call
witnesses and to interrogate witnesses -- a right that exists in both judge and jury trials
and provide that the court may upon notice and recommendation from the parties appoint
experts in civil and criminal cases. This power does not preclude the parties from
selecting their own experts as Wen.841
In California for example the judge may control the mode of questioning of a witness and
comment on witness credibility;842 the judge has a duty to do justice by bringing out an
the facts relevant to a jury's functions,843 but it is misconduct and reversible error for the
judge to disparage, be discourteous or to create the impression that it is aligning itself
with a party.844A California Appellate Court reversed a drug sale conviction finding that
a trial judge asked questions at great length, emphasizing weaknesses in the defendant's
case, framing the questions in a disparaging adversarial and repetitious manner in such a
way that the questions reflected disbelief of the defendant's assertions and alignment of
the Court with the prosecution.t"
mode the defendant, usually interrupting his testimony during the case in chief, thereby
r:eventing the defendant from telling his version of the facts to the jury).
IFed. R. Evid. 614, 706.
:: People v. Calderon, 9 Cal. 4th 69, 75 (1994); People v. Fudge, 7 Cal. 4th 1075, 1108 (1994).
People v. Curlucci, 23 Ca1.3d 249, 255-256 (1979).
IoU People v. Carpenter, 15 Ca1.4th 312,212 (1997); People v. Fudge,supra note 842, at 1107;
People v. Clark, 3 Ca1.4th 41, 143 (1992).
MS People v. Santani, 80 Ca1.App.4th 1194, 1200-1207(2000}.
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The New York view is less expansive, permitting judicial questioning "only when
necessary to clarify confusing testimony or otherwise to facilitate the orderly and
expeditious process of the trial. ,,846 A New York Appellate Court reversed a trial judge
during a bench trial of a civil case who intra trial ordered the testimony by deposition of
new witnesses located out of the county, finding that the Court exceeded its authority and
abandoned impartiality.t'"
The prevailing attitude in the comparator jurisdictions regarding excessive judicial
intervention is captured in the following quote:
"Although you may be the smartest and wisest Judge
anywhere, when you are trying a case that you have to
decide you are dependent on the lawyers. It's very hard to
be better than the lawyers. So the whole thrust of your
pretrial and trial conduct in a case to be submitted to you is
to help the lawyers to do their thing so that your brilliance
and wisdom will be permitted to do justice. ,,848
An unspoken but likely concern of the England and Wales legal establishment is that
non-jury trials will ultimately become comparable to the civil system, referred to by
Darnaska as the continental criminal trial. That concern is likely because the organized
bar has arrived at the same conclusion as Damaska, "the common law jury trial presents
Wi MichaelM. Martin, Daniel 1. Capra, & Faust F. Rossi, New York Evidence Handbook 608-
109(Aspen 1997);see People v. Yu and Wai Tom, 53 N.Y.2d 44,56 (Ct. App. 1981) ('The trial
judge's role is neither that of automation nor advocate"); People v. Mendes, 3 N.Y.2d 120 (Ct.
App. 1957). Both cases stand for the notion that the trial judge should question in a jury trial with
caution, not express disbelief or partiality or opinion as to credibility.
... 7 Carroll v. Gammerman, 193A.D.2d 202,205-206 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1993).
.... StephenA. Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 Va.
L. Rev. 1,81 (1978), quoting Jointer, Non-Jury Trials, in Seminars for Newly Appointed United
States District Judges, 1973-75,305,309 (Federal Judicial Center ed. 1976).
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the prosecution with more evidentiary obstacles than does the continental criminal
tria1.'.849
Darnaska argues that the difference in fact finding methodology between the two
systems is such that the civil law system creates fewer legal impediments than the jury
trial. Thus, for the bench trial to be truly attractive as an alternative in the comparator
nations, uniformity in the application of the rules of evidence would seem essential, as
well as just.
The analysis may be even more complex as the movement toward non-jury trials reflects
a philosophical shift that is best evidenced by the work of Herbert Packer who articulated
the due process and crime control models of criminal justice systems.850
The government of England and Wales seems to seek a form of the crime control model
with its most recent proposals to limit the right to silence, diminish the hearsay rule and
enlarge the inferences that can be gleaned by jurors.8Si It is useful to examine this theory
of criminal process and to contrast it with the due process model identified by Packer and
analyzed by Damaska, because the analysis givens a potential philosophical context for
the present England and Wales debate and analogous roadmap going forward. The crime
control model favors efficiency, that is the system's capacity to apprehend, try, convict,
and dispose of a high proportion of criminal offenders whose offenses became known:
U9 Mirjan Darnaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models o/Criminal Procedure:
A Comparative Study, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 507, 554 (1973).
ISO Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 149 (Stanford, California: Stanford U.
Press 1968).
IH Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 98, 99; Criminal Justice & Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33,
n 34-37; Criminal Justice Act, 1987, c. 38, § 2.
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"The model, in order to operate successfully, must produce
a high rate of apprehension and conviction and must do so
in a context where the magnitudes being dealt with are very
large, and the resources for dealing with them are very
limited. There must then be a premium on speed and
finality. Speed, in turn, depends on informality and on
uniformity; finality depends on minimizing the occasions
for challenge. The process must not be cluttered with
ceremonious rituals that do not advance the progress of a
case. Facts can be established more quickly through
interrogation in a police station than through the formal
process of examination and cross-examination in a court; it
follows that extrajudicial processes should be preferred to
judicial processes, informal to formal operations.
Informality is not enough; there must also be uniformity.
Routine stereotyped procedures are essential if large
numbers are being handled. The model that will operate
successfully on these presuppositions must be an
administrative, almost a managerial, model. The image
that comes to mind is an assembly line or a conveyor belt
down which moves an endless stream of cases, never
stopping, carrying the cases to workers who stand at fixed
stations and who perform on each case as it comes by the
same small but essential operation that brings it one step
closer to being a finished product, or to exchange the
metaphor for the reality, a closed file.
The criminal process, on this model, is seen as a
screening process in which each successive stage -
prearrest investigation, arrest, post-arrest investigation,
preparation for trial, trial or entry of plea, conviction, and
disposition-involves a series of routinized operations
whose success sis gauged primarily by their tendency to
pass the case along to a successful conclusion.
Itmight be said of the Crime Control Model that, reduced
to its barest essentials and when operating at its most
successful pitch, it consists of two elements: (a) an
administrative fact finding process leading to exoneration
of the suspect, or to (b) the entry of a plea of guilty. ,,852
This is to be contrasted with the due process model, defined as follows:
m Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of The Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 10-11, 13
(1964-1965).
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"The combination of stigma and loss of liberty that is
embodied in the end result of the criminal process is
viewed as being the heaviest deprivation that government
can inflect on the individual. Furthermore, the processes
that culminate in these highly afflictive sanctions are in
themselves coercive, restricting, and demeaning. Power is
always subject to abuse, sometimes subtle, other times, as
in the criminal process, open and ugly. Precisely because
of its potency in subjecting the individual to the coercive
power of the state, the criminal process must, on this
model, be SUbjected to controls and safeguards that prevent
it from operating with maximal efficiency. According to
this ideology, maximal efficiency means maximal tyranny.
And, while no one would assert that minimal efficiency
means minimal tyranny, the proponents of the Due Process
model would accept with considerable equanimity a
substantial diminution in the efficiency with which the
criminal process operates in the interest of preventing
official oppression of the individual. ,,853
The due process model implements these values based on the notion of legal guilt versus
factual guilt. In short, factual proof must be presented in a "procedurally regular fashion
and by authorities acting within the competences duly allocated to them", consistent with
the rules designed to safeguard the integrity.f"
The concept of legal innocence, an extension of the presumption of innocence, is
expanded enormously when the criminal process is viewed as the appropriate forum for
correcting its own abuses".85S
Packer identified the two process models shortly after the United States Supreme Court
decided that there was a constitutional right to counsel in all criminal cases involving the
m Id. at 16.
IU Id.
m Id. at 17.
316
potential for jail and suppressing the confession of a suspect who is induced to confess by
an interrogation held even after requests to consult with counsel (and while counsel was
attempting to consult with the suspectj.f" He saw the American justice system at that
time also as far more consistent with the crime control model but the above referenced
U.S. Supreme Court decisions as moving toward the due process model.
Damaska views the crime control model as favoring administratively adjudicated
outcomes while the due process model favors judicial (trial) fact finding.8s7 Damaska
maintains that the ultimate preference for judicial fact finding in the due process model
is not that the judicial fact finding process "emanates from the cluster of ideas revolving
around the primacy of the individual ... ,,858 Rather Damaska views the rival models of
trial procedure, civil and common law, as having "the core of opposition seem(s) to lie in
alternative ways of conceiving the adjucators role: judicial passivity (the umpire) is
juxtaposed with judicial activity (a researcher pursuing the actual facts ).',859
The concern in England and Wales therefore must be that this is an attempt to modify the
judicial role and that the trial judge will become more the researcher as in Diplock trials
than the passive umpire.86o It is difficult to draw any other conclusion given the sense of
urgency on the part of the government with no actual crisis at hand. The House of Lords
debates preceding the adoption of Criminal Justice Act 2003 demonstrated per Lord
.,. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
'~1M" Drrjan amaska, supra note 850, at 575 .
•~.M" D. irjan amaska, supra note 850, at 576.
'~M" D kirjan am as a, supra note 850, at 571.
IWJ John Jackson& Sean Doran, supra note 834, at 130-63; Sean Doran, John D. Jackson, &
Michael L. Siegel supra note 672, at 39-40.
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Thomas of Gresford that the conviction rate in all frauds trials is between 83-87% of
those tried substantially "higher than the percentage of those convicted in all other
trials".861While the overall outcome achieved by the Serious Frauds Office is
substantially less, there is no indication that the diminished verdict success rate for the
prosecution is any way attributable to jury malfunction.862 The leading anecdotal
example offered by the government as proof of jury failure is the so-called Jubilee Line
cases which resulted in a collapsed trial after over one year from the commencement of
the trial, the Inspector General totally exonerated the jury from any responsibility for that
misadventure, instead attributing the failure to bring the case to a verdict of any type,
much less a conviction was a series of tactical failures on the part of the prosecution, a
lack of management and control of the case by the Court, and a convergence of the poor
health of the defendant and a juror, as well just plain bad luck.863
"This outcome was not a systemic failure of the criminal
justice system or the nature of jury trial.',s64
"No responsibility for the inconclusive outcome of the
case can properly be attributed to the capability or conduct
of the jury. Overall, they discharged their duties in a
thorough and conscientious manner, and the fact that the
trial became unmanageable was not their responsibility.Y'"
161651 ParI.Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) (2003) 776, see also 651 ParI. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (2003) 779-
780 (BaronessKennedyof the Shaws).
162 SeriousFraudOffice, Annual Reports 2004-2005, available at
bttp:/lwww.sfo.gov.uklpublications/annual report.asp (reports a 57% conviction rate for that one
t.~a~!~hen Wooler, Revie~ of the Investigation and Criminal Proceedings Relating to the Jubilee
line Case, at 2, June 27,2006 (HMCPS1), available at
hItP:llwww.hmcpsi.gov.uklreports/JubileeLineReponIY.Pdf·
...".Id.at 2.
.. , Id. at 6.
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The inescapable conclusion that must be drawn is that the present England and Wales
government views the trial judge who becomes the trier of fact in serious frauds cases as
moving closer to the continental model of judge, and comparable in activism to the role
of the judge in the current England and Wales Civil System. Both the New York State
survey and the England and Wales interviews establish that judicial interrogations in
bench trials are far more prevalent than in jury trials. Chapter 8 and 9 will further
evaluate the significance of this pattern of behaviour.
B. Juror Questioning During Trial
Permitting jurors to question was perceived by judges in one study as a "benefit-reducing
complexity - from one practice - allowing jurors to submit written questions - that
reduced their perceptions of evidentiary (but not overall case) complexity".866 This
study concluded that longer trials were also perceived as complex by the survey of
judges, lawyers and jurors, but theorizes that perhaps this is because complicated cases
take more time to try. 867
One survey suggests that the practice of permitting jurors to submit questions to
witnesses is not uncommon and is utilized in a number of American jurisdictions, with
variations regarding the method of administration of the questions.v"
166 Michael Heise, Criminal Case Complexity: An Empirical Perspective, 1 J. Empirical Legal
Studies 331,365 (2004).
101 Id. at 361.
W Thomas Lundy, Jury Instruction Corner: Propriety of Permitting Jurors to Submit Questions
for Witnesses: Instructional Safeguards to Consider If Juror Authored Questions are Allowed, 26
Champion48 (2002). .
.319
I. The New York State Rule
New York State allows jurors to ask clarification questions, although the procedure has
historically rarely been used and is regarded as experimental but is recently favored by
the Chief Judge of the State.869 Moreover, a New York State study found that while 8%
of judges looking at the same trial as jurors found the trial to be complex, nearly 50% of
the jurors found the same trials to be complex.V" The conclusion of New York State's
Chief Judge is that jury questioning for clarification should be encouraged, particularly in
complex trials, because it will help keep juror attention and provide a mechanism to
reduce complexity.
2. The Federal Rule
Every United States Circuit Court of Appeals which has considered the practice of jury
questioning has permitted it based on the reasoning that the decision to permit jury
questioning is in the discretion of the trial judge.871 But jury questioning is not warmly
received by the United States Federal Circuit Courts. While one Circuit has overturned a
verdict based on extensive jury questioning in a non complex case872, and while all
Circuits discourage jury questioning, the procedure uniformly recommended is the
.".,N.Y.Office of Court Admin., Jury Trial Innovations in New York State: A Practical Guide
for Trial Judges 4-5 (2005). The jury may submit questions to the Court who issues on the
record rulings on the questions after permitting objections by counsel presumably out of the
presenceof the jury. The project monitored jury questions in 74 trials. Jury questions averaged
4.7 questions per criminal trial, added 15minutes to the trial. 157 criminal trial questions
submitted to the jury 25 questions objected to and 2 of those proposed were sustained as
objectionable.
'70 Id.
"1 U.S.v. Collins, 226 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1999);U.S. v. Feinberg, 89 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1999);
U.S. v. Hernandez, 176 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1999);U.S. v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1999);U.S.
v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1993);U.S. v. Greene, 998 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1993);U.S. v.
Polowichak,783 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1986);U.S. v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1979).
,72 U.S. v. Bush, supra note 871.
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submission of questions by jurors in a non-deliberative mode (they do not collaborate in
preparing the question) because a main risk of jury questioning is premature deliberation
coupled with a loss of jury neutrality.873
3. The California Rule
California does not have a formal rule regarding permitting jurors to question witnesses.
However, the custom and practice permits juror questions. 874 California Courts hold
that it is preferable that the trial judge rather than the jurors pose the questions in some
instances, however a trial court allowing the prosecutor to pose juror questions would not
be reversible error.87S Indeed an approved method in California is to permit the jurors to
submit questions to the judge when a witness has completed testimony, the judge reviews
the questions and takes objections from counsel and then permits the attorney who called
the witness to ask the question.i"
4. The Canadian Rule
There are no limitations on juror questioning during the trial, although it is rare, and
many judges do not permit it.877
11) Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 83-89 pocket part (5th ed., West Group
Publishing2005) .
.,. Author interview with Judge Peter Lichtman of Superior Court, Los Angeles County
(December, 2005); People v. Anderson, 52 Cal.2d 453,481 (1990).
u, People v. Majors, 18 Ca1.4th 385 (1998) (reasoning that the witness to whom the juror
questions were propounded was primarily questioned by the prosecution.
176 People v. Cummings, 4 Ca1.4th 1233, 1305 (1993).
an Law Reform Commission, Working Paper ch. 2 at 118-119 (Canada: Law Reform
Commission), cited in, Jury Service in Victoria eh, 2, available at
b.ttp:llwww.parliament.vic.gov.au/lawreformljury/default.htm.
321
The recommended procedure in Canada and specifically in Quebec is for the jurors after
counsel have questioned, to write down any questions and submit the same through the
Sheriff who perfumes a bailiff function to the judge with the judge ultimately deciding
whether or not to ask the question.s78 Jury questions during deliberations are answered in
a procedure set forth in the Jurors' handbook, which requires a comprehensive and
accurate response.V" The Model Jury Instructions published by the Canadian Judicial
Council set forth the procedure as follows:
"[ 1] It is not the role of jurors to conduct the trial. It is
your duty to consider the evidence that is presented, not to
decide what questions the witnesses should be asked or
how to ask them.
[2] Sometimes you might wish to ask a witness questions.
It is usually best to listen to the rest of the witness's
testimony in case you question is answered later. Itmay
even be answered by another witness. This is why it is
generally best simply to be patient and listen closely to all
the evidence.
[3] However, if there is an important point that you believe
needs to be clarified, put up your hand to indicate that you
have a question. Please hand you question to me in
writing. After I have read the question, I will decide what
to do. Imay need to ask you to go to the jury room while I
discuss the question with the lawyers.
Footnote 6: This instruction is optional. It should only be
given when the judge decides to permit jurors to ask
questions and to tell them that they may do so.'.8S0
Ir81d.
=u.
1110 Canadian Judicial Council, Model Jury Instructions (2004), available at http://www.cjc-
cern .gc.calarticle.asp?id=2337.
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S. The England & Wales Rule
While jurors in England and Wales are permitted to ask questions, juries are rarely told
they have this right and the exercise of the right is limited.881 It is a right that has existed
at common law in England and Wales and the United States, but has been in some
disuse.882
As noted above, New York State appears to be a leading jurisdiction in concluding that
juror questioning is desirable and that such questions can playa significant role in
permitting jurors to better understand complex cases. Labeled "Jury Trial Innovations in
New York State Enhancing The Trial Process for All Participants", a committee
appointed by the Chief Judge published a manual outlining several proposed
methodologies for juror questioning, setting forth the results of an extensive study. This
notion is resisted by England and Wales and the U.S. Federal Courts, while Canada and
California permit juror questioning but have not taken a formalistic or highly supportive
approach to the conccpt.f"
1111 Viscount Runciman,The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (HMSO 1993) at 134:
"Some Judges, according to the Crown Court Study, are doubtful about the wisdom of
encouragingjurors to ask questions, but are normally reluctant to do so (46% of the jurors said
that they had wanted to ask a question during the trial but only 8% had actually done so)".
1112 Shari SeidmanDiamond,Juror Questions At Trial- In Principle and In Fact, 78 N.Y. St.
B.A. J. 22 (Oct. 2006); see also U.S. v. Bush, supra note 872, at 515.
Ill) N.Y. Office of Court Admin., Jury Trial Innovations in New York State: A Practical Guide
For Trial Judges 4-5 (2005) ("Jurors did not go on fishing expeditions. In civil trials an average
of2-S questions were asked. In criminal trials an average of 4.7 questions were asked.") And the
study found that "jurors rarely asked improper questions."
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IX. Comparing Appellate Review Between Judge Only and Jury Trials.
All comparator jurisdictions apparently accord judge only trials much wider latitude on
evidentiary issues, if not all matters of trial conduct. Appellate Courts are more likely to
overturn a jury verdict than a bench trial verdict.884
Jackson and Doran found only one Diplock case where the Court of Appeal quashed a
defendant's conviction based on excessive judicial intervention.t'" An analysis of the
Diplock Courts in the 1990s concluded that the posture by the Northern Ireland Court of
Appeal "has been a wariness of intruding upon the area of the judge's fact-finding
responsibility".886 However in England and Wales, Courts have periodically reversed
convictions and articulated the need for judges to be balanced and minimalist in their
interventions.i'"
In R. v. Leggett, Farmer and Hircock888 the Appellate Court upheld as safe a verdict of
conviction after the judge had said "Oh, God" and had sighed and groaned during defense
114 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation, 79 Or. L.
Rev. 61,100 (2000), citing Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appealfrom Jury or
Judge Trial: Defendants Advantage, 3 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 125 (2001).
us John Jackson & Sean Doran, supra note 593, at 104, 105, citing R. v. Thompson, [1977] NI
74,83, (the authors argue that the Court primarily objected not to the Court's invasive
questioning, but rather that the court appeared to have its mind made up.").
U6 Scan Doran, John D. Jackson, & Michael L. Siegel, supra note 672, at 49, citing John D.
Jackson & Sean Doran, Miscarriages of Justice: The Role of the Court Appeal in Northern
Ireland, Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, Seventeenth Report, 275-80, n. 205
(1992).
1117 Jones v. National Coal Board, [1959] 2 Q.B. 55, 63-64 (holding that judicial questioning so
invaded the trial that new trial was required), citing as precedent Ex Parte Lloyd, [1822] Mont.
70, n.8; Yuill v. Yuill, [1945] P. 15,20,61 T.L.R. 176, 1 All E.R. 183 (stating that if a Judge
conducts the examination of a witness "he, so to speak, descends into the arena and is liable to
have his vision clouded by the dust of conflict.").
au R. v. Leggett, Farmer and Hircock, (1968) 53 Cr. App. Rep. 51.
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counsel's closing speech. The Court reasoned that the trial judge's exclamation had not
prohibited the content of defendant's counsel's speech.889
The Appellate notion that judges do not require the same scrutiny in terms of fact finding
where inadmissible evidence is heard by the judge should be in some dispute based on
the results of a recent detailed study suggesting the need for a more careful analysis of
judicial decision making:
"On balance, then, our results suggest that those clamoring
for a judge to replace juries should proceed with caution.
Judges are likely to make better decisions in certain
circumstances because their training and experience will
enable them to avoid the more pernicious effects of such
cognitive decision-making phenomena as the
representativeness heuristic. On the other hand, group
decision making or the insulation afforded by a judicial
gatekeeper may enable juries to make better decisions than
judges in other circumstances. ,,890
This study finds that judges are influenced by four cognitive illusions which also effect
jurors and others: anchoring (making estimates based on irrelevant starting points),
framing (treating economically equivalent gains and losses differently), hindsight bias
(perceiving past events to have been more predictable than they actually were), and the
representativeness heuristic (ignoring important background statistical information in
favor of individual information) .
• 119 .
See John Jackson & Sean Doran, supra note 573, at 106.
•90 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wist rich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 68
Cornell L. Rev. 777 (2001). Heuristics according to Psychologists are mental shortcuts humans
rely upon to make complex decisions.
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Rachlinski also found that judges confused "consistent with" and "probative'Y"
Rachlinski found that although it is possible that "Judges make better decisions than
juries, there is little evidence to support this".892 He concludes based on his own work
and those of others that judges are susceptible to hindsight bias and specifically cognitive
illusions such as framing effects, egocentric biases, hindsight bias, and as mentioned
above, a misapplication of the representative heuristic.893
American Appellate review of non-jury trials is quite different from jury trials in that the
trial judge's fact finding is presumed to follow the evidence rules - even when
inadmissible proof is presented at the bench trial. In fact, it is general practice in bench
trials for judges to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence "for what it is worth",894
however it has been observed that "the failure to rule becomes a convenient means
available to the judge for avoiding error. But it means, of course, that the criminal
defendant does not truly receive the benefit of the evidentiary protection'Y"
191 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation, 79 Or. L.
Rev. 61 (2000). He defines the representativeness heuristic as follows at 82: " ... people make
categorical judgments primarily by assessing the degree to which the event resembles the
category. When the event is similar to the category, people judge the likelihood that the event is a
member of that category as high; when the event is not similar to the category, people judge the
likelihood that the event is a member of that category as low. Psychologists refer to this decision-
making strategy as the representativeness heuristic."
IY2 Id. at 100.
19) Id. at 101.
IN Charles T. McCormick, McCormick On Evidence § 60 (5th ed. John W. Strong ed., 2004) .
• 9J Sean Doran, John D. Jackson, & Michael L. Siegel, supra note 672, at 30. Certain
commentators have criticized this practice as particularly unfair to the Defendant in the context of
American Appellate Courts generally according the trial judge in a bench trial the presumption of
having discounted improper evidence. Id. at 31, also citing Note: Improper Evidence in Non-Jury
Trials: Basis/or Reversal?, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 407, n.128 (1965).
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for example, some New York State Appellate Courts have held that the judge in a bench
trial is presumed to have considered only the competent evidence in reaching a
determination despite the absence of a ruling on proffered inadmissible evidence.896
Thus palpably inadmissible questions about the accused's pretrial silence when
questioned or about a prior bad act897 or improper questions about prior traffic infractions
because they are in the context of a bench trial are regarded on appeal as harmless
error.898 At least some Appellate Courts have not viewed this as automatic and have
based their affirmance of a bench verdict, for example, where erroneous evidence was
allowed, on the trial court's affirmative representation that it would not consider the
erroneous evidence.F"
However other courts have upheld the presumption in the wake of no such representation
and in the absence of a showing of prejudice, reasoning that the judge must have
considered only the competent evidence at trial in reaching the verdict.90o In a bench
trial. the judge's factual findings are accorded great deference, as the findings resolve
issues of credibility.Y'
In United Sates Federal District Courts, a comparable body of decisional law holds that
where a judge improperly over objection admits evidence, the same is disregarded if the
196 People v, Majeed, 204 A.D.2d 986 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dept. 1994); see also, People v, Dazi,
195 A.D.2d 571, 600 N.Y.S.2d 276 (N.Y. App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1993).
191 People v, Torres, 249 A.D.2d 229, 673 N.Y.S.2d 72 (N.Y. App. Div, 1st Dept. 1998).
191 People v, Taylor, 135 A.D.2d 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1988).
199 People v. McIlwain, 188 A.D.2d 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1992).
900 People v, Sims, 127 A.D.2d 805 (N.Y. App. Div, 2d Dept. 1987).
901 People v, Van Akin, 197 A.D.2d 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dept. 1993); People v, Balacky, 203
A.D.2d 471 (N.Y. App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1994).
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court upon review of the record finds that competent evidence supports the result.902 The
reasoning is that "The judge will be presumed to have disregarded the inadmissible and
relied on the competent evidence'V'" A later edition of McCormick on Evidence
explains how the appellate jurisprudence regarding non-jury trials has caused conflicting
customs and practices:
"However, where the admissibility of evidence is
debatable, the Appellate Court's contrasting attitudes
toward errors in receiving and excluding evidence account
for the emergence of the practice adopted by many
experienced trial judges cases; that practice is to
provisionally admit all arguably admissible evidence, even
if objected to with the announcement that all the
admissibility questions are reserved until all the evidence is
in. In considering any objections renewed by motion to
strike at the end of the case, the Judge leans toward
admission rather than exclusion but seeks to find clearly
admissible testimony on which to base his findings of fact.
The practice lessens the time spent in organizing objections
and helps ensure that appellate courts have in the record the
evidence that was rejected as well as that which was
received."
An obvious problem with this scenario is that it is a virtual deception which fails to give
the Appellate reviewers a clear indication as to what weight the court may actually give
either the inadmissible evidence received or the admissible evidence wrongly dismissed
as received for what its worth and ignored. In a jury trial, evidence is either received or it
is not. In a bench trial, it is received more likely than not, but its significance to the trier
of fact is veiled in the disguise of "for what its worth."
91)2 Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., Inc., 656 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1981).
91») Edward W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 60 (2d ed. 1972).
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Without a clear cut requirement that the evidentiary rules be applied equally between
bench and jury trial, a Defendant would properly be concerned that judicial abuses during
bench trials will not receive adequate appellate review.
X. Conclusion
While the jury trial remains a healthy institution, it is the ongoing subject of critical
review. There also remains a natural distrust, particularly in America and England and
Wales, of the bench trial. It is a small wonder there remains a raging dispute between
advocates the two modes of trial, given the disparate applications of the rules of evidence,
different judicial conduct, and the disparate wide berth granted by Appellate Courts to
bench decisions.
Complex trials tried before ajudge are likely more efficient in terms of time expended.
A judge is likely better equipped to sort through complex or prejudicial proof, but not
always. In the common law system the prosecution gets to frame the case before
indictment with little input from the defendant. If there is a right to a jury trial, as in
America, it is the defendant's right. The conclusion that the defendant should be allowed
to choose the mode of trial, forming hislher own judgments to which mode will offer a
better understanding of the facts in the case is more readily reached based on this review
of the rules of evidence. The next two chapters will demonstrate that U.S. judges and
lawyers and English judges find that the rules of evidence change in bench trials. Given
that those rules include the potential exclusion of relevant evidence, the application of
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inferences and other substantive evidentiary rules like hearsay, the mode of trial debate in
England and Wales raises issues regarding the application of evidence that could
profoundly impact on whether or not a human rights/civil rights model remains the
overriding objective of the English court system.
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CHAPTER8
A SURVEY OF NEW YORK JUDGES AND LAWYERS TO:
1)DETERMINE THE REASONS FOR MODE OF TRIAL CHOICES, 2)
CO~IPARE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR IN BENCH AND JURY TRIALS, AND 3)
COMPARE THE APPLCIATION OF KEY EVIDENTIARY RULES IN BOTH
MODES OF TRIAL
I. Introduction
As Chapter 6 notes, freedom on the part of the defendant to choose the mode of trial has
been the subject of either debate or legislation in the comparator jurisdictions. New York
State offers the defendant clear control over the mode of trial choices in criminal cases.
But as Chapter 6 demonstrates the mode of trial choice most frequently selected is the
jury trial, not the bench trial, and that is particularly true of corporate defendants, which
generally have the more complex charges against them and which might be expected to
opt for a judge only trial for that reason among others. Moreover concern is expressed
that in the comparator jurisdictions that the quality of bench trials is diminished as
compared to jury trials. Chapter 7 outlined the contentions that judges are invasive in
their questioning in bench trials and that the rules of evidence are unevenly applied when
comparing bench trials to jury trials. Moreover, chapter 7 detailed the widely held belief
in all of the comparator nations that while bench trials are more efficient (brief) than jury
trials, pretrial proceedings in bench trials may prejudice the judge and the very efficiency
of a bench trial may be achieved to the prejudice of the defendant.
331
Scrutiny of the jury trial showed an overarching concern, examined in chapters two
through four, that juries may not be up to the task of deciding complex cases. There is a
lingering question as to whether or not new inclusive rules regarding the composition of
the jury pool creates unfairness to the litigants and that a retooling of the rules of
evidence may be in order.
This chapter will analyze two surveys, one of New York State judges and the second of
selected New York State lawyers on the main issues covered in prior chapters. Chapter
nine will engage in an analysis of comparable issues based on interviews with nine
England and Wales judges certified to try serious fraud cases.
Two parallel surveys were conducted in New York State. One surveyed all of the full-
time New York State trial judges who are authorized to conduct both bench and jury
trials. (Annex A) The attorney survey was administered to the New York State
members of the American College of Trial Lawyers, the group of American lawyers who
most frequently try complex cases (Annex B). The compiled statistical results of the
survey are attached as well (Annex C).
It was the objective of each survey to ascertain the basis for mode of trial choices in New
York State, to evaluate and compare the application of procedural rules and rules of
evidence in each mode of trial, to determine attorney/judge agreement with outcomes and
to examine discrete issues relevant to judge and jury trials. Civil cases were deemed
relevant to the study of mode of trial decision making because in New York State civil
332
cases are usually tried by jury and generally of sufficient complexity, particularly in the
tort field, to require expert testimony. Moreover, while the standard of proof is different
in civil trials as compared to criminal trials (predominance of the evidence as compared
to beyond a reasonable doubt) the rules of evidence are otherwise virtually the same. As
discussed in detail in previous chapters, in New York State the choice of mode of trial is
exclusively made by the defendant in criminal cases, subject to limited judicial approval,
but in civil cases the parties elect the mode of trial by either agreeing to a bench trial or if
one party selects a jury trial, that demand is controlling.i" Because the bench trial is
utilized in nineteen percent of New York State criminal cases, both judges and lawyers
were asked about factors that are considered in choosing that mode of trial.
The survey also sought to examine if the role of the trial judge, including behaviour,
changes in judge only trials. As has been noted in previous chapters, Doran, Jackson and
Siegel and others have argued that both a lack of adversariness and excessive judicial
intervention can occur in judge only trials which may adversely impact upon the fairness
of the trial. The judges and attorneys were asked detailed questions about judicial conduct
in pretrial case management and/or settlement type proceedings. As discussed at length
in Chapter 7, a number of commentators, most prominently Doran, Jackson and Siegel
have observed that rules of evidence may be different in bench trials as compared to jury
trials.90s The survey conducted herein inquired about judicial and attorney perceptions
regarding actual practice based on the concerns articulated by these authors. The results
904 Civil Practice Rules 4101 and 4102 (McKinneys, 2007).
90' Scan Doran, John D. Jackson, Michael L. Siegel, Rethinking Adversariness in Non-Jury
Criminal Trials, 23 American Journal of Criminal Law 1; Stephen Saltzberg, The Unnecessarily
Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 Virginia L. Rev. 1, 7 (1978).
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demonstrate that most of the judges do not think that different evidentiary rules are
applied in bench trials, but the attorneys report a difference in the rules of evidence in
bench trials as compared to jury trials. The survey inquires as to whether a loosening of
the New York State hearsay rule, which is much more restrictive than in England and
Wales, is favoured and it asks about the experience of those sampled in trials where
jurors with expertise participated in reaching a verdict.
II. Description of Sample
The total sample size was 122 including 80 judges and 42 attorneys.
The judicial sample was selected by identifying every New York State trial judge who
hears jury trials and both e-mailing and mailing the survey to them. The lawyer sample
was selected bye-mailing and mailing every Fellow of the American College of Trial
lawyers, an organization of peer selected lawyers with high experiential and ethical
standards generally regarded as the most capable and experienced members of the
practicing bar. The results were collected by and analyzed by the New York State Office
of Court Administration. The statistical analysis and some textual analysis particularly
are fully adopted by the author into this chapter. Moreover the questionnaires which are
attached as Appendix A and B were the collaborative effort of the author and the Office
of Court Administration.
Most of the attorneys (97.6%) had 10 or more years of experience, with one attorney
having less than 5 years.
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The judges were more varied in their levels of experience:
14judges (17.5%) had less than 5 years experience,
17judges (21.3%) had between 6 to 10 years, and
49 (61.3%) had more than 10 years experience.
Judges with more than 10 years experience were compared to those with less than 10
years. The only major difference was that judges with more experience had tried more
cases. which is logical. There were no other significant differences between judges with
more experience and those with less.
Most of the attorneys were in civil practice (n = 36). The attorneys were evenly split on
whether their practice was predominantly state or federal. 76% (n = 38) of attorneys
reported their most recent case tried to verdict was a jury trial, 56% (n = 27) were in State
court. and 80% (n = 25) tried a civil case.
The majority of attorneys (63.4%) participated in between 1-49 civil jury trials; judges
were slightly more varied. though not significantly different - 58% of judges participated
in 99 or fewer civil jury trials, while 36% participated in more than 100 civil jury trials.
Attorneys overwhelmingly (86.8%) had participated in 1-49 civil bench trials; over half
of the judges (55.7%) also chose this category, but 13 judges (18.6%) had presided in
over 200 civil bench trials. Attorneys participated in less than 50 criminal jury trials,
while judges were again more varied and had presided over more criminal jury trials in
general. Finally, the majority (54.5%) of attorneys said they had not participated in a
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criminal bench trial, while the majority of judges (55.6%) said they had presided over 1-
49 criminal bench trials.
Regarding the average length of trial days, regardless of whether the case was civil or
criminal, judges more frequently said the case took 1-5 days if it was "not complex" and
10 days or less if it was "complex." Interestingly, judges frequently said "doesn't apply"
to complex cases indicating that in the past 5 years they had not encountered a complex
case. Attorneys indicated that complex jury trials take at least 6 days, with the most
frequent response being "more than 10 days." A total of 26 attorneys did not answer or
chose "does not apply" when referring to non-complex jury trials, indicating on the
attorney side, they have not had a non-complex case in the last five years. 36 attorneys
did not answer or chose "does not apply" regarding non-complex bench trials indicating
that attorneys rarely participated in such trials.
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III. Findings and Analysis 906
A. Trial Complexity\Trial Duration
1. Findings
Attorneys are more likely than judges to believe that their cases are complex. Most
attorneys say that 75% to 100% of their cases are complex, while judges believe that
between 25% and 50% of their case load are complex.
Where bench trials are conducted in complex cases, both criminal and civil, they are
generally less lengthy than complex jury trials.
Of the judges who reported trying complex criminal trials, 47% found the average
duration of complex jury criminal trials to be 6 to 10 days, 41% more than 10 days, and
12% I to 5 days, as compared to average criminal complex bench trials in which the
response was reversed with 73% reported complex trials of 1-5 days, 21% 6-10 days, and
6% 1-5 days.
The judges also found the average duration of the complex civil jury trial to be
significantly longer than the complex bench trial. 7% answered that complex jury trials
averaged 1-5 days, 62% 6-10 days and 31% more than 10 days; whereas complex bench
906 When applicable, chi-square tests of significance were used to examine differences in response
patterns between judges and attorneys. Due to a smaller attorney sample size and a large portion
of attorneys not answering relevant questions (for example at least 16 attorneys did not answer
the questions regarding the reasons for or against a bench trial leaving n = 26 for those questions
compared to n = 76 for judges), some of the results should be viewed with some skepticism as
several cells would often contain expected counts less than 5, which is a chi-square "red flag."
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trials were 1-5 days according to 8%, 6-10 days in the opinion of 47% and exceeded 10
days in the opinion of 5%.
Lawyers asked about both types of cases opined that the average jury trial in complex
cases was 1-5 days according to 15%,6 to 10 days according to 36% and 49% answered
more than 10 days. Complex bench trials were reported to be 1-5 days by 48% and 6-10
days by 52%.
2. Analysis
It is well known that complexity is a subjective definition. The survey did not request a
definition of complexity from either the judges or the lawyers.
The relative similarity of the report of trial duration between complex and non complex
cases would suggest that there was reasonable commonality between the bench and the
bar regarding the definition. Moreover the extent to which complex bench trials are more
brief than complex jury trials supports the assumption by the proponents of bench trials in
serious fraud cases that those trials will be shorter in duration than a jury trial on the
comparable subject matter. As we will see in the next chapter, nine judges who try
serious fraud cases in England and Wales do not unanimously agree with the assumption
that bench trials will be of a shorter duration than jury trials.
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The result from the New York State survey confirms the belief held both in England and
Wales and the U.S.A. that bench trials in complex cases will require less time to try to a
conclusion than jury trials.
B. Reasons for or against Considering/Choosing a Bench Trial
1. Findings
Bench trials are rarely considered. Judges believed that attorneys "sometimes" to
"rarely" consider a bench trial (79% total) and attorneys agreed (74%).
a) Judge and Attorney Responses
Questions covering reasons why an attorney would or would not consider a bench trial
were questions 5-8 for judges and 12 & 13 for attorneys in Annex A and B respectively.
The judge questionnaire specified civil/criminal, jury/bench while the attorney
questionnaire did not. The questionnaire design assumed that attorney respondents would
be evenly distributed between civil and criminal practitioners. As it turned out there were
only 8 attorneys whose practice was predominantly criminal. Therefore, it is not
appropriate to compare the judges' answers about criminal trials to the attorneys'
answers. The comparisons focus on the civil questions.
Judges and attorneys were similar when it came to reasons why attorneys would or would
not choose a bench trial in a civil case. Chi-square produced only two significant
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differences in the civil questions.i'" These results are based on the 22 civil attorneys who
answered these questions and exclude the 16 who failed to answer. These 22 attorneys
do not differ significantly in other ways from those who did not answer. Removing the
criminal attorneys from the comparison did not alter the findings.
1. Judges believe that the likelihood of a prompt trial is a "somewhat" to "very
important" reason why attorneys consider a civil bench trial, while attorneys
selected "not at all important" or "somewhat" for a prompt bench trial in general
since they were not asked civil or criminal.
2. Judges believe that the lower cost of a bench trial is a "somewhat" to "very"
important factor in considering a civil bench trial; attorneys were more likely to
choose "not at all important" for bench trials in general.
There were no other significant relationships between responder's group membership and
response. Since 16 attorneys did not answer questions 12 & 13 inquiring about the
reasons for selecting bench trials, all results, significant or not, are subject to question. It
is possible that this low response rate was, as indicated earlier, a result of the fact that
most attorneys rarely consider a bench trial.
907 A chi-square test is used to test relationships between categorical variables. A significant chi-
square indicates that there is a relationship between the two categories, such that if you fall into
one category on one variable, you are more likely to fall into a particular category on the other
variable. In this case, a significant chi-square indicates the response pattern depends on who is
responding (judge or attorney) - judges and attorneys respond differently from each other.
Results reportedwere significant at the .05 level.
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b) Judges' Responses to Criminal Trial Questions
Judges' responses to these questions tended to occur in pairs, such that the most frequent
responses to a question were "very important"/"somewhat important" or "somewhat
important"l"not at all important" with neither of the pair being clearly the most frequent
response.
Judges considered the following factors to be "very important" or "somewhat important"
when an attorney decides not to choose a bench trial: the identity of the judge, the
personality of the judge, and the fact that a jury might be more sympathetic. Those
factors that were considered "somewhat important"/ "not at all important" were the
application of rules of evidence and whether the judge was active in questioning. There
was only one factor regarding why attorneys do not choose a criminal bench trial that
garnered a clear response - judges thought concern over less appellate review was "not at
all important" in the decision to not choose a bench trial.
As for the decisions to consider or choose a criminal bench trial, judges found the
following factors "very important"/ "somewhat important": complexity of the case,
nature of the case, identity of the judge, and an unsympathetic client. Judges found the




The identity and personality of the judge is the predominant factor in mode of trial
selection.
For example, the judges responded that the identity of the judge according to 65% is the
predominant very important factor in the decision to seek a bench trial; 30% rated it a
somewhat important factor; and 5% rated not at all important.
According to the judges surveyed another very important factor in the decision to not
choose a bench trial is the personality of the judge: 50% rate that factor as very
important; 44% somewhat important; and 6% not at all important.
The attorneys concurred, responding that the predominant very important factor for
choosing a bench trial is the identity of the judge, 67% rating it very important and 32%
somewhat important. None rated it not at all important as a factor. As a factor against
choosing a bench trial, 46% rated the personality of the judge as very important, 29%
somewhat important and 25% not at all important.
Case complexity was identified by the attorneys as a factor equal in significance to the
identity of the judge in the choice of the bench trial as the mode of trial. 66% of the
lawyers responding believed that complexity of the case was a very important factor in
choosing a bench trial, 32% said it was somewhat important. Slightly less than one half
of the attorneys (47%) rated nature of the case as a very important factor, whereas 62% of
•
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the judges rated it as a very important factor in selecting a criminal bench trial. Unlike
the lawyers only 35% of the judges viewed case complexity as very important in the
selection of bench trials, whereas 50% viewed it as somewhat important in the decision to
choose a bench trial.
It is helpful to look at other responses to survey questions to understand why the
personality and the identity of the judge is significant, reasoning that these results must
be compared to the survey results regarding the applications of the rules of evidence. The
attorneys as reported above did not view judges as vigorously applying the rules of
evidence regarding a series of evidentiary issues surveyed, including testimonial hearsay,
documentary hearsay, prior bad acts, prior criminal record, disclosure discovery
compliance and expert testimony based on Daubert or Frye. Moreover the majority of
the attorneys in their survey responses answered that trial judges do not apply the rules
the same way in a bench trial as in a jury trial. The majority of the judges responded that
they did apply the rules of evidence evenly between bench and jury trial. All differences
were significant at the .001 level. In terms of rating factors that would militate for or
against choosing a bench trial the personality and/or identity of the judge rated as a far
more significant factor than issues relating to the application of the rules of evidence. It
is difficult to discern, but logical to infer from the questions asked that the precise
judicial identity of the trier of fact may suggest how the rules of evidence will be applied
and thus factors into mode of trial choices. In terms of verdict agreement, juries' verdicts
received 58% lawyer agreement greater than 75% of the time, while judge's verdicts
receive a 53% agreement greater than 75% of the time. Overall lawyers agreed with
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better than one-half of the judges' verdicts over 93% ofthe time whereas their agreement
with juries was 78%.
Lawyers and judges did acknowledge that a bench trial would not be selected in
circumstances where sympathy for the client was an important factor. That may suggest
some concern about judicial case hardening in the view of both groups. (Particularly
when considered with the attorney response (68%) that the personality of the judge was
an important factor against the selection of a bench trial.) On the other hand, both groups
acknowledged that an unsympathetic client was a significant factor in the opting for a
bench trial, somewhat refuting that inference.
C. Judges' Questions of Witnesses
1. Findings
There was one significant finding in connection with judges' questioning of witnesses in
bench trials. Judges were more likely than attorneys to say that they questioned "no
witnesses" in a civil bench trial; while attorneys were more likely to say that judges
question "some witnesses'tin a civil bench trial.
Although not significant, both attorneys and judges responded that "no witnesses" or
"some witnesses" are questioned by the judge in civil jury trials. Attorneys were more
likely to say that "some witnesses" were questioned (64.1%), while judges were split
between "no" and "some," 46.8% and 45.5%, respectively.
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Comparisons were not made regarding criminal trials based on lack of attorney data. The
majority of judges said they questioned no witnesses during a criminal jury trial.
2. Analysis
Chapter 7 outlines the concerns of commentators such as Stephen A. Salzburg, Sean
Doran, and Michael Siegel that bench trials may result in excessive judicial interventions
and questioning.?"
This concern is addressed in the survey both regarding whether or not it is a factor in the
choice of mode of trial and whether or not judicial questioning impacts outcome.
The survey suggests that such conduct is not a significant factor in mode of trial selection
in the opinion of both the judges and the lawyers.




Not at all important 49% 55% 52%
Somewhat important 48% 40% 29%
Very important 3% 5% 19%
Ilowever, the survey does establish that judges are much more proactive as questioners in
bench trials.
91'11 Stephen Saltzberg, supra note 905, at 7; Doran, Jackson and Siegel, supra note 905.
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Even accepting that judges may under report their pattern and frequency of questioning, it
is quite obvious that the substantially more judicial questioning occurs in bench trials
than in jury trials.
THE FREQUENCY OF JUDICIAL QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES
Judges Survey Attorneys Survey
1m:y Bench fury Bench
Civil Criminal Civil Criminal Civil Criminal Civil Criminal
Bench Bench Bench Bench
Do not 47% 64% 22% 41% 33% 32% 3% 0%
question
Some 41% 31% 59% 47% 64% 61% 76% 89%
witnesses
Most 5% 2% 16% 10% 3% 7% 21% 11%
witnesses
All 2% 35% 35% 35% 0% 0% 0% 0%
witnesses
Likewise that 46% and 31% of the judges would report respectively that they question
some witnesses in civil and criminal jury trials is surprising and is not materially different
from the questioning patterns, 59% and 47% in bench trials in the respective categories.
This may in part explain why judicial questioning is not a significant factor in the choice
of mode of trial.
It is possible that the questioning by the judge is not usually seen as prejudicial by either
side. However, the judges did report that 45% of the time their questions are objected to
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and that their patterns of cautionary charges after questioning and at the end of the trial
do not demonstrate concern that their questioning in jury trials could cause prejudice.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT JUDICIAL QUESTIONING AS ANSWERED BY
THE JUDGE IN THE JUDGES' SURVEY
After questioning










It is somewhat surprising that after engaging in questioning in a jury trial that a
significant number of judges never give a cautionary charge about their questions.
Generally such a charge would advise the jury that the questioning is for clarification
purposes and not to be construed by the jury as indicating a judicial bias or preference for
one side or the other.
As noted in the findings there is some disparity between attorneys and judges regarding
the frequency of questioning. For example in civil jury trials, 47% of the judges say they
question no witnesses, the attorneys stated that was a fact 33% of the time. Moreover it
is clear that more judicial questioning occurs in civil bench and criminal bench trials.
The finding that questioning is not a significant factor in mode of trial decisions suggests
that lawyers generally do not regard the interventions as prejudicial. This is an issue that
calls for more research, however, as the objection patterns reported by judges and the
•
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opinion of the lawyers that there is an uneven application of rules of evidence, and the
importance of the personality of the judge in selecting the mode of trial may suggest
underlying concerns about fairness and prejudice associated with judicial questioning.
D. Relaxing the Hearsay Rule
1. Findings
Both the judges and the attorneys opposed the idea of relaxing the hearsay rule, with a
slightly higher proportion (66.7%) of attorneys opposing it than judges (55.1%).
2. Analysis
Chapter seven detailed the differences between the comparator jurisdictions regarding the
hearsay rule. The rule has become far less exclusionary and far more expansive in
England and Wales. In the next chapter in which England and Wales trial judges are
interviewed about the practical application of the new rule, some enhanced insight is
offered to the American bench and bar, (particularly to the opponents to relaxing the rule)
as most of the judges found the changes to positively impact upon the trial, noting that
juries seem able to evaluate hearsay. Itwas noteworthy that a significant minority ofthe
New York bench, 43.9%, favoured relaxing the rule, suggesting that some reform might
not be overwhelmingly opposed. This question is important because it also suggests that
the New York bench and bar may favour a more rigorous application of the hearsay rule
in bench trials.
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E. Time Limits on Parties during Trial
1. Findings
Both attorneys and judges favoured this idea although only 16 attorneys answered this
question.909 A much higher proportion of attorneys (81.3%) responding to this question
favoured the time limits as compared to 58.2% of judges.
2. Analysis
The frequent use of time limits in England and Wales civil cases is essential to the
underlying concept of proportionality, which is applied to civil cases. The same precepts
are not at work in criminal cases in England and Wales and the use of time limits
presently has limited application in America. A willingness to have such limitations on
the part of the surveyed judges and the small sample of lawyers responding is at least
suggestive that this is a useful trial management technique that could be employed in the
future as in England and Wales.
f. Jurors with Expertise
1. Findings
A little more than half (51.2%, n = 21) of attorneys said they had not had a juror with
expertise relevant to the case, while 65% of judges said they had presided over a trial
where a juror with expertise was on the jury.
909 No significant difference in pattern of response, although the result was approaching
significance, p = .083.
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Interestingly, a significant difference was found when respondents were asked whether
the judge had provided a special instruction regarding the juror expertise: 82.1% of
judges said they had given a special instruction, while 65% of attorneys said in their
particular case no special instruction was given.
In the overwhelming majority of cases involving an "expert" juror, the jury reached a
verdict. About 60% in both sets of respondents talked to the jury after the verdict and
neither group thought the expert juror carried his or her expertise into the jury room.
Despite the feeling that the juror did not playa role as an expert in the deliberations, 70%
of the 10 attorneys who responded to this question thought the juror's expertise had an
impact on the verdict. Judges were split on whether the juror's expertise did not or did
affect the verdict: 54.5% and 45.5%, respectively. Judges' response patterns were not
significantly different from the attorneys.
2. Analysis
One of the surprising aspects of the answers to the questionnaire is the attorneys' report
(albeit a very small sample) that judges in a significant number of cases do not give a
special instruction about jurors with expertise. There is a specific jury charge in New
York State that should accompany the empanelling of such juror.910
910 New York Pattern Jury Instructions, Jurors Use of Professional Expertise, Civil 1:25 A,46-
48.
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It is concerning that a significant percentage of both groups questioned found that the
juror with expertise may have served as an expert in the jury room, i.e. Attorneys, 48%
(NS) Judges 26% (N 9)
Itmust be argued that any such circumstance creates a miscarriage of justice. It is not the
role of the juror to provide expertise that is not subject to proper testing oflegal
sufficiency as to qualifications, foundation, and cross-examination. The need for more
broad based studies is indicated by these findings.
In Chapter nine, England and Wales judges voice similar concerns about permitting
judges and police officers to serve as jurors.
The introduction of jurors once disqualified because of their occupation into trial
deliberations is an expedition into uncharted waters. The results herein demonstrate that
there should be an increased index of suspicion that such jurors could improperly impact
outcome, thereby indicating a more extensive study of the issue.
G. Pre-trial Judge Activity/Case Management/Motions
1. Findings
Below is a table of responses for pre-trial activities. Again, attorneys were only asked
jury/bench and were not specifically asked criminal/civil assuming that there would be a
greater mix of specialization among respondents. Judges, however, were asked both, so
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the data was not easily merged. Instead frequencies were run separately and can be
compared side-by-side.
Highlighted below are some of the more interesting discrepancies between the two
groups. For example, attorneys are less likely than judges to believe that judges read the
case file prior to a civil bench trial. Attorneys were similarly less likely to believe that a
judge would hold a substantive pre-trial prior to a civil jury or civil bench trial. Finally,
for civil bench trials attorneys were less likely to say that judges decide substantive
motions which contain potentially prejudicial material and more likely to say that they
never made such decisions.
JUDICIAL PRETRIAL ACTIVITIES
Judge Attorney
Response (%) Response (%)
Read File Prior: (Civil) Jury Very Often 56% 48%
Once in a While 24% 41%
Never 5% 2%
Not Sure 15% 5%
Read File Prior: (Civil) Bench Very Often 71% 57%
Once in a While 16% 31%
Never 1% 0%
Not Sure 12% 11%
Read File Prior: (Criminal) Jury Very Often 59%
Once in a While 14%
Never 5%
Not Sure 22%
Read File Prior: (Criminal) Bench Very Often 66%
Once in a While 9%
Never 7%
Not Sure 19%
Offer Opinions: (Civil) Jury Very Often 26% 26%
Once in a While 49% 57%
Never 10% 0%
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Not Sure 13% 12%
Offer Opinions: (Civil) Bench Very Often 9% 6%
Once in a While 34% 40%
Never 41% 43%
Not Sure 14% 11%
Offer Opinions: (Criminal) Jury Very Often 10%
Once in a While 38%
Never 23%
Not Sure 30%
Offer Opinions: (Criminal) Bench Very Often 4%
Once in a While 23%
Never 42%
Not Sure 26%
Substantive Pretrial: (Civil) Jury Very Often 80% 51%
Once in a While 11% 41%
Never 1% 0%
Not Sure 6% 8%
Substantive Pretrial: (Civil) Bench Very Often 61% 24%
Once in a While 20% 44%
Never 10% 26%
Not Sure 6% 6%
Substantive Pretrial: (Criminal) Very Often 58%
Jury
Once in a While 18%
Never 1%
Not Sure 17%
Substantive Pretrial: (Criminal) Very Often 50%
Bench
Once in a While 18%
Never 11%
Not Sure 21%
Decide Motions: (Civil) Jury Very Often 48% 50%
Once in a While 38% 26%
Never 3% 17%
Not Sure 12% 2%
Decide Motions: (Civil) Bench Very Often 42% 29%
Once in a While 38% 34%
Never 7% 23%
Not Sure 13% 14%
Decide Motions: (Criminal) Jury Very Often 60%
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The statistics suggest the following:
1) Judges who engage in bench trials are significantly exposed to prejudicial and
potentially inadmissible information to the extent that the same is within the
court's file. In fact, judges acknowledge by a higher percentage that they read the
file more often in civil and criminal bench trials than jury trials. A very low
percentage of the judges say they never read the file before trying a civil (1%) or
criminal (7%) bench case. There must be concern about whether or not the file
includes inadmissible information and/or prejudicial information. In both the
U.S.A. and England and Wales, for example, the trial judge will know about the
defendant's prior criminal record based on pretrial motions and conferences.
2) In a bench trial during the pretrial process judges are much less likely to offer
opinions about the case in an effort to settle the case than in a jury trial. However,
a majority of the judges (61%) also report that they engage in substantive
pretrials very often where the facts of the case are discussed, even though they
will be the trier of fact in a bench trial. The attorneys differed in their perception,
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offering that judges in civil bench trials will not engage in a substantive pretrial
as frequently as in a jury trial, 24% bench trial as compared to 51% jury trials.
3) In criminal bench trials (49%) and civil bench trials (42%) of the judges will
decide motions which have prejudicial information within them.
4) Judges are mindful of their role as the trier of fact in bench trials and while
they may read the file more often, they do not offer opinions about outcomes of
the case in pretrial sessions nearly as frequently as in jury trials.
Nine percent and four percent of the judges in bench trials offer opinions during
pretrials very often, and 34% and 23% offer opinions once in a while during civil
and criminal bench trials, while 41% and 42% never offer opinions in each form
of bench trials. This is to be contrasted with 25% and 10% very often offering
opinions during jury trials, civil and criminal, and 34% and 23% offering opinions
once in a while in civil and jury trials. The percentage that never offer opinions in
civil and criminal jury trials is 10% and 23%.
,
The attorney response verified a reluctance to offer opinions by judges in
substantive pretrial proceedings in bench trials with 43% reporting judges not
offering opinions in civil bench trials, while they reported 0% never offered an
opinion about the case in jury trials.
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5) Commentators such as Doran, Jackson and Siegel are very concerned about
the judge deciding motions that contain prejudicial, otherwise excluded
information as a prelude to a bench trial because it could either prejudice the
judge or cause the defendant discomfort in that regard. The foregoing statistics
confirm that the exposure to inadmissible prejudicial material likely occurs.
In summary it is very likely based on the survey that an event which could expose the
trial judge to inadmissible prejudicial material occurs with great frequency the pretrial
phase before the commencement of bench trials. In criminal bench trials one half of the
judges decide motions with prejudicial material very frequently, and once in a while,
21% of the time. It could be postulated that this is another subtle contributing factor that
deters the choice of a bench trial as a mode of trial, and that having a judge who is not
aware of the prejudicial information try the case in a non-jury mode would offer greater
comfort to the defendant.
II. Do trial judges apply the rules in a bench trial in the same manner as do in a jury
trial?
1. Findings
for all three questions - rules of evidence, testimonial hearsay, and documentary hearsay
-the attorneys and judges differed significantly in their responses. For all three
questions, attorneys said trial judges do not apply the rules the same way in a bench trial,
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while judges said they did.911 Moreover lawyers did not report a strict application of the
rules of evidence generally.
2. Analysis
While there was discussion above that these findings may effect the choice of the mode
of trial, this section will consider the other main question raised by apparent unequal
application of the rules of evidence between judge and jury trials, which is how that
difference impacts upon the fairness of the process creating the possibility that the
different application of the rules can cause different outcomes applying the same facts to
each mode of trial.
Given the different applications of evidence in bench versus jury trials, the survey finding
suggests that if each mode of trial tried the exact same fact pattern, the trier of fact would
weigh different facts in reaching a verdict. The spectre of such a potential inconsistency
raises interesting ethical and practical problems for attorneys or barristers in counseling
the defendant who has a mode of trial choice and poses a more substantive dilemma for
any legal system which would impose a bench trial on that defendant. At minimum the
choice of a bench trial by client with counsel should not occur without the client being
apprised of this uncertainty. And this very finding by definition makes a choice of mode
of trial not just a tactical decision, it also creates an evidentiary pattern for the case that
could seriously impact the outcome. The results also raise a cautionary flag for
advocates of judge only trials in certain serious fraud cases in England and Wales. If
91 I All differences were significant at the .001 level.
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proper steps are not taken to ensure that the compelling of a bench trial does not mean a
different evidentiary standard than a jury trial, that difference could create a miscarriage
that might be asserted before the European Court of Human rights.
Such an evidentiary distinction between modes of trial could also inspire a loss of public
confidence, for example, in a case where co-defendants are severed, tried separately by
different modes of trial with different outcomes perhaps based on different evidence.
Moreover if fundamental due process is an overriding objective, shouldn't the parties
subject to one mode of trial or the other have clearly defined rules of evidence so that if
there is to be a different standard for bench trials, i.e., a suspension of hearsay for
example, this is based on a published and notorious rule applicable to all bench trials and
not the result of a subjective decision made by one judge which might be quite different
from the decision of another judge in a comparable case?
The evidence that there is the disparity in terms of attorney and judges' opinions
regarding application of evidentiary rules in bench as compared to jury trials well
demonstrated in the survey result.
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The foregoing must be considered in conjunction with the general impression expressed
by attorneys in the survey that the judiciary is not vigorously applying the existing rules
of evidence. For example with regard to the application of Daubert or Frye, the over half
of the attorneys, 67%, felt that the court applied those rules in a far less than strict
application. Better than one-half of the attorneys felt the judiciary applied the rules of
testimonial hearsay fairly strictly, but that same percentage was reversed with regard to
the application of documentary hearsay.
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I. Agreement with Juries' Verdicts
1. Findings
The judges answering the relevant questions agreed with verdicts in all jury trials, be it
civil or criminal over 75% of the time, 89% and 77%, respectively. Over 50% of the
attorneys agreed over 75% of the time with bench verdicts and regarding jury verdicts,
58% of the attorneys agreed with jury verdicts over 75% of the time, and 22% of the
attorneys agreed with jury verdicts50% of the time.
2. Analysis
Even more telling is the fact that 78% of the judges responding agreed with jury verdicts
in complex criminal cases 76% to 100% of the time, 17% of the judges agreed with juries
in complex criminal cases 50% of the time; 58% of the judges agreed with complex civil
jury verdicts 75% to 100% of the time; 33% agreed 51 to 75% of the time with complex
civil verdicts. The foregoing is fully consistent with earlier noted judge/jury agreement
studies.
IV. Conclusion
As noted immediately above the judges surveyed gave juries a resounding vote of
confidence, particularly in complex cases. Bench trials on the other hand were rarely
considered.
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The survey results strongly suggest that both judges and attorneys believe that the
personality and identity of the judge strongly influences mode of trial choices. While
evidentiary factors are not rated as significant factors in the mode of trial choice, there is
a difference in the application of the rules of evidence between and bench and jury trials.
It is therefore inferred that the propensity of the individual judge regarding the
enforcement of rules of evidence is built into the consideration of mode of trial decision.
Case complexity is an important factor in the selection of mode of trial with attorneys
weighing that factor more heavily toward selecting a bench trial. Both judges and
attorneys agree that the mode of trial decision favors the jury when seeking sympathy and
favors the judge when the client is unsympathetic.
Of likely greater concern to policy makers is the clear indication that bench trials take on
a different flavour from jury trials. Pretrial the judge as the trier of fact is potentially
exposed to prejudicial inadmissible information in reviewing the case file, in hearing
pretrial motions which includes potentially inadmissible information, and in engaging in
pretrial settlement discussions. Therefore, the judges are exposed to more information,
some of it prejudicial, as the trier of fact in a bench trial than the jury would hear. By
substantial percentages the judges say that they read the file (which can contain
inadmissible information) in pretrials discussing the substantive merits of the case and
offer opinions about the case, even though they are to be the trier of fact.
During the trial the rules of evidence are not tightly applied and while the judges believe
that they are generally applying the rules comparably in bench and jury trials, the lawyers
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think the rules are applied differently. Judges ask far more questions in bench trials than
they ask in jury trials. Expert jurors could jade outcomes in jury trials as both judges and
lawyers felt that their presence impacted outcome.
It is quite clear that the bench trial in New York State has a substantially different
character than the jury trial. For example, while the attorney sample contends that judges
apply rules of evidence different in a bench trial than in jury trials, the judges by 60%
opine they apply the rules the same in both venues. Thirty-five percent of the judges
surveyed say they apply different rules in bench trials. Particularly as it pertains to
testimonial hearsay, 54% of the judges say they apply the same rules, 4-5 say they do not.
Of the judges answering the question, 57% of the judges felt application of the rules of
evidence in criminal cases was somewhat to very important, 63% in the decision in civil
cases, against a bench trial.
The bench trial is perhaps under utilized in New York State even though the defendant
may select it. The reasons boil down to discomfort with one trier of fact based on
existing rules that give the judge great latitude and discretion. This concern trumps the
sense that a bench trial could be a good choice in complex cases. For example, Chapter
6(0) demonstrates that presently corporations do not choose bench trials in New York
State, based on the survey we can postulate that concerns about the identity of the judge
and consequently how a bench trial would be conducted drive this concern.
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The differences in the application of the basic rules of evidence as reported in this survey
indicate fairness issues when comparing the modes of trial. Mandating a bench trial in a
criminal case would pose a risk to the integrity of the process given the existing rules in
New York State. The presence of expert jurors on panels poses a potential threat to the
deliberative process that requires greater exploration.
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CHAPTER9
JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDUCT OF
TRIALS IN ENGAND AND WALES
WITH EMPHASIS ON COMPLEX AND SERIOUS FRAUDS
I. Introduction
Since Lord Roskill declared in 1986 that "the most complex of frauds cases will exceed
the limits of comprehension of members of a jury" ,912 the role of the jury has been the
object of ongoing debate. Even though a more nuanced view of the jury's function in
serious frauds cases was presented by Michael Levi in 1993,913 Lord Justice Auld in his
review of the criminal courts recommended in 2002 that serious fraud cases be tried by
judge with lay members or upon the choice of the defendant by judge alone.914
More recently Sally Lloyd-Bostock has provided an analysis of the jury's understanding
of and opinions about the failed complex fraud trial known as the Jubilee Line case.915
912 Roskill Committee, [1986] Frauds Trials Committee Report, p. 142; Miriam Peck [23 Nov.,
2006) The Frauds (Trials Without a Jury) Bil12006-07, Research Paper 06/57 Home Affairs
Section, House of Commons Library, 23 Nov. 2006, p. 10:
"The majority of the Fraud Trials Committee appointed in 1983, and chaired by
Lord Roskill, recommended that serious and complex frauds cases should be
tried by a Special Frauds Trials Tribunal consisting of a judge and a small
number of lay members, instead of a jury."
9JJ Levi, M. (1993) The Investigation, Prosecution and Trial of Serious Fraud, Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice Research Study No. 14, Home Office, London.
914 Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales by the Right Honourable Lord Justice
Auld, [September 2002] http:/www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk!ccr-OO.htm. p. 282; Para.4.31.
9" Sally Lloyd-Bostock, [2007] The Jubilee Line Jurors: Does their Experience Strengthen the
Argument/or Judge-only Trials in Long and Complex Cases? Crim L. R. 255.
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In the ongoing parliamentary debate in England and Wales regarding the role of the jury
in the conduct of serious fraud trials, the judges who manage and try these cases,
constrained both by law and custom, have not provided significant public comment. This
chapter will explore the judicial perspective on the role of the English jury in complex
fraud cases and a judicial view of the perceived risks and benefits of judge only trials.
Even though trial by jury has existed for hundreds of years, judges were first utilized in
1966 as a source to gauge the reliability of jury verdicts when American legal scholars
Harry Kalven, Jr., and Hans Zeisel introduced judge/jury agreement as a comparator to
weigh jury function.?" Their study found over a seventy percent rate of agreement in
jury trials, comparing the opinion of the presiding judges of each trial with the actual jury
verdict in over 4,000 American trials studied.917 That percentage of agreement was
recently ratified by the work of Eisenberg, et al, who reported an over seventy percent
rate of concurrence between judge and jury in over 300 trials venued in four major urban
centers in the U.S.A.9Ig
Although the present law of England and Wales renders it virtually impossible to
duplicate either study, there is, however, a substantial body of work in England and
916 The American Jury (Boston, Little, Brown, 1966)
917 /d., 58
"1Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Azor, Valarie P. Hans, Nicole L.Waters, G. Thomas
Munsterman, Stewart J. Schwab and Martin T. Wells, Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases:
A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisels "The American Jury", 2 Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies 171, 173 (2005)
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Wales regarding jury reliability,"!" Little of the work assembled reflects the judicial
viewpoint regarding the conduct of serious fraud trials. It is possible that such an effort
would be of probative value to the members of Parliament enmeshed in the present
debate regarding the judicial imposition of non-jury trials in serious fraud cases.920 This
chapter and the research reported herein is a limited attempt to grossly follow Kalven and
Zeisel's concept by interviewing a small sample of England and Wales judges who are
authorized (ticketed) to try serious fraud cases to obtain their views about jury function in
serious fraud trials and related issues.
Detailed interviews were conducted with nine sitting judges who both hold serious fraud
tickets and have actual serious fraud litigation experience both as a barrister and as a
judge. All nine judges expressed strong support for juries, voicing both a high level of
agreement with jury verdicts, and a firm belief that juries have the capacity to understand
properly litigated complex fraud cases. Each judge interviewed also voiced his
principled belief that trial by jury should continue in all serious fraud cases. Many of the
judges expressed significant concerns about the actual and perceived fairness of judge
only trials.
919 PennyDarbyshire,Andy Maughn & Angus Stewart, What Can the English legal System Learn
from Jury Research Published up to 2001 ?, Kingston Business School/Kingston Law School,
Occasional Paper Series 49, 45-62 (2002).
920 This reference is to Bill 6 of 2006-07 (The Fraud Trials Without a Jury) Bill2006-07 which is
pending but as ofthis writing on March 20,2007, the House of Lords voted to delay the second
readingof the Bill for six months. See. Peers Wreck No-Jury Fraud Trial Bid. [2/30/07], The
Guardian, http//wwwguardiacouk.
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II. Selection of the Judges Interviewed/Overview
Permission was received from Lord Justice Thomas, Presiding Justice of England and
Wales, to survey all of the judges who had tried a serious fraud case prosecuted by the
Serious Fraud Office either to a verdict or a judicial dismissal for a recent randomly
selected year.921 The only condition imposed was the requirement that the survey be in
interview form with loosely worded topics rather than questionnaires. The Presiding
Justice recommended several additional names for interview. Nine of the eleven judges
identified from both sources were interviewed (one was deceased and the other declined).
All of the interviews but one took place from March 15,2007 through March 23,2007,
the last interview occurred on April 19, 2007. By way of geographic distribution, the
judges are chambered as follows: 1 in Leeds, 2 in Bristol, 3 in Southwark, 1 in
Birmingham, 1 in Kingston, and 1 in Sheffield. Three of the Judges are QCs.
Two of the interviewed judges have for years presided over a docket of mostly serious
fraud cases, each having tried over twenty serious fraud cases to a conclusion.922 Another
interviewee described those veteran judges as "moving seamlessly from case to case", as
compared with the experience of several of the interviewed Judges having tried three to
six lengthy complex serious fraud cases. As one judge noted, while six complex serious
921 The year will not be published as the author has agreed to maintain the anonymity of the
judges as a condition of their cooperation with this study.
¥22 SeriousFraud as used in this thesis will rely upon the general description given in the Control
and Managementof Heavy Fraud and Other Complex Criminal Cases - A Protocol Issued by the
LordChief Justice of England and Wales, 22 March 2005, summarized as a case that involves
fraudor other crimes which could result in a complex trial, that is a trial that will require more
than eight weeks to try and thus the protocol should be followed "in all cases estimated to last
more than four weeks", as well as in any case prosecuted by the Serious Fraud Office or the
fraudprosecutors of the Crown Prosecution Service London.
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fraud trials may not seem impressive, it constitutes collectively many weeks of pretrial
management hearings and many months of trial time.
The nine judges will be identified by number. They are quoted at length because a main
purpose of this chapter is to offer the opinions of trial judges about serious fraud trials.
The agreement of the judges with jury verdicts rendered in their court and their
impressions of jury comprehension shall be reviewed. The chapter will explore the role
of advocacy in obtaining jury comprehension and as it affects trial length. Judicial
concern about fairness in judge only trials both during the pretrial phase and in the actual
trial will be examined. Opinions are offered about the application of the rules of
evidence in both modes of trial, the judge's view of plea bargaining and selection of the
mode of trial is also examined. The judges will, in summary, give their view on certain
of the major issues impacting upon serious fraud and other complex trials.
The interviews examined judges' opinions of proposed legislation to permit some serious
fraud cases to be tried by judge only, both pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and
the present legislation pending before parliament.923
The interviews also examined the effect of various administrative protocols on issues
salient to serious fraud trials: jury comprehension, trial length, and pretrial judicial
92J Criminal Justice Act 2003, §43; Bill6 of2006-07 (The Frauds Trials Without a Jury) Bill
2006-07.
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decision making such as the reduction of indictments (pruning); the reorganizing of
indictments into several trials; and the impact of rules requiring case statements.V"
The Protocol promulgated by the Lord Chief Justice in 2005 requires case management
hearings, obligates the advocates to justify the proposed length of the trial, encourages
judicial pruning of indictments, requires evidence to be weighed pretrial with extensive
agreed upon facts and obligates both sides to give detailed case statements, exchange of
expert disclosure and presentation of core bundles of documents.925
III. Judicial Agreement with the Jury in Serious Fraud Cases
The interviews were conducted in the actual shadow of the 2007 parliamentary debate
about trial without jury in serious fraud cases.926 Permeating every interview was the
strong belief expressed by each of the judges that trial by jury was entirely appropriate in
serious fraud cases and that trial by judge should not replace trial by jury. The judges
unanimously voiced their faith in and commitment to the jury system. The common
rational of the judges interviewed was that juries were usually able to understand a
complex fraud case upon the completion of the trial, explaining that usually the
complexity of a serious fraud case gradually evaporates as the trial progresses when the
proof is competently and carefully presented. They further suggest a longer trial can
'24 Control and Management of Heavy Fraud and other Complex Criminal Cases, A Protocol
Issuedby the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales (The Protocol) [2005] (All Eu Er 10386
(MAR),; Protocol for the Control and Management of Heavy Fraud and Complex Criminal Cases,
http://www.judiciary.gov.ukldocs!controlandmanagementofbeavyfraudandothercomplexcriminalc
ascs1803.pdf.;Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, §28 to 38.
9lS Id.
916 Bill 5 of 2006-07, supra note 924.
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sometimes give jurors a greater understanding of the facts. Finally each judge expressed
a high rate of agreement with juries in the cases they have presided over.
Judge No.1:
"I have a great faith in the jury system generally,
occasionally something can go wrong but until somebody
has a better idea and nobody has to date, 1would use the
jury in all cases except in the most complex fraud case.
I agree with the decisions of most juries. 1 have been
surprised less often by the jury's verdict in long cases than
perhaps in shorter cases. 1 agree with the Jury 70% of the
time or even more in complex cases.
There are very few fraud cases that are so complex that he
or she (jurors) cannot understand it. .. There's going to be
one or two, but even then 1 think we will still need a jury."
Judge No.2:
"I have agreed with juries in all of my serious frauds trials.
In longer trials the verdict is more accurate.
1 am far more likely to agree with juries in complex fraud
cases than I am in sex cases.
In fraud trials the verdicts are frequently a mixed bag, the
jury finding on some indictments and not on others. I am a
strong supporter of juries in complex fraud cases.
Generally I agree with juries in other cases. Over the years
(12 years experience on the bench) I can count on one hand
the number of cases in which I think the jury got it wrong.
In serious fraud cases jurors are able to handle the
concepts.
1 am aware of the notion that these cases are far too
complex for a jury to understand. If the case has been




relatively clear and simple trial is going to take place at the
end of the day when all of the elements have been heard,
the issue to be heard is no more complex than your rather
average case wherein the jurors are making judgments
about people's intentions, states of mind, and whether what
they are doing by standard of ordinary people are acts that
are honest or dishonest. I always say to a jury don't be
overwhelmed by it, ... , it may seem daunting by the sheer
volume of material but by the end of the trial it will be
fairly clear to you what you have to decide, and at the end
of it when you are to consider your verdict, you will not be
in any doubt as to what the question is ... "
"I agree with jury in the great majority of cases and when I
don't agree, Iusually understand their verdict. Imight not,
where there are a number of defendants, agree with a
complete verdict."
"I am a traditionalist and I don't want to lose the trial by
jury system.
Ihave seen both at the bar and as a judge, cases in which
the jury has trouble grasping (the facts) and it has been
difficult for the advocates and the judge to communicate
those issues to them clearly.
Juries can find it difficult to focus on the issues in a frauds
trial and understand if it is a heavy documents or an
accounting case ...
It's hard over months to retain the knowledge and focus on
the issues.
Some of these cases can fail because the jury cannot
understand the issues.
On the whole we can trust them to do what we ask them to
do.





My overall impression is that juries want to do the right
thing ...
1think on balance 1 favor retaining the jury system across
the board.
1trust the jury system. 1 agree with jury verdicts most of
the time, but there are surprises."
"I view the jury as the best measurement of truth or
dishonesty. It is right that the jury should remain and 1feel
that very strongly. The guardian of the notion of dishonest
or not is the jury.,,927
Most frauds trials at the end of the day, no matter how
complicated you allow them to become, are based on
documents not in dispute and the issue very solidly comes
down to an inference to be drawn about the defendants,
honesty or no dishonesty and whether the case has been
proven or not proven.
1have very rarely believed that someone has been acquitted
undeservedly within the context of what was the case
against him in an adversarial system.
1have never come across any case ... so difficult that the
point has not been shown at the end of the trial."
"I favor retention of trial by jury.
1do not have any complaints about jury outcomes before
me.
1agree with the serious frauds verdicts 1have taken."
"I do not detect a lack of understanding from observing
jurors during serious fraud cases. By the end of a serious
fraud trial it is apparent that they understand the case.




I have not yet had a trial where the jury did not understand
the issues and I have always understood the jury's verdict,
even if I did not agree with it.
To paraphrase a Heineken Beer advertisement, juries get to
the parts that logic can't reach and they do it with an
intuitive understanding.
I agree with jury verdicts most of the time, and agree with
juries more often in complex cases."
"In big cases, I am seldom in disagreement with the jury
although overall there are 1 or 2 defendants I wouldn't have
let go in multiple defendant cases.
In many ways serious fraud cases are not a lot different
from certain sex cases in terms of complexity.
I have confidence that juries generally understand most if
not all complex serious fraud cases.
I have no reason to doubt that juries understand the issues
in serious fraud cases - which can quite often be easily
understood by the completion of the trial.
Fundamentally we are talking about honesty and
dishonesty. That's very well suited to the jury trial
process."
"I haven't a shred of a doubt about that ... (the jury's
ability to understand serious fraud cases). There is
absolutely no reason on earth why a jury ... could not try a
frauds case, it is simply a question of how well prosecuted
or presented that case may be
It really does fall upon those bringing the claim to be very
disciplined and quite incisive in what it is they think they
are alleging and to confine themselves to the absolutely
critical points and keep a tight control over the
documentation ... "
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The judges indicated that they are rarely surprised by a verdict. For example, one of the
judge's interviewed stated that there were only two times when he was "slightly inwardly
surprised" - in one serious fraud case it was because of the rapidity of the verdict and in
another trial it was because the jury convicted on all counts when there was room for
possible compromise - but the judge quickly noted that he felt that in each case the jury
had a sound basis for its verdict.928
IV. Judicial Opinions about Jury Comprehension
Not only is there a substantial agreement with the jury in serious frauds cases, there is
also a strong judicial consensus that juries have a reasonable comprehension of these
cases. The judges interviewed believe that juries engage in informed and relatively
sophisticated decision making, acquitting certain Defendants and convicting others.
Individual judges stated that while they might dispute certain of the individual acquittals,
the acquittals were understandable based on the proof in the case. One judge opined that
in certain of the acquittals he felt the jury was expressing its independence and collective
individuality.?"
Many of the judges offered objective bases for their favorable opinions about jury
understanding, distinct from the observation by the judge of jury reactions during the
trial. For example, regarding questions sent to the judge by the jury during deliberations,
it was observed that juror analysis can be favorably inferred when compared to the proof
and the ultimate verdict:
928 Judge no. 6.
929 Judge no. 5.
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"You can tell from the questions how they are approaching
it. You can sometimes tell from the questions which order
of the count they are going through thematically.T'"
Several of the judges indicated that the specifics of the verdict could also be suggestive of
jury comprehension:
"The propensity of many juries in multiple defendant cases
is to convict some defendants and acquit others, thereby
suggesting a discerning reasoning process by the jury that
is generally understandable to the trial judge who heard the
same facts. It does suggest some sort of analysis ... ,,931
"You can tell from the questions (the extent ot) their
understanding - the verdicts also reveal it.,,932
An analysis of the annual reports of the Serious Fraud Office offers support for the
judges' opinions in that of nineteen trials to a verdict with more than one defendant from
2003 to 2006, there were eight mixed verdicts in which there were both convictions and
acquittals of certain defendants in the same case. While it is possible that the Serious
Fraud Office has overcharged certain defendants, it remains a positive for juries that they
are able to discern such a flaw in the indictments and distinguish between indictments.
The analysis also assumes that there is no higher rate of cutthroat defenses (defendants
blaming each other) in serious fraud trials as compared to other crimes. (This is an area
that will require further research). That the jury would by verdict find some co-
defendants guilty and acquit others objectively addresses the concerns ofthe former
9JO Judge no. 7..
9)1 Judge no. 4.
9)2 Judge no. 7.
375
Master of the Rolls, Lord Donaldson of Lymington, who argued during the 2003 House
of Lords Debate on the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that the eighty-six percent
conviction rate reported in fraud trials could be an indication that juries are so confused
that they are blindly convicting in serious fraud trials:
"It is said that juries are wholly suitable for such trials
because the conviction rate is 86 percent. That figure
frightens me ..... .1wonder ... whether the jury simply does
not understand and comes to the conclusion in some cases
that people would not have been charged if they had not
been guilty.,,933
Lord Donaldson's concern that jury confusion weighs toward verdicts in favor of the
prosecution was likewise not confirmed by post trial interviews with the Jubilee Line
case jurors who demonstrated sound jury comprehension. The Jubilee Line jurors "were
adamant that the jury had a very good understanding of the evidence, some commenting
that it was not all that difficult" and the post trial interviews conducted six months after
the trial's collapse were reported as demonstrating that a number of the jurors had a solid
understanding of the facts.934
9H Miriam Peck, (23 Nov. 2006) The Frauds (Trials Without a Jury) Bi1l2006-07, Bill6 of2006-
07, Research Paper 06/57, 19, (quoting H.L. Debates, 15 July 2003 C 793-4). The conviction rate
offraudsters of86% is introduced on 15 July, 2003 in the debate by Baroness Kennedy of the
Shaws and by Lord Thomas of Gresford and without a source relied upon for that percentage. It
is an assumed fact that permeates the debate.
93.. Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Jubilee Line Jurors, supra note 509.
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There is other objective support for the judges' opinions. The most persuasive is a trial
simulation study utilizing mock jurors which evaluated jury comprehension and
competence in a complex trial which concluded as follows about jury compliance:
"We estimate that a majority of the participants in our
studies - around four out of five - may be regarded as
sufficiently competent to serve on a major fraud trial".935
V. Jury Comprehension Correlates with Competent Advocacy
The judges have a difference of opinion about juror verdict reliability in non-complex
cases as compared to complex cases. Several of the judges opined that jurors actually
performed better in longer more complex cases while others did not perceive a difference
in performance. Case organization may be the distinguishing factor in jury performance.
Matthews, et al., found in the survey of jurors in all types of cases that trial organization
and proof presentation are key to jury comprehension.f"
Many of the judges observed that the quality of case preparation and trial advocacy are
both essential to juror understanding:
"The problem is the competence of the prosecution in cases
where juries don't understand, not the competence of the
jury.,,937
9J~ T.M. Honess,M. Levi and M. Charman [1998] Juror Competence in Processing Complex
Information: Implications from A Simulation of the Maxwell Trial, Crim. L.R., 763-775.
936 R. Mathews,L. Hancock and D. Briggs [2004] Jurors Perceptions, Understanding,
Confidence, and Satisfaction in the Jury System - A Study in Six Courts, Research and
DevelopmentDirectorate of the Home Office, Home Office Outline Report No. 05104, p. 4..
917 Judge no. 6.
377
"Serious fraud cases usually come down to the issue of
honesty or dishonesty and if the case is simply and clearly
presented the jury can understand what they have to decide.
At the end of the day you have got to carry your jury with
you, so you must concentrate on what really matters so they
don't wander off.,,938
One famous example referenced by several judges and reported in the literature is the
convoluted opening statement for the prosecution in the Maxwell case in which the
prosecution gave an impossible explanation of a limited liability company that would
confuse a law student much less a juror.939 The Jubilee Line case was also generally
referenced by the judges as a possible example of management problems; however each
judge noted that their impression was not based on actual involvement.
The subsequent investigation into the Jubilee Line case by the Inspector General of the
Crown Prosecution Service confirms the impression widely held by the judges that the
size and subject matter of the case created managerial challenges that could have been
addressed so that the collapse was averted and the case was rather concluded by a verdict.
The jury was exonerated from any responsibility for the trial's collapse:
"And that the jury had acquitted itself in a thorough and
conscientious manner, having not contributed in any way to
the inconclusive outcome'V"
931 J du ge no. 1.
939 T.M. Honess, M. Levi and E.A. Charman [2003] Juror Competence In Serious Frauds Since
Roskill: A Research Based Assessment, Journal of Financial Crime, 17,27, FN 38.
940 Stephen Wooler [2006] Review of the Investigation and Criminal Proceedings Relating to the
Jubilee Line Case (HM Crown Prosecutions Service Inspectorate (HMCPSl), Executive
Summary at 2, 6.
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VI. Judge Only Trials Are Not Favoured
In stark contrast to favouring the use of juries in serious fraud cases, the judicial
interviews yielded no support for judge only trials as a replacement for juries. The
judges' views were similar to those expressed by the Jubilee Line jurors, favouring the
preservation of the jury system, and disfavouring judge only trials as a substitute.941
"It seems to me that it is far better to be judged by twelve
of your peers than one judge. That is a right I believe we
should maintain." 942
The opinions of the judges ranged from the notion that judges are simply unable to fairly
engage in bench trials (No.3); to the belief that judges are capable of fairly serving as the
trier of fact, but the jury should not be supplanted (No.5); to the opinion that the jury
should decide guilt or innocence and the judge should determine the extent of the fraud
(No.1).
"Iwould be wary of trying a fraud case on my own
(without a jury).
Iwould be concerned in Judge only trials that Judges would
become hardened by their experience generally.
Isit uneasily with the idea that Iam the sole judge of fact in
these circumstances (Serious Fraud cases).,,943
It is a prevailing view that the very nature of a judge alone trial creates an unsatisfactory
pretrial and courtroom environment and that the perceived primary advantages of a judge
94. Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Jubilee Line Jurors supra note 509, at 270.
942 Judge no. 4.
94J Judge no. 1.
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only trial which are a more brief trial duration and an avoidance of indictment pruning
are unlikely to happen in reality.
VII. Trial Brevity and Judge Only Trials
The judges were almost evenly divided regarding the premise that a serious fraud bench
trial would take less trial time and be more efficient than trial by jury.
"The only advantage that I can see to judge only trials is
that they may be shorter, and as a consequence, less
expensive." 944
This was representative of the view of those judges who thought bench trials would be
more brief.
By contrast, several of the other judges with extensive experience in serious fraud
litigation opined to the contrary projecting that non-jury trials would be as long as jury
trials because the prosecution would pursue theories and indictments before a judge
alone that would otherwise be pruned for a jury.945 They reasoned that the judge as the
trier of fact would inherit complexities that the jury would be spared, thereby lengthening
the judge only trial.
"But that advantage may be lost because there may be a
tendency by the prosecutors to pass the buck and put boxes
of materials and extra charges before the Judge because he
would be more likely to cope with the material in a way
they wouldn't think the jury would and the reality then is
that is that the trial may be longer than it would have been
with a jury.,,946
"'" Judge no. 9.
904S Judges nos. 3, 7., and 9.
9046 Judge no. 7.
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Those interviewed who felt that judge only trials would be more brief argued that case
management hearings could limit the scope of bench trials because initially expansive
indictments would be pruned comparable to the process in jury trials.947 This view
undercuts the argument of Lord Donaldson that the full magnitude of alleged criminality
would be heard at a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial.948
The jud~es opine that trial length through proper management is a combined function of
the judge and advocates (primarily the prosecution) regardless of the mode of trial. They
further believe that pruning and other trial management techniques do not reduce
defendant culpability, but rather are an integral part of proper trial preparation by the
advocates:
"There are three words I would use: focused, incisive and
disciplined. They are the watchwords of any litigation and
after all a criminal prosecution is just a form of litigation.
I do respectfully disagree (with Lord Donaldson's
argument) because the fact of the matter is a fraud case no
matter what form it takes involves a very dry, simple issue -
namely honesty - and I can't think of a tribunal better
qualified to determine if someone is honest or dishonest
than the jury.
It's a misapprehension to think that a Judge alone would
give a shorter and cheaper trial. What they (various police
and prosecutors) often say and I think quite wrongly is that
they have to undercharge because they can't present to the
Court, the evidence properly to reflect the full magnitude of
the criminality and in effect whoever is convicted isn't
sentenced properly because they couldn't go as far as they
9047 Judge nos. 4, 5, 7.
9041 Judge no. 4.
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wished to make the thing manageable at all. That is a view
point 1simply profoundly disagree with. 1 frankly have
conducted (as an advocate in private practice in civil cases)
for trial or arbitration far larger cases than any criminal
fraud prosecution presented in English criminal courts.
And of course, the way you do these things is to have a
sufficient team of lawyers and sufficient quality. That
however is a difficulty when you start involving the public
purse. ,,949
VIII. Concern about the Bench Trial Environment - Intra Trial Prejudice
Several of the judges interviewed expressed a strongly held concern that the judge only
trial would adversely challenge or alter the dynamic of the judge's role during the trial.
For example, if a judge asks a question or several questions during a judge only trial
(thereby exercising the same right enjoyed by the jury) that could consequently alter the
course of the trial because unlike a question posed by a juror, a query from the judge
comes from the sole trier of fact rather than one of twelve:
"I fear that when approaching the important issue of non-
jury trials, far too little weight (if any) has been given to the
fact that we operate under an adversarial system in which
the parties, and not the judge, are regarded as responsible
for laying the evidence before the Court. 1 regard this as
being of fundamental importance to the issue, for to give
the judge the great responsibility of fact-finding in very
substantial (often high-profile) cases will (to an even
greater degree than occurs in some civil cases) be
accompanied by an urge on his part to ensure that he does
arrive at a safe (true) verdict, with which he, at least, will
thereafter feel entirely comfortable.
The judge, now also the judge of fact, sees things going
wrong and puts them right; or asks an entirely necessary,
but thoroughly unwelcome, question and is accused of
having made his mind up; or spots damaging evidence
against a defendant, which has not hitherto formed the basis
949 Judge no. 9.
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of the case against him; or for good reason asks to hear the
evidence of a witness who both sides have decided not to
call. These might not be seen as severe difficulties in the
conduct of a civil action or in an inquisitorial system, but in
a non-jury criminal trial conducted under our adversarial
system they surely would be.,,9so
The same judge further reasoned that after one or two bench trials, judges could unfairly
obtain the reputation of favouring the prosecution or the defense (when neither is true)
based on the judge's actions in several cases even though the judge was fairly applying
the facts and the law as the case was tried before himlher.
Judge No.6 succinctly labeled bench trials as requiring:
"Decision making that is very hard work, and it is stressful
work, and would impose an additional burden on the Judge
... a burden that would not benefit the system in my view."
Judge No.8 concurred with Judge No.6 and Judge No.3:
"I'm not keen to do it; Ibelieve it poses an intolerable
burden in a big complex trial. Itwould be tremendously
difficult to regulate the advocate's conduct and keep them
to the point and compel them to focus on the issues ...
when the judge is also sitting in the jury box with the juries
hat on, there is a risk that the appearance of bias or
prejudgment will result from judicial interventions which
will be seen as unfair even though those actions are
ordinarily engaged in to manage jury trials. Ithink its very
helpful to keep the two functions separate (judge and jury)
not least of all from the perception of the defendant himself
and the observer who is looking to see that the trial is being
conducted in an even handed way ... ".9SI
9SO Judge no. 3.
fSl Judge no. 8.
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Another judge noted that in bench trials in civil cases, judges are far more interactive and
participatory. He offered the following analysis of problems associated with bench trials:
"I am reasonably confident that 1 could do a good, quick
job on a major fraud trial with several caveats. . .. 1accept
that there would be difficulties because with trial
management hearings from the early stage, I'm rather
stamping my character on the trial which doesn't matter if 1
can then conduct a fair trial in front of a jury ... if 1were
then making the decisions during the trial as to truth and
lies, 1can understand a defendant being unhappy about it if
he goes down. On the other hand my experience with Civil
Judges in civil fraud is that they are much slower to find
fraud than the juries, ...
Ifjudges were to start trying fraud alone they might find
more acquittals than the politicians would think.,,952
Holding the same view two other judges expressed concern that Judge only trials could
lead to case hardening:
"Unlike the fresh objective approach each jury brings to a
trial, we (Judges) would see what we would believe to be
set piece fraud and you see a pattern and shape and it can
cause prejudice in a person who has done many cases,
whereas it would be looked at with a fresh look by a jury
without being in any way naive about it ... if there is some
sort of dishonesty they will see it ... on balance Ithink a
jury is more likely to give a fair verdict than a judge alone
but of course no two juries are the same and you could have
unfair people on a jury and you can have some judges that
were outstandingly fair, so it isn't capable of a black and
white answer. 1believe because of case hardening that
someone who became used to them (fraud cases) would be
jaded, that it is more likely that a jury will be fair. ,,953
"A risk is that judges doing judge only trials would become
a little jaundiced. In a judge only trial in a criminal case,
the judge will need to fragment the evidence based on the
rules of admissibility and the difficulty with that is that
some will begin to worry not just the Defendants, but the
952 Judge no. 5.
9H Judge no. 7.
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judges assume as well as whether it is real or just a legal
fiction that he is removing from his mind things that he
does in fact know that a jury wouldn't know and I think
that raises a question not just of justice being done, but
being seen to be done.,,954
Of course, district judges and magistrates engage in bench trials all of the time. It is
perhaps no coincidence that the conviction rate is higher before these tribunals in either
way offenses than before juries. One inference that can be drawn from the conviction
rates is that there is some degree of case hardening.i" On the other hand, studies of
judge only Diplock Trials in Northern Ireland have generally suggested that case
hardening is not a significant problem.956
Another judge, also an advocate of jury trials, felt that management problems in a judge
only trial would likely be the same as in a jury trial, but the management of evidence
pretrial and intra-trial would be quite different:
"What would be different (pretrial) is that you could be
direct as to the evidence that you would acquire to resolve
the issue, you could speed up the process which during the
course of the trial you could see the issues and get to them
and deal with them better. No one knows what a jury is
thinking and everyone dances around the issues so you
could deal with evidence using core bundles, read it, get
into it on a much quicker scale if you didn't have the
jury.,,957
9S4 Judge no. 9.
~s J. Vennard, The Outcome of Contested Trial" in D. Moxon (ed.) Managing Criminal Justice
(1985) at 121; P. Darbyshire, For the New Lord Chancellor- Some Causes/or Concern About
Magistrates [1997] Crim. L. R. 861, at 869.
9S6 J. Jackson and S. Doran, Judge Without Jury, Diplock Trials in the Adversary System (Oxford
U. Press, 1995); S. Doran and J. Jackson, The Case for Jury Waiver [1997] Crim. L.R. 155.
9S7 Judge no. 4.
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That judge, with both civil and criminal experience, felt that the criminal bench trial
would ultimately mirror the civil bench trial. While he prefers jury trials and advocates
for their retention, he believes judges could do a competent and fair job as triers of fact:
"In the civil trial experience ... part of our function as a
judge is to see what the issues are and chip through them.
If I see evidence going in that is marginally important or
irrelevant or of no assistance ... I will say let's move on ...
and I think pretty likely judges would be able to say that in
our (criminal) jurisdiction. I don't see it as a particular
problem in the jury versus non-jury debate. What I feel as
a traditionalist is that it's far better to have a trial by twelve
of your peers than by a judge. It seems to me that is an
important principle that we ought to maintain. ,,958
A judge who also sits in civil cases states:
"In civil cases I sit alone and the trial is designed to allow
me to get to the root of the case quickly. That is a wholly
undesirable approach in a criminal case. The jury is a
balance against injustice and prejudice which a judge only
trial can't ensure.,,959
IX. Concern about the Bench Trial Environment - Potential Judicial Prejudice-
Pretrial Rulings and Evidentiary Issues
Many of the judges interviewed made a detailed, reasoned argument against judge only
trials because of concerns about the appearance of judicial prejudice derived from
managing the case from cradle to grave as contemplated by trial management
9S1 Judge no. 4.
9S9 Judge no. 7. This balancing of course must be compared to the perceived accountability of the
professionalJudge. "A professional Judge is accountable for his or her decisions much more than
a lay trier of fact." John D. Jackson, Paradoxes of Lay and Professional Decision Making in
Common Law Criminal Systems [2001] 72 Revue Intemationale de droit Penal 579, #13 (2001).
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protocols.t'" One judge argues that eight instances ordinarily dealt with pretrial (Public
interest immunity; abuse hearings; trial management, and severance; Section 78
decisions, balancing relevance and probative value against prejudicial effect; bad
character; hearsay; applications to read evidence under Section 116 Criminal Justice Act
2003; confessions) or in any combination thereof:
"Provides an opportunity for the judge to become privy to a
body of evidence which may be very prejudicial to a
defendant, and which may compromise his fact finding
responsibilities - or at least, will be seen to do SO".961
While generally the judge will see this information in a jury trial, proposed evidence
which is excluded by the judge will not be considered by the jury. In a judge only trial
the trier of fact will see the excluded material.
The same judge referenced a paper to the Judicial Standards Board by a past
commissioner who identified this as a serious problem to be remedied by recommending
that:
"A judge, who has ruled, pretrial on admissibility in respect
of other matters, should withdraw from the trial if he has
had sight of material which has been ruled inadmissible".962
There is some dispute about the circumstances requiring recusal or withdrawal. One
judge rejects this option as impractical?", another judge offers a different view:
960 Protocol for the Control and Management of Heavy Fraud and Complex Criminal Cases,
http://www.judiciary.gov.ukJdocs/controlandmanagementofheavyfraudandothercomplex
criminalcases 1803pdf.
961 Judge no. 3.
962 Private communication on file with Author.
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"I think the proposition that by reason of his training and
experience that a judge is capable of taking on board that
which should be taken on board and can put out of his mind
that which should not be considered is baloney - how is
anybody to put something out of his mind ... ,,964
A third judge views prejudice as unlikely:
"I do have sufficient confidence that a professional judge
can not only exclude evidence which is unreliable or
prejudicial and could give reasons for doing so which
would eliminate the appearance of prejudice. 1 cannot say
that there would never be a risk of circumstances arising in
case management which would be so prejudicial as to
require another judge to try the case ... but I can't think of
an example.,,965
The problems posed by the creation of the appearance of judicial prejudice caused by
pretrial decisions in bench trials and the remedy of recusal from trying any case where
the judge has been exposed to prejudicial pretrial material have been raised by respected
academic commentators, arguing that judges should not view prejudicial evidence in a
pretrial proceeding, exclude it, and then sit as the trier of fact.966 One judge labeled
recusal in such a situation as a "pragmatic practical solution to a principled problem", but
offered that such a solution runs contrary to present efforts in serious fraud cases to
emulate America's docket or one case, one judge system.967
963 Judge no. 3.
964 Judge no. 6.
96~ Judge no. 7.
966 Scan Doran, John D. Jackson, Michael L. Siegel [1999], Rethinking Adversariness in Non-
Jury Criminal Trials, 23 American Journal of Criminal Law 1,77, FN8.
961 Judge no. 9.
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x. Will There Be Different Evidentiary Standards for Bench Trials? The Impact of
the Criminal Justice Act 2003
Evidentiary standards are more relaxed in judge only civil judge trials as compared to
criminal jury trials in England and Wales. The judges were asked to project that in the
event serious fraud cases were to be tried by judge only, how would the rules of evidence
be applied in these trials.
A majority of the judges believed that the rules of evidence would be applied similarly in
a bench trial as compared to a jury trial. The judges considered the Criminal Justice Act
2003 as enacting a more permissive standard for admission of evidence in the application
of key evidentiary rules such as hearsay, prior bad acts, bad character, and prior
convictions. Section 78 of The Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 (Pace) 1984 was
referenced by several as providing a balance to the perceived expansion of admissibility,
said statute providing that:
"The Court may refuse to allow evidence on which the
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the
Court that, having regard to all the circumstances ... the
admission of the evidence would have such an adverse
effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the Court
ought not to admit it."
The majority of judges when asked if the rules of evidence would be different in a bench
trial as compared to a jury trial stated:
"I would answer that question different today than 1would
have several years ago; we have had some very significant
changes in the rules of evidence which effectively mean
that an awful lot of material will go before a jury today that
three years would not have been in the form of prior
convictions and reform of the hearsay rule. The (present)
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rules are more lax and thus more evidence goes before the
jury now than years ago.,,968
"I believe a properly instructed jury is going to take as
careful a look at evidence which cannot be cross-examined
as a Judge would.,,969
"(Because of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) Juries now get
more of the evidence that a judge would get in a bench only
trial ... so I think that the difference in a judge alone case
and a jury case are very much more narrow than they
would have been before the 2003 Act.,mo
"2003 CJA has made a huge difference in approach but I do
not see it has done anything but good. It is not causing
problems in my view regarding fairness. I have been
surprised at the ease with which juries have taken to, for
example, the occasions in which bad character has gone in
'" now that it has gone in in much broader circumstances, 1
have not found that it automatically results in convictions
... juries are not over influenced by it.,,971
While most of the judges interviewed did not think that there would be a material
difference in the evidentiary standards applied in bench trials from jury trials, the
minority view was as follows:972
"I think the bench trial evidentiary rules would be different
from jury trials. But I'm rather in favor ofloosening the
grip we maintain on hearsay injury trials anyway. I think
juries find it difficult to understand why they can't hear and
understand what we lawyers call hearsay evidence as it is,
and I think given careful and proper directions there
wouldn't be much danger of any unfaimess.,,973
968 Judge no. 2.
9fI9 Judge no. 5.
910 Judge no. 7.
911 Judge no. 8.
912 Judges no. 4, nos. 6, 7, 8.
913 Judge no. 8.
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For example, several judges expressed the opinion that juries were not impressed by
prosecutorial reliance on prior convictions, the judges believing that jurors saw the use of
prior convictions as unfair. This contrasts with a more scientific simulation study of
mock jurors which concludes that:
"The results indicate that the information evokes
stereotypes of typical criminality, and that caution over
revealing a defendant's criminal record is welljustified.,,974
A judge opined that the new hearsay rules have helped the prosecution streamline cases,
but that case organization and cogency is primarily achieved by the prompt retention of a
capable prosecutor with adequate supporting resources to try the case.975
Some judges did not think that the changes effectuated by the Criminal Justice Act 2003
altered the conduct of trials despite the fact that it is more permissive:
"It has not had any great impact in the two years that it has
been in effect. ,,976
"CJA 2003 does not ultimately affect outcome of the
case.,,977
One judge summarized evidentiary issues in jury versus non-jury trials in civil versus
criminal trials as follows:
"It is trite that to say of someone that he has acted as 'judge
and jury' is to accuse him of bias or unfairness. No such
accusation is leveled at the judge in civil proceedings, but
974 Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant's Previous
Criminal Record; A Simulation Study [2000], Crim. L.R. 734, 734.
m Judge no. 4.
916 Judge no. 5.
977 Judge no. 6.
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one can see why: (1) the standard of proof in civil cases is
significantly lower, the fact-finding exercise is therefore
likely to be simpler, easier to explain and justify, and most
importantly, to accept; (2) the public is not normally
involved in the same way; and (3) the consequences are of
a different order. An adverse finding in a case of serious
crime will be loss of liberty, quite possibly for years, with
the threat of much more to come in confiscation
proceedings.
As it happens 1have had the experience of having tried
several Q.B. civil cases in which I have had to determine
allegations of fraud (one lasted more than six weeks). In
these cases, of course, the standard of proof is somewhat
higher than the conventional civil standard. 1 accept
without reservation that these trials were easier to conduct
than the equivalent criminal trials, in that e.g. concerns
about jury availability and the burdens of jury pastoral care
were removed, and the strict rules of admissibility were
relaxed. ,,978
Another judge made a concurring point from a different perspective:
"I don't want to get too high minded or pompous about it
but there would be unease, 1 think, about hearing and
seeing everything and the deciding the cases and then
sentencing - the whole thing.,,979
One judge expressed the view that in the hands of the present cadre of judges the more
permissive hearsay rules enacted by Criminal Justice Act 2003 will not materially impact
upon trial outcomes, but he also feared that the hearsay exceptions pose opportunity for
ethically challenged advocates to greatly impact trial outcome.P" Another Judge agrees
that the application of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 evidentiary provisions will be
971 Judge no. 3.
979 Judge no. 9.
9'10 Judge no. s.
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balanced based on judicial training under the prior law of evidence, but he clearly sees
the reforms as favoring the prosecution and reducing defendant's rights.981
Several judges noted that it was ironic that Criminal Justice Act 2003 actually places
greater faith in juries by giving them more evidence with the duty to weigh it -
particularly hearsay.
"In view of recent changes in the CJA 2003, the jury is
presented with a great deal more evidence to take into
account than before. ,,982
XI. Management Techniques Have Worked
In 1983 Michael Levi observed the trend toward a managerial solution to serious fraud
cases, reporting that the abolition of the jury was under consideration in these cases,
offering the following explanation:
It is precisely because fraud is not seen as an ordinary (or
even "real") crime that many people can see the abolition
of the right to a trial by jury in this sphere as not infringing
basic principles of criminal justice.?"
Managerialism is alive and well presently to such an extent that the judicial role in
serious fraud cases may be more like that of the judge in the civil law nations. As
reported above, nine England and Wales judges who were certificated to try serious fraud
cases reported their support for trial by jury, but also accentuated the importance of trial
9f1J Judge no. 4.
9112 Judge no. 1, a similar view was expressed by Judge no. 7.
9IIJ Michael Levi, Blaming the Jury: Frauds on Trial [1983] 10 Journal of Law and Society 257,
268.
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management by the judge and the quality of advocacy by the barristers in achieving a just
and efficient outcome.i"
The continental system has been extolled as a model of efficiency by common law nation
authors such as John Langbein, asserting that the European system of procedure includes
judicial control of the investigatory process, control over witnesses both fact and expert,
and generally forbidding lawyers to contact witnesses.985 The Civil Procedure Act in
England and Wales in a non-jury trial grant judicial control over both trial duration and
expert testimony including permitting the judge to order opposing expert consultation or
to retain its own expert, thereby resembling a civil law role for the judge.986
The managerial scheme set forth in both the criminal justice rules and a protocol issued
by The Lord Chief Justice for the control and management of serious fraud cases may
mildly resemble the civil law form of criminal justice. The rules primarily rely upon
judicial persuasion to pare indictments, manage witnesses, and control the flow of the
case, ceding to the barristers the significant control over the trial in terms of witnesses
and the ultimate architecture of the case. Case management conferences offer the parties
the opportunity to receive judicial input but the lawyers retain control over their case in
all essential respects.
CM Robert F., Julian, Judicial Perspectives on the Conduct of Serious Fraud Trials [2007] Crim.
L.R.751.
914' John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 University of Chicago Law
R. 823 (1985).
9lI6 Civil Procedure Rules Part 35, Civil Procedure Rules Part 3.
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The managerial rules do not alter Mirjan Damaska's description of the judicial role in a
jury trial:
"[The] judge stands at the gate of the fact finding citadel,
charged with determining whether information to be passed
on to the ultimate fact finder possesses a significant
cognitive potential to be admissible. But the
trustworthiness of the information' s carrier is not his
business: That lies in the exclusive province of the revered
jury,,987
The Auld Report embraced the need for more proactive judicial management, ushering in
at the commencement of the new century a somewhat different role for the judges
charged with trying complex cases such as serious fraud.988 The Court of Appeal and the
managerial judiciary thereafter reorganized case management including assigning the
trial judge to the complex case early on and encouraging the judge to actively "manage"
the case from cradle to grave.989
The Auld report also ushered in changes in the England and Wales jury pool, resulting in
legislation eliminating vocational exception for jury service. The report did not advocate
granting the defendant a say in the mode of trial and subsequent studies such as the
"Fraud Review" have advocated more plea bargaining of serious fraud cases.990
917 Mirjan Damaska, Evidence Law Adrift 56 (1997, New Haven: Yale University Press).
91' 'Auld Report, supra note 16.
9W9 Control and Management of Heavy Fraud and Other Complex Criminal Cases - A Protocol
Issued by The Lord ChiefJustice of England and Wales [2005] All Eur (D) 386 (Mar).
Hereinafter the protocol.
990 Fraud Review: Final Report, 204-205 (2006).
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The judges interviewed unanimously concluded that the management format for complex
cases established pursuant to Criminal Justice Rules 2004, Part 3 and the March 2005
protocol has reduced trial length.?" endorsing the accomplishments of the regimen of
managerial changes with the following descriptions of the protocol's effect:
"We have a pretty effectively rolling bandwagon.,,992
"They have created a change of style and atmosphere'V'"
"Generally the protocols for pretrial direction operate satisfactorily. The
primary problem is that if you don't get the cooperation of the parties,
there is no effective sanction if the directions are not adhered to. ,,994
Given the perceived success achieved in reducing the duration of serious fraud trials, the
judges were mystified regarding the present parliamentary efforts to impose judge only
trials. One judge noted that Parliament has been unwilling to give the managerial
changes a full opportunity to work:
"Why then, when we are at the beginning of a new era of
proper and effective trial management designed to make
jury trials in these cases acceptable, are we suddenly to
introduce a new system confined exclusively to cases of
fraud?,,995
Every judge interviewed detailed a significant cultural shift in the management of
complex cases. The specific procedures implementing that shift are codified by the Lord
991 The Protocol, supra note 924.
992 Judge no. 6.
99J Judge no. 5.
994 Judge no. 1.
99~Judge no. 3
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Chief Justice in the protocol have become the normal basis for case management of
complex cases.996 The impact of the protocol is described as follows:
"It has produced a culture change, a change in attitude both
in the judiciary and in the bar not overnight but has made
changes that are constructive.t'f"
"While I do not have the protocol quoted at me nor do I
quote the protocol very frequently, there is no doubt it has
changed trial management to the better."?"
"It is not just 'the protocol'. The new criminal procedure
rules have promoted better case management ... and has
the influence of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division ...
and the present Chief Judge of the Court of Appeal, Sir Igor
Judge. It is rare for him to miss an opportunity in decisions
to comment on the need for improved case
management. ,,999
Although so-called "cradle to grave" judicial case management is encouraged in the
protocol, it is not always achievable in the major urban centers where most of the serious
frauds cases are tried.lOoo Scheduling can prevent the judges assigned exclusively to
serious fraud trials from trying every case assigned to them when they have lengthy trials,
because trial dates frequently overlap, thereby requiring the assignment of some trials to
judges who have not managed the case pretrial. In the smaller judicial centers "cradle to
grave" management is achieved because each judge will be assigned one or two serious
fraud cases a year as the smaller volume of serious fraud cases are evenly divided
between the ticketed judges.'?"
- The Protocol,supra note 924.
WI Judge no. 9.
.". Judge no. S.
"" Judge no. 6.
''''JfJ Judge no. 3.
,,,,,.Judge nos. 1,4.
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Every judge interviewed agreed that the managerial policies articulated in the protocol
have reduced the duration of jury trials. The most detailed example was offered by a
judge who estimated that his most recent serious fraud trial was shortened from a likely
eight week trial to a six week trial to verdict by case management hearings conducted
pursuant to the Protoco1.1002Other judges stated:
"The protocols have reduced trial time by virtue of the
atmosphere they have created - trial time is dramatically
reduced. We used to take two to three weeks in serious
fraud cases setting the scene so the jury can understand the
system - not so presently. We now get to it much more
quickly."loo3
"They (the rules and protocol) make the case shorter."?"
"As a matter of culture, including the protocols, the trial
time in these cases has been greatly, greatly reduced. 1
think it started with the Blue Arrow case, how could the
jury manage a case such as this case and the thinking from
then on is that we should better manage these cases ... the
protocol reflected that general consensus and sort of further
pushed the matter along."loo5
Other judges were unable to be as precise in terms of the exact amount of time saved by
implementing the protocols, apart from a general acknowledgement that the savings are
significant:
"Idon't think I can quantify it but there is no doubt in my
mind that time is saved."I066
A main feature of the case management hearings is an initial effort to evaluate the
indictment in terms of the content and the number of defendants. The early involvement
1002 Judge no. 1.
1003 Judge no. 5.
1004 Judge no. 4.
lOOS Judge no. 4.
1006 Judge no. 2.
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of the lead prosecutor is essential, as one judge explained, because there is a propensity
by the police or the Serious Fraud Office to attempt to try their entire investigation rather
than the most provable and readily understandable aspects of the case.I007 Along with
early involvement of the lead prosecutor, adequate resources must be dedicated early on
to the investigation and trial in order to properly prosecute a complex case. It is the
quality of both the instructed counsel and the team assembled to prepare the prosecution
that is essential to well organized successful prosecution.P'"
"Few people would say that the Serious Fraud Office has
been a resounding and unalloyed success.v'?"
Another judge opined that bench trials, given the present pattern of prosecutions, even
with pruning, would likely become longer with time. Bench trials could become a
significant management problem as the prosecution would likely place broader theories
and more detailed fact situations before the judge than a jury.101OEven presently, pruning
is a difficult task:
"In a serious fraud investigation by the Serious Frauds
Office, the investigation has gone on frequently for four or
five years. So in management hearings you do not
generally get to eliminate defendants, but what it is possible
to do in the first hearings in terms of managing the case is
to set a fairly tight timetable up to a trial date which you set
in the first hearing, you put everybody under a
responsibility to report to the COurt."lOll
1007 Judge no. 3.
1(J(J8 Judge no. 9.
1009 Judge no. 9.
1010 Judge no. 7.
1011 Judge no. 2.
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The judges interviewed were of the unanimous view that the pretrial hearing process
generally improves the trial advocacy by prompting a more organized prosecution case.
As veteran advocates as well as trial judges, they view the pretrial hearing process as a
useful methodology which usefully requires the prosecution to realistically organize a
complicated investigation into a plan for trial. The government acknowledged in its fraud
review that trial organization is essential, noting that prosecutorial organizational failures
have had adverse consequences:
"We have concluded that poorly thought out and executed
prosecutions, or the unwillingness of the defense to provide
properly detailed defenses statement ... or to focus on
narrowing issues can and do contribute to delay and waste
of resources in some cases."IOI2
The judges use pretrial hearing( s) to define the meat of the proposed charges against the
defendant, and achieve cogent indictments. The hearings are not a means to reduce
culpability or water down the case against the defendants.
"You really identify the issues that are going to be tried and
all of the agreed facts are scheduled. If the pretrial
proceedings are done properly in the trial before the jury is
relatively simple because you have got rid of the
unnecessary and are really concentrating on what matters -
which usually comes down to the big old question of
honesty or dishonesty."loI3
In cases of both multiple indictments and multiple defendants it is a common practice to
split the indictments so that the judge can try the fraud in two or three shorter, more
1012 The Fraud Review - The Final Report, Legal Secretariat of the Law Officers, July 2006,
httr:llwww.lslo.gov.uklpd£lFraudReview.pdf.
101 Judge no. 1.
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concise, consecutive trials rather than having one trial with seven to ten defendants.P'"
In a serious fraud case with eighteen defendants, a judge utilized the case management
bearings to sever the indictments, trying five consecutive but shorter cases rather than
one.IOIS Overall, the multiple trials will in aggregate likely be longer for certain of the
defendants and the judge, but each individual trial will be of much shorter duration.10l6
Tbe mechanics of such a pruning are simple. At the judge's request during the initial
case management hearing, the prosecution will be asked to propose a plan to reduce and
reorganize the indictments and the defendant into sequential trials. That proposal is
reviewed by counsel and a plan for a more compact trial is devised at the subsequent
case management hearing.1017 For example, in multiple defendant cases, if there are one
or two main actors who are defendants, he/she will be a defendant at each of these
trials.IOl8 One judge noted that a guilty verdict against the first group of defendants to be
tried frequently results in pleas from the remainder of the defendants.IOl9
Concern was expressed during the Parliamentary debate that the act of pruning
potentially diminishes the extent of the culpability of the fraudsters for their acts.1020
The further argument is that the full magnitude of the fraudster's actions would be triable
in a judge-only case, and to do any less would pervert justice. The judges do not hold
101. Judge no. 2.
101~ Judge no. 2.
1016 Judge no. 2.
1017 Judge no. 6.
10111Judge no. 2.
1019 Judge no. 5.
1020 Miriam Peck, supra note 912, [quoting for example Lord Donaldson H.L. Debates 15 July
2003] C79 304
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the view that case management will necessarily result in diminished culpability. A judge
described one case management conference in which he negotiated a twenty-five count
indictment to nine or ten counts with the understanding that facts regarding the other
counts were admissible to show a "similar fact" or "modus operandi". As a result, the
alleged culpability of the defendants was in that judge's opinion fully, but coherently set
forth for jury evaluation ..1021
A different judge described the reasoning used in pruning in a case where the indictments
were reduced from 35 to 14:
"Getting more and more criminality doesn't produce
enormously longer sentences because of the proportionality
principle. If the prosecution says to me that it is the
cumulative effects of the counts which make out the case,
in other words, it's the circumstances and evidence rather
than the number of counts of the indictment, clearly that
does raise different issues and I look at that closely. But
even then I become a little uneasy because that then is a
function of evidence rather than allegation. If it's criminal
once, then it is criminal thirty five times. It is not criminal
once then it will not be criminal35 times.,,1022
Not all case management hearings result in pruning. A third judge described a pretrial
management hearing immediately before the trial that consumed one week regarding
whether the indictment should be split up and tried separately in a multiple defendant
serious fraud case. The judge declined to split up the indictment.1023 This prolonged
hearing was the last of a series of management or progression hearings held in sequence
1021 Judge no. 5.
1022 Judge no. 9.
lOll Judge no. 4.
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by the judge both to update the court on the trial management process and to deal with
other substantive issues that might otherwise lengthen the trial.
The same judge observed that while pretrial management hearings are useful in having
the prosecution reduce and manage its case, consequently saving time, the defense is a
much more difficult management problem:
"You can reduce down the evidence, obtain agreement
(admissions as to the evidence on agreed facts) as to certain
evidence that will be presented to the jury but the
procedures are 3uite toothless in terms of obtaining defense
compliance."I02
lie noted that while issuing fines to the defense for wasted costs is an option for non-
compliance with the protocol, it is usually not meaningful in obtaining compliance. He
adds that the more harsh remedy of precluding a defendant who does not give full
disclosure is not a realistic option.
The value of pretrial management hearings rationally evaluating the evidence, the scope
of the indictments, and theories of the defendants' culpabilities is emphasized by the
Jubilee Line case. The investigation conducted by Crown Prosecution Service Chief
Inspector, Stephen Wooler, describes the prosecution as proceeding at trial on a
convoluted conspiracy to defraud theory:
"The defendants had conspired to obtain confidential
claims assessments and other commercially sensitive
information from the LUL (London Underground Limited)
and used it to advance (their) commercial interests ... " The
1024 Judge no. 4.
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second count of the indictment, conspiracy to defraud,
required the drawing of inference by the jury that the
dishonest possession of these documents, and all the
surrounding circumstances, raised an inference that the
defendants intended to use them to the economic prejudice
ofLUL." 1025
This was, according to Mr. Wooler, an unrealistic strategy that should have expected the
defense to refute the inference by introducing the contrary actual use of the documents,
proving in detail the use of each document in the reimbursement claim process.
Although Count 2 was found by the judge before trial to be good in law and that there
was a case to answer at the close of the prosecution's proof, the actual prosecution of this
count required ten months of trial time because the prosecution encountered
overwhelming proof problems. As described by Mr. Wooler, the proofon this count:
"Came to resemble more the investigation of a case
conducted in an adversarial forum that the prosecution and
defense of criminal allegation, with the slow rate of
progress and frequent interruption that such a process
implies",'?"
The trial management process utilized by each of the interviewed judges fully applying
the protocol would likely reduce the risk or the extent of such an evidentiary
misadventure. For example, one judge described a serious fraud case assigned to him
where the prosecutors brought a 35-count indictment. The original case management
hearing as described by the judge was as follows:
"1 told the advocates that 1 am not prepared to present a 35
count indictment to any jury. The prosecution thereafter
came back with a 14 count indictment. 1have never ever
IOHS h WI·tep en 00 er, Executive Summary, supra note 940.
I0261d .•• 4.
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been impressed by the notion that you can't prune an
indictment to a digestible length and not properly reflect
the criminality of the case. In the event of a conviction the
Judge can then properly sentence.,,1027
Case management hearings are also a forum to establish detailed deadlines, exchanges of
information, and organizational efforts as follows:
a) The declaration by the prosecution of its case through a case summary,
a case bundle of documents and possibly a mini-opening to be delivered in
court during either first case management hearing (or thereafter).1028
b) The evidence to be vetted including the introduction of hearsay or bad
character evidence, and the reading of evidence in the absence of
witnesses.P'"
"We try to decide matters of admissibility, if
necessary before the date of the trial, to let
everyone know in advance what has been
admitted into evidence and what has been
left out. ,,1030
c) The providing of defense statements. Although as noted above there
are concerns that defense non-compliance with disclosure and case
statements cannot be met with meaningful penalties.1031 Another judge
1027 Judge no. 9.
1028 AModel CaseManagement Order provided to and on file with the Author.
1029 Judge no. 4 noted that adequate preparation time was required in which the judge reads
through the documents "not as if you were to try the case as lead counsel but you have to have a
grip of it" in effectively conducting a case management hearing. This is especially important in
attemptingto resolve disclosure issues "you can't effectively rule on these issues until you have
read the case".
1030 Judge no. 1.
1031 Judge no. 4.
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noted that there really is no effective sanction that can be given for non-
cooperation in a criminal case.1032
"Late service (some 18 months after
prosecution primary disclosure) of defense
case statements delayed access to 3rd Party
unused material, raised new disclosure
issues for the Judge and delayed the start of
the trial."I033
This problem was acknowledged by the Government in
the 2006 Fraud Review which called for more detailed
defense case statements and noted that in a case:
d) The preparation of an agreed statement by way of a background
material for the jury.
e) The organizing of notices to admit evidence and formal admissions of
fact.
The obvious advantage of agreed upon facts is:
"The trial is shortened by the identification
of what are the real issues the jury has to
decide and a written schedule of the facts
that are agreed upon."I034
However, one judge noted that a downside of agreed upon facts is that:
1032 Judge no. 9.
1033F d Revi F· Irau eview: ina Report, 204-205 (2006).
103. Judge no. 1.
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"Too much agreed upon and scheduled can
give the jury too little time to understand the
case. ,,1035
f) The creation of schedules and graphics.
"The progress of a case is advanced by
technology.,,1036
"In the last long case I tried the electronic
presentation of documents saved a lot oftime.,,1037
"The jurors have the case documents in a binder ...
so they can write on them and the other documents
are electronic ...,,1038
g) The issuance of orders in respect to disclosure of unused material by
the prosecution as is required by statute or common law.
h) Regarding expert witnesses, according to several judges, pursuant to
the common law both sides are obligated to exchange expert
information.1039 A judge during case management hearings can order
experts to determine in what areas or issues they have agreement and
disagreement.
1035 Judge no. 8.
1036Judge no. 1.
1037 Judge no. 1.
1038 Judge no. 1.
1039Judge no. 3.
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"When this practice becomes more common
as in civil cases we will see a substantial
reduction in issues and the case becoming
more simplified without the judge having to
enter the fray.,,1040
"As a result of the new Criminal Procedure
Rules we now direct the experts to meet or
communicate and draw up areas of
agreement and disagreement that has been
borrowed from the civil into the criminal. A
colleague goes further and advises the
advocates initially to jointly instruct ... I'm
not sure that we have that power presently
,,1041
There is no suggestion or hint from any of the nine judges that the managerial rules have
altered the traditional vote of the trial jury. Decisions as to specific indictments pruned
and evidentiary organization remain firmly within the purview of the trial advocates. The
rules do allow the judge to manage the indictment, evidence and trial schedule so that the
case is cogent, organized and tried with efficiency to the benefit of the jury.
XII. Jury Selection and Jurors with Expertise
The principle of randomness in jury selection received strong judicial support. The
judges characterized the composition of English juries as people from all walks of life
who after selection by the luck of the draw, pool their experience, background and
training in reaching a verdict. Some jurisdictions use a method to cull out prejudice or
other problems that may exist with the first twelve jurors drawn by not immediately
swearing the jurors in that day. The reasoning is that the drawn jurors are therefore
1040 Judge no. 5.
1041 Judge no. 4.
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permitted overnight to consider and weigh any issues which might prevent service on that
jury such a bias or problems associated with a lengthy trial. A number of potential jurors
are held in reserve overnight to be released once a jury of twelve is sworn.
The following is a representative opinion in favour of the random jury, describing it as:
"People from all walks of life pool their experience, juror
expertise is not a concern because the judge tells them to
decide the case only on the evidence they have heard.
There are pros and cons in terms of eliminating people
from the jury. For example, we will excuse employees of
the Revenues and Customs Excise Service automatically in
a tax case because of the automatic perception of
unfairness. However eliminating jurors because of their
education or employment may lead to an artificial selection
of the jury.,,1042
The Crown Prosecution Service inspector general's post trial evaluation of the lengthy
Jubilee Line trial did not find significant problems regarding the background or abilities
of the jury in that case. The findings were characterized by one observer as follows:
According to Stephen Wooler, the problems
that arose in the Jubilee Line case did not
indicate the fraud cases are unsuitable for
jury trial. Rather, the trial shows how cases
which are intrinsically manageable can
become unmanageable because of the way
they are handled and trials can become very
long and complex as a result.1043
1042 Judge no. 7.
I04J Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Jubilee Line Jurors, supra, note 509.
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A number of the judges did acknowledge that lengthy trials generally do not result in a
truly random jury because prospective jurors with professional economic or social
hardships are excused.
A judge described in detail the problems associated with random selection in trials of
extended length:
"Robin Auld notwithstanding, in a lengthy trial, for
example three months, we still are not getting a
representative sample. Those who can sit for three months
may not be the people you want hearing a complex case.
In a straightforward week in Crown Court we have jurors
who are summoned for two weeks. We tell them however
that the trial for which they are before the court is a three-
month trial. I ask "Can you tell me if you are unable to sit:
-Because you have a hospital or medical
appointment;
-Because you pre-booked a holiday and have
tickets, reservations, etc.
-Because you are self-employed in a small
business or self-employed where your
business could not stand your absence?
Then you get the excuses such as:
'I am a team leader in an engineering project
for British Aerospace" or "I am in R&D and
the project I am working on will be placed
behind schedule with adverse consequences
for my employees (subordinates) and my
employer. '"
We are likely to let this juror go because we can't have
people sitting as jurors with havoc going on around them.
Random selection isn't quite random is it?"lo44
1044 Judge no. 4.
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The retention of prospective jurors presenting for jury service with the foregoing type of
excuse was acknowledged by the judges to be a problem, but how it affects actual
outcomes is unclear.
Another issue regarding jury composition discussed with the judges was the relatively
recent removal of the automatic jury service disqualification for professions such as
physicians, police officers, and judges. These professions now are part of the random
mix, despite their obvious special knowledge and expertise. The question posed to the
judges was "did the possibility of special expertise of a juror pose the risk of the juror
becoming an un-sworn, un-cross examined expert who would lead the jury in the jury
room?" The majority view in response was that the knowledge or expertise was not a
problem:
"If it's a case involving accounting and the juror called just
happens to be an accountant, well that's too bad, one must
accept that. The standard summing up advises them to try
the case on the evidence in the courtroom and not to rely on
outside information ... ,,1045
Judge No.4 described a similar case in which he tried as a barrister wherein a woman on
a serious fraud jury turned out to be a chartered public accountant who led the charge for
conviction of all the defendants. Moreover, she wrote a letter of complaint to the trial
judge after he dismissed the charges during the trial against one defendant.
Other judicial comments on juror expertise consistent with the majority view are:
11).4~ Judge no. 6.
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"The jury should be composed of ordinary people ... a
broad spectrum should make the decision and that should
include people from all walks oflife and professions.t'Y"
"Since the early 1980s, the occupation of a juror has been
excluded from the jury card, but I was at the bar before that
when the occupation was on the card. Iwould regularly
take the opportunity to look at those cards to consider the
relevance of anybody's occupation to the trial that Iwas
either prosecuting or defending."lo47
"A Jubilee Line case juror was an engineer, who kept the
others straight. The fear here (in England and Wales) is not
too much knowledge but lack of knowledge.t'?"
Judge No.7, likely summarized the majority view that:
"Randomness is an effort to seat people from all walks of
life, and that the jury is instructed to decide the case on the
evidence that they have heard, but their life experience is
relevant to the task of evidentiary evaluation."
There is a strong minority view among the judges. While many of the judges view the
presence of a juror with expertise in the subject matter of the trial as the luck of the
draw,1049emphasizing randomness includes withholding the occupation of each juror so
that it is unknown to the judge and barristers. Judge No.3 expressed discomfort with
police officers and judges serving on the jury. Judge No.8 did say that his judicial
colleagues chambered at his courthouse agreed with him that there are situations where
juror expertise cut across the principal of randomness and that juror expertise may cause
the case to be tried on more than the evidence before the court:
1046 Judge no. 1.
1047 Judge no. 2.
1048 Judge no. s.
1049 Judge no. s.
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"We tell jurors that they are to try the case based on the
evidence in the case before them but it is hard for any juror
to put their knowledge and eXRertise aside. Many of my
colleagues agree with that."!" 0
Judge No.9 agreed in a more limited way:
"I do think the notion of opening up juries to those actually
involved in the legal system is a step too far. When 1say
the legal system, 1 include police officers ... "
Judge No.4 also mentioned a problem that he experienced when he had a police officer
on a jury who discovered during the trial he knew the forensic expert. For that reason in
his jurisdiction they now advise the jury of likely trial witnesses prior to swearing in the
jury. Like Judge No.9., he voiced reservations about police and judges serving as jurors,
particularly given the concept of randomness:
"The traditional position ... is that if you have someone
who has that expertise well and good, I'm sure about it. I
think it's too far to have judges and policemen sit on juries
... in a criminal case police in particular are not who you
would want on a dispassionate jury."I051
Despite the above concerns expressed about the composition of random juries, there is
some objective evidence that one social or economic group does not dominate the jury
deliberation process. Judge No. 1noted that the individuals who he believed were likely
to be selected foreperson based on dress and demeanor were frequently not elected by the
peers, refuting inferentially the notion that there may be white collar dominance of the
jury process. He also noted that jurors seem to zealously guard their vote and he does not
think social or professional status trumps the juror's oath to use their own judgment. As
IOSO Judge no. 8.
IOSI Judge no. 4.
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indicated earlier in this chapter, the judges are unanimously of the view that the jury is
able to understand and rationally decide complex fraud cases.
The judges did not identify any commonly used summing up to the jury about special
expertise or knowledge, but in the interviews some expressed an interest in that charge as
it is delivered in America.1052
XIII. Plea Bargaining
The judicial consensus was that there is a role for plea bargaining in England and Wales:
"I can see the point of it. There is a place for it, but 1favor
the present open court approach with the judge having the
option to indicate the likely sentence in the event of the
plea."lo53
Whether plea bargaining will have a practical value in serious fraud cases is in dispute.
Several of the judges believe that plea bargaining in serious fraud cases in England and
Wales is less attractive to defendants than in the U.S. because the sentences are less
severe in the U.K, consequently there is little to offer in serious fraud cases, because
IOS2 Jurors Use of Professional Expertise, New York Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil 1:25 A,46-
48. The charge states:
Although as jurors you are encouraged to use all of your life experiences
in analyzing testimony and reaching a fair verdict, you may not communicate any
personal professional expertise you might have or other facts not in evidence to
the other jurors during deliberations. You must base your discussions and
decisions solely on the evidence presented to you during the trial and that
evidence alone. You may not consider or speculate on matters not in evidence or
matters outside the case.
lOS) Judge no. 8.
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unlike in America, the sentences are not very long.1054 Therefore they "have not seen
plea bargaining make a difference".'?"
Solicitor Ian Jones suggests the same comparing American plea bargaining with the
proposals made by the Government Fraud Review in 2006, which advocate early plea
bargaining in serious fraud cases to save court time and trial preparation costs:
The plea bargaining arrangements in the U.S.A. have been
developed against a background of potentially very lengthy
custodial sentences together with a sentencing framework
that provides a high degree of certainty about the actual
sentence that will be imposed in respect of any particular
plea bargaining agreement.
The recommendation of the Review is that a formal plea
bargaining system should be agreed specifically for serious
IOS4 Judges nos. 4 and 6 consider recent American sentences in serious fraud cases. For example,
Jeffrey Skilling of Enron received 25 years imprisonment as did Bernard Ebbers, the former CEO
of World Com, both for fraud. L. Dennis Kozlowski received 8Y2to 25 years for looting Tyco of
150 million dollars for his own use. Ebbers argued on appeal that his sentence was excessive,
particularly when compared to the sentences of other officials from his former company, for
example, the Chief Financial Officer received five years and the Accounting Director and
Comptroller each received 1 year. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that 25
years was a long sentence for white collar crime:
"Longer than the sentences routinely imposed by many states for
violent crimes, including murder.
The securities fraud here was not puffery or cheerleading or even
a misguided effort to protect the company, its employees, and its
shareholders from the capital- impairing effects of what was
believed to be a temporary downturn in business ...
The methods used were specifically intended to create a false
picture of profitability even for professional analysts that, in
Ebbers case, was motivated by his personal financial
circumstances."
The court noted that the disparity in sentences was acceptable because the others were Effers
subordinates and that they had pleaded guilty and cooperated with prosecutors. The Associated
Press, Conviction of Ex-World Com Chief was Upheld, NY Times, July 29, 2006, C2.
JOss] d Nu ge o. 6; Judge No.4.
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and complex fraud cases. It envisages that the prosecution
would have the option to provide a case statement to a
suspect and his representative indicting the nature of the
case and the suspect's role in it. The suspect would provide
a "without prejudice" response setting out the extent of
accepted criminality. This would be followed by "without
prejudice" negotiations to endeavor to agree not only the
extent of the criminality but also a recommended realistic
sentence package. The sentencing package would include
any of the additional sentencing options that are
recommended elsewhere in the Review. There would be
access to a specialized fraud judge to seek agreement to the
plea and sentence package or for the defense to seek an
early sentence indication prior to further negotiations.Y"
Another judge agreed with the opinion of the Fraud Review that a more American system
of plea bargaining would have value:
"There would be advantages to the Defendant to agree as to
the basis of liability. Their advantage would be ... to limit
the sums referable to their criminal conduct and therefore
confiscation proceedings could be less damaging to
them."I057
The judges as a group embraced the concept of plea bargaining. They did have concern
about the format and setting in which the plea bargaining occurs. All were adamant that
plea bargaining should not be coercive that the plea should be made only by the guilty
and that whenever possible the judge should have full awareness of the defendant's
criminality and prior record. One judge explained that under the present system that:
"The problem with these indications is there is a tendency
of the judge saying things in a broad brush way with too
littl . c. . h fi di h' I ,,10581 e mtormation t en m mg out t mgs ater ...
JOS6 Jan Jones, Russell Jones andWalker, Plea Bargaining- The Way Forward?,
www .rjw.co/ukll ibrary/ articles/p Ieabargaining.
IOS7 Judge no. 7.
lOSS Judge no. 9.
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The judges did not voice concern about the stage of the case in which the plea bargain
occurs. The Government Fraud Review advocated a discussion of the possible plea early
in the proceedings rather than the present England and Wales practice of shortly before
trial. The specific proposal of the Fraud Review sets forth a formal plea bargaining
system (which may address judicial concerns) in which the prosecution may provide a
case statement to the defense, the defense would respond with its own without prejudice
statement acknowledging the facts of the criminality and without prejudice negotiations
of all sentencing options into a sentence package is conducted. If there is agreement, a
specialized fraud judge is consulted for a sentence indication.P'"
There was a generalized sense of judicial comfort with the present system set forth in the
Goodyear Guidelines in which the trial judge may indicate on the record in open court the
likely sentence in the event of a plea if asked by the parties pursuant to a process started
by the dcfense.106o
"I favour the use of plea bargaining providing defendants
are not coerced into pleading guilty to something they do
not want to admit.?'?"
Under the Goodyear Guidelines not less than a seven day notice is required to seek an
indication of the Prosecution and the Court. The prosecution should inquire if the judge
"is in possession of or has had access to all the evidence relied on by the prosecution,
IOS9 Judge no. 5.
1060 Rv. Goodyear [2005] EWCA Crim. 888 CA (Crim. Div.), [2005]; [2005] 2 CR. App. R. 20,
#70,73-77.
1061 Judge no. 1.
417
including any personal impact statement from the victim of the crime, as well as any
. f t' f relevant nrevi . . d d . h d ti d t" 1062In orma Ion 0 re evant previous convicttons recor e agamst tee en an .
The future status of plea bargaining is summarized as follows:
"I think could become earlier (indications) but advocates
frequently are unwilling for their own reasons to get to a
situation where the case could crack or fold too early. I
think there is a proper basis that you could argue that it is in
the best interest of the defendant and the Crown to
investigate a plea bargain at an early stage before we get
into the ghastly nightmare of discovery.,,1063
XIV. Average Length of Trial
Serious fraud trials vary in length.
The judges' experience is as follows:
As to Judge No.1, the longest trial he presided over is 8 weeks; his average
serious fraud trial lasts about 4-6 weeks;
Judge No.2 found serious fraud trials to be as long as three months;
Judge No.3 presided over trials ranging from six weeks to three to four months;
Judge No.4 found the range to be two to three months to one year. The average
trial for him is about two to three months;
1062 R. v. Goodyear, supra note 1060.
1063 Judge no. 8.
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Judge No. 6's longest trial was two and one-half months but the main Defendant
had jumped bail, the Defendant's lawyers resigned from the case, and he was tried
in absentia with no lawyers representing him so there was no way to stipulate as
to the evidence, documents, etc.;
Judge No. 7 conducted trials ranging three to nine months;
Judge No.8 the range of trials conducted was two months to fifteen months.
Given the concern about lengthy jury trials, several of those interviewed offered that
judge only trials were likely to be more brief:
"A judge only trial would reduce pre-trial preparation, the
length of the trial itself and costs. The reason being that
both the details and length of presentation of the evidence
could be greatly reduced and focused solely on the bare
issues for decision."I064
"I disagree that the presence of a jury on a long and
complex case would have no marked effect on the length of
the trial."I065
Judge No.3 asserts that judge-only trials will likely not reduce trial length - indictments
will not be pruned and the police/Serious Frauds Office investigators will be able to put
all details before the jury. While that was a minority view, most of the judges expressed
discomfort about the actions that the judge must take to reduce trial length in judge only
trial as those steps may give the judge the appearance of bias or prejudgment of the case.
1064 Judge no. 4.
1065 Judge no. 3.
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Thus the unanimous view of the judges was that any brevity achieved in judge only trials
was not worth the appearance of judicial bias.
xv. Should The Defendant Choose The Mode of Trial?
In 1999 Lord Bingham C.J. proposed that defendants should be accorded the right to opt
for a non-jury mode of trial, suggesting that this might be more likely in serious fraud
cases.'?"
The defendant was accorded the opportunity to choose the mode of trial for trials on
indictment in the original provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2002-03. That putative
right was removed from the bill in a cloud of parliamentary controversy.Y"
The decision to not give the defendant the choice of mode of trial in cases on indictment
was strongly endorsed by the judges interviewed. In the interviews the judges were given
an explanation that mode of trial choices are granted to the defendant by statute in New
York State and even though reminded that the defendant was slated to receive this right
in the initial version of CJA 2002-03, all of the judges rejected the concept of permitting
the defendant to have the choice of mode of trial. Many of the judges did, however,
believe that the decision about mode of trial should be exclusively judicial (rather than
accorded to one side or the other), with both sides able to argue for or against the
proposed mode of trial.
1066 Confidential communication from a third-party on file with the Author.
I061M·· P kinam ec ,Research Paper 06/57, supra note 934, 13.
420
Presently Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not grant the defense the
right to apply for a judge only trial but that section of the act has not been brought
forward. The Fraud (Trial Without a Jury) Bill 6 of 2006-07, which has passed the House
of Commons but has been delayed by the House of Lords would impose by statute the
implementation of non-jury trials,1068amending Section 43 and 48 of the Criminal Justice
Act 2003:
"To require that application for non-jury trial under section
43 and any non-jury trials resulting form such applications,
should be heard by a High Court Judge (sitting as a judge
of the Crown Court)."I069
The judges' argument that the defendant should not be given the opportunity to choose
the mode of trial was best reasoned as follows:
"For defendants, some of whom may want trial by jury;
others trial by judge alone. Presumably, only those who
feel that the judge may have a keener appreciation of their
defense will opt for judge trial. This could at least be the
recipe for a most entertaining application for severance.
For the court list officer who receives the (no doubt coded)
message - if judge X is allocated to this case this will be a
jury trial, but if judge Y - it will be trial by judge alone.
For the judge, now the judge of fact, who sees things going
wrong with the prosecution case and puts them right (see
below). (Will an anxious and unhappy defendant be
permitted to change his mind?).
For the parties who might both in foreseen and unforeseen
circumstances have to call upon the judge to rule upon the
admissibility of highly prejudicial material (also see below)
and no squabble over whether he can possible try the case
fairly, or be seen to do so.
10611330 (5) (b) CJA 2003.
1069The United Kingdom Parliament, Explanatory Notes Frauds, Trial Without a Jury Bill as
Introduced in the House of Commons on 16th November, 2006).
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For 'street-wise' jurors empanelled to try a case who will
now resent the defendant (and not the prosecution) for their
prolonged incarceration - 'The defendant knows he has no
chance with ajudge, that's why he is troubling us.'
For the Court of Appeal, who will have to sort all of this
out, and review (possibly even related) trials in which a
jury has returned a simple verdict of guilty in one and a
judge has given a reasoned judge in the other. ,,1070
Another judge, asserting that the mode decision should be exclusively in judicial
discretion as a part of the trial management process, reasoned to the contrary, noting that
if the prosecution is to be given the choice of mode of trial, it is only fair that the
defendant be given that device also.I07l
Several other judges were willing to consider the defendant having a choice in the mode
of trial, but were concerned that it could be a tactical decision. For example, Judge No.6
noted that before the defendant would choose the mode of trial, he would likely want to
know the identity of the judge:
"If I were a defendant I would need to know who that judge
was going to be."
Judge No.6 then expressed discomfort with shopping for the judge in judge only trials
and emphasized that he favoured the present England and Wales system. Another of the
judges concurred, asserted that the mode of trial decision:
"Should be "principled" - defined as not a tactical decision
to obtain advantage."
1070 Judge no. 3.
1071 Judge no. 2.
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"If there is a choice it should be up to the Court with each
side making submissions. Ifboth sides agree it should be
given due weight, but in the end it should be the Court
which makes decisions like that given the way our system
has evolved. I don't think it is right either party should
have the right to elect."I072
Another judge stated:
"I suppose the argument is there are courses for horses -
but I don't like the idea of any party being able to choose
their tribunal in a criminal case. I like the system where
you get the judge who is available to do it."I013
One judge was willing to give the defendant a choice (No.2) and another offered that the
defendant's might opt for a judge only trial where part of the proof may include a
disproportionately high life style that does not equal the defendant's means.
"One point that is forgotten by those who advocate for jury
trial, I think there are circumstances where trial by jury is
less to the defendant's advantage than trial by judge."I014
In the final analysis, the preference of all of the judges was to retain the present system
which would require all indictable offenses to be tried by a jury.
XVI. Summary - The Future of Serious Fraud Trials
Predicting the ultimate parliamentary outcome of the serious fraud trial debate is far
beyond the scope of this chapter. What does emerge from the small sample of judges
interviewed is a fairly united judicial view of the way forward.
1072 Judge no. 9.
1073 Judge no. 1.
1074 Judge no. 6.
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They clearly not only favour jury trials, the judges are strong and in the case of many,
passionate advocates for the jury. They believe that juries do a good job overall and that
juries understand properly managed and presented serious fraud cases. There was no
support for judge only trials replacing jury trials, and many of the judges expressed
concerns about the perceived and actual fairness of judge only trials. The judges have a
high rate of agreement with and acceptance of the jury outcomes before them. All of the
judges felt strongly that the quality of prosecution will dictate trial organization and juror
understanding that quality advocacy can shorten and make understandable complex
cases.
The judges do not view a judge only trial as an improvement over the jury and most of
them expressed trepidation about substituting judicial decision making for that of the
jury. There is no overwhelming opinion that judge only trials would be shorter than jury
trials and the view was held by certain of the judges that bench trials could be based on
more complex (and not necessarily provable) prosecution indictments.
The judges agreed that CJA 2003 broadened the rules of evidence in England and Wales
making more hearsay and other evidence newly admissible. Many of the judges felt in
light of that broadening that bench trials would not result in significantly different
evidentiary rulings than a jury trial.
The judicial posture was unanimous that the present regime of rules and directives have
significantly shortened jury trials, making them more readily understandable to the jury.
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Likewise the judges did not view the pruning case management process as significantly
reducing the culpability of accused fraudsters. The overwhelming view is that indictment
pruning and pretrial management hearings in which agreed facts are stipulated to, core
documents identified, disputes on evidentiary issues resolved and expert testimony vetted
all are consistent with the essentials of modem trial practice in any case, putting before
the trier of fact a cogent provable case with clarity and precision.
There is support for random jury selection but concern among some of the judges about
the service of jurors like police officers and judges. The judges favor plea bargaining,
but some of them are skeptical about whether or not it will ultimately achieve what the
government fraud review predicted fewer serious fraud trials.
Finally most of the judges favor the present system requiring the trial of all indictable
offenses before a jury and would not favor giving the defendant a choice of the mode of




"Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is
destroyed when right minded people go away thinking "the
judge was biased':".
Lord Lane, Rv. Bath [1990] Crim. L. R. 272
The spectre of jury ineptitude has driven the debate in favour of judge only trials and has
constrained policy regarding mode of trial decision making. The Auld report states that
juror capacity to deal with "the burdensome length" and increasing complexity of serious
fraud cases "put(s) justice at risk":
"The Director of Serious Fraud Office has recently said that the average
length of a serious fraud prosecuted by it is six months, which would come
largely before a jury of "the unemployed or unemployable".1075
This thesis has examined the jury and bench trial with this haunting concern in mind
along with other significant elements and factors which individually and combined can
impact on the soundness of each mode of trial. Fortunately different conclusions are
reached in this work which challenge the accuracy of this dire warning of the Director of
the Serious Fraud Office, and refute the main complaints of other critics of jury trials.
The conclusion reached herein is that trial by jury is sound. Trial by judge is not
presently a mode of trial that engenders confidence but it can be a sound alternative in
England and Wales and the U.S.A. if reformed to create more certainty regarding the
I01S The Auld Report. supra note 16, at Chap. 6 #183.
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process to be followed. Therefore the conclusions and recommendations to improve both
modes of trial are set forth below.
I. Should Juries Continue?
I conclude that the jury is a culturally important political instrument of longstanding
significance to the U.S.A., Canada and England and Wales. Trial by jury is a protected
right in Canada and the U.S.A., and is a legal and cultural precedent protected by statute
in England and Wales. Indeed in jurisdictions in which the human rights, due process, or
civil rights model of justice are the philosophical objectives of the justice system, the jury
is a guarantor that outcomes are not reached by permanent state agents such as judges.
There is an artificial division between policy and practice in this debate. In each of the
comparator jurisdictions mode of trial decisions are set forth in political instruments and
are frequently fodder for political posturing. For example, the Blair government's pursuit
of trial by judge in certain serious fraud cases blaming juries for collapsed trials, or
unsupported myth that juries in America in civil cases are biased against corporations are
examples of political policy arguments which lack a sound factual basis.1076
1016 Valarie Hans, Business on Trial (2000 Yale University Press) 216-218.
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Redmayne points out that juries are competent fact finders, provide citizen participation,
and offer the defendant in criminal cases peer decision making thereby providing succor
to nations with emphasis on due process.I077
The extent to which the jury offers the defendant peer review is properly the object of
discussion. In culturally diverse societies like America and England and Wales, making
the jury pool more representative is an important objective. Cheryl Thomas and Nigel
Balmer have concluded that England and Wales juries are in fact racially and culturally
balanced based on studies of jurors summoned to representative courthouses.Y"
Ab . h d lid" '1" 11079ramson pomts out t at a ran om y se ecte JUry IS not necessan y impartia .
Random jury selection as practiced in England and Wales poses problems given the
absence of voir dire. By contrast as noted in chapters 2 and 3, American voir dire creates
citizen discontent and a sense that juries are crafted by lawyers to be biased. Not
withstanding those problems, the notion of judges serving as fact finders without the
option of jury trials creates discomfort among the judiciary. The research conducted in
this thesis demonstrates that the England and Wales judges interviewed have real
concerns that judicial fact finding will create cultural concerns and/or public opinion that
is suspicious of judicial bias in criminal cases.
1077 Michael Redmayne, Theorizing Jury Reform, in Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra
Marshall and Victor Tadros Eds, The Trial on Trial, Vol. 2, 101-105, (2006 Oxford and Portland
Press).
1078 Cheryl Thomas and Nigel Balmer, Diversity and Fairness in Jury System, ii-iv, (2007
Ministry of Justice Research Series 2/07).
1079 Jeffrey Abramson, We, The Jury, 122-123 (1994 Basic Books).
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I would note that the intensive efforts in the comparator nations to obtain a representative
jury pool are precursors to the tidal wave of doubt that may follow if jury trials are
eliminated to be replaced by judges. Method of judicial selection will be of even greater
significance and the cultural diversity of the judiciary will be even more important.
Judges cannot bring to the task of fact finding the same broad cross section of all walks
of society available when jurors are summoned to the courthouse.
Creating panels of judges, apart from the expense associated therewith, would likely not
significantly increase diversity. Some might suggest that such a panel would provide
comfort to the sole trier of fact as a decision maker, but the problem is more complex. As
noted by Judge Number 7 in Chapter 9 the judge as the trier of law in common law
adversarial justice system must render a series of decisions commencing in the pretrial
phase up through the trial that inevitably requires extensive discourse and comment about
the facts in the case as applied to the law. This pretrial knowledge of the facts in the case
is contrasted with the absolute ignorance of the facts on the part of the jury when first
empanelled. An unfavorable decision or even a gesture by the judge may suggest to the
litigants prejudice or predisposition, a very different role than the continental system
judge as noted in Chapter 9. A three judge panel would likely not relieve that problem,
as the trier of law will also serve as the trier of fact, and thus pretrial exposure remains a
concern. The mode of trial debate need not be an either/or proposition, the choice of
mode of trial can be given to the defendant without causing systemic harm. The academic
focus and that of the legal establishment should therefore be directed toward making each
mode of trial equivalent, fair and available to the accused at his/her option.
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Most objective academic studies confirm the opinions of the overwhelming number of
lawyers and judges that the jury system works. The reason the legal establishment
including judges and bar associations support the continuation of trial by jury in criminal
cases is a clear sense that fairness is achieved and justice is done in that mode of trial.
II. Juries Have the Confidence of the Judiciary
What is indisputable from this study is the strong level of agreement and confidence
expressed by the U.S.A. and England and Wales judiciary in jury verdicts in all cases and
particularly in complex and serious fraud trials. Each and every England and Wales
judge interviewed expressed a strong preference that all criminal cases including serious
fraud cases be tried by a jury. Each and every judge also expressed a high level of
confidence in jury verdicts, offering the view that juries are able to understand complex
cases.
The New York State judges surveyed also expressed a high level of agreement with the
jury verdicts before them, particularly in complex cases -- 78% of the surveyed judges
agreed with juries in complex criminal cases over 75% of the time and in complex civil
cases, 58% agreed with the jury over 75% of the time. In all criminal cases 89% of the
judges surveyed agreed with the jury over 75% of the time and in all civil cases 77%
agreed with the jury over 75% of the time. Coupled with the work performed by others
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over the last several decades in both England and Wales and the U.S.A., this study shows
that the claims made in the England and Wales parliament and the U.S.A. that juries lack
the competence to try serious fraud and other complex case are without support by the
judges who observed them.I080
III. Judge only Trials Can Be a Sound Alternative to Jury Trials
The survey results demonstrate that in New York State complex bench trials are of a
shorter duration than complex jury trials. Interviews with judges in England and Wales
found a closely divided opinion on whether complex judge only trials would take less
time than complex jury trials.
The survey further indicates that New York State judges and lawyers both believe that
case complexity is an important basis to choose a judge only trial. However, the survey
also suggests that there are procedural impediments which make that choice less
attractive in the absence of changes. It is telling that in New York State, where the
defendant can choose a bench trial in a criminal case and the parties can choose a bench
trial in a civil case, both the judges and attorneys surveyed believe that a bench trial is
rarely considered as an option to the jury trial. Major factors which militate against that
choice include the identity and personality of the trial judge and the belief that juries are
more sympathetic than judges. On the other hand judge only trials were viewed more
favorably in complex cases and/or where there is an unsympathetic defendant. The
1080 Kalven and Zeisel, supra note 547; Levi (1993) supra note 913; Lloyd Bostock, [2007] The
Jubilee Line Jurors, supra note 509; Eisenberg, Hannaford-Azor Hans, Waters Munsterman,
Schwab andWells [2005], supra note 918.
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following is a review of the component factors which influence mode of trial choices
with recommendations for change to make the modes of trial more comparable and
consequently enhance the likelihood of the selection of the bench trial:
1. The Rules of Evidence. There should be uniformity in the application of the
rules of evidence. The rules of evidence should either be the same as between
judge only and jury trials or there should be clearly declared distinctions with
codified judge only trial rules. It appears that presently in the U.S.A. and
England and Wales based on the attorney survey and the interviews with judges
that the rules of evidence are applied differently in judge only trials. Chapter 7
recites cases in which American appellate courts have indicated that the rules of
expert witness reliability differs from bench to jury. The Auld report advocated
different judicial conduct in bench trials from jury trials in England and Wales.
American lawyers surveyed say the evidentiary ruling are different between bench
and jury trials, and while a majority of New York State judges gave survey
responses which dispute this contention, England and Wales judges tacitly
acknowledge this difference in conduct in their interviews.
Unlike England and Wales the hearsay rule in the U.S.A., California and New
York State is narrow. The survey suggests reluctance on the part of the judges
and lawyers to broaden the hearsay rule. This posture is relevant because it would
suggest that particularly in the U.S. there will continue to be a wide gap between
bench and jury trials in terms of evidentiary standards as the narrow application
432
will occur in jury trials and the more broad application will occur in bench trials.
The standard for the admission of expert testimony should be the same in each
mode of trial.
As suggested in Chapter 7, a best evidence hearsay rule applicable to both bench
and jury trials is a reasonable alternative to the present undefined rules in bench
trials.
2. Judicial conduct in Bench Trials Must Change to Avoid Either the Appearance
of or Actual Prejudice.
a. Recusal from prejudicial material.
The survey of judges and lawyers and the interviews confirm that there is judicial
exposure to prejudicial material during the pretrial phase which should be avoided
if there is going to be a bench trial or in the alternative a mechanism should exist
to permit reference of pretrial matters to another judge upon the application of a
party.
As noted in the survey, judges engage in substantive pretrial discussions in
criminal cases -- this is customarily in a management conference or in discussions
that result in plea bargaining. The judges in England and Wales favour plea
bargaining, with some expressing support for the Goodyear guidelines which are
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far more narrow in scope than American plea bargaining and restrict the judge to
only expressing the possible sentence on the record. Other England and Wales
judges felt that a broadening of the guidelines to allow the judge more interaction
in England and Wales regarding sentencing was indicated. Once again, there is a
substantial risk of prejudice when the trial judge engages in this process in a judge
only trial.
h. Judges should engage in conduct during the bench trial that is comparable to
their conduct during the jury trial.
The survey of judges and lawyers and the interviews also demonstrate that in
judge only trials, judges question witnesses more frequently and are likely to
conduct themselves in a different manner than in jury trials. While that was not
rated as a significant factor in mode of trial decision making in the survey, the
identity and personality of the judge were the highest factors rated. It is logical to
infer that judicial conduct during the trial is a manifestation of the judge's
personality. Judge only trials should not be events wherein common law judges
abandon the umpire-like role and don the robes of the continental/civil system
judiciary. Both modes of trial should have the common bond of the passive
judge. In reality there is no proper justification for different rules between judge
and jury trials. What is inadmissible before one mode of trial should not be
received into evidence in the other. The adversarial mode of trial should remain
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the constant and the trier of fact passive with same rules applicable to either
mode.
The judge should not conduct extensive inquiries during a bench trial, but as the
trier of fact should ask precisely the same questions that he/she would allow the
jury to ask. However the judge should be permitted, during the trial, to put
interrogatories to counsel regarding both factual issues and theories of the case,
to allow both sides to understand the trier of facts concerns and impressions, Le.
"Thus far Mr. Prosecutor I am unclear as what proof you have provided regarding
a required statutory element. Can you direct me to it or will it be forthcoming?"
If this statement is made in a bench trial, it will give both sides the opportunity to
know the concerns of the trier of fact as proof is developed. If this statement is
made in a jury trial, gaps in proof that may result in dismissal or conviction will
be brought to counsels' attention for the purpose of modifying the presentation of
the case. The bench verdict should be reasoned, offering the rational for its
decisions and specific rulings on all issues reserved upon. The appellate review
of a bench verdict should be precisely the same as the review of a jury verdict.
In jury trials when judges do question witnesses, most American jurisdictions call
for a jury charge by the judge to the jury reassuring them that the questioning
does not indicate that the judge has taken sides or formed a conclusion but rather
asked the questions for clarification. This charge is neglected by many New York
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judges and a similar instruction might be considered in England and Wales. Such
a charge should be given in all jurisdictions when a judge questions witnesses.
IV. The Defendant Should be Allowed to Select the Mode of Trial and the Parties
Should be Permitted One Peremptory Challenge of the Trial Judge in a Bench Trial
Bench trials in the U.S.A. are different from jury trials in the substantive ways set forth
above particularly as to the application of the rules of evidence. As contemplated in
England and Wales bench trials would also be very different from jury trials in complex
cases. This finding alone should give policy makers pause before imposing a bench trial
on a defendant in a complex case.
The survey results, the interviews with the England and Wales judges, and the debate in
Parliament all underline uneasiness with judge only trials in complex cases as presently
constituted in the U.S.A. and as proposed in England and Wales. The concern is
apparent, that bench trials will not be as fair and neutral as jury trials. The New York
State survey demonstrates that judicial personality and identity is a key factor in not
considering bench trials and motivate the choice of mode of trial. The England and
Wales judges expressed great concern about the burden imposed by bench trials upon the
appearance of fairness and were candid that case hardening may be a possibility. They
strongly opposed state imposed bench trials.
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The following analysis and proposals suggest a way forward in the mode of trial debate.
1. Allow the Defendant to Choose the Mode of Trial
Allowing the defendant to choose the mode of trial mitigates certain concerns about
appearances, as would permitting each side one peremptory challenge of the trial judge in
a bench trial. Coupled with the procedural reforms suggested above, the survey suggests
that judge only trials would be considered in complex cases and in cases with
unsympathetic defendants, the very profile of a serious fraud case.
The surveys, interviews, and case law all demonstrate that under the present systems in
England and Wales, New York State, the U.S. Federal Courts and California, bench trials
are quite different from jury trials.
The differences which exist in modes of trial including the application of the rules of
evidence, a much changed level of judicial participation, as well as much more potential
to prejudice the trier of fact constitute the key differences in the modes of trial. Although
empirical evidence is difficult if not impossible to gather in support of the proposition, it
is a logical assumption if not a fair conclusion that these factors could create a different
outcome in the same case in a jury trial as compared to a bench trial. Consequently the
imposition of the mode of trial in serious fraud cases as is proposed by the government in
England and Wales, works an unfairness upon the defendant and forces a mode of trial
that may not have the confidence of the defendant, his counsel, or even the judiciary.
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The mode of trial choice in New York State has provoked only 19% of the criminal cases
to be tried by judge only, suggesting that there are significant concerns about the bench
only mode of trial. As the survey of judges and attorneys confirms the bench mode of
trial is infrequently considered. The reasons for the infrequent consideration of a bench
trial include reservations about having one person serve as the trier of fact coupled with
uneven application of the rules of evidence in bench trials as compared to jury trials.
Inherently present is the problem of judicial case hardening. However, the
recommendations made above to permit peremptory challenges of judges, to have
uniformly applied rules of evidence, to modify judicial pretrial and intra trial conduct,
would likely make bench trials more attractive in complex cases, as demonstrated by the
survey showing that both complexity and an unsympathetic client are significant factors
favouring a bench trial.
The England and Wales judiciary interviewed did not support giving the defendant mode
of trial choice. It is the same philosophy which drives England and Wales opposition to
peremptory challenges - the belief that the parties should not be allowed to tacitly impact
the trial outcome through maneuvering the identity of the trier of fact. The difference
regarding peremptory challenges reflects a cultural difference between the American and
English justice system. However, given the stark contrasts between bench and jury trials,
government imposition of judge only trials works greater violence upon the justice
system than the foregoing proposals.
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Judge #3, a distinguished England and Wales jurist with extensive experience, gave the
most detailed objections to the mode of trial choice resting in the defendant and to the
imposition of judge only trials, which are set forth below with the counter argument,
bolstered by the results of this study:
A) Where there are multiple defendants. there will be severance
problems. The answer is that the right to a jury trial is paramount and a
jury trial is ordered for all if there is disagreement between the defendants
to resolve the severance issue. Severances occur in any event as it is the
present practice to split up defendants for trial in England and Wales and
the U.S.A. for management purposes as noted in Chapter 9.
B) There will be judge shopping (For the judge in a bench trial). That
may be but if it is based on the notion that both sides have an equal
opportunity to shop, won't that at least give some enhanced sense of
fairness? This paper advocates one peremptory challenge of the judge in a
judge-only trial per side, or a stipulated judge selected from an available
list agreed upon between the parties, is arguably more principled than the
state imposing a judge only trial.
C) Judges will be asked to remove themselves during the case. As in
California, once selected, the trial judge stays on the case, particularly
once a substantive issue has been determined by that judge. Prior to that
time as established in a trial management order, the parties each have one
challenge of the judge to be exercised at the commencement of the case.
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D) Judges will be exposed pretrial to prejudicial material. The issue of
exposure to prejudicial material is salient and applicable as well to the
government's pending proposal to have some serious frauds cases tried by
judge only. The judge as trier of fact should refer prejudicial motions to
another judge unless the parties stipulate otherwise. This is a principled
solution that resolves any problems regarding appearances.
E) Street wise jurors will resent that it is not a judge only trial. The
author has not found any published report of this phenomena nor heard
about it anecdotally, but it certainly warrants further study.
The choice of mode of trial must be made early in the case, before a substantive
decision is made by the judge and in the context of a grant of one challenge to the
judge, if a bench trial is selected.
2. Allow the Parties One Peremptory Challenge of the Judge in Judge Only
Trials. The parties should be allowed one (each) peremptory challenge to the trial
judge in a judge only trial. As noted above, both the identity and the personality
of trial judges were the highest factors weighed in the opinion of judges and
lawyers in New York State. Some protections to the parties who opt for the bench
mode of trial would appear to be sound and principled. This proposal has more
urgency in England and Wales where Parliament continues to weigh legislation
that would impose a bench trial in serious fraud cases. According the defendant
some input or control over the identity of the judge to try him seems principled.
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3. The Proposed System
A. England and Wales
1) England and Wales could create a several part system to permit choice
of mode of trial and peremptory challenge of the judge. The proposed
system would have the defendant advise the prosecution he is considering
a judge only mode of trial. This discussion should be prompted by the
presiding judge at the first management conference required as a part of
the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales control and management of
heavy fraud and other complex criminal cases protocol.1081
2) The parties would thereafter discuss whether or not they can agree on a
properly credentialed judge who is available to try the case either way,
from the list proffered by the presiding judge consistent with the
management protocol.
3) If the parties cannot agree, ajudge is assigned and the defendant must
promptly choose in a binding manner the mode of trial. If a judge only
trial is selected by the defendant each side receives a peremptory
challenge of the judge. A side would be defined as defendants with a
common interest or position in the case. Itwould be possible, but not
usual for the presiding judge to determine that more than one defendant
would have a peremptory challenge if a judge only trial was selected.
1081 Practice Direction, 22 March 2005, [2005] All Eur (D) 386 (Mar) (supra) 2(i)(a)(b).
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4) If a jury trial is selected, the trial judge randomly assigned sits on the
trial, with no peremptory challenges allowed.
This concept offers the defendant choice. It provides the prosecution with input and
creates a procedure through which both sides may agree with regard to the identity of
judge for a bench trial. If there is no agreement as to the specific judge but a bench trial
goes forward, each is offered some control over the identity of the trier oflaw/fact, a
quantum of control that is not available in the random selection format.
B. The U.S.A. and Canada
In U.S. Federal District Courts and New York State courts, and in Canadian Courts, the
process would be the same as in England and Wales except it would be initiated when a
judge is assigned to the case under the individual assignment systems in place in each
jurisdiction.
There may be concern at first blush that some judges will be preferred by the parties to
preside at bench trials and the other judges will see less service in that regard. This is a
workload issue which is readily adjusted. Those judges less frequently selected for bench
trials will be presiding at jury trials and any actual or perceived disparity in work load is
purely an administrative matter.
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v. The Managerial Approach Is Effective But Prejudice Should Be Avoided in
Bench Trials
The protocols in England and Wales, including indictment pruning and attempts to
reduce trial length are having success in England and Wales according to the judges
interviewed. The system is comparable to the present U.S.A. case management. Most
complex trials in the U.S.A. conclude without a Jubilee Line case like mishap although
hung juries do occur, as the anecdotal references in Chapter 4 chronicle.
However, the notion of intensive case management by the trial judge does pose increased
risk of prejudice as noted above. The judges and attorneys surveyed in New York State,
a significant percentage of the judges in New York State in bench trials read the file
(which can contain prejudicial and inadmissible material), decide substantive motions
with prejudicial material and engage in substantive pretrials. Particularly where there is
prejudicial evidence eligible for exclusion, the judge in a bench trial should require those
decisions to be made by another judge. Care must be taken in substantive pretrials to
protect the bench trial process from prejudice and/or the appearance of prejudice.
In the U.S.A., the New York judges and attorneys surveyed favored the imposition of
time limits in trials, reflecting a sense that due process is not necessarily an endurance
test for all involved.
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VI. Jury Selection and Randomness
All jurisdictions must be concerned about the role of expert jurors in the jury room. The
New York survey indicates a significant percentage where that expertise is believed to
have had an influence on case outcome. Of the judges who had expert jurors serve on a
jury, 54.5% said that expertise did not affect the verdict in their view, but 45.5% said it
did. Some of the England and Wales judges expressed concerns about judges and police
officers serving on randomly selected juries.
Neither random selection in England and Wales and Canada, nor the U.S.A. system of
voir dire with peremptory challenges appear to answer the problem of more educated
jurors being discharged in lengthy complex trials such as serious fraud cases. That there
is a high degree of judicial confidence in jury outcomes should provide some succor that
the impact of this potential imbalance is not adverse to a sound outcome. The problem is
likely one that cannot be remedied, as Judge #5 noted in Chapter 9, potential jurors with
responsible employment will likely frequently be unable to sit in lengthy trials.
VII. Jurors Should Not Publicly Comment Post-Trial on Deliberations Upon
Completion of a Trial; Courts should be Permitted to Investigate a Breach of the
Jurors' Oath
A modified version of the rule in England and Wales embargoing any juror comment post
trial about verdicts would serve the U.S.A. well. In the U.S.A. jurors should be advised
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that they are entitled to give their opinions and their position regarding the verdict, but
that they are not permitted to disclose the details of the deliberations, the opinions of
other jurors, or prior votes by the jury before the fmal verdict. On the other hand, the
restrictions in England and Wales and the U.S.A. on investigation into jury deliberation
conduct should be modified to permit the trial court to investigate any credible allegation
that the jurors breached their oath.
VIII. Summary
It is the inescapable conclusion that the choice of mode of trial can determine the
outcome of a case because it will determine the identity of the trier of fact and the tenor
of the case, including the evidence that will be considered. Trial by judge can and should
be an attractive alternative for a defendant to select, particularly in complex cases.
Fairness dictates that the choice of mode of trial be given to the defendant and reason
suggests that peremptory challenges of judges is fair and principled given the present
status of judge only trials. Even in the random jury selection forum of England and
Wales, the government can still stand aside jurors and under 43 C.J.A. 2003 and bill 6 of
2006-07 can exclusively ask for a judge only trial, giving the prosecution unfair
advantage.
All of the comparator countries should strive to make the bench trial either comparable in
rule or tone to the jury trial or with clearly established procedures and evidentiary rules
that remove that mode of trial from judicial caprice.
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Finally, and most significant, research in this thesis indicates a vital jury system which
has the confidence of judges and lawyers in the U.S.A. and England and Wales. The
perceived crisis prompting judge only trials and the notion of unconstitutional complexity
is not supported by the professionals who actually hear and try complex cases.
Judge #5 best reflected the state of the jury:
"I view the jury as the best measurement of truth or
dishonesty. It is right that the jury should remain and 1feel
that very strongly - the guardian of the notion of honest or
not is the jury."
Although bench trials are the defendant's choice in New York State they are rarely
considered because of a lack of confidence in their structure and fairness. The
comparator countries should strive to reform the judge only trial system so that mode of
trial can receive an endorsement comparable that received by juries in the above quote.
And the imposition of judge only criminal trials in common law countries should be
resisted because of the flawed nature of that process which appears to impose one
instrument of the state to sit in judgment as to guilt or innocence. As Judge Number 3
said:
"It seems to me that it is far better to be judged by twelve
of your peers than one judge. That is a right 1believe we
should maintain."
This view in America is based on the U.S. constitution and in England and Wales it is a
cultural belief.
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Trial by jury is a privilege in England and Wales as opposed to a right in the U.S.A. and
Canada. The flaws projected in judge only trials of indictable offences discussed above
raise the spectre that the imposition of judge only trials for serious fraud cases as
presently proposed in Parliament would be unsound, particularly because juries are able
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ANNEX A
Thank you for taking the time to complete this quostionnaie.





If you would like to receive information about the results or the survey
send a separate e-mau to Judge Julian at riulian@cQurts state.ny. us
Judges' Questionnaire
1. For how many years have you been a judge?
01 to 5~ars
06 to 10 ~ars
o More than 10 years
2. Over how many trials of each type have you presided?
0 1-49 50-99 100·200 >200
Civil Jury 0 0 0 0 0
Civil Bench 0 0 0 0 0
Criminal Jury 0 0 0 0 0
Criminal bench 0 0 0 0 0
3. In what percent of jury trials over which you preside do you agree with the Jury's
verdict?
Doesn't Less Than
Apply 25% 26%·50% 510/...75% 76·/0-100%
CMI Jury Trials 0 0 0 0 0
Criminal Jury Trials 0 0 0 0 0
















S. When counsel in a civil case decides NOT to consider or choose a bench trial,
how important do you think each of the following factors is in the decision?
Very Somewhat Not at all Not surel
Important Important Important No opinion
Uncertainty about the identity of
judge who will try the case 0 0 0 0
The personality of the Judge (in
individual assignment parts) 0 0 0 0
Uncertainty about how the judge
will apply rules of evidence in a 0 0 0 0
bench trial
Concern that the judge will take an
active role in questioning witnesses 0 0 0 0
Concem that bench verdicts
receive less Appellate Review than 0 0 0 0
jury verdicts
6. When counsel in a civil case chooses a bench trial, how important do you think
each of the foHowing factors is in the decision?
Very Somewhat Not at all Not surel
Important Important Important No opinion
Likelihood of prompt trial 0 0 0 0
Lower cost of bench trial in
terms of time and money









7. When counsel in a criminal case decide NOT to consider or choose a bench trial,
how important do you think each of the following factors is in the decision?
Very Somewhat Not at all Not surel
Important Important Important No opinion
Uncertainty about the identity of
judge who will actually try the 0 0 0 0
case
The personality of the judge (ln
0 0 0 0individual assignment parts)
The belief that jury is more likely
0to be sympathetic 0 0 0
Uncertainty about how the judge
will apply rules of evidence in a 0 0 0 0
bench trial
Concem that the judge >Mil take
an active role in questioning 0 0 0 0
witnesses
Concern that bench verdicts
receive less Appellate Review 0 0 0 0
than jury verdicts
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8. When counsel in a criminal case decide to choose a bench trial, how important
do you think each of the following factors is in the decision?
Very Somewhat Not at ail Doesn't
Important Important Important Apply
Likelihood of prompt trial
0 0 0 0
lower cost of bench trial in
terms of time and money 0 0 0 0
Complexity of the case
0 0 0 0
Nature of the Case (heinous
crime or controversial Issues) 0 0 0 0
Identity of the judge
0 0 0 0
length of the trial
0 0 0 0
Unsympathetic client 0 0 0 0
9. Overall. what percentage of the cases that you try would you say are complex?
ONone 025% 050% 075% OAII
10. When a jury decides a complex case over which you preside. about how often do
you agree with the jury?
Doesn't Less Than
Apply 25% 26%..50% 51%..75% 76%-100
Civil 0 0 ill 0
Criminal 0 0 ill 0
'1. In the last five years what is the average number of trial days for cases over
which you have presided?
Doesn't Mlre than
Apply 1-0 days 6-10 days 10 da)6
Civil Jury Trials
Complex 0 0 0 0
Not Complex 0 0 0 0
Civil Bench Trials
Complex 0 0 0 0
Not Complex 0 0 0 0
Criminal Jury Trials
Complex 0 0 0 0
Not Complex 0 0 0 0
Criminal Bench Trials
Complex 0 0 0 0
Not Complex 0 0 0 0
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12. How often you think that a trial judge engages in the following activities before
trial?
Very Once in Never Not sure
Often 8\'ilile
Reading the file prior to pretrial
Civil Jury Trials 0 0 0 0
Civil Bench Trials 0 0 0 0
Criminal Jury Trials 0 0 0 0
Criminal Bench Trials 0 0 0 0
Offer opinions about the likely Very Once in Never
Nol sure
outcome of the case Often a\'ilile
Civil Jury Trials 0 0 0
0
Ci"';l Bench Trials 0 0 0
0
Criminal Jury Trials 0 0 0
0
Criminal Bench Trials 0 0 0
0
Conducting a substantive pretrial Very Once in
Never Not sure
for settlement purposes Often al>lhile
Cilll Jury Trials 0 0
0 0
Civil Bench Trials 0 0
0 0
Criminal Jury Trials 0 0
0 0
Criminal Bench Trials 0 0 0
0
Deciding substantive motions that Very Once in
Never Not sure
include potentially prejudicial or Often s\'ilile
inadmissible information
Civil Jury Trials 0 0 0
0
Civil Bench Trials 0 0 0
0
Criminal Jury Trials 0 0
0 0
Criminal Bench Trials 0 0
0 0






Civil Jury Trials 0 0 0
0
Civil Bench TrialS 0 0 0
0
Criminal Jury Trials 0 0 0
0
Criminal Bench Trials 0 0 0
0
14. If you question witnesses, how often would you say you
Very Often Once In a While
Ne-.er
a) Ask a Question that is objected to 0 0
0
b) Give a cautionary charge after your
questions 0 0
0
c) Give a cautionary charge about
)Ourquestions at the end of the trial 0 0
0
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15. In your opinion, would you say that judges generally apply
a) Apply rules of evidence the same way in bench trials as in jury tnats?
OYes 0 No 0 Don't Know 0 Not Applicable
b) Apply rules regarding testimonial hearsay the same way in bench trials in jury trials?
oYes 0 No 0 Don't Know 0 Not Applicable
c)Apply rules regarding documentary hearsay the same way in bench trials as in Jurytrials?
oYes 0 No 0 Don't Know 0 Not Applicable
16. What's your opinion about relaxing the present New York State hearsay rule?o Favor 0 Oppose
17. What's your opinion about having a rule permitting trial judges to impose time limits
on the parties during trials? 0 Favor 0 Oppose
18. Have you had jurors with special training or expertise on a trial where you believed
their expertise was relevant to the case? 0 Yes 0 No
IF YES:
a) Did you give a special instruction given about juror's expertiso?
o Yes ONo
b)Did the jury reach a verdict? 0 Yes 0 No
c) Did you talk with the jury after the trial verdict was rendered?
o ves 0 No
IF YES: Based on what the jurors told you do you feel that the Juror's
expertise made him/her an expert in the jury room?DYes 0 No
IF YES: Do you think the juror's expertise had an impact
on the verdict 0 Yes 0 No
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Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.





If you would like to receive information about the results of the survey
send a separate e-mail toJudgeJulianatdulian@cQurts.state.ny.us
501
ANNEXB
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questlonnale.





If you would like to receive information about the results of the survey
send a separate e-mail to Judge Julian at riulian@courts.state.nyus
Attorney Questionnaire
1. For how many years have you been an attorney?
01 to 5 years
06 to 10 years
o More than 10 years
2. In how many trials of each type have you participated?
0 149 50-99 100-200 >200
Civil Jury 0 0 0 0 0
Civil Bench 0 0 0 0 0
Criminal Jury 0 0 0 0 0
Criminal bench 0 0 0 0 0
3. Is your practice predominantly 0 Civil 0 Criminal
4. Is your practice predominantly in 0 State Court 0 Federal Court
5. A} For Attorneys whose practice is predominantly CIVIL:
Please estimate what percent of your civil trials are resolved through.
(Total should equaI100.)
__ Settlement without adjudication
__ Bench trial (with or without subsequent settlement)
__ Arbitration
__ Jury Trial (with or without subsequent settlement)
__ (Total should equaI100.)
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B) For Attorneys whose practice is predominantly CRIMINAL:
Please estimate what percent of the criminal trials are resolved through.
(Total should equal 100%).
___ Plea
__ Jury Trial
__ (Total should equaI100.)














O' Other Explain: _




o Other Explain: _
9. Overall, what percentage of the cases that you try would you say are complex?
o None 0 25% 0 50% 0 75% 0 All
10. In the last five years what has been the average number of trial days for cases in
which you were involved?
Doesn't fv'ore than
Apply 1-6 days 6-10 days 10dajoS
Jury Trials
Complex 0 0 0 0


















11. How often do you consider seeking a bench trial?
o Most of the time 0 Sometimes 0 Very rarely o Never
12. If you consider seeking a bench trial most of the time or sometimes, how
important are the following factors in your decision to seek a bench trial?
Very Somewhat Not at all Doesn't
Important Important Important Apply
o 0 0 0
o 0 0 0
likelihood of prompt trial
Lower cost of bench trial in terms
of time and money
Complexity of the case
Nalure of the Case (heinous
crime or controversial issues)
Identity of the Judge






















13. If you rarely or never consider seeking a bench trial, how important are the
following factors in your decision NOT to seek a bench trial?
Doesn'!Very Somewhat No! at all
Important Important Important Apply
Uncertalrlty about the identity of
0 0judge who will actually try the case 0 0
The personality of the judge (in
0individual assignment parts) 0 0 0
The belief that jury is more likely to
0 0be sympathetic 0 0
Uncertainty about how the judge will
apply rules of evidence in a bench 0 0 0 0trial
Concern that the judge will lake an
0 0active role in questioning witnesses 0 0
Concern that bench verdicts receive
less Appellate Review than jury 0 0 0 0
verdicts
Federal rules requiring prosecutor's
0 0 0 0consent
3
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14. In your experience, how often do trial judges engage in the following activities
before trial?
Very Once in Never Not sure
Often awhile
Reading the file prior to pretrial
Jury Trials 0 0 0 0
Bench Trials 0 0 0 0
Offering opinions about the likely
outcome of the case
Jury Trials 0 0 0 0
Bench Trials 0 0 0 0
Conducting a substantive pretrial
for settlement purposes
Jury Trials 0 0 0 0
Bench Trials 0 0 0 0
Deciding substantive motions that
include potential prejudicial or
inadmissible lntormation
Jury Trials 0 0 0 0
Bench Trials 0 0 0 0
15. In your experience, how active are judges in questioning witnesses during trials?
Generally do judges question ...
All Most Some No Doesn't
Witnesses Witnesses Witnesses Witnesses Apply
Civil Jury Trials 0 0 0 0 0
Civil Bench Trials 0 0 0 0 0
Criminal Jury Trials 0 0 0 0 0
Criminal Bench Trials 0 0 0 0 0
16. In your trial experience, how strictly would you say that judges apply the rules of
evidence relating to .... (Circle the number that applies.)
Not at all Very Strictly
Testimonial hearsay 01 02 03 04 05
Documentary hearsay 01 02 03 04 05
Prior bad acts 01 02 03 04 05
Prior criminal record 01 02 03 04 05
Disclosure/discovery compliance 01 02 03 04 05
Expert Testimony based on
Daubert or Frye 01 02 03 04 05
4
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17. Based on your own trial experience, would you say that judges generally .
Apply rules of evidence the same way in bench trials as in jury trials?
OYes 0 No 0 Don't Know 0 Not Applicable
Apply rules regarding testimonial hearsay the same way in bench trials as in jury trials?
OYes 0 No 0 Don't Know 0 Not Applicable
Apply rules regarding documentary hearsay the same way in bench trials as in jury trials?
OYes 0 No 0 Don't Know 0 Not Applicable
18. What's your opinion about relaxing the present New York State hearsay rule?
o Favor 0 Oppose
19. What's your opinion about a having a rule permitting trial judges to impose time limits
on the parties during trials? 0 Favor 0 Oppose
20. Have you had jurors with special training or expertise on a trial where you believed
their expertise was relevant to the case? 0 Yes 0 No
IFYES:
a) Did the judge give a special instruction given about juror's expertise?
OYes 0 No
b)Did the jury reach a verdict? 0 Yes 0 No
c) Did you talk with the jury after the trial verdict was rendered?
OYes 0 No
IF YES: Based on what the jurors told you do you feel that the juror's
expertise made him/her an expert in the jury room? 0 Yes 0 No
IF YES: Do you think the juror's expertise had an impact on the
verdict 0 Yes 0 No
21. In what percent of trials in which you have been involved in the last five years, have



















Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.





If you would like to receive information about the results of the survey
send a separate e-mail toJudgeJulianatdulian@courts.slale.ny.us
507
Annex C
Summary Statistics for Attorney and Judge Questionnaires
- ~- .- -
}:Xllcraence
Attorney Judge Total
1 to 5 years I 14
15
Experience 6 to 10 years e 17 17










1-49 26 32 58
# Civil Jury
50-99 6 10 16
100-200 3 13 16









1-49 33 39 n
50-99 2 8 10
100-200 I 5 6





II Criminal Jury Trials
------r Attorney Judge Total--
lNOA~;~ 9 9 18ro- 7 13 20
11-49 23 30 53II Criminal Jury
50-99 3 7 10
1-----
100-200 0 12 12
1----
>200 0 9 9-




II Criminal Bench Trials
,---------------i---rAltorncy IJudge ITotal
f lNo Answer I 9 17 26
I 1>200 0 6 6
# Criminal Bench ~
18 14 32
I 100-200 0 3 3
11-49 15 35 50
I 150-99 0 5 5
lTot:l1 42 80 122
- -
Judge Agree with Civil Jury Verdict
----
Attorney Judge Total
No Answer 42 4 46
26%-50% 0 2 2
udge Agree Civil Jur-y Verdict 5J%-75% 0 13 13
76%-100% 0 52 52
Don't Apply 0 9 9








Judge Agree with Criminal Jury Verdict
I Attorney Judge Tot.1
i No Answer 42 7 49
I
!.Judge Agree Criminal Jury Verdict
51%-75% 0 6 6
I 76%-100% 0 50 50




How often arto rneys consider Civil Bench Trials
,- Attorney Judge To •• 1
I No Answer 42 7 49
I Never I 0 I I
I IIConsider Civil Bench Rarely 0 26 26
Sometimes 0 37 37
Ivery_ofle~ 0 I) 9
I
~ 42 80 122
-
How often attorneys consider Criminal Bench trials
I Attorney Judge Total
I
No Answer 42 13 55
Never 0 I 1
!Consider Criminal Bench Rarely 0 41 41
I Sometimes 0 18 18
! Very Often 0 7 7
Fot,,1 42 80 122
3
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Judges were asked to determine importance of factors in considering or choosing it bench
trial for both civil and criminal cases. Attorneys were only asked generally the
importance of the following factors in considering or choosing a bench trial. Therefore,
the frequencies are reported separately. Judges' responses appear first followed by the
attorney responses.
Factor-s Agllinst Choosing. Civil Bench Trial: Identity of Judge
I Attorney Judge Total
I No Answer 42 4 46
I Does Not Apply 0 II II
ICivil: Judge II) Not at All Important 0 II II
I
Somewhat Important 0 27 27
I Very ImI>Ort110' 0 27 27






Factnrs Against Choosing. Civil Bench Trial: Judge's Personality
--------
Attorney Judge Total
No Answer 42 3 45
Does Nol Apply 0 10 10
vii: Judge Personality Not at All Important 0 8 8
Somewhat Importaot 0 32 32
Very lmportant 0 27 27
tal 42 80 122
Factor
o.
S Against Choosing a Civil Bench Trial: Application of Rule. of Evident.
.----..._---,---
Altorney Judge Total
No Answer 42 4 46
Docs Not Apl,ly 0 9 9
vpply Evid rules Not at All Important 0 25 25
Somewhat Important 0 30 30

















ICiVil: Judge active Not at All Important
\





Factors Against Choosing a Civil Bench Trial: Less Appellate Review
--- - -----.----- IAttorney Judge Total
No Answer I 42 3 45
Does Not Apply LO 20 20
Civil: Less Appellate Not at Alllmportant~O 35 35
Somewhat Importan;r--- 0 16 16
Very [mpnrtant 1 0 6 6
Total I 42 80 122----
Factors For Choosing a Civil Bench Trial: Promptness
i--r-- Attorney Judge Total
, No Answer 42 3 45
I 1)0 es Not Apply r- 0 6 6I
ICivi: Prompt Not at All Importanl 0 1.0 10
i
Somewhal Importanl 0 37 37









, lDoes Not Apply














Factors For Choosing a Civil Bench Trial: Complexity or Case
,
I-- I IAttorney l.iudge Total
I INo Answer 42 3 45
I I 0 5I Does Not Apply 5ICivil: Complexity Nol at All Important 0 3 3
I
I Somewhat Important 0 36 36
I Very Important 0 33 33:
[TOr",- 42 80 122
Factors Against Choosing a Criminal Bench Trial: Idenury of Judge
I--------r---I Judge TotalI Attorney
r--- 4 46, No Answer 42
Does Not Apply 0 II II
Criminal: Judge ID Not at All Important 0 15 15
Somewhat Importanr 0 19 19
i
Very Important 0 31 31
L~~_____., 42 80 122
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Factors Agninst Choosing a Criminal Bench Trial: Personality or Judge
r-
I Attorney Judge Total
f
I No Answer 42 5 47
!
I Does Not Apply 0 II IIICriminal: Judge PHS Not .1 All Important 0 4 4
I
l Somewhat Important 0 28 28Very Important 0 32 32
1._Toral 42 80 122
F:lCIO"SAgainst Choosing a Criminal Bench Trial: Jury more sympathetic
r _._._---- 1Altorney 1,ludge Total
r--
42 4 46I No Answer
I
I Does Not Apply 0 II II
I
!Criminal: .Jury more sympat Not at All Important 0 2 2
I Somewhat Important 0 28 28
I
35f Very Important 0 35
ITol,,1 42 80 122
Factors Againsl Choosing a Criminal Bench Trial: Application of Rules of E"idenee
I Attorney Judge TotalI
No Answer 42 6 48
Doe. Not Apply 0 II II
Cs-iminul: Apply evid rules ' Not at All Important 0 27 _7
Somewhat Important 0 33 33
Very Important 0 J 3





Factors Against Choosing. Criminal Bench Trial: Judge active
Attorney Judge Total
INo Answer 42 4 46
Does Not Apply 0 11 11
Crlminal: Judge active Not at All Important 0 36 36
Somewhat Important 0 26 26
Very Important 0 3 3
Tot111 42 80 122
I
r:::--
Factors Against Cno osing a Criminal Bench Trial: Less Appellate Review
IAttorney l.Judgel Total
No Answer 42 -----:il 46
Does Not Apply 0 14 14
Hate NOl at Alllml,ort8nt 0 43 43
Somewhat Important 0 15 15














Factors For Choosing a Criminal Bench Trial: Promptness
r IAttorney IJudge Total
No Answer 42 5 47
Does Not Apply 0 9 9
riminnl: Prompt Not at All Important 0 32 32
Somewhat Important '0 22 22
Very Important 0 12 12









Factors For Cboosing a Criminal Bench Trial: COS I
~ ._-'1 IAHOrney Judge Tot.1
-----lrN-O--A-n-S-"-'e-r--------r-----4~2-r--~7+---4~9
Does Not Apply I 0 8 8
Crtnunnt: Cost' Not at All Important 0
Somewhat Important 0
Very Important 0 9 9
Total 42 80 122
Factors For Choosing. Criminal Bench Trial: Complexity of Case
._r I Attorney .Judge Total,-
rNo Answer 421I 5 47
i .. . lDoes Not Apply -----or 7 7
ICrtminal: Complexity INot at All Important 0 10 10
'Somewhat Important 0 34 34
I IVery ImportantI 0 24 24
r--
lTotal 42 80 122
factors For Choosing a Criminal Bench Trial: Nature of Case
! Attorney Judge Total
I No Answer 42 5 471-----.--Does Not Apply 0 6 6iCriminal: Nature of Case Not at Allimporlant 0 4 4
Somewhat Important 0 23 23
I Very Important 0 42 42
~ 42 80 122
9
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Factors Fe r Choosing a Criminal Bench Trtal: Identity or .Iudge
i---
Attorney Judge Total, --
No Answer 42 5 47
Does Not Apply 0 7 7
Crtrmnnt: Judge ID Not at All Important 0 3 3
Somewhat Important 0 21 21,
Very Important 0 44 44
r-
ITotal 42 80 122
Factors For Choosing a Criminal Bench Trial: Trtal leugth
---I Attorney Judge Total
No Answer 42 5 47
Does Not Apply 0 6 6
-
Crimmat: Triat lengtb Not at All Import •• t 0 28 28
Somewhat Important 0 39 39
Very Important 0 2 2
Total 42 80 122
Factors For Choosing a Criminal Bench Trial: lJnsympathetic client
I, Attorney ,Judge Totlll
No Answer 42 5 47
I
Does Not Apply 0 6 6ICriminnl: Unsyrnpathenc client Not at All Important 0 2 2
I
38Somewhat Important 0 38;
Very Important 0 2<) 29
ITot:l1 42 80 122
10
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Factors Agai.nst Choosing a Bench Trial: Identity of Judge
r -_-
I Attorney Judge ToI.1
! 16 80 96
I Does Not Apply 7 0 7
!JudgelD Not at All Important 2 0 2
I Somewhat Important 4 0 4
I Very Importaut 13 0 13
ITolal 42 80 122






Dues Not Apply 2 0 2
I Judge Personality NOI .1 All Important 6 0 6
I 0 7Somewhat Impcrtant 7,
Very Important II 0 II
TOlal 42 80 122




I Attorney Judge Tolal
: 16 80 96
I Does Nol Apply 4 0 4I
!Jury more sympathetic Not at Alllmportanl 5 0 5
I
0 9Somewhat Important 9
I
I Very Important 8 0 8
:Total 42 80 122
II
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Fnctors Against Choosing ,I Bench Trial: AppliCJIt.ion of Rules of Evidrnce
: -- [ M,"n., "'" ,.,.. ,
~--- Docs Not Apply '; 8~ 9;
I Rules or Evidence ~ All Important II 0 ~
ISomewhat Important 10 0 10
IVery Important 2 0 2
,·ro!al . j_ 4_2-L 8_0-L__ 1_2~2
Factors Against Choosing a Hench Trial: .Judge Active,
I Attorney Judge Total
, 16 80 96
I IDoes Not Apply 5 0 5
!Judg(' uctive Not a! All Important 11 0 I
I
Somewhat Important 6 0 6
I
Very Important 4 0 4
ITotal 42 80 122
Factors Against Choosing a Bench Trial; Less Appellate Review
r---
I Attorney Judge Total,
:- 16 80 96
I Does Not Apply 2 0 2iLess Appellate Not at All Important 13 0 13
I
Somewhat Important 8 0 8
I Very Important 3 0 3Ir
iTo!.' 42 80 122
12
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s Not Apply 1 0 I
at All Important l--uil 0 10
iewhat Importan!l 13 0 13
Y Import;;;;;---r- I 0 I
--:_[_ 42 80 122





I IDoes Not Apply 2 0 2
Icostl Not at All Important 12 0 12I [Somewhat Important 5 0 5
1 I very Important --5 0 5
rr,;tal 42 80 122




Does Not Apply 0 0 0
omplexity Not at All Important I 0 I
Somewhat Important 8 0 8
'very Important 16 0 16
otal 42 80 122----
13
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Factors For Choosing a Bench Trial: Nature ofCase
I,
I Judge Totali Attorney
r--- 18 80 98,, IDoes Not Apply! 7 0 7
Nature of c:lse! Not at All Important 0 0 0
rSomewhat Important 9 0 9
very Important 8 0 8
rTohl1 42 80 122
L
Factors For Choosing a Bench Trial: Identity of .ludge:-----r--
Attorney Judge Tot~1
i-I 17 80 22
I
I
Does Not Apply I 0 I
I Judge ID Not at All Important 0 0 0
I Somewhat Important
8 0 8
I Very Important I
16 0 16
1-Total 42 80 122
-
Factors For Choosing a flench Trial: Trial Length
!
I Attorney Judge Total,
r-, 18 80 98
I
i Does Not Apply I 0
I
ITrial length Not at All Important 9 0 9
I
Somewhat Important 12 0 12
Very Important 2 0 2











Does Not Apply 6 0 (,
I
i Unsympathetic client Not at All Important I 0 I
,
Somewhat Important II 0 III
! Very Important 6 0 6
ITotal 42 80 122
Complex Trials
I Attorney Judge. Total
No Answer 2 0 2
None 0 J 3
25% 5 '2 57,Complex Trials
50% (, 15 21
I 75(Vn t7 6 23
l All 12 4 16
Total 42 80 122
Agre. Complex Criminal
I Attorney Judge Tota'
I
No Answer 42 17 59
1.,25% 0 I I
,
26%·50% 0 I IIAgr e e Complex Criminal
I 51%-75% 0 7 7
i 76%-100% 0 32 32I: Don't Apply 0 22 22




r--r-, AUorney .Judge Tot.1
i
I No Answer 42 6 48
! 26%-50°/1) 0 4 4
1Agree Complex Civil 510/0-75% 0 21 21,
I 76%-100% 0 35 35
I Don't Apply 0 14 14rTola'-- 42 80 122
r
Average Number Trial Days: Clvil Jury Compl ex
- ---------~
Attorney Jud~e TOlal
No Answer 42 J 45
I - 5 Days 0 4 4
rm he r Trial Dnys: Civil Jury Complex 6-IODays 0 35 35
More than 10 Days 0 19 19





r-- -- ------ -
I
Average Number Trial Days: Civil Jury NOI Complex
--- ---
Attorney Judge Total
No Answer 42 4 46
1-50ays 0 47 41
er Trial Days: Civil Jury Not Complex 6-IODays 0 10 10
More tho" 10 U"ys 0 6 6









Average Number Trial Days: Civil Bench Complex
--
Attorney Judge Total
No Answer 42 3 45
I - 5 Days 0 24 24
\'crllge Numher Tr-ial Days: Civil Bench Cplx 6 - 10 Days 0 23 23
More than 10 Days 0 JL;
Doesn" Apply 0 27 27-





Aver-age Number Trial Days: Civil Hench Not Complex
r-- - Attorney Judge Total
IAverage Number Trial Days: Civil Bench Not Corn pi ..
No Answer 42 9 51
1-5 Days 0 53 53
6-100ays 0 3 3
l More than 10 ODY. 0 3 3Doesn't Apply 0 12 12
LTo,,,_,_ 42 80 122
Averngc Number Trial Days: Criminal Jury Complex
1- --- Artorney .Iu<lge TOIaI
r--
II 53I No Answer 42
IAverage Number Trial Days: Criminal Jury Compl ex 1- Sllay. 0 4 46-10 Day. 0 16 16
More than 10 Days 0 14 14




Average Number Trlal Days: Criminal Jury Not Complex
r---
Attorney Judge. Totalr--- No Answer 42 13 55,
i 1-5 Days 0 25 25IAverage Number Trial O"Y': Criminal Jury Not Complex 6 - 10 Days 0 8 8
More than 10 Day. 0 4 4, Doesn't Apply 0 30 30
'Total 42 80 122
17
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Average Number Triotl Days: CriminallJench Complex
r-- ~--- - -, AUorney Judge Total,-------
i No Answer 42 II 53,
1-50"ys 0 21 21
:Average Number Trhll Days: Criminal Bench Complex 6-100ays 0 6 6
I
I More than 10 Days 0 3 JDoesn't Apply 0 39 39




Ave mge Number Trial DJYs: Criminal Bencb Nol Complex
---- -
Attorn.y Judge TOlal
No Answer 42 10 52
1- S Days 0 36 36
r Trial U~I~'~:Criminal Bench Not Complex
0 I IMor-e than 10 Days
Doesn't Apply 0 33 JJ--
12242 80
NOTE TO READERS: For the next 16 questions response categories were SCI up left 10
right from "Verv Often" to "Not Sure"
Read File Prior: Civil Jury
r' I Attorney Judge T"t.1-- INever 0 4 4
No Answer 42 I 43
Read File Prior: Civil Jury Not Sure 0 12 12
Once in a While 0 19 19
IVery Onen 0 44 44
TOI"I 42 80 122
18
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Read file Prior: Civil Bench
r---- IAttorney IJudge Total
r
No Answer 42 3 45
! Not Sure 0 9 9
iRend File Prior: Civil Bench Never 0 I I
I Once in a While 0 12 12I
ITOlal Very Often 0
55 55
42 80 122
Read file Prior: Criminal Jury
~- -, Attorney .Judge Total
I- --- 421No Answer 7 49
Not Sure or 16 16
Read File Prior: Criminal Jury Never 0 4 4
Once in a While 0 10 10
Very Often 0 43 43
Tunll 42 80 122
Ir
Read File Prior: Criminal Bench
r
r--I IAttorney IJudge, Tot,alr-
1 No Answer 42 10 52
I
I Not Sure 0 13 13
RC!1d File Prior: Criminal Bench Never 0 5 5
Once in I While 0 6 r.
Very Often 0 46 46




I ~-------+-----+---+--~: lNot Sure __ -+ 04- __ I-----1
;Offer Opinions: Civil .Iury r-I N_'_ev_e_r l-- O+ __ +-_-l








Offer Opinions: Civil Jury
! [Very Often 0
10rotlii__ -----0+----42-+----+--~
r-----
Offer Opinions: Civil Bench
--- Attorney Judge TOlul
--
No Answer 42 2 44
Not Sure 0 II II
f1S: Civil Bench Never 0 33 33
Once in u While 0 27 27







Offer Opinions: Crimin.1 .Jury
r-· .Judge Tot.1, "ttnrnty
No Answer 42 9 SI
,
i Not Sur. D 21
21
IOffer Opinions: Crimin~1 Jury Never 0 16 16
I Once in a While 0 27
27










Offer Opinions: Criminal Bench
Allorney Judge Total
No AIl~YI'er 42 7 49
Not Sure 0 20 20
ffer Opinions: Criminal Bench Never 0 32 32
Once in a Wbile 0 18 18
Very Often 0 3 J




43No Answer 42 I
Not Sure 0 5 5
I
Substantive: Civil.Jury Never 0 1 I
I Once in a \\,hile 0 9 9
1 -I Very Often 0 64 64I
ITol.1 42 80 122
Substantive: Civil Deneh
[ Attorney Jurlge Total
! No Answer 42 2 44
Not Sure 0 5 5
f Substantive: Civil Bench Never 0 8 8
I
16I Once in a While 0 16
I Vtry Often 0 49 49








No Answer 42 g 50,
Not Sure 0 12 12
I Substantive: Criminal Jury Never 0 S S
I Once in a While 13 13I 0
I










1 Atlorney .Judge Toto •
~oswer
42 8 50
0 IS ISNot Sur.
'hie: Criminal Rench fNeve-r 0 8 8
IOnce in • While 0 13 13






Decide MOllons: Civil Jury
j Attorney Judge Tot.1
_.
No Answer 42 3 45
Not Sure 0 9 9
de Motions: Ch'il Jury Never 0 2 2
Once in " While 0 29 2<1





Decide Motions: Civil Bench
1
-----1------ Attorney Judge 'I'olal
I No Answer 42 4 46
Nol Sure 0 10 10
1 Decide Motions: Civil Bench Never 0 5 5
i Once in • While 0 29 29
i




Decide Motions: Criminal .Jury
r AHorney Judge Total
No Answer 42 10 '2
i
Nol Sure 0 19
1'1
!Dcddc Motions: Criminal Jury Never
1 Once in a While
Very Often 42 42
iTolal
42 80 122
Decide I\Iotiolls: Criminal Bench
I-- Attorney Judge Tolal
f
IDecide Motions: Criminal Bench
No Answer 42 10 ~2
Not Sure 0 20 20
Never 0 I 1
I 0 15 IS
I
Once In a While
i





NOTE TO READERS: In Judge Questionnaire scale was from left to right: Every
Witness, Some Witness, Do not question witnesses. In attorney questionnaire scale Will>









Witnesses Questioned: Civil Jury
r-------
~ l-__ - __ --_--+ __--'-1_"';:_+--__'
I
I Every / All Witnesses
I
Witnesses Questioned: Civil Jury
~~~1=o=st_\~V=iu=,=cs='s=e'~ +--- 1' -r__~
I Some Witnesses
1----- INo / Do Not Question wltnesses~~- __.--_----------__j_~-----~------------r-----~·--~i-~:i
No Answer
r,------
wunesses Questioned: Civil Bench
--- - r-r--r+:Auomey .Iud!!. T","1
No Answer 7 .1 10
Doesn't Apply I 0 I
Every/All wlrnesses 0 I t
Questioned: Civil Bench 7 D 20Most Witnesses
Some Wttnesses 26 46 n







Witnesses Questioned: Criminal .Jury
\VitI1CSSCS Quest
Allorney Judge Tot .•1
lNOAnswer
20 13 n
Doesn't Apply 9 0 <).-
ioned: Criminal Jury Every Wllness 0 I I
Most 'wttnesses I 2 J
Some WitnesstS 8 21 29




, __' ,_.__ ._-,- . --,_---,-.--.---1
Ir---'---------------~N-O-A-n-s--we-r----------+----~r-~~---'
I






1)0 Not Question Wil:ness~s
Don't Apply
WitnessesQuestioned:CriminalBench







T IAttorney JudgeTotal-1Nl) Answer I 42 8 50
cered Questions !Never I 0 39 39
IOnce WhileI 0 33 33
I I 42 80 122
Cautionary Charge Arter Questions
r----- Attorney Judge Total:
No Answer 42 10 32
,
ICautionary Charge After Questions
Never 0 39 39
, Once While 0 21 21
I VeryOften 0 10 10
r:r;;-tal 42 80 122
25
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Cautionary Charge End of Trial
~
Attorney Judge Tolul
No AnswerJ 42 10 52,
iCaunonary Charge End of Tril.1 Never 1 0 2K 28
I Onre While 0 II II
•I Vcry Often 0 31 31




Apply Rules of Evidence - Same in Bench and Jury
Allorney .Judge Tolal
No Answer I 0 I
Don't Know 3 4 7
Application Rules of Evidence
No 32 28 60





Apply Rules of Tesumeninl Hearsay - Same in Uench and Jury
-
Altorney Judge Torul
No Answer I 0 I
Don't "now 3 S 8
IIIl' Applicanon Rules or Testimonial Hearsay
No 31 32 63
Ves 7 43 50








_______ Apply Rules of Document Hearsay - Same in Bench and Jury
! Attorney ./ud~e Torll
No Answer I 0 I
i
Don't Know 3 3 6
Same Application Rules of Document Hearsay
No 29 24 S3
Yes 9 53 62,.__ .
Total 42 80 122
Opinion re relaxing NYS Hearsay rule
26
533
---. 1 - Attorney Judge Total_-----.
lNoAnswer 6 2 8
inion re relaxing NYS Hearsay rule IFavor 12 35 47
lo~pose 24 43 67
31 42 80 122
! I I Attorneyr INo Answer 26
!
Opinion re time limits !Favor 13
IOppose 3








l IAttorney .Judge ITotalr------ No Answei I 0 II r----lJurors with expertise No 21 28 49
Yes I 20 52 72
~. I 42 80 122




i No Answer 22 24 46
ISpecial instruction about the juror No 13 10 23
I Yes 7 46 53
[:r;;;:1 42 80 122
27
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Jury reach :I verdict
I Attorney Judge Tolalr- No Answer 22 27 49
lJury reach a verdict No 3 2 5
I
I Yes 17 51 68







Talk to the jury after verdict
Attorney Judge TOlal
No Answer 22 27 49
the jury after verdict No 8 23 31
Yes 12 30 42
42 80 122
-
Expert in the Jury "Room
I Attorney Judge Total
IExpert in Ihe Jury Room No Answer 31
46 77
No 6 25 J I
YtS 5 9 14
~ot"1 42 80 122




I No Answer 32 58 90I Impact on the Verdict -r---No 3 12 15
i Yes 7 10
17




f Attorney Judge Totalr No Answer 0 80 80IPractice Civil 36 0 36
I
I Criminal 6 0 6I





I Attorney Judge Tolal
No Answer 2 80 82
Federal Court 20 0 20









































































No Answer 4 80 84
Bench Trial 9 0 9
Jury Trial 29 0 29
r-
ITot~1 42 80 122
Type of Court
-----T IAttorney Judge Total
., No Answer 15 80 95
e of Court lFederal Court 12 0 12
~tcCourt 15 0 15







F I 1Attorney Judge Tol,,1No Answer 17 80 97
\Type of Case Civil
20 0 20
Criminal 5 0 5
rr.;;;'1
42 80 122
Type of Civil Case
:-- Altorney Judge Tolul
r-
I






















r 32 80 112
i antitrust
2 0 2

























Type of Criminal C ..se




















I have never tried a criminal I
0 I






- 42 80 122r
Total
Averalle Number Trial Dayl: Jury Cornplt,x
-.----~- Anornty JudGe '1'0111
No Allswer 4 80 84
1- S Days
, 0 $
ernge Number Trtnl Days: Jury Complex 6-10 Day, IZ
0 11
Doe •• 't APtlly S 0 .I






Average Number Trial Days: Jury N Comples
[ Attorney Judge TOlal
!
-
No Answer 16 80 96
I· 5 Days II 0 II
.Avcruge Number Trial DIIYs: Jury N Complex
I
6·IOD.ys 5 0 5
Doesn't Apply 10 0 10
r::-:- 42 80 122
L~~~
Average Number Trtal Days: Ben r h Cpix
."_--" . -
Anorney Judge T" .. I
---
No Answer 16 80 96
I·SUay. S 0 5
Average Number Trial Days: Bench Cp" 6·IODay' 6 0 6
Doesn't APllly 7 0 7
Mort than 8 0 8
---







Average Number Trtnl Days: Bench N Cph
---
Attornty .Judge Total
No i\nSWer 21 80 101
J ·5 Day. 4 0 4
\vcl"ngc Number Trial Days: Bench N Cpl. 0 26·IOD.y, 2
Doesn' Apply IS 0 IS
'otal 42 80 122
35
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flow often consider a bench trial
;--, AHor.ry ,Iud~. Total
f No Answer I 80 81
,
Most of the time 6 0 6




Sometimes 18 0 18--




- - No An.wtr : IK 80 "IX
Federal 'Rules requiring Prosecutor Consenl
Does Not ;\rply 17 0 17
1FNIr r:tI Rules rl'quiring Prosecutor Consent Not Kt Allintporta.t 3 0
l
Som.whot Important 2 0 2
!




Rud File Prior: ,Iury
r- Atto.ney ,Iudg. Total
No Answer 2 80 82
Not sure 2 0 2
Head File Prior: Jury Never I 0 I
Once in a While 17 0 17





Read File Prior: lI.nch
r
--,-, Attorney Jurlge Tot.1
r-'
No Answer 7 80 87
Not sure 4 0 4
Rend File Prior: DC.DCh
Once in a While II 0 II







r- No Answer 2 RO 82
I Never S 0 5IOffer Opinions: Jury I--
Once in • While 24 0 24





No Answer 7 SO 87
Nul sur. 4 0 4IOrfer Opinions: Bench Never IS 0 15
Once In • While 14 0 14
I Very Often 2 0 2




INo Answer Auorney Judge Tot.1J 80 8.1
Never J 0 .1
ubstnntive: Jury
Once In a Whil. 16 0 16
Very oro." 20 0 20
'otal 42 80 122
Substantive: Bend.
--I Anorney Judge Totul
f No Answer 8 80 88
I Not sure 2 0 2
J Substunnve: Belich Never 9 0 Q
I
Once tn • While 15 0 IS
Very Otten 8 0 R
ITot,,1 42 80 122
Decide Motions: Jury
r-- "[lorney Judge Tot.1i- No Answer 2 80 82
Not sure I 0 IIDecide Motions: Jury Never 7 0 7
Once in a White II 0 II
I Very Often 21 0 21




r Artorney Judge TotulI
r No Answer 7 80 87
I Not sure 5 0 5IDecide Motions: Bench Never H 0 8
I
Once in a '''hile 12 0 12
k01n1
Very Often 10 0 10
42 80 122





/1{Ulrs Applied: Testimony Hearsay
2 J 0 3
J 10 0 10
I 4 25 0 25I
ITo!:l1
5 3 0 J
42 80 122




I I 0 I
2 4 0 4
Rules API'Ii.d: Document Hearsay
3 16 0 16
4 17 0 17
5 3 0 3
Total 42 80 122
39
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R I r t P' II tIu es . PP 'e' : nor • Acls
, Attorney Judge To •• 1
! 13 80 93
2 2 0 2IRules Applied: Prior B.d Aras 3 " 0 II
4 12 0 12
5 4 0 4
~al 42 80 122
Rules Applied: I'rior Criminal Record
---
,\Uorney .tudge '1'0 •• 1
16 80 96
rr--- --
3 7 0 7
ules Applied: Prior Crimin ••1Record
134 13 0
5 6 0 6
otal 42 80 122
r
T




I 3 0 3
2 S 0 SRutcs Applied: Disclosure/Discovery
J 17 0 17
4 12 0 12
s 2 0 2
/'1'01., 42 80 122
40
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Rules Applied: Daubert or Frye
r<----------
Judge TotalAttorney
r No Answer 3 80 83I
I 2 8 0 8i Rules Applied: Daubert or Frye 3 18 0 18
I 4 II 0 II
I 5 2 0 2






Agreed with Verdict: Bench
,-
Attorney Judge TOlnl
No Answer 7 80 87
51%-75% 11 0 II
et with Verdict: Bench 76% -100% 15 0 15
Doesn't Apply 7 0 7





Agre." with Verdict: Jury
r---< Attorney Judge Tot.l
No Answer 6 80 86
26%- SO'lo 5 0 5
51'10 - 75% 7 0 7
Agreed with Verdict: Jury
76% - 100'10 18 0 18
Doesn't Al'ply 5 0 5
I
Less Thall 25% I 0 I




United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge Amy J. SI. Eve Silting Judge lf Otberor-Mngisiralc Judge than A.nil!nc,d ,Iud~t
CASE NUMBER 05 eR 727 - 1,2,3,5 DATE 3116/2007
CASE USA vs. Conrad Black, John Boultbcc, Peter Atkinson and Mark Kipnis
TITLE
DOCKET ENTRY TEXT
Juror QUestionnaire filed .
• lFor further details sec text bclow.]
CONRAD M. BLACK, et al. Hon. Amy J. SI. Eve
NAME: _
UNITED STATES DISTRICT couur
NORTHER.!'\' DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION







No. 05 en 727
.JUROR OUESTIONNAIRE
You have been summoned by this Court for jury selection. The case for which you have been. urnmoncd
for jury selection is a criminal case entitled United Stales ofAmerica II. Conrad M. Black, John A. Boultbee,
Peter Y. Atkinson, Mark S. Kipnis, and The Ravelston Corporation Limited ("Navels/oil "). In the indictment.
defendants Black, Boultbee, Atkinson, Kipnis, and Ravclston arc charged with various alleged of len. cs relate I
to the conduct of the affairs of Hollinger International, Inc. Each of the defendants has pled not guilty to the
charges alleged.
As part of the jury selection process, each of you must complete this juror questionnaire. The questions
on this form are asked to assist the Court and the attorneys in the jury selection process for this trial. This
questionnaire is designed to obtain information about your background as it relates to your possible service as
a fair and impartial jmor in this casco lts use will avoid the necessity of asking each prospective juror every onc
549
SIAIt.:MI'-NT
ofthcse questions in open Court, thereby substantially shortening the jury selection process. Unless the question
states otherwise, the fact that a particular question is asked does not imply that the subject matter of the question
is an issue in this case. As you read the questions, you arc not to draw any inferences about the issues which
must be decided in this case.
The questions are not meant 10 invade your privacy, but to help select a fair and impartial jury for this
case. lf thcre is any reason why you might not be able to give both sides a fair trial in this case, it is important
to say so. Please answer each question as fully as you can. Your complete honesty is essential, Do not leave
any questions blank. Ira question does not apply to you in any way, write "N/A" (for "not applicable"), rather
than leaving the Conn blank. If you do not understand the question, please write that in the space for the answer.
If you feel the answer is too personal, please say so in the space provided. You will have the opportunity to
discuss your answer privately. If you do not understand a question, need more space for your response, or wish
to make further comments about any question, please use the extra sheet attached to the back of the questionnaire.
Ifyou usc the explanation sheets, please make sure to indicate which numbered question you arc answering. DO
NOT WIU'fr. ON TilE BACK ON ANY PAGL
Page 2 of 45
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(First) (Middle Initial) (Last) (Maiden, if applicable)
STATEMENT
You arc instructed not to discuss this case or questionnaire with anyone, including your family or fellow
jurors. It is important that your answers be yours and yours alone.
Your answers are confidential. They will be reviewed by thejudge and the lawyers in this case. Following
jury selection, the original questionnaire will be kept under seal and will be disclosed, if at all, with names and
other identifying information removed. There may be some questions that touch on matters that you consider
personal, private or other wise sensitive. In order to select a fair and impartial jury, however, it is important that
the Court and the lawyers have your complete and truthful answers to these kinds of questions. If there arc
certain questions you prefer not to answer in writing (even though the document remains confidential), please
so indicate and th judge will discuss it with you in private at a later time.
Please print your name on the cover page, and upon completion, sign your name on the last page where
indicated. If possible print your answers andusc ink only. You are expectcd to sign your qucstionnaire, and
vour answcrs will be givcn the same effect as a statement given to the COUrI undcr oath.
An indictment is merely an accusation. It is proof of nothing. You may draw 110 inference against any
defendant from the fact that he has been indicted. Each defendant has pleaded "not guilty" to each of'thc charges
against him/it and he/it is presumed innocent. A defendant does not have to prove anything. The government
bears the burden of proving the guilt of each defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judge Amy SI. Eve is the trial judge in this case. Once the jury is selected, generally this case will be
tried from approximately 9:30 a.m, to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday each week. You typically will have
Fridays ofT from court. If you arc expected to be here 011 a Friday, Judge St. Eve will let you know in advance.
The next phase of the jury selection process will begin on March 14,2007 at 9:00 a.m., and will continue until
completed. During thi phase, you will likely be asked follow-up questions by the judge based on your responses
to this questionnaire. YOIl will have the opportunity to answer any of these questions in private. To determine
whether you will be required to report on Wednesday, March 14, or one day shortly thereafter, you must call 1-
800-572-4210 and key in your participant number wben indicated (your participant number is located to the right
of your name on the surnmons.) The message will inform you which day and time to appear. The opening
statements and presentation of the evidence in the trial will begin after the jury selection process is completed.
The trial is expected to last 12 to 16 weeks from the commencement of opening statements. This is just an
estimate and the time frame could change a bit depending on the circumstances of the case.
Thank you for your time and cooperation.
I. Name: _
2. Sex:









Date of Birth: Age: _
Where were you born and raised?
What city/town/village and county do you currently live in?
(city/town) (zip code) (county)
If you live in the Chicago area, what is the name of your neighborhood. if'uny (for example. Strcctcrvillc,
Jefferson Park, ctc.)?
Are you currently: (check all that apply)
Married _ (Since __ )
Separated _ (Since _)
Divorced __ (Since __ )
Widowed __ (Since _)
Single, ever Married_
Living With a Partner/Significant Other _ (Since )
Do you have any medical issues, mental impairments or physical problems (for example. sight, hearing.
or back) that may affect your ability to understand the evidence or would make it difficult for YOllto sit
for long periods')
o Yes 0 No
If yes, please describe:
If you have children or stepchildren, please list for each child (include children and stepchildren who do




Occupation and Employer (or if in college, their school attended lind degree sOIl!:"I)




In what other cities, towns, or areas have you lived during the past 10 years, and how long did you live
there? (Please note if you have lived in anothereountry or state.)
d
Please provide the following information about your parents (and your stepparents. if any):
Cit), of Residence R e I'
II.





(a) How long have you lived at your current address'! _ years




__ Other (specify) _
___ Own home
___ Own apartment/condo/townhome
___ Own mobile home
12.





If you live with persons other than your spouse/partner and/or children/stepchildren, please explain their
relationship to you (for example, roommate or parent) and their occupation:
What is the name of your current employer, your job title and job de cription'i (Or, if you arc no longer
employed, list your last employer, job title and job description.)
(a) How many years have you worked at your currentllastjob? __ Years
(b) Regarding your employment, please check all that apply to you at this time:
Part-lime
Full-time







___ Own Busine. s
___ Disabled
__ Other (please describe) _
(c) Please briefly describe what you do on the job on a typical work day:
(d) Do/did you have management or supervisory duties? 0 Yes 0 No
(e) Arc you/were you supervised by others at your job? 0 Yes 0 No
(f) Do/did you have authority to hire and fire employees? 0 Yes Cl No
(g) Will you be paid by your employer during jury service? 0 Yes Cl No





If yes, for how many days? __
15. Please list prior occupations and employers, if any during the last tcn years:
Job Employer How long employed there?
Have you or anyone close to you ever worked for any of the following?
___ State, City or County office/dept/agency Police departmcnt
___ Illinois Departmcnt of Corrections Law firm
___ Federal government officc/dept/agency State or Federal court
___ Other government agency/office Other Law Enforcement
If you checked any of the above, please describe the person involved, the agency or orgunil-ati(lll involved
and the nature of the cmployment:
Have you or anyone close to you ever owned a business?
DYes 0 No
(a) If Yes, briefly describe the type and size of the business:
Page 7 of 45
555
STATEMENT
(b) If Yes, was the business ever bought or sold by you or anyone close to you?
DYes 0 No
If Ycs, briefly describe:




19. Have you or anyone close to you ever been employed in or had any training or education in any aspect of
the legal field?
DYes 0 No
If yes, please explain:
(a) Have you ever hired or consulted with a lawyer for any reason?
DYes 0 No
If yes, please describe:
(b) If yes, were you satisfied with your representation?
DYes 0 No
Ir your answer is yes OR no, please describe:
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(e) Do you have business dealings with attorneys in the normal course of your work'!
DYes 0 No
J f yes, please describe:
(d) Ilow many attorneys have you known fairly well? _
(c) Arc you or anyone close to you now employed, or ever been employed, by a law linn or om.",'!
n Yes 0 No
If Yes, please list each employer and briefly describe the nature of your employment:
20. Have you or anyone close to you ever been employed in the accounting proles ion?
DYes 0 No
Ir yes, please describe:
(a) How many accountants or auditors have you known fairly wcll? _
(b) Do you have business dealings with accountants or auditors in the normal course of yuur work?
DYes 0 No
If yes, please describe:












21. What is your highest education level?
o Grammar school o Some high school o High school diplomnfGED
o Trade or technical school
o Subject studied and degree:
22. Do you have any plans to attend school in the future? 0 Yes 0 No If Yes, plea c e plmn:
23. Describe any special training or skills that you have (for example as a welder. auto m iebunlc. or oak)'
24. Have you or any immediate members of your family ever served in any bran h of the armed ~ r~e~ orll1~
United States (including military reserve or ROTC),!
DYes 0 No
If Yes, please answer the following and identify if the person is you or II mcmb 'r of your funnly:
(a) What branch of service:
(b) When did you or your relative serve:
(c) II ighest rank achieved:
(d) Occupational specialty:






(I) Place of scrvi c:
(g) Did you or this person see combat?
(h) Have you or any of your family members participated in a Court Martial?
o Yes 0 No
(i) If Yes, when, where and under what circumstances:
(j) What type of discharge did you or that person receive?






___ Prison . correctional facilities
___ Shareholders' Rights




___ Real Estate (including appraisals)
1f you checked any of the choices above, please explain in detail:
What arc your primary leisure activities, hobbies and interests?





What charitable, civic, social, union, professional, fraternal, political, recreational or religious
organizations do you and/or your significant other volunteer for; belong to; participate in; donate money,
time or services to; or hold offices in'?
Spouse or Significant Other __Please complete the following questions regarding your spouse/ significant
other. (If you arc (Please check): __ Widowed __ Divorced or __ Separated and currently not
married, please complete the following questions regarding your former spouse.)
(a) Spouse's!significant other's age: __
(b) What is the highest level of education your spouse or significant other completed?
Grade school or less
_ Some high school
__ High school graduate
___ Technical or business school
___ Less than 2 years of college
___ More than 2 years of college
___ College graduate
___ Post graduate degree
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_____ Unemployed - looking for work
_____ Unemployed - not looking for work
Retired




(d) What is her/his occupation (Note - Jfyour spouse or significant other is retired, unemployed or
deceased, please answer the following questions as regards his/her last employment).
(e) Who is his her employer (or is he or she self-employed)?
(f) How long has or did she/he worked there?
(g) Please describe her/his job:
(h) Does he or she supervise any other employees? If Yes, please explain:
(i) Please list any other jobs she/he has had as an adult for the last 5 years. If your spouse/significant
other is retired or deceased, please list the jobs she/he held for the last 10 years before retirement
or death.
Job title Employer How long employed there?
Have you Of anyone close to you ever been employed by Hollinger International, Inc., or any or its
subsidiaries, affiliates Of partnerships, including the Chicago Sun Times?
DYes 0 No
1f yes, please e,xplain:




Do you follow the news on a regular basis? 0 Y cs 0 No
(a) If yes, check all the news you follow on a regular basis.






_Ot.hcr news (specify _l)







(c) Which newspapers do you read regularly, including both local and ollt-()I~lOWn papers?
(d) How often do you read a newspaper?
Every day
Once or twice a week
Never
Several times a week
Less often than once a week
(c) Which television programs do you watch on a regular basis?
(I) Do you watch financial news programs or networks (for example, CNBC and Bloomberg) Of visit
financial news wcbsites (for example, Yahoo' Finance, Money.coni, CNN·FN, CFO.COlll) or rend
the financial/business news (tor example, the business pages of your local newspaper) on a regular
basis?
DYes 0 No






(g) Which magazines do you read regularly?
(h) Which radio programs do you listen to on a regular basis?
Are you a regular user of the internet? 0 Yes 0 No
(a) If yes. what do you usc the internet for?
(b) If you get news from the internet, what websitcs do you frequently visit?
If you are selected as a juror in this case, the Court will instruct you not to read, listen to or watch any news
media accounts of the trial, including those on the intern t.
(a) Will you have any difficulties following this instruction?
(b) This case may receive media attention during trial. Does this matter in any way to you? 0 Yes
o :-Jo
IfYt,S, please explain:
Have you or anyone close to you ever:
(a) Been arrested, charged with or convicted of a crime? 0 Yes 0 No




(b) Appeared as a witness before any federal, state or district court, grand JUry nr I!ll\ crruncnt hody or
agency (including any legislative committee)? 0 Yes 0 '\/0
(c) Sued or been sued by anyone'! DYes lJ No
(d) If you checked Yes for any of the above, please cxplam here,
Was there any sort ofcourt hearing in the runners you described in the preceding qucvricn" '1 ~'.:' '1 "
If Yes, did you or the person dose to you, testify at that court hcanng? n Y.:, 0 ""
(a) If Yes, who testified'?
(b) If Yes, how did you or the person close to you, fed about the cxpcncncc'
Have you or anyone close to you c ....er been asked to t,'lily III COlin u, an C'l'l.'lt \1 IIn...,~,11I ~.t \\ IIIIP'
with special knowledge or training?
[J Yes n Nu
Iryes, pk;lsc describe:
l lnvc you or anyone close tu you been the vrcum til'. 01 \\lInc;,~ to, uny 1,111.1III ~IUUC. "hl,'ll", II l'oS





reported to law enforcement authorities or not?
DYes 0 :-<0
(a) If yes, was anyone caught? What was the outcome of the case?
(b) l Iavc you or anyone close 10 you ever been the victim 01 Iraud or another type "ftillallcJ,l1 crunc?
n Yes 0 0
I ryes, please give details:
Have you or anyone dose to YOll made or brought any clalllls or lawsuit-; ,1J,!:Iltht,IIlY kd r.il, state, tllStrll:t
or local government agency or have any clauns or luw suits ever been made 11}any 1~,kt,tI .• i.u distuct,
local official or gO\'Cnllllcnt agency against you or anyone dose to > ou?
[J Yt;S 0 No
If Yes, please explain:
Arc you or anyone close tu you employed by a law enlorcement agency tas all empluyee Ill' ,I \ ulunt ",
DYes 0 No
If yes, please describe:
(3) I (ave you or anyone close to YOll ever applied or cOIl,i,krcd ,Ipplyllll: tU uny 1;1\\ enli)! 'Ill lit








If yes. please explain:
(b) Have you or anyone close to you ever worked for, applied to or had any experience with the
Federal Bureau of investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, the United States Postal Service.
the United Slates Attorneys Office or the United Stales Securities and Exchange COl1unission?
DYes 0 No
If yes, please explain:
Do you feci that you might give more or less weight to the testimony of agents ofthe federal government
than to civilian witnesses?
DYes 0 No
Please explain why or why not:
Do you currently, or have you ever, owned stocks (including mutual funds)?
o Yes 0 No
(a) IfYes, have you owned or are you aware of whether your mutual fund owned stock in Hollinger
Inc. or Hollinger International, Inc. (which owned the Chicago SUfi Times) at any time in the past
len years? DYes 0 No
(b) If Yes, could you impartially consider evidence presented about Hollinger lnc., Hollinger




lntemational, Inc. and its directors, officers and other present and former employees?
o No
UNo, please explain:




[ryes, please list the organization, who participated, and any position that person holds or held:
llave you ever served as a juror before?42.
DYes 0 No
[ryes, please complete for each case on which you served:
Civil or Criminal?
What were the charges or allegations'!
When lind where was the trial?
Did the jury reach a verdict? (Yes or No)
(a) If you have served on a jury before, were you the forcpcrson?
DYes 0 No
(b) Have you ever served on a grand jury or coroner's jury?
DYes 0 No







Cc) How did you feel about your service as a juror'!
Was there anything about your experience as a juror which would make you want to serve agam or not







This case is about an alleged financial fraud at a company called Ilollinger lnrcmational, which II ,IS the
parent company that owned the Chicago Sun Times. The defendants in this case ure Conrad Hlack, John
Boultbce, Peter Atkinson, Mark Kipnis and The Ravelston Corporation Limited ("RuvclslUn").
The defendants arc presumed to be innocent of all charges. The defendants have pled not gUIlty to nil
charges.
The prosecution has the burden ofproving each defendant guilty of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt
44. Do you or any family members know Conrad Black, John l3oultbec, Peter Atkmson or Mark Kipni "/ I lnvc
you heard of The Ravclston Corporation Limited']
From time to time, this case has received media auentien. There IS noihin • wrong wuh huvinp heard
something about this case. It is important that you truthfully and fully answer the lulhm illl\ 411..... 11\111'
concerning your knowledge about this case.
(a) ]Javc you seen, read or heard anything about this case or the crirmnalchargcs bcmg brou!lhlUgalll~t
any of the defendants in this case: Conrad lJlack, John Boultbcc, Peter Atkinson, Murl. Klfllll" or
Ravclston?
DYes 0 No
lf Yes, please describe;
(b) In general, have you formed an opinion about this case?
DYes 0 No
If Yes, please describe:





(e) If you have formed an opinion or impression about the case, will it take evidence from the
defendants or the government to change that opinion or impression?
DYes 0 No
If Yes. please describe:
Conrad Black is a defendant in this case. Ilow much, if anything. have YOll seen. read. or heard about
Conrad Black?
o Nothing [J Some Things o A lot
(a) What have you heard and what do you k110\\l about Conrad Black?
(b) What impressions, feelings, or opinions had you formed about Conrad Black before coming into
Court today?
(e) Have you formed any opinions about the guilt or innocence of defendant Conrad Black?
If yes, please explain:
John Boultbec is a defendant in this case. How much, ifanything, have you seen, read, or hcun! ubuut John
Boultbce?
o Nothing o SOIl1C Things o A lot
Page 23 of 45
571
III,
(a) What have you heard and wh.il do you 1.1101\ .:It out JolUlllollllbcc"
(b) WhatunpreJisions. kchng.>. or Opllllllrl'i hJ,i )110 (",mled ab(}ut loon li<luhtl\'l:' 11(1lfC',llflltnll1il10
Court tothy'!
(c) Have you tanned an)' opinions about the l:UIIt m Hili xence Ill"dch;tubnll.1hn IImh ~.
Peter Atklll\OIl i~:1u~lcndnt in Ihill case, 110\\ m 'h, II Ul)thln', b u:) .. "",;w, uf h Jeld
Peter Atkinson"





(c) Have you formed any opinions about the guilt or innocence of'defendant Peter Atkinson?
If yes, please explain:
Mark Kipnis is a defendant in this casco How much, ifanything, have you seen, read, or heard about Mark
Kipnis')
o Nothing 0 Some Things o A lot
(a) What have you heard and what do you know about Mark Kipnis?
(b) What impressions, feelings, or opinions had you formed about Mark Kipnis before coming into
Court today?
(c) !lave you formed any opinions about the guilt or innocence of defendant Mark Kipnis'!




(b) What impressions, feelings, or opinions had you formed about Ravclston b ohm: cUllllnr uuo ('ourt
today?
50. Ravclston (a corporation) is a defendant in this case. Ilow much, If anything, have you seen, read, or
heard about Ravelston?
o Nothing 0 Some Things o A lot
Is there anything that you have heard about thi. case lhot you feel would make It hnrd lur >",11 h) b 0 a Iur
and impartial juror in this case?
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(a) What have you heard and what do you know about Ravclston?
Cc) Have you formed any opinions about the guilt or innocence of dcC,'ndant J(n\lchlon'!
If yes, please explain:
DYes 0 No
Ir yes, please describe:
STAn:MENT
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52. During this trial, you may hear testimony about the entities listed below.
American Publishing Company
American Publishing Management Services, Inc.
Bass, Berry & Sims PLC
Can West Global Communications Corporation
Cardinal Capital Management, Inc.
Chicago Sun-Times
Community Newspaper Holdings, Inc.
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LtP
Davies, Ward, Phillips & Vincberg, LL!>












Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.
National Post
Newspaper lioIdings, Inc.
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__ O'Mclvcny & Meyers LLP
Osler, Hoskins & Harcourt LLP
Osprey Media Group Inc.
Osprey Media Holdings Inc.
Paxton Media Group LLC
PMG Acquisition Corp.
Primcdia Inc.
The Ravclston Corporation Ltd.
Ravelston Management Inc.
Richard C. Breeden & Co.
Shearman & Sterling
Southam, Inc.







Tweedy, Browne Company LLC
Vogel Law Firm
Wachovia Bank
Winston & Strawn LLP
XSTM Holdings (2000) Inc.
Do you or anyone close to you have any personal knowledge or cxpc.:rh:ncc.:wuh ~IIYuf 1111,'111'/





If Yes, please provide the following infcrmation:
Entity or event about which you have personal knowledge
What is the source of your knowledge?
What do you know about that entity or event?




























































































Do you or anyone close to you personally know any 01'these persons?
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f\ IrY~s. please pro- ide the II)liowing infonnation:
Name of "itne,,: 110\\ do you. your family member. or your friend know this witncsv?
How long have you. your family member. or your friend known this witness?
).1. :'Ull1c' indi\iduab you may hear from or about in this cas, ha", title, such as "Lord" (II' "All1bassador."
\\ ould the fact Ih:1Iall indi , idual held such a title cause you to view them diCrcr,ntly'i
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Martin. Brown & Sullivan
Newman & Greenberg
Schiff Hardin
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Schulte Roth & Zabel
Willkic Farr & Gallagher
Do you know any of these attorneys or firms? 0 Yes 0 No






If Y cs, please provide the following information:
Name of attorney or linn you know:
How do you know this attorney or firm?
How long have you known this attorney or linn?
In general, what, if any, opinions do you have about people from Canada?
If you heard evidence that some of the defendants in this case received tens of millions or dollars, would
that fact alone cause you to believe that there must have been some type of misconduct?
If yes, please explain.
Do you think there should be:
o More government regulation of large corporations
Cl Less government regulation of large corporations
Cl The amount of current regulation is adequate
o No opinion





During the case, there will be evidence about law firms that have large corporatio!ls as clients. Do you
hold any views about law firms that could affect your view of evidence in this case?
o Ycs 0 t'n
I ryes, please describe:
During the case, there will be evidence about practice- in which a I'cr,o!lor corporanun lila) set lip a I
uansacrion to obtai» better I:lX treatment. Do you Imld any views about such prucucc- that could alk-:t
}~Hlrvic» of evidence in this case?
o Y,s 0 No
lfycs, please describe:
During tlh' case, there will be evidence about the practice or obtaining, in connection with :l hllsil!c,~
transaction, so-called "nol\'Clllnpctilillll agrccments" (,liso 'llll1etimes callcu",'O\cnunts nor to compete").
(:t) l lavc you ever signed a !lon.competition agreement (on:ovcn:lIlln<1tlo t:llI11IK'IC) or b"~11~,h'uI,'
sign one?
c y~s 0 No
(h) Do you hold any views about such agn:cm~nlS Ihat could affect your view orcvid~ll~c in thi- l'a'~')




II~I\" Y(lll ur ;1Il}nne close III you ,\ er ,,;1"\.:<1 on " Uo.trd of l hrcctor> lit been JII ()lIk~r ,11 .111\
,'u1l'm:ltillIl, "Oll1P;lIl}. charitable urgani/:ltiun or ether entity"
r Yes "J r--."
II Yc-, bllcll} describe your r",poll'ihilitic~ (IIlJ tHk' ,ilO: tlfth~ 1lr\!:IIlI/,1I11l1l
11~1\" you ever read a Shareholder I'ruX) Slnl.:n1.:I1I. l'onn IO·K. t orm III.C) or Anllll;t! !>.h.lfdIllIJ ,,',
[("1'0ft "f:l puhlid) traded eumpnny or corporation"
Cl \'..:~ C 0
I r' Y 'S, please describe:
[I Yc's [l ~o







I lave yOll or anyone close to you been atfcctcd by financial problems at companies where there han: been
allegations of wrongdoing by corporate executives?
DYes 0 No
Iryes, please describe:
[lave you or anyone dose to you b0C'1l a party It) any shareholder action or lawsuit against OJ corpor.uiou
or a corporations executives?
DYes 0 ]'\0
Ir yes please describe:
I lave you or anyone close tu you ever served on, worked tor or appeared before all Audit Commiucc of
any corporation. company. charitable organization or other entity'!
[J Yes 0 No
If Yes, briell), describe your responsibilities and type/size of the orguuivation:
llavc you ever worked with auditors or conde ted an audit or any corporation, company. charitable
organization or other entity'?
u Yes 0 i'\u
If) cs. please describe:




o Ye 0 Nu
II ~CS, pkaw dcsnih.::
Did you r"I1"" any "r the 1<1\',uit> prosecution» '11the past Ii.·" ).;"r, Ill'oh illg \\ 1I,ILll·OIH. l illIll.l1




ILt\ C \ 1111 Cl er ,1\\ 1I~t1 ,Iod. III 11 company II ho,e otfic cr, III rhc 1.'11'1',)(.11,,111 it- 'II have 1>1:1.'11""'''1'",<1 II nil
~Icruuc
l ': J -r rhc l un. ..d St,lt·, t'lllhtitlitioll. 0 person or .;ntll> ac "h.;d of a crunc LlII" 1\,111111'1.' hI ("I,t\ !f,III'




~4 " Ih~l~ .!II) m.utcr not covered by this questionnaire that you think the attorneys or the Court 1I11!!hl\\'.IIl!
10 knov, about you \\11(,11 considering you as Cl juror in this case?
Y\.'S ~j No
11 ICS. plca-.c dCSCllb":
~5, Do yotl I]:" .. pcrsonul. rchuiou-; plulosophical or other hdids Ihat would make it dll'Jintit Iii!" )011 10
:-.I{ !ll.llHJ~Ilh.'1l1 III .inothcr"
Y ,',' L, '"
Ir vc-., pk':lsc \'\J1LIIIl
!)D you h.rv,: dilficultv reading, speak in]; or undcrsmndmg the English language"
,--1 Yt:s I~ No
II Yes, pIL-:N: cvpl.un
" there :111) thll1g cls,: about ) our ahil it, to SCrI c as a Juror Iltat you think II e ,11lluld k nnw




I declare under p.:nalt) of p.:r.lllT) that the answers SCI forth in tills JUT) C)u..-,uvnll.III.' urc true ~lItllll" 'cl





I'k,,,.: 1"_ thv '1""'" bclo« tu firush an) ul your ,"h''''.' ('1.:a,': 'I',dl) Ih.: number III anI '1U.:\II\Jlh III II tlldl
)OU .ue complcum; an \111:'\\\"'1
593
